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1. Chapter: Introduction 
Africa’s continental regional organisation – the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
and today’s African Union (AU) – had to put up for a long time with international criticism 
regarding the handling of human rights violations, to differentiate between violations beyond 
their own borders and such violations in which those responsible were amongst the 
organisation’s members. Whereas in particular the circumstances in formerly colonial 
countries and South Africa were thematically treated in critical and detailed fashion, 
fundamental human rights violations among the member states have not been placed on the 
agenda.  
When these human rights violations reached a magnitude that led to an increasing rebuke and 
international discredisation of the OAU, the organisation reacted in 1981 with the adoption of 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Banjul Charter). The OAU thus 
established a human rights protection system which their members were supposed to be 
subject to, and absorbed the developments which had been previous brought into play in 
Europe with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and in the Americas with 
the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR). As the protective body provided 
by the Banjul Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights commenced 
their work in 1987. Furnished with only a few purviews, its activities – in contrast to the 
bodies in the two corresponding regional pacts – hardly found any response.   
The demands for a juridical authority became increasing louder in the face of the 
commission’s lack of achievements. Therefore on 10 June 1998 the OAU’s Heads of State 
and Government Conference adopted a supplementary protocol to the Banjul Charter which 
provides for the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The 
necessary quorum was achieved on 9 January 2003 after ratification by the Republic of 
Comoro, and the protocol entered into effect on 24 January 2004 commensurate with Article 
34 Paragraph III. Its judges have been elected; its seat has been chosen and for the time being 
one now awaits the inauguration of the Court. 
The expansion of the African protection system by adding a juridical authority is linked with 
great hopes and expectations — a fact which detailed study of the protocol deems appropriate. 
Therefore the objective of this study is to analyse the institutional, procedural and other 
provisions of the protocol in order to elucidate the Court’s prospective operational 
possibilities and difficulties.  
After its inauguration the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights will not come onto 
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the regional stage in isolated fashion, but will be placed alongside the commission. The 
success or failure of this new institution will thus also considerably depend on how it can 
position itself in the structure of the regional protection system. The Court’s spectrum of 
responsibilities is directly linked with those of the Commission. The relationship of the Court 
to the Commission is therefore a further essential aspect of the study.  
Therefore, after a brief summary on the development of human rights protection on the 
African continent until entry into force of the Banjul Charter, the previous human rights 
protection system will be outlined to show the institutional environment in which the Court 
will agitate. Especially the institutional and procedural framework of the Commission will be 
emblazes in this chapter.  
On this basis the additional protocol to the Banjul-Charter on the Establishment of the Court 
will be subsequently analysed in the fourth chapter of the treatise. Here a focus will be on the 
organization of the Court as well as on its jurisdiction and the judicial procedure. However, 
for the sake of completeness all other provisions of the protocol such as ratification 
amendment, or termination provisions will also be portrayed. 
The thesis concludes with a summary of the essential findings and an outlook on the further 
development of the African protection system. 
   
2. Chapter: Human rights protection in Africa — protagonists and 
backgrounds 
The political path towards protection of human rights and its codification commenced in 
Africa during a period in which the majority of African peoples were on the verge of being 
dismissed from colonial rule or liberating themselves.1 In 1961, African jurists conferred in 
Lagos, Nigeria under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) with the 
original objective of discussing the importance of the rule of law for the new states.2 Instead, 
human rights protection became the focus of attention: The idea of an African human rights 
protection authority was provided with substance for the first time. The conference adopted a 
resolution known as the “Law of Lagos”3, which recommended to the African states…“in 
order to give full effect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 [...] to study 
the possibility of adopting an African Convention on Human Rights in such a manner that the 
conclusion of this conference will be safeguarded by the creation of a court of appropriate 
jurisdiction and that the recourse thereto be available for all persons under the jurisdiction of 
the signatory states.”4 But in reaction to the preceding colonisation phase, the political 
climate was to a great extent marked by a strong endeavour of the African states for 
comprehensive political emancipation. That is why the proposal of the conference to create an 
international monitoring body for the young states was not met with a positive response 
among the addressees. On the contrary, they concentrated their efforts on the fundamental 
reorganisation of the African continent. These efforts ultimately culminated in the creation of 
the OAU as a regional African organisation.  
I. The Formation of the OAU — Africa in the Conflict of Interests  
The political reality made such a reorganisation urgently necessary: The arbitrary colonial 
borders and the lacking political and administrative experience of many governments resulted 
in armed intrastate and inter-African conflicts, and forced the new states to define their 
                                                 
1
  Dahomey (today’s Benin), Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta (today’s Burkina Faso), Senegal, Somalia, 
Togo, Chad and the Central African Republic became independent in the so-called “African Year” (1960); 
compare: John Iliffe, Africans: A History of a Continent, Cambridge 1996, p. 327 et seqq. 
2
  Adama Dieng, Interface between Global and Regional Protection and Promotion of Human Rights: An 
African Perspective, in: Yeal Danieli, Elsa Stamatopoulou, Clarence Dias (Eds.); The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, New York 1999, pp. 271-282, 273. 
3
  The resolution is provided by the University of Pretoria at http://www.up.ac.za/chr/ahrdb/ 
other_OAU4.html#COM1. 
4
  Paragraph 4 of the resolution. 
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relations. The targeted complete decolonisation of Africa called for the closing of ranks 
among the already independent states. 
The Congo crisis5 in the beginning of the 1960s threatened to split Africa into two camps: On 
the one side stood the socialist aligned Casablanca Group — a confederation of states which 
included Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco. Under Kwame Nkrumah6 
the Casablanca Group advocated the establishment of an African federation (“Union 
Government for Africa”). The mostly anti-Western aligned governments propagated the far-
reaching break with the western nations as former colonial powers.7 The common interests of 
the African states – such as the struggle against apartheid, colonialism and neo-colonialism as 
well as socioeconomic interests – should overcome the cultural and ethnic differences and 
subsequently resulting divergences of interest.8 Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Togo and Tunisia almost simultaneously established the Monrovia Group at the 
Conference of Monrovia (Liberia). This group adhered to the stability of the colonial borders. 
In view of the ongoing pragmatic dependencies, they spoke out in favour of a pro-Western 
foreign policy, but at the same time emphasised the just-obtained state sovereignty and the 
subsequently related necessity of non-intervention in internal affairs. This was also the reason 
for the categorical rejection of a political integration in an African confederation of states. 
Instead, the Monrovia Group advocated a looser inter-African alliance system that should 
devote its efforts to international cooperation in the economical, scientific, social, technical 
                                                 
5
  Shortly after gaining independence, violent unrest broke out in Congo on account of ethnic conflicts and a 
revolt by the Congolese armed forces against their white officers. To restore order, Belgian troops who 
were still in the country were deployed, and additional contingents of troops were flown in — against the 
will of Prime Minister Lumumba. The action was interpreted as an attempt to restore Belgian rule, and 
provoked encroachments against the white population. The political tensions intensified when Moise 
Tshombé, the premier of the Katanga province, proclaimed his province as an independent country and 
expressly requested Belgian military assistance. Colonel Mobuto Sese-Seko, who staged a coup in 1965 
and took over power, ultimately emerged from the turmoil of the Congo crisis, John Iliffe, Africans: A 
History of a Continent, Cambridge 1996, p. 327 et seqq. 
6
  Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) was the first prime minister (1957-1969) and first president (1960-1966) of 
Ghana. He pursued a radical pan-African foreign policy which aimed at Africa’s unity and liberation. 
However, Nkrumah was less freedom-loving in internal affairs. His rule became increasingly dictatorial. In 
1964, he introduced a one-party system and allowed himself to be elected president for life. For instance, he 
allowed himself to be titled in controlled press as “The Messiah”, “Star of Africa”, “Man of Destiny” und 
“His High Dedication”, among other things. In 1966, Nkrumah was overthrown by a military putsch and 
spent his final years in exile as a guest of Guinean President Sékou Touré. Compare: A. Kirk-Greene, His 
Eternity, His Eccentricity or His Exemplarity; in: African Affairs 90 (1991), pp. 163-187, 179. 
7
  Nkrumah analysed the economic situation in Africa and thus formulated the main aspect for this attitude: 
“Our capital flows in veritable streams in order to irrigate the overall economic system of the imperialist 
West. For centuries Africa was the dairy cow of the western world.” Compare: Kwame Nkrumah, 
L’Afrique doit s’unir, Accra 1962, p. 5. 
8
  Gino Naldi, The Organisation of African Unity — an analysis of its role, London-New York, 1989 p. 4. 
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and cultural sphere.9 Both state formations, the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group, 
rivalled each other with their partially quite contrary standpoints and vied for their adherents 
in the remaining states of Africa.  
Based on this background, the heads of state and government of the then 32 independent 
states met at the initiative of Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie I. in May 1963 in Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia) to decide on the future coexistence of nations on the African continent. On 
25 May 1963 the present heads of state, with the exception of the leaders from Togo and 
Morocco, signed the charter for establishment of the Organisation of African Unity.10 
II. The Original Charter of the OAU — Solidarity, Sovereignty and Non-
intervention  
The designation of this organisation was deceptive, but nevertheless allowed the conclusion 
that Africa’s political unity was a leitmotif for its establishment. The opposite was the case: 
At the foundation conference from Addis Ababa the Monrovia Group was able to prevail in 
the essential points with their ideas. The charter prepared by Ethiopia clearly reveals its 
trademark “handwriting”: The charter’s preamble formulates the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the acceding states as well as the necessity of non-intervention in internal affairs 
as the uppermost objectives of the new organisation.11 The Casablanca Group’s pan-African 
uniform objective dwindled to the mere promotion of solidarity among the member states.12 
The idea of a supranational organisation with federal structure – as Nkrumah aspired to – was 
thus dealt a clear renunciation. The assembly sought a compromise with the Casablanca 
Group in the adoption of common objectives such as the freedom of African peoples — but in 
particular the resolute struggle against any form of colonialism and imperialism.13  
The distributions of power were also reflected in the arrangement of the organisational 
structure: The only quorate body was the “Assembly of Heads of State and Government” 
                                                 
9
  Claude E. Welch, The OAU and Human Rights: Towards a new Definition, in: JMAS 19 (1981), pp 401-
420, 402. 
10
  UNTS 479, p. 30. 
11
  Paragraph 6 of the preamble: “Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard won independence as well 
as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states”. This objective was taken up once again under Art. 
2 I lit. c of the charter, in which the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of the member 
states is declared as the duty of the organisation. 
12
  Paragraph IV of the preamble, Art. 2 I lit. e of the OAU charter. 
13
  Art. 2 I lit. d of the OAU charter. This objective was first taken seriously at the foundation conference, and 
in reference to South Africa it was militantly proclaimed that the member states maintain no diplomatic or 
consular relations whatsoever with the Republic of South Africa, that any trade with South Africa is to be 
boycotted, that harbours and airports are closed to South African ships and aircraft, and that South African 
aircraft will be denied fly-over permission. Compare: CIAS/Plen.2/Rev.2A, 1963, Para. 8 et seq.  
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(Art. VIII f). However, Art. VIII p. 2 of the OAU charter merely granted the possibility “to 
discuss affairs which are of general importance to Africa, to discuss the objective, and to 
coordinate and harmonise the general policy of the organisation.” Within the framework of its 
jurisdiction it was authorised to issue resolutions, but of which any legal obligation for the 
member states is missing.14 Consequently, the organisation also had no operative sanction 
possibilities. On the contrary, their resolutions merely represented recommendations of the 
assembly to the addressed members15. In turn, the subsequent ineffectiveness of the 
organisation fostered the national sovereignty of its members, since the states were deprived 
of any structural influence through the organisation.  
Human rights were only marginally reflected in the charter. In the preamble one showed 
themselves “persuaded that [...] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Principles 
of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide[s] a solid foundation for peaceful and positive 
cooperation among States”. Art. II Nor. 1 e) of the charter targets an international cooperation 
“having due regard to [...] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Apart from these 
general references, relevant human rights contents are found in the charter’s preamble in the 
avowal of the OAU regarding right to self-determination of peoples as well as freedom, 
equality and dignity of the individual.  
And so the key issues were clearly distributed: In contrast to the sovereignty of the member 
states and the non-intervention principle, the observance of human rights did not belong to the 
OAU’s target provisions. Accordingly, the OAU’s founding fathers also did not formulate any 
intervention jurisdictions on the part of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government with 
regard to human rights matters16, and refrained from the creation of an organisationally-
                                                 
14
  Dieter Nohlen (Ed.), Third World, Reinbek 1998, p. 574; A.A.: G.K.A. Ofusu-Amaah, Regional 
Enforcement of International Obligations, in: ZaöRV 47 (1987), pp. 80-94, 82. The author affirms the legal 
force of the resolutions, but sees no possibility of respective implementation or sanction. 
15
  Volker Epping, Internationale Organisationen, in: Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht, Munich 1999, pp. 387-474, 468 
et seqq. 
16
  In this context, U.O Umozurike intends to derive a restricted right of intervention on the part of the OAU 
from the reference to the preamble and Art. II Para. 1 e) regarding the UN’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights from 1948 and the objectives relating to the “creation of better living conditions” (Art. II 
Para. 1 b)), insofar as this aims at the safeguarding of individual rights; compare the same: The Domestic 
Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter, in: African Affairs 78 (1979), pp. 197-209, 206 et seqq. However, 
no competencies can be derived solely from this reference. Phillip Kunig correctly concludes from these 
references only that a corresponding intervention jurisdiction could develop more easily with a statutory 
established right than with the absence of such reference. Compare ibid: Das völkerrechtliche 
Nichteinmischungsprinzip, Baden-Baden 1980, p. 180. However, the emergence of such an established 
right presupposes a corresponding general exercise as well as a legal opinion. Wolff Heintschel von 
Heinegg, Die weiteren Quellen des Völklerrechts, in: Knut Ipsen (ed.), Völkerrecht, Munich, 1999, pp. 
180-221, 183 et seqq. The following remarks may be anticipated insofar as it is maintained that neither of 
the two elements has become established in the practice of the OAU. 
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inherent human rights body.  
III. The OAU and Human Rights — a Retrospective  
Based on this background, it seems worth considering to what extent the existing target 
provisions had an effect (on their part) on the agitation of the OAU in relation to human rights 
matters. An insight into this may be gained with the help of some examples.  
In 1972, the president of the then Republic of Central Africa, Bokassa17, personally led a 
group of soldiers into a state prison and ordered them to abuse prisoners who had been 
convicted of theft. Many were beaten to death, others were mutilated. Bokassa ordered the 
corpses to be exhibited so that the survivors of this orgy of violence could be led past the dead 
bodies. He justified this “punishment” with the fact that the presidential palace had been 
broken into a few days beforehand and various objects had been stolen. While a reaction on 
the part of the OAU on the occasion of the 10th anniversary Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government in Addis Ababa in the same year might have been expected, the did not come 
about.18  
In 1973, the deposed Ugandan president Milton Obote wrote from his exile a letter to the 
OAU’s secretariat with the request to forward it to the delegates at the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government. In this letter he accused – with detailed reports – Idi Amin of massive 
state-concealed human rights violations in Uganda.19 A forwarding of this letter to the 
assembly did not come about, however.20 Instead, in 1976 the assembly emphasised Idi 
Amin’s “humanitarian role” in connection with the Israeli military action in Entebbe.21 
Particularly serious human rights violations were reported over the course of years from the 
Republic of Equatorial Guinea: Under the dictatorship of President Macias Nguema, ca. 
300,000 people, about a third of the population, left the country while fleeing the regime. 
                                                 
17
  Jean-Bedel Bokassa was President of the Republic of Central Africa (1966-1976) and Emperor of the 
Central African Empire (1976-1979). In 1966, Bokassa carried out a coup and appointed himself as 
president. He pursued an increasingly less calculable dictatorial policy. He became president for life in 
1971. In 1976, he proclaimed his country as an empire and pronounced himself as emperor under the name 
Bokassa I. He paid ₤ 14 million for the coronation ceremony. The per capital annual income was ₤ 85 
(ARB 1977, 4668 BC). Absurd banknotes bore witness to the self-prescribed worship of his persona: 
Bokassa allowed himself to be revered as the first engineer, the first farmer and the best football player in 
the country. 
18
  U.O. Umozourike, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter, in: African Affairs 78 (1979), pp. 
197-209, 199 et seqq. 
19
  However, since Obote actively worked on his political comeback from his exile, his input may be partially 
seen as rather self-interested and therefore may not have had a trustworthy effect. 
20
  Collin Legum, The Organisation of African Unity – Success or Failure? in: International Affairs 52 (1975), 
pp. 208-219, 212. 
21
  AHG/Res. 83 (XIII), 1976, Para. 3. 
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After his seizure of power in 1969, Nguema liquidated political opponents in great numbers 
and reintroduced torture. Executions were organised as mass events and accompanied with 
pop music. He ordered political prisoners to be buried up to their heads in the ground so that 
they would be bitten to death by ants.22 These accusations – widely discussed in the general 
public – were ignored by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Instead, the OAU 
operated a coordination office for technical assistance and cooperation in Malabo (Equatorial 
Guinea) — without attaching any stipulation or condition whatsoever.23 In 1974, the OAU 
called upon its members to provide technical assistance to Equatorial Guinea.24 
Also in 1974, Mengistu Haile overthrew the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, who had 
decisively expedited the foundation of the OAU in 1963.25 Selassie himself and 57 high-
ranking government officials were executed, although the African state group in the UN had 
directed a public appeal to Mengistu to spare the lives of the emperor and his officials.26 The 
chairman of the Africa Group and later OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim referred 
to the “collective concern for human life and fundamental freedom”, but at the same time 
explicitly emphasised that one had “no desire to intervene in the domestic affairs of that 
brother state”.27 
In summary, it has to be noted that even the most serious human rights violations in member 
states during this long period did not even provoke discussion. This is quite remarkable, 
particularly since a discussion commensurate with Art. VIII of the charter was the sole 
possible conventional reaction of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government regarding 
“matters of general importance”. The fact that such human rights violations were not assigned 
to this category sufficiently demonstrates that up until the mid-1970’s the OAU restrictively 
exhausted or did not exhaust whatsoever the scope of  intervention assigned to it and thus left 
severe human rights violations for the most part unanswered. The OAU founding principles of 
non-intervention in internal affairs and sovereignty were tacitly interpreted as the necessity of 
non-observance of human rights violations in member states. The targeted solidarity of allied 
states was largely restricted to silently taking note of human rights violations of the individual 
member states. 
                                                 
22
  Randall Fegley, Equatorial Guinea – An African Tragedy, New York 1989, p. 82. 
23
  CM/Res. 335 (XXIII), 1974. 
24
  Ibid. Para. 3. 
25
  Compare p.4 above. 
26
  UN Doc. A/PV/2301, quoted according to Edward Kannyo, The OAU and Human Rights, in: Yassin El 
Ayoty (Ed.), The Organization of African Unity After Twenty Years, New York et al. 1984, pp. 155-162, 
155. 
27
  Ibid. 
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IV. The Codification of the Banjul Charter  
The solidarity amongst the “brother states” was clearly broken for the first time when the 12th 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government was relocated to Kampala (Uganda) in 1975, 
although Amin’s atrocities had become more and more obvious. Botswana, Tanzania, and 
Zambia subsequently boycotted the assembly.28 The government of Tanzania reacted the most 
vehemently and published their opinion29 through the information ministry, which deserves 
closer consideration: “It is not surprising that the whole of Africa cries out against the 
atrocities of the colonial and racist States. [...] But when massacres, oppression and torture 
are used against Africans in the independent states there is no protest anywhere in Africa. 
There is silence even when crimes are perpetrated by or with connivance of African 
Governments and the leaders of African states. [...] The OAU never makes any protest or 
criticism at all. [...] Now, by meeting in Kampala, the Heads of State of OAU are giving 
approval over what has been done, and what is still being done, by General Amin and his 
henchmen against the people of Uganda. [...] The reasons given by African leaders for their 
silence about these things is the non-interference clause in the OUA Charter. [...] Why is it 
legitimate to call for the isolation of South Africa because of its oppression, but illegitimate to 
refuse co-operation with a country like Uganda, where the Government survives because of 
the ruthlessness with which it kills suspected critics?” 
This concise opinion may not have had any practical effect – Idi Amin was the rotating 
chairman of the assembly – but for the first time an OAU member had broken the wall of 
silence and offered resistance. The government of Tanzania precisely analysed the OAU’s 
previous behaviour with regard to human rights violations amongst its member nations and 
exposed the organisation’s double standard. On the one hand, the OAU had set the banning of 
colonial-political oppression and apartheid repression from the entire continent as a founding 
objective, but allowed the most blatant human rights violations in its own ranks to happen 
unacknowledged. And so at the same time Tanzania provided an impetus that had to bring the 
OAU closer together — to come to terms with the human rights situation of a member state.30 
                                                 
28
  Mozambique, first became independent on 15 June 1975, had for the first time the opportunity to 
participate as a new member of the OAU in the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and was thus 
not entirely absent, but was only represented by a lower ranking delegation. Compare: Edward Kannyo, 
The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: Genesis and Political Background, in: Claude Welch, 
Ronald Meltzer (Eds.), Human Rights and Development in Africa, Albany 1984, p. 134. 
29
  Official Statement issued by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Dar es Salaam, 25 July 1975, quote 
according to Colin Legum (Ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 4 (1975-1976), p. 22. 
30
  Adama Dieng, Interface between Global and Regional Protection and Promotion of Human Rights: An 
African Perspective, in: Yeal Danieli, Elsa Stamatopoulou, Clarence Dias (Eds.), The Universal 
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The severity and sensationalism of human rights violations reached an unusual dimension 
(even for African proportions at that time) at the end of the 1970’s. As a result of the 
continued silence, the African community of states even discredited itself before the world 
public, which increasingly politicised the respect for and evolution of human rights.31 
Subsequently, the western community of states increasingly made provisions of 
developmental aid contingent on the observance of human rights in the recipient states. For 
instance, the US government reduced the planned economic aid for the then Central African 
Empire and Guinea for the years 1977 to 1979. In April 1978 the USA suspended its 
developmental aid for Ethiopia in order to sanction the ongoing human rights violations of the 
Mengistu regime. Three months later, Canada and Sweden reacted with corresponding 
measures for the same reason.32 
1. The 1979 Monrovia Conference  
The subject of human rights was first focused on in 1979 at the 16th Summit Conference in 
Monrovia, Liberia. In addition to the foreign policy (and above all the economic) pressure, a 
decisive factor was an incident that shocked the world public: Amnesty International proved 
the involvement of Emperor Bokassa I. in the murder of over 100 school children between the 
ages of eight and 16 in Bangui, at that time Central African Empire. The reason was the 
refusal of the pupils to wear the school uniforms ordered by Bokassa, which were 
manufactured in the family-owned factory.33 This incident prompted the 6th Franco-African 
                                                 
Declaration of Human Rights, New York 1999, pp. 271-282, 275. 
31
  The core points of this development were the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International 
in 1975, the signing of the intensive human rights CSCE Final Act from Helsinki in 1975 (Chapter VII, 
“Human Rights and Basic Freedoms”) and the adoption of the UN Human Rights Pact in 1976. In 1977, the 
then US President Jimmy Carter commenced his involvement in matters of human rights, and placed this in 
the realm of international diplomacy (“Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of 
freedom elsewhere. [...] Our commitment to human rights must be absolute.” Inaugural speech by President 
Carter on 20.1.1977; compare: Department of State Bulletin, 76 (1977), p. 122; with regard to Jimmy 
Carter’s human rights policy, compare: Stephan Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Assistance on Human Rights 
Practices, in: AJIL 76 (1982), pp. 246-279). The EC refrained from the formal integration of a guarantee of 
human rights at the conclusion of the second ACP-EEC Lomé Convention (Lomé II) from 1978. This 
mainly took place in order to avoid being bound to certain reactions in case of human rights violations. 
During the Cold War the ACP states were integrated in the global balance of power, and so one wanted to 
keep all possibilities open under any circumstances. Nevertheless, the EC made it clear during the treaty 
negotiations that the observance of human rights would be the basis of mutual cooperation. Compare: 
Gabriele Oestreich, Menschenrechte als Elemente der dritten AKP-EWG Konvention von Lomé, Berlin 
1990, p. 83 et seqq.; see also Peter Hilpold, Konditionalität in den Beziehungen zwischen der EU und den 
AKP-Staaten: Menschenrechte, Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und verantwortungsvolle 
Regierungsführung, in: ZEuS 5 (2002), pp. 239-254, 242 et seqq. 
32
  Amadu Sesay, Olusa Ojo, Orbobolka Fasehun (Eds.), The OAU after Twenty Years, Boulder 1984, p. 82. 
33
  Charles Rousseau, Chronique des Faites internationaux, in: RGDIP 84 (1980), p. 361 et seqq..; Jonathan 
Power, Amnesty International: The Human Rights Story, Oxford 1981, pp. 82-89. Three months 
beforehand, hundreds of pupils and students had demonstrated against the obligation to purchase and wear 
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Summit Conference in May 1979 to form an investigation commission consisting of jurists 
from the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo.34 Their 137-page report, which 
was submitted to the respective heads of state and government on the eve of the Monrovia 
Conference, concluded with an indisputable finding: “His [Bokassa’s] responsibility was 
involved. His presence at the sites is proven, his participation is quasi-certain.”35  
Based on this background, the Liberian president and host of the 16th OAU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, Tolbert, opened the session with a speech that contained 
clear words on the previous OAU human rights policy. He commented “that the inviolable 
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs has become an excuse” for the African heads 
of state to also silently ignore the most blatant human rights violations”.36 He warned the 
present heads of state that Africa’s independence, which the OAU had prescribed in its 
formation, would be wasted if it merely engenders poverty and brutality, and he 
recommended the assembly to revise the OAU original charter in order to safeguard the 
observance of more fundamental human rights.37 It was the first time the observance of 
human rights had been bluntly admonished like that at an OAU assembly. This thrust paved 
the way for further statements with similar content from various participants: First and 
foremost the new president of Uganda, Binaisa.38 He called on his colleagues to learn from 
Uganda’s experiences and to speak out in support of the respect of human rights.39 
Ultimately, the resolution AHG/115 (XVI) “Décision sur les droits de l’homme et des peuples 
en Afrique” emerged from the subsequent discussion amongst the participants, with which the 
OAU Secretary General was mandated to convene a conference of experts in order to prepare 
a draft for an African charter40 of human rights and the rights of peoples. At the same time, 
                                                 
these uniforms. The investigating committee found out that the imperial guard had already killed 150 of 
these demonstrators: compare: Amnesty International (Edl.), Annual Report 1980, p. 125; Frankfurt 1981. 
34
  KCA 1979, 29750 A. 
35
  Quoted according to Olusola Ojo, Amadu Sesay, The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and 
Beyond, in: HRQ 8 (1986), pp. 89-103, 93. 
36
  Address by His Excellency William R. Tolbert Jr. to the 16th Summit Meeting of the OAU on 11 July 1979, 
Monrovia Government Printer 1979; quoted according to Amadu Sesay, Olusa Ojo, Orbobolka Fasehun 
(Eds.), The OAU after Twenty Years, p. 83. 
37
  Address by H.E. William R. Tolbert Jr. to the 16th Summit meeting of the OAU on 11 July 1979, a.a.O. 
38
  “I warn you, I am going to propose that this assembly condemn Equatorial Guinea and the Central African 
Empire, which massacres children, while you sit here and do nothing”, ARB 1979, 5329 B; President 
Obasanjo, Nigeria, explained this comment by Binaisa with his still ongoing “honeymoon” as head of state; 
compare: Philip Kunig, Das völkerrechtliche Nichteinmischungsprinzip, Baden-Baden 1981, p. 186. 
39
  ARB 1979, 5329 B. 
40
  The term “charter” was chosen instead of “convention” in order to express the fundamental significance of 
their regulations. Compare: Mikuin L. Balanda, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: Konrad 
Ginther, Wolfgang Benedek (Eds.), New Perspectives and Conceptions of International Law, Vienna 1983, 
p.137. 
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special attention should be paid to the bodies for promotion and protection of human rights.  
2. The expert draft from Dakar 
At the invitation of the OAU Secretary General and the Senegalese government, 20 legal 
experts and various African governmental representatives met in Dakar (Senegal) from 28.11. 
– 7.12.1979 in order to prepare the draft of the human rights charter. The resolved document 
was submitted to the OAU’s Council of Justice Ministers six months later in Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia) for further discussion in order to prepare a resolution proposal for the OAU’s 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Nevertheless, the necessary majority was not 
reached in Addis Ababa, and the discussion was postponed. Only at the following meeting of 
the justice ministers in January 1981 in Banjul (Gambia) was the text adopted and forwarded 
to the OAU’s Council of Ministers. On 17 June 1981, the council submitted the Banjul text 
without further amendments to the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government for 
acceptance.41 
The main focus of attention during this conference was on the civil war and the Libyan 
intervention in Chad, as well as the always topical question of West Sahara. Only at the end 
of the assembly – shortly after midnight on 27 June 1981, when only a few heads of state 
were present –Gambian President Jawara finally brought up the Banjul Charter for discussion. 
The participants consented by acclamation without further debate.42  
However, the Banjul Charter commensurate with Art. 63 III would enter into force after the 
simple majority of the OAU members (26 out of 50 at that time) ratified the charter and had 
submitted the ratification documents commensurate with Art. 63 III to the General Secretariat. 
In principle, the binding effect of a contractual set of agreements under international law is 
only brought into play with the signing as authentication of the contractual text and 
ratification of the contract as a commitment of the ratifying states vis-à-vis the contractual 
partner or respective depositary.43 Particularly the NGOs, but also the commission itself, 
persistently called for the ratification of the charter by governments which had not ratified the 
Charter yet. Five years after its passage, the necessary majority quorum was reached with the 
                                                 
41
  Edward Kannyo, The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Genesis and Political Background, in: 
Claude Welch, Ronald Meltzer (Eds.), Human Rights and Development in Africa, Albany 1984, p. 146 et 
seqq. 
42
  Renate Meurer, Arbeitsweise der Afrikanischen Kommission für die Rechte des Menschen und der Völker, 
Ausarbeitung des WDdDB No. 200/96, p. 4, unpublished. 
43
  Antonio Cassese, International Law, Oxford 2005, p 172; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Die 
völkerrechtlichen Verträge als Hauptquelle des Völkerrechts, in: Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht, Munich 1999, p. 
92-179, 110 et seqq. 
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depositing of the Nigerian ratification document with the OAU’s General Secretariat.44 Three 
months later, on 21 October 1986, the Banjul Charter in accordance with Art. 63 II entered 
into force. 
V. The AU and Human Rights — a Perspective?  
However, the observance of human rights as it should be achieved through the Banjul Charter 
was merely one challenge that the OAU had to face as a continental organisation. Global 
political and economic marginalisation, poverty, hunger, natural disasters, civil wars and 
coups determine African reality to this very day. The upshot of the OAU to counteract these 
developments is sobering.45 Political displeasure coupled with the organisation’s legal 
incapacity led to the fact that disaster after disaster transpired without an effective reaction on 
the part of the OAU having to occur: The complete collapse in Somalia, the years of bloody 
disputes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique also remained 
disregarded, just like the wars between Ethiopia (the OAU host country) and Eritrea as well as 
between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo. The extensive 
disregard of the genocide in Rwanda was merely the logical continuation of the OAU’s 
manner of acting.  
This also led to the fact that the OAU had to cede significance as a continental protagonist to 
regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 
the South African Development Community (SADC), which at least endeavoured to 
settlement of conflicts in its member states.46  
                                                 
44
 In the meantime, all OAU member states have deposited their ratification documents with the General 
Secretariat. Swaziland ratified in 1995, South Africa in 1996, and Ethiopia, as OAU host country, only 
ratified the charter in 1997 — after Ethiopia (as well as Eritrea) was explicitly called upon by the 
Commission of Human and the People’s Rights at its 18th session to ratify the charter as quickly as 
possible. Compare: Final Communiqué of the 18th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Para. 35, in: ICJ (Eds.), The Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in the 
Work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Chenôve 1996, p. 188. Eritrea only 
ratified the charter in the beginning of 1999. 
45
  Expressive in this context is the OAU’s self-knowledge, which it has summarised in the NEPAD paper: “In 
Africa, 340 million people, or half the population, live on less than US $1 per day. The mortality rate of 
children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1,000, and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years. Only 58 percent 
of the population have access to safe water. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 percent. There are 
only 18 mainline telephones per 1,000 people in Africa, compared with 146 for the world as a whole and 
567 for high-income countries.” New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Para. 4 NEPAD 
Doc (2001), available under www.nepad.org. 
46
  For instance, ECOWAS unsuccessfully intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone; compare with the 
international law aspects compiled by Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in 
Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in: TICLJ 12 (1998), p. 333-375, 
363 et seqq.; Anthony Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, in: ColJTL 32 (1994), pp. 
381-418; Matthew Barton, ECOWAS and West African Security: The New Regionalism, in: DPILJ 4 
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The OAU also lost significance with regard to economic integration. Sub-regional 
organisations increasingly led the central authority in Addis Ababa to appear superfluous. The 
formations of these organisations since the mid-70’s impressively bear witness to the OAU’s 
deficient integrative ability: ECOWAS47 (1975), East African Community48 (1980), SADC49 
(1980), Economic Community of Central African States (1983), North African and Arab 
Maghreb Union50 (1987) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa51 (1994) 
strove towards compensating for the OAU’s failures.  
In 1990, the OAU attempted to bundle the economic integration by involving the sub-regional 
organisations even more on a continental basis through the formation of the African 
Economic Community (AEC)52. The constitutive act, the so-called Abuja Treaty,53 is 
regarded as a milestone on the path of an institutional transformation process on the part of 
the OAU.54 The treaty stipulates the establishment of the AEC as an integral organisation 
within the OAU, which should take place over six stages in a period of no more than 34 
years.55 Various bodies were provided for fulfilment of the treaty purpose, the creation of an 
“African Common Market”56: The General Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Pan-
African Parliament, the Economic and Social Council, the Court, the General Secretariat and 
the Technical Committee.57 After the entry into force of the Abuja Treaty (12.05.1994), the 
OAU commenced working on the basis of both treaties, the OAU Original Charter and the 
                                                 
(2000), pp. 79-113. In 1998, the SADC also intervened with moderate success in the civil war in Lesotho; 
compare: Sehoai Santho, Lesotho: Lessons and Challenges after SADC Intervention, in: Diane Philander, 
Monograph No. 50, Franco-South African Dialogue Sustainable Security in Africa, Pretoria 2000, pp. 54-
68, 57. 
47
  Edwini Kessi, Trade liberalisation under ECOWAS: prospects, challenges and WTO compatibility, in: 
AYIL 7 (1999), pp. 31-59. 
48
  Wilbert Kaahwa, The Treaty Establishing the East African Community: An Overview, in: AYIL 7 (1999), 
pp. 61-81. 
49
  Muna Ndulo, African Integration Schemes: A Case Study of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), in: AYIL 7 (1999), pp. 3-30. 
50
  Abdelaziz Testas, Evaluating Participation in African Economic Integration Schemes: The Case of the 
North African and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), in: JAE 8 (1999), pp. 108-123. 
51
  Michael Gondwe, From PTA to COMESA – the Quest for sub-regional economic integration in Eastern 
and Southern Africa, in: AYIL 6 (1999), pp. 3-22. 
52
  Jeggan Senghor, The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community: An Introductory Essay, in: 
AYIL 1 (1993), pp. 183-193, 186; Frank Ofei, Le traite d’Abuja et les communautes economiques 
regionales: la CEDEAO, in: CAAP 52 (1999), pp. 23-30, 24; Bankole Thomson provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the contractual set of agreements, in: Economic Integration Efforts in Africa: A Milestone – the 
Abuja Treaty, in: AJICL 5 (1993), pp. 743-767. 
53
  ILM 30 (1991) 1241. 
54
  Corinne Packer, Donald Rukare, The New African Union and its Constitutive Act, in: AJIL 96 (2002), pp. 
365-379, 369 et seqq.; Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for better Protection of Human Rights in 
Africa? in: AHRLJ, pp. 299-314, 303. 
55
  Compare: Art. 6 I Abuja Treaty. 
56
  Compare: Art. 6 II lit. f Abuja Treaty. 
57
  Compare: Art. 7 Abuja Treaty. 
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Abuja Treaty, whereby the OAU’s existing bodies functioned as those of the AEC. Further 
bodies were not developed yet. This condition more or less suggested a fusion of both 
organisations. 
The accelerated trend of globalisation, which started after the end of the East-West conflict, 
had not only created a situation in which the OAU came under pressure to rethink its strategy 
in view of the African economic cooperation and integration. The political challenges also 
had to be appropriately confronted. In 1990, the OAU summit conference passed a resolution 
regarding the situation in Africa in view of the global changes, and acknowledged the “real 
danger of marginalisation of our continent”.58 The OAU special summit in Sirte (Libya) – 
which was summoned by Libya’s revolutionary leader Gaddafi and from which the genesis of 
the “African Union” (AU) stemmed – concerned Africa’s preparation for globalisation and 
the examination of “ways and means of strengthening our continental organisation to make it 
more effective so as to keep pace with the political, economic and social developments taking 
place within and outside our continent.”59 
In quite a few respects, the origin of the AU shows clear parallels to the origin of its 
predecessor. Of course, the historical situation was entirely different: Back then there was the 
euphoria of the just obtained political independence and the prospects of a free, prospering 
Africa, whereas at this time there was widespread economic misery, internal and international 
armed conflicts and the prospects of increasing marginalisation in the world. However, as in 
those days, there were two opposing positions with regard to achieving Africa’s integration — 
a more radical position and a more moderate position. And like back then, the more radical 
position was represented with considerable involvement by a politician, Gaddafi,60 whereas 
the more moderate position was supported by a larger number of countries grouped around 
South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria. Gaddafi’s present-day positions on Africa’s unity are also 
very similar to those of Nkrumah in terms of content.61 
                                                 
58
  AHG/Dec.2 (XVII) Rev. 1. Para. 3. 
59
  Sirte Declaration at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
8-9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya; EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, Para. 4. 
60
  This particularly concerns newspaper reports about financial involvement that Gaddafi had shown for 
assertion of his ideas. For instance, he had paid the well-known continental poorhouses such as the 
Comoros, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Sierra Leone, the Central African Empire and Equatorial Guinea one-third 
of the outstanding membership subscriptions to the OAU in order to secure the voting right for these states 
at the Sirte Summit; compare NZZ from 02.03.01, p 5; SZ from 28.05.01, p. 4; FAZ from 10.07.02, p. 1 et 
seqq. 
61
  For instance, Gaddafi had designated the African Union project under the catchwords “United States of 
Africa”; compare: ARB 1999, 13677 A. But in one respect Gaddafi clearly differs from Nkrumah: He 
hardly had any connection to Pan-Africanism. The OAU, Africa and the African Union did not assume any 
considerable importance in the Libyan foreign policy until 1998. On the contrary, the integration into the 
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The transition process from the OAU to the AU proceeded with astounding speed: After the 
first Sirte conference in 1999, it took all of two years – thanks to Libyan (financial) influence 
– until the formation document was worked out, initialled and the minimum number of 
ratifications were submitted in order to allow the Constitutive Act (CA) to enter into force. In 
the meantime, all African states have ratified the CA. Altogether, 17 bodies shall initially 
realise the dealings of the AU.62 The ballooning of the institutional structure is connected 
with the amalgamation of the OAU and the AEC63, which provides for precisely these 
institutions. 
However, with the first AU Summit Conference at Durban in 2002, only three of these 
institutions were established: The Assembly of the Union as successor to the OAU’s 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council of Ministers as successor 
to the OAU’s Council of Ministers and the Permanent Representatives Committee — the only 
new body to date, which is responsible for the AU’s ongoing operations and performs 
preliminary work for the Executive Council. 
The AU’s constitutive act is explicitly based on the OAU and the Abuja Treaty and reflects 
their tradition accordingly. Important fundamentals of the OAU Charter, such as non-
                                                 
Arabic and Islamic community was essential to Gaddafi. Compare: Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya’s Foreign 
Policy in North Africa, Oxford 1991, p. 12. His international isolation after the murderous Lockerbie 
incident led to the fact that he showed himself to be much more conciliatory vis-à-vis western countries and 
at the same time intensified relations with Arabic and African states. Compare: Birgit Jagusch, Mephisto 
auf Versöhnungskurs? Libysche Außenpolitik unter Gaddafi, in: BDIP 46 (2001), pp. 1483-1490, 1485. 
Compare also the illustrative article “Libyen will wieder in die internationale Staatengemeinschaft 
zurückkehren” in the FAZ from 29.07.1999, p. 3. The fact that Gaddafi turned more strongly towards 
Africa – contrary to his former priority – may well lie in the fact that he found more support for his 
concerns there. For instance, the OAU summit conference from 1998 called into question the legality of the 
Lockerbie proceedings from Camp Van Zeist and called for the immediate lifting of the UN sanctions; 
compare: AHG/Dec.127 (XXXIV). The fifth extraordinary summit conference in Sirte repeated this and 
furthermore resolved to establish a commission which was supposed to examine the legality of the 
proceedings, EAHG/Dec. 3 (V). However, nothing is known to date about the formation of such a 
commission. A virtually complaisant hymn of praise to Gadaffi was adopted at the same conference — a 
“Special Motion of Thanks to the Leader of the Great Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Brother Muammar 
Al Ghaddafi” (EAHG/Dec. 4 (V)), in which the heads of Government also declare “that any act aimed at 
destabilizing and undermining the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an affront to the collective aspiration 
of Africa and African peoples towards the attainment of self esteem, dignity and independence.” (Ibid. 
Para. 3). Even the African Commission of Human Rights did not abstain from a laudatory opinion to the 
benefit of Gaddafi: In a “Resolution on the Immediate Lifting of Sanctions Imposed on Libya” from 7 May 
2001 the commission showed themselves to be convinced “that the Government of Libya has fully 
complied with the resolutions of the United Nations” (Preamble Section II). Therefore the commission 
called on the Security Council and the United Nations to lift the sanctions against Libya (operative Section 
II); compare: AHG/229/XXXVII. 
62
  Art. 5 CA mentions in particular: Assembly of the Union, Executive Council of Ministers, Pan-African 
Parliament, Court, Commission, Permanent Representatives Committee, Specialized Technical Committees 
(altogether seven, commensurate with Art. 14 CA), Economic, Social and Cultural Council, Financial 
Institutions (altogether three, commensurate with Art. 19 CA). 
63
  Compare: Art. 33 CA. 
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intervention in internal affairs as well as the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
are also ranked high in the organisational acts (Art. 3 lit. b, Art. 4 lit. a, g CA).  
But the organisational acts also point the way to the future by emphasising the rights of 
individuals: democracy, the protection of human rights in accordance with the Banjul Charter, 
gender equality and the participation of the population in order to achieve “greater unity and 
solidarity” between the countries and peoples of Africa are adopted in the AU’s Objective and 
Principles Catalogue (Art. 3 lit. a, h, Art. 4 lit. c, l, m CA).  
Moreover, it is remarkable that the organisational acts no longer protect excesses of autocratic 
domination through sovereignty barriers: Immediately in connection with the mention of the 
necessity of non-intervention, the right of the African Union to intervene is stated with regard 
to serious circumstances – namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity – in a 
member state, when the Summit Conference has adopted an appropriate resolution (Art. 4 lit. 
h CA). In 1999, the OAU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Algiers had 
already resolved to reject unconstitutional change of government in Africa.64 The 
organisational acts assume this position in their Principles Catalogue, and provides for the 
suspension of AU activities for governments which came to power in this manner (Art. 4 lit. p 
und Art. 30 CA).65 
The available literature doubts whether the AU’s course of action in the future will differ 
significantly from that of its predecessor with regard to human rights violations amongst its 
member states.66 But at least the CA brought movement into the rusty institutional structure 
of the Pan-African regional organisation which is responsible for the human rights protection 
system. At the same time, the issues clearly proceed in the right direction: In the future, at 
                                                 
64
  AHG/Dec. 4 (XXXVI) Para. 4. However, this intention did not prevent the subsequent military putsches in 
Sierra Leone, Niger and Guinea Bissau; compare: Adenmola Abass, Mashood Baderin, Towards effective 
Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New 
African Union, in: NILR 49 (2002), pp. 1-38, 7. 
65
  The AU has already proven that these are not merely unused competencies: The overthrow of the 
Government in Madagascar was sanctioned during the foundation summit in Durban. In March 2003, the 
same sanctions were applied to the Central African Republic when a successful coup was carried out in the 
absence of the president; compare: NZZ from 17.03.03, p. 6; International Herald Tribune from 18.03.03, p. 
3. 
66
  Compare: Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for better Protection of Human Rights in Africa?, in: 
AHRLJ 1 (2001), pp. 299-314, 313 et seqq.; Adenmola Abass, Mashood Baderin, Towards effective 
Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New 
African Union, in: NILR 49 (2002), pp. 1-38, 37; compare also: Nsongurua Udombana, Can the Leopard 
Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights, in: AUILR 17 (2002), pp. 1177-1261, 
1258; he quite vividly expresses his doubts: “The AU is a reincarnation of the OAU. As such, it is not 
likely to take human rights seriously – even though that is greatly desired – for the simple reason that a 
married woman does not recover her virginity by divorce. [...] The adoption of the AU Treaty has more to 
do with the hysteria of globalization than the euphoria of unity or, for that matter, human right.”. 
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least legal hurdles can no longer be cited as an explanation for inactivity on the part of the AU 
in view of its powers of intervention. 
   
3. Chapter: The Banjul Charter’s Human Rights Protection System — 
Analysis and Stocktaking  
The adoption of the “African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in June 1981 pointed 
the way to the future in international terms, but at the same time it was also sceptically 
acknowledged in reference to the OAU’s previous human rights policy. The equation of 
“human rights” with “peoples’ rights” already communicated in the title led to the fact that 
the Charter left behind the impression as if it already wanted to restrict its standardised human 
rights content in relative terms.67 Before the further development of the OAU’s human rights 
policy up to and including the adoption of the protocol establishing the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights is addressed, it seems meaningful to initially analyse more 
precisely the system created through the Charter in order to expose the weak spots and 
strengths of this system. In the second section, with the help of the thus acquired results, the 
consideration can be reviewed as to what extent the provisions of the Human Rights Court fit 
into this system and close or leave open system-inherent gaps.  
A more detailed study of the Banjul Charter is also important for the evaluation of the Human 
Rights Court’s effective possibilities: For one thing it serves as a legal source, and for another 
thing, the “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” – which was constituted 
with the Banjul Charter – continues to function as a regional human rights protection body in 
addition to the Human Rights Court. The following analysis shall provide an overview 
concerning the normative content relevant as a legal source68, and on the other hand it shall 
provide results concerning the working methods and functional capability of the “African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, which enable a classification of the Human 
Rights Court in the existing human rights protection mechanisms. 
I. The Structure of the Banjul Charter 
The Charter includes a preamble and a total of 68 articles, which are divided into three main 
                                                 
67
  Mahalu sees this formulation more as the result of a compromise between political ideologies of western 
and socialist-aligned states. Compare: Costa Mahalu, Africa and Human Rights, in: Philip Kunig, 
Wolfgang Benedek, Costa Mahalu (Eds.), Regional Protection of Human Rights by International Law: The 
Emerging African System, Hamburg 1985 pp. 1-30, 26. 
68
  The following consideration is thus also limited to the norms possibly relevant for the Human Rights Court, 
and should not represent any complete content analysis of the Banjul Charter. Several representations 
concerning the content of the Banjul Charter are to be found in the literature. A comprehensive 
representation is offered by: Fatsah Ouguergouz, La Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples 
– Une approche juridique des droit de l’homme entre tradition et modernité, Paris 1993. 
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sections: The first 29 articles include the substantive section and proclaim the “rights and 
obligations”. According to the titular description, the second section governs the “protective 
measures” and includes organisational and procedural provisions concerning the 
establishment of the “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, its competencies 
and the procedural law. The Charter ends with the third title “General Provisions”, which 
includes the regulations pertaining to ratification, entry into force and condition for its 
supplementation. 
II. The Preamble  
The Preamble of the Banjul Charter, like most international agreements, prefixes the values 
and motivations which underly its emergence to the actual provisions.  
It reminds one that “freedom, equality, justice and dignity are the essential objectives for the 
achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples’” (Paragraph 2 of the 
Preamble), and explicitly endorses the obligation agreed upon by the member states — to 
eliminate all forms of colonialism in Africa and to coordinate their efforts in order to create 
better living conditions and at the same time to duly consider the Charter of the United 
Nations and the General Declaration of Human Rights (Paragraph 3 of the Preamble). At this 
point the Preamble will point out that the Banjul Charter abides by the universal standard of 
human rights. However, the “tradition and the values of African civilisation, which guide its 
attitude vis-à-vis human rights and the rights of peoples’ and shall be characteristic for them”, 
is taken into consideration in Paragraph 4 of the Preamble. This formulation refers to a 
culturally relative interpretation of human rights in the Banjul Charter. But furthermore it is 
stated “that on the one hand the fundamental human rights are derived from the inherent 
human qualities”. However, it is also recognised that “the reality and the respect for peoples’ 
rights should absolutely guarantee human rights” (Paragraph 5 of the Preamble). The 
Preamble does not comment by any means on the relationship of individual rights and 
collectives, but abruptly places them side by side. And so to the critics of the Charter, who 
fear a subordination of individual rights vis-à-vis collective rights,69 it did not offer any 
counter argument.70  
                                                 
69
  Rudolf Dolzer, Die afrikanische Banju-Charta der Rechte der Menschen und der Völker (1981), in: 
Deutsche UNESCO-Kommission (Eds.), Menschenrechte und “Rechte der Völker”, Munich 1983, p. 34 et 
seqq. 
70
  One of the founding fathers of the Banjul Charter, Kéba Mbaye, reverses this argumentation and in this 
connection sees the universal claim to validity of human rights, which comprises the protection of all legal 
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Moreover, in Paragraph 6 it is taken into consideration “that the enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms also entails the assumption of obligations”. In this connection the Preamble makes it 
clear that an obligation on the part of the individual not only exists vis-à-vis other individuals, 
but also vis-à-vis the state. A fundamental difference to other regional human rights systems 
is also seen in this regard: Obligations in the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) as well as in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) merely related to 
the obligations of the states vis-à-vis their citizens.71 But this is only to be endorsed in a 
restrictive manner: The Preamble of the ACHR explicitly refers in Paragraph 3 to the 
“American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man”72, which includes a pronounced 
obligation catalogue of the individual vis-à-vis the state.73 Of course, in contrast to the Banjul 
Charter the Declaration is not a treaty binding under international law. Nevertheless, the 
imposition of individual obligations within the scope of a human rights document is not solely 
an African phenomenon,74 but it corresponds to the African community-oriented tradition.75 
At the same time, this comparison of rights and obligations reflects the antithetical ideological 
points of departure; the Banjul Charter bears their signature. Socialist states could hardly 
harmonise state theory and the emphasis of individual rights without having to fear an 
ideological alleviation. The granting of individual rights on the one hand and the demand of 
obligations on the other hand may have made it easier for the socialist states to endorse the 
Charter. 
III. Rights and Obligations  
The material content of the Banjul Charter is found in its first section under the title “Rights 
                                                 
categories, as substantiated. Compare: Kéba Mbaye, Les Droits de l’Homme en Afrique, Paris 1992, p. 175. 
71
  Richard Gittleman, The Banjul-Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis, in: Claude 
Welch, Ronald Melzer (Eds.), Human Rights and Development in Africa, Albany 1984, pp. 152-176, 154. 
72
  American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17; the text is 
also found under http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm. 
73
  See, for instance: Art. 33 (duty to abide by the law), Art. 34 (duty to render military service or alternative 
civilian service), and Art. 36 (duty to render payment of taxes). 
74
  Compare Beate Rudolf, Völkerrechtliche Pflichten des einzelnen und Drittwirkung von Menschenrechten, 
in: Beate Rudolf./Juliane Kokott (Eds.), “Gesellschaftsgestaltung unter dem Einfluss von Grund- und 
Menschenrechten”, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 91-116, 94 et seqq. (with supporting documents from the 
universal and regional human rights pacts). 
75
  Edem Kodjo, Die Afrikanische Charta der Rechte des Menschen und der Völker in ihrem historischen 
Zusammenhang”, in: EuGRZ 17 (1990), pp. 306-311, 309; G.O. Olusanya, African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Some Analytical Comments and Appraisal, in: NJIL 11 (1985), pp. 1-9, 5. The obligations 
of the individual are also expressed in most constitutions of African countries. Just to cite a small selection, 
the constitutions of Egypt (Art. 13, 58 et seqq.), Benin (Art. 33 to 36), Tanzania (Art. 25, 26, 27 and 28) 
and Zaire (Art. 28, 30 and 31) include obligations in reference to the family, the society, the state apparatus 
or the constitution. For further supporting documents, compare: Gilbert Flans (Ed.), Constitutions of the 
Countries of the World, New York, 3/2001; comp. alternatively the database http://confinder.richmond.edu. 
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and Obligations” (Art. 1 to Art. 29). It includes “Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Chapter 1 
(Art. 1 to Art. 26) and the adjunctive “Obligations” in Chapter 2 (Art. 27 to Art. 29). The 
Banjul Charter includes all generations or respective dimensions of human rights in this first 
section.76 
Art. 1 AfrCHPR obligates the Charter’s contracting states to recognise the rights, obligations 
and freedoms and to adopt measures for their implementation. This specifically includes the 
obligation to incorporate the Banjul Charter as nationally applicable law.77 Closely linked 
with this obligation is Art. 62 AfrCHPR, according to which the contracting states must 
submit a report every two years, which indicates which legal and other measures they have 
adopted for implementation of the rights enshrined by the Banjul Charter.78 
1. Individual Rights  
Art. 3 to 18 AfrCHPR contain the catalogue of individual rights. But this allocation is not to 
be made unequivocally. For instance, Art. 18 in Paragraphs I and II addresses the collective 
rights of the family, whereas in Paragraphs III and IV it includes the rights of women, 
children, the elderly and the handicapped. Similarly, Art. 3 AfrCHPR is inconsistently 
presented: In Paragraph I, it includes an equality requirement before the law, and in Paragraph 
II it includes a right to equal protection through the law.  
a) Non-discrimination and equality requirements  
Art. 2 AfrCHPR formulates a general equality and non-discrimination requirement with 
regard to the rights ensured through the Banjul Charter, “without any differentiation such as 
race, ethnic group, skin colour, language, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, wealth or other status”. The provision hardly differs from the corresponding 
                                                 
76
  This categorisation of human rights goes back to Karel Vasak. The first generation of human rights 
accordingly encompasses political rights, and the second generation comprises economic, social and 
cultural rights. Vasak spoke of “solidarity rights” in the third generation. Compare: Karel Vasak, Pour les 
droits de l’homme de la troisième génération: Les droits solidarité. Lesson inaugural, dixième session 
d’enseignement, Strasbourg 1979, p. 17. This development has been particularly criticised by the western 
side with varying rationale. Franz Nuscheler feared an inflation of human rights to the “right to everything” 
through “an orgy of ideals”, which is superfluous because it is devoid of content. Compare Nuscheler: Das 
‘Recht auf Entwicklung’. Fortschritt oder Danaergeschenk?”; in: DGVN (Eds.), Blaue Reihe No. 67, Bonn 
1966, p. 13. Others absolutely reject the legal character of this third generation of human rights. Compare: 
Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte und Staatsgewalt, in: Christian Chwaszeca, Wolfgang Kerstin (Eds.), 
Politische Philosophie der internationalen Beziehungen, Frankfurt 1998, p. 154 et seqq. 
77
  Gino Naldi, The Organization of African Unity – An Analysis of its Role, New York 1989, p. 114; Philip 
Kunig, The Protection of Human Rights by International Law in Africa, in: GYIL 25 (1982), pp. 138-168, 
151. 
78
  Statements pertaining to state reporting methods follow further below. 
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equality requirements of other human rights documents.79 The equality tenet naturally does 
not formulate any independent protective right, but can only be understood in connection with 
the rights included in the Banjul Charter. However, Art. 2 AfrCHPR is so openly composed 
that that the Court might use it to review actually permissible restrictions of the guaranteed 
rights granted in the Charter by the signatory states insofar as these restrictions themselves do 
not meet the equality requirement. As a result, the Human Rights Court is given the 
possibility – so much may be anticipated – to review the partially considerable restriction 
leeway of the provisions at least with regard to the discriminatory effect in a specific case. 
Art. 3 I AfrCHPR substantiates the non-discrimination requirement and specifies, as 
mentioned, the equality before the law.  
b) Civil and political rights  
In contrast to Paragraph I, Art. 3 II includes a subjective right. This is aimed at equal 
protection through the law.80 And so, if taken literally, a right to legal protection as well as a 
right to equal treatment is also included. As a result, Art. 3 II AfrCHPR presents the Court of 
Human Rights within the scope of its function with the possibility to also review individual 
judiciary acts for any discriminatory verdicts or judicial proceedings. The right to legal 
protection is only put in concrete terms in Art. 7 AfrCHPR.  
The inviolability of the individual is guaranteed through Art. 4 AfrCHPR.81 The addendum 
that nobody may be arbitrarily robbed of this right takes into account the fact that in many 
African nations the death penalty is a legitimate criminal law sanction.82 A signatory state 
should not violate any international agreements as the result of a lawful condemnation to 
death.83  
                                                 
79
  Compare: Art. 1 ACHR, Art. 14 ECHR. 
80
  Compare: Art. 23, 24 ACHR. 
81
  Compare: Art. 4 ACHR, Art. 2 ECHR. 
82
  Compare: Etienne-Richard Mbaya, A la recherche du noyau intangible dans la Charte Africaine, in: Patrice 
Meyer-Bisch (Ed.), Le noyau intangible des droits de l'homme, Fribourg 1989, pp. 207-226, 221. The death 
penalty is only officially abolished in eight African nations. Compare: Amnesty International Report AFR 
01/03/97 p.2. For development of the death penalty on the African continent, see also: William Schabas, 
The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3rd Edition, Cambridge 2002, p. 356 et seqq. 
83
  A corresponding restriction is also found in the ACHR (compare: Art. 4 Para. I p. 1 ACHR) and in the 
ECHR (Art. 2 Para. 1 p. 2) for the same reason. However, the death penalty was entirely abolished through 
Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR. All contracting States of the Council of Europe have signed the protocol, only 
San Marino has not yet ratified it. Compare: http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm. In 
contrast to the Banjul Charter, the ACHR stringently restricts the imposition of the death penalty, and only 
allows it for the most serious crimes, but prohibits it for political criminal offences and for culprits who are 
pregnant, or who were younger than 18 or older than 70 at the time of the incident. It also prohibits the 
reintroduction of the death penalty in states in which it was abolished. For instance, Gambia, which 
abolished the death penalty in 1993, reintroduced it after the military putsch in 1995 (Amnesty International 
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Art. 5 AfrCHPR guarantees the respect of human dignity and prohibits any form of 
exploitation and degradation, in particular slavery, slave trade, torture as well as cruel, 
inhumane or humiliating punishment and treatment. The latter passage is particularly 
noteworthy, since in some African nations corporal punishment has survived in the criminal 
law systems.84 And so the Court of Human Rights has considerable latitude in this 
connection. In other respects the provision is for the most part oriented towards the 
international standard.85  
Art. 6 AfrCHPR protects the right of individuals to freedom and security and also prohibits 
imprisonment without predetermined reason for punishment.86 African reality was further 
emphasised by virtue of the fact that arbitrary arrest or detention is particularly prohibited. 
But in contrast to comparable provisions, the rights of the detainees are not vested.87 Of 
particular relevance here is the lack of a right to review of a detention order, a claim for 
damages after unlawful imprisonment and a right to the immediate notification of the reasons 
for detention. The Charter also does not include any right to free legal defence for the 
destitute, as the two other regional covenants formulate.88 The lack of rights for detainees is a 
clear deficiency of the Banjul Charter which the Court of Human Rights cannot compensate 
through more far-reaching interpretation of the Charter.  
The right to due process of law and procedural laws are vested in Art. 7 AfrCHPR.89 The 
weaknesses of Art. 6 AfrCHPR are not compensated, however. To be emphasised here is the 
                                                 
Report AFR 01/03/97, loc. cit.). In particular, the prohibition of political execution would be a desirable 
supplement to the Banjul Charter, especially since the imposition of the death penalty for political criminal 
offences is also still provided for and also practiced today in many African nations. The most prominent 
example in recent times was the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwas and eight other Ogoni leaders in 1995 for 
“oppositional resistance” in Nigeria. 
84
  Corporal punishment (“caning” or “flogging”) is for offences which are suspended with prison sentence 
from six months and is provided for individuals up to age 45, and can occur in addition to or instead of 
other penalties. Compare: Alan Miller, The Nigerian Penal System, London 1997, p. 305 et seqq. In 
particular, draconic penalties are imposed after the introduction of Sharia law in northern Nigeria. For 
instance, a Sharia court in the northern federal state of Kebbi sentenced a 15 year old juvenile to lose his 
right hand on account of theft amounting to about 30 USD. A young girl was sentenced by the Sharia court 
in the federal state of Zamfara to 100 lashes of the whip for premarital sexual intercourse - the accused had 
spoken about rape. Compare: FAZ  from 4.8.2001, p. 5. 
85
  Compare: Art. 5 I, II ACHR, Art. 3, 4 ECHR. 
86
  Compare: Art. 7 I, II, III ACHR, Art. 5 ECHR. 
87
  Compare: Art. 7 IV – VII, Art. 5 ECHR. 
88
  Compare Art. 6 III c ECHR, Art. 8 II e ACHR. Moreover, Art. 6 III e ECHR explicitly endorses the right to 
a free interpreter insofar as the accused does not understand the court’s language of negotiations or else 
cannot express themselves. The free service of an interpreter is also not contingent on whether the accused 
is actually impecunious. It is definitively formulated to confront the risk that the accused abstains from the 
consultation of an interpreter due to fear of his or her own costs and experiences a disadvantageous court 
hearing as a result. Compare: Mark Villinger, Handbuch der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 2nd 
Edition, Zurich 1999, Ed. No.: 519. 
89
  Compare: Art. 8 ACHR, Art. 6 ECHR. 
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determination in Paragraph 2 Sentence 2, which says that a penalty may not be imposed 
collectively, but only personally against the perpetrator.90  
Art. 8 AfrCHPR guarantees the right of freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and 
freedom to choose an occupation, which can be respectively restricted for reasons of public 
safety and order, however.91 When citing comparable norms, in particular Art. 18 III ICCPR, 
it is conspicuous that not merely the public exercise of these rights is subject to these 
restriction possibilities in the Banjul Charter, but the entire extent of protection. In particular, 
public safety and order is a hardly tangible criterion, and opens up a broad, hard to contain 
justification spectrum for interventions in the protected legal positions.  
The right to information and freedom of opinion is laid down in Art. 9 AfrCHPR.  
The freedom of the press, as also in the other regional and universal human rights pacts, is not 
mentioned in particular. However, it is generally seen as a condicio sine qua non of the 
freedom of information92, so that it is to be perceived as comprised within the scope of 
protection of Art. 9 AfrCHPR.93 
The freedom of association is laid down in Art. 10 AfrCHPR. Everyone is granted the right 
“to freely associate with others within the scope of the laws” (Paragraph I). In comparison 
with the international standard, it is also conspicuous in this provision that “laws” are devoid 
of specification and can restrict the right of association without the review latitude of a 
judicial instance.94 All comparable provisions presuppose qualified laws which are capable of 
restricting the freedom of association in a permissible manner. Only the restriction 
possibilities for associations of police and armed forces remain unaffected by these 
requirements. Even here the protection of the Banjul Charter does not correspond to the 
international standard. Art. 10 II AfrCHPR includes the correlative notion of negative 
freedom of association. However, this comes under the express proviso of the solidarity 
obligation in Art. 29 AfrCHPR and thus seems to be for the most part worthless.  
                                                 
90
  A comparable provision is not found in the ECHR. Here Kunig sees a fundamental difference of the 
African understanding as opposed to the European-American understanding of human rights, where 
collective responsibility per se is rejected and an explicit determination is therefore unnecessary. Compare: 
Philip Kunig, The Protection of Human Rights by International Law in Africa, in: GYIL 25 (1982), pp. 
138-168, 152. However, Art. 5 III ACHR – which includes a corresponding provision – is overlooked. 
Therefore a difference of the European-American understanding of human rights with regard to the African 
understanding cannot be ascertained without further ado in this provision.  
91
  Compare: Art. 12 ACHR, Art. 9 ECHR. 
92
  In the concurring opinion in the ruling of the matter Barthold versus Germany, judge Pettiti formulated: 
“Freedom of expression in its true dimension is the right to receive and to impart information and ideas on 
political issues as well as on other areas of public interest”. Compare: Series A 90 concurring opinion.  
93
  Kenneth Acheampong, Freedom of Expression, including Freedom of the Press, under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: LLJ 10 (1997), pp. 57-73, 66. 
94
  Compare: Art. 16 ACHR, Art. 11 ECHR. 
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The freedom of association is also guaranteed through Art. 11 AfrCHPR and also comes 
under the provision of legality. Although conditions are placed on the restrictive laws – these 
must be applied in the interest of national and public security, national health, the morality 
and the rights and freedoms of others – this enumeration is not conclusive: The addendum “in 
particular” makes it clear that a gateway for manifold restriction possibilities in harmony with 
the Banjul Charter is also provided here. However, the freedom of association is subject to 
similar restrictions in all comparable international human rights documents, although with 
conclusive enumeration.95 
The freedom of movement is granted without limit in Art. 12 I AfrCHPR. And so the Banjul 
Charter exceeds the scope of protection of the two other regional covenants.96 The ACHR97 
as well as the ECHR98 permit the restriction of freedom of movement through simple law. 
The right “to leave any country, including one’s own and to return to one’s own country”, is 
manifested in Art. 12 II AfrCHPR and comes under qualified provision of legality. The 
Banjul Charter’s restriction possibility for the entry of one’s own citizens is unique in the 
international comparison.99 Art 12 III AfrCHPR includes the right to asylum from 
persecution, which comes under the proviso of national legislation as well as international 
convention100. Insofar as the prerequisites for the right to asylum are concerned, the Banjul 
Charter offers more extensive protection than, for instance, the ACHR, which determines in 
Art. 22 VII ACHR that right of asylum presupposes “persecution on account of political 
criminal offences or related normal criminal offences”. Art. 12 IV and V AfrCHPR belong 
together in terms of content. Paragraph IV specifies that a foreigner who is lawfully residing 
in the sovereign territory of a contracting state may only be expelled on account of a lawful 
decision. Paragraph V is of particular relevance for the purview of the Banjul Charter: It 
prohibits the mass expulsion of foreigners101 and – in contrast to the corresponding 
                                                 
95
  Compare: Art. 15 ACHR, Art. 11 ECHR. 
96
  A limitless guarantee of the freedom of movement seems to be questionable, however. There are a vast 
number of reasons which must inevitably lead to the restriction of the freedom of movement: For instance, 
in the event of a catastrophe, probationary conditions or with regard to individuals in military service. That 
the Charter has not devoted any attention whatsoever to these necessary restrictions ultimately leads to the 
fact that produces its own non-compliance in this regard.  
97
  Art. 22 I ACHR. 
98
  Art. 2 III SP IV ECHR. 
99
  In contrast, Art. 3 II of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR explicitly excludes such a proviso. 
100
  Reference is made here to the “OAU Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees” of 10 
September 1969, CAB/LEG/24.3 (in force since 20 June 1974). 
101
  The mass expulsion of foreigners and stateless individuals has always been a central problem of the human 
rights situation in Africa. In 1970, Ghana expelled all foreigners because of excessively high 
unemployment. All Liberians were expelled from the Ivory Coast and all Nigerians were expelled from 
Zaire in 1971 for political reasons. All foreigners were expelled from the Congo in 1977. Nigeria expelled 
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international provisions102 – specifies the scope of protection which also extends to ethnic or 
religious groups.  
Art. 13 I AfrCHPR guarantees every citizen the right to freely participate in the 
administration of public affairs, either directly or through a representative. But this right can 
only be exercised under observation of legal provisions. And so the Banjul charter takes into 
consideration the fact that the majority of the OAU’s member states are based on one-party 
systems. For this reason the scope of protection of Art. 13 I AfrCHPR is narrower than the 
comparable provisions.103 The ACHR also permits legal restrictions of this right, but only 
under the qualified prerequisites of Art. 23 II ACHR (provisions which refer to age, 
citizenship, residence, language, education, legal capacity, mental capacity or criminal 
convictions). For citizens from dictatorial or one-party states an appeal to the African Human 
Rights Court with reference to Art. 13 I AfrCHPR appears to be virtually impossible because 
of the quasi unlimited restriction possibilities. Only in liberal-democratically oriented states 
can citizens successfully claim a violation of Art. 13 I AfrCHPR.  
Art. 14 AfrCHPR guarantees the right to ownership and only permits an intervention in the 
public interest or in the interest of the community welfare, which has to be in accordance with 
the provisions of the corresponding laws. Therefore, in addition to the public interest or the 
community welfare, a lawful expropriation requires the existence of expropriation laws or 
laws from which an expropriation authorisation emerges. But the lack of a right to appropriate 
compensation upon expropriation is remarkable in comparison with the corresponding right of 
the ACHR104. The ECHR did not explicitly acknowledge such a right to compensation in the 
corresponding provision105, but this is read into the provision by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) as a prerequisite for compensation.106 In its obligation catalogue107, 
the Banjul Charter leaves the obligation to payment of taxes108 unaffected from this right to 
                                                 
all Ghanaians from the country in 1984. Compare: Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in 
Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: HRQ 6 (1984), pp. 141-159, 147. 
Nothing has changed in the present era. The most recent examples were the “repatriation” of Ethiopians 
from Eritrea in the course of the border conflict and the expulsion of all Tutsis from the Congo to Rwanda. 
Compare: Heidelberger Institut für internationale Konfliktforschung (Eds.), Konfliktbarometer 1998, p. 23 
et seqq. 
102
  Compare: Art. 22 IX ACHR, Art. 4 SP 4 ECHR. 
103
  Compare: Art. 3 SP 1 ECHR, Art. 23 ACHR. 
104
  Compare: Art. 21 II ACHR. 
105
  Compare: Art. 1 I SP 1 ECHR. 
106
  Compare the ruling in the case Lithgow et al. versus United Kingdom, Series A 120, para. 120. But 
according to the ECtHR this does not mean that full compensation is granted, but that a consideration has to 
be made between the severity of the measure and the objective to be achieved. 
107
  For reference to the Banjul Charter’s obligation catalogue, see below. 
108
  Compare Art. 29 No. 6 AfrCHPR. 
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ownership.  
And so the catalogue of civil and political rights encompasses a series of fundamental 
individual rights, as they are also included in the universal and regional human rights 
documents. However, the guaranteed rights are provided with a large number of barrier 
clauses which enable the national legislature to penetrate far into the respective standard range 
of protection. 
c) Economic, social and cultural rights  
In addition to civil and political rights, a series of economic, social and cultural rights 
(hereinafter referred to as ESC rights) are codified in the Banjul Charter. In the terminology 
coined by Vasak109 this concerns second generation human rights. Art. 15 AfrCHPR grants 
every individual a right to work under fair and satisfactory conditions and a right to equal pay 
for equal work. Art. 16 AfrCHPR guarantees a right to physical and mental health, and Art. 
17 AfrCHPR also includes a right to education and to participation in cultural life. It is 
noteworthy that all rights are not citizen-related, which is absolutely relevant in view of the 
refugee problem in many African countries110.  
The comparison of international law documents which guarantee social, economic and 
cultural rights on a universal and regional level allow one to recognise a distinct gradation in 
relation to the governmental duty to act: In Section I of the European Social Charter111, the 
contracting states have merely “consented, with all appropriate means […], to pursue a policy 
which is designed to create suitable prerequisites” which shall guarantee the exercise of 
rights. The ACHR112 already provides that the states “take measures […] which have the 
objective of gradually achieving the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights 
through legislation or other suitable means”. The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) decidedly formulates in Art. 2 I that every contracting state 
undertakes “to take measures by exhausting all of its possibilities in order to gradually 
achieve – with all suitable means, particularly through legislative measures – the complete 
implementation of the rights mentioned in the covenant.” On the other hand, these rights are 
                                                 
109
  Compare: Footnote 76 above. 
110
  According to the UNHCR, there are 3.6 million refugees in Africa (status: July 2006). For example, among 
these refugees there are approximately 180,000 in Ethiopia, Guinea and Uganda, 510,000 in Tanzania, 
215,000 in Zambia and 203,000 in Kenya; compare: www.unhcr.de. Not included in these figures are the 
numerous domestic refugees (1.3 million) who do not enjoy any legal advantage in this connection, 
however. 
111
  European Social Charter from 18.10.1961. 
112
  Art. 26 ACHR. 
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less nebulously arranged in the Banjul Charter, but formulated as completely actionable. Art. 
1 AfrCHPR collaterally obligates the states “to take legislative and other measures pertaining 
to the implementation” of all rights, obligations and freedoms.  
In connection with the state reports, these rights are still relatively well-manageable for the 
Commission because they open up the possibility to gain an insight into the reality of life in 
the reporting state through specific questions, and to occasionally provide fresh impetus to an 
area through improvement proposals which lie beyond the realm of civil and political 
fundamental rights. This does not merely concern showing the reporting state its 
shortcomings, but actually pointing out the possibilities and necessities of a legal provision 
concerning certain subject matter, for instance in the realm of maternity protection113, health 
care114, working life115 or education116. 
But apart from their acknowledged quality as human rights, the social, economic and cultural 
rights always pose the issue of their justiciability117. The comparatively unequivocal 
                                                 
113
  For instance, the contracting states are urged within the scope of the state reporting procedure with regard 
Art. 15 und 16 AfrCHPR to report on measures for prenatal and postnatal health care, special care for 
working mothers (payment, protection against unlawful dismissal), measures regarding protection for 
mothers working in agriculture or in family enterprises and relief measures for unmarried mothers. 
Compare: Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, 2nd Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1988-1989, ACHPR/RPT/2nd Annex II para. II A 29. 
114
  With reference to the state report from Zimbabwe at the 21st session, a commissioner noted “that it would 
appear President Mugabe has decided to eliminate homosexuality in order to avoid a further spread of 
AIDS. [...] I should like to know what the present legal situation is in Zimbabwe today.” Rachel Murray, 
Minutes of the 21st session, p. 75, unpublished. 
115
  From the states it is expected that they report on measures in the private and public sector which 
particularly comprise an appropriate remuneration, social security, vocational training possibilities and job 
security. Legal and collectively agreed provisions regarding working times, overtime, paid holiday leave, 
public holidays and payment in the event of illness shall also be communicated. Compare: Guidelines for 
National Periodic Reports, 2nd Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, 1988-1989, ACHPR/RPT/2nd Annexe II para. II B 54(b) and II 9 (b). 
116
  In this connection, amongst other things, measures are taken into consideration which ensure a free and 
generally accessible basic education and further vocational training, with any sex-related discrimination 
becoming impossible. In addition, such provisions which ensure that individuals can establish educational 
institutes shall be communicated. Compare: Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, ibid para. II B. In 
this connection, at the 21st session a commissioner commented with regard to the Zimbabwe state report 
that private school institutes provide a lower educational standard: “You say on private land, the schools 
are substandard, but nothing can be done about it because they are on private land. Doesn’t the state have 
power to legislate over such matters of public concern on private land? And in answering that you may 
want to consider whether if murder is committed on private land, the state would be silent about it.” Rachel 
Murray, Minutes of the 21st session, p.74, unpublished. 
117
  The term “justiciability” is not uniformly applied in the jurisprudence literature, which necessitates a 
clarification for the following statements. Sometimes it only means that mechanisms exist for 
implementation and/or observation of rights (compare: Michael Addo, Justiciability Re-examined, in: Ralph 
Beddard, Dilys Hill (Eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Progress and Achievements, London et 
al. 1992, pp. 93-117, 95). “Justiciability” is elsewhere described as the quality of a legal standard to be 
reviewed in a juridical or quasi-juridical monitoring mode (according to E.W. Vierdag, Legal Nature of the 
Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in: NYIL 11 
(1978), pp. 69-105, 76 et seqq.). For Scheinin these are two facets of the definition of “justiciability” 
(Martin Scheinin, Direct Applicability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in: Krysztof Drzewicki 
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formulation of the rights in the Banjul Charter is also not capable of changing this.  
This issue is pivotal in connection with their enforcement before the African Human Rights 
Court. Also noteworthy in this connection is the fact that up to now no possibility exists – 
neither on the regional nor on the universal level – to censure the violation of economic, 
social and cultural rights in an appellate procedure, let alone to implement these rights with 
the aid of juridical assistance.118 In this context the African regional system uncritically 
entered and still enters terra incognita. The Commission – unimpressed by legal qualms – 
suggested not shrinking back from the submission of notifications which censure a violation 
of ESC rights because there were uncertainties with regard to the actionable content of these 
rights.119 
Uncertainty with regard to the justiciability of ESC rights exists in two ways:  
For one thing, they are so vague and exhortatory formulated that a court can hardly sift out 
their actual content with regard to their applications in a specific case. More clearly 
expressed: How satisfactorily must working conditions be in order to apply as satisfactory 
working conditions as defined by Art. 15 I AfrCHPR?120 
Secondly, these rights are contingent on resources in terms of content, i.e. they revolve around 
the question of how much money is to be spent for which purposes, and not instead for other 
purposes. This is a question which actually is not to be answered through the judiciary, but 
                                                 
(Ed.). Social Rights as Human Rights, Turku 1994, pp. 73-87, 82). This notion at issue is exclusively 
applied according to the second understanding, since the justiciability of ESC rights in the Banjul Charter 
would be undoubtedly affirmed according to the first explanation of the term. 
118
  However, at the moment a draft of an additional protocol to the ICESCR is being worked out, which shall 
permit individual complaints before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Compare: 
Report of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Commission on Human Rights on 
a draft protocol for the consideration of communications in relation to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights E/CN.4/1997/105. 
119
  For instance, before the NGO conference which was held in preparation for the 28th session of the 
Commission (23.10-6.11.2000) in Cotonou (Benin), Commissioner Pityana also explicitly called on the 
present NGO community to utilise the existing mechanisms in the notification process for economic, social 
and cultural rights in order to exhaust the entire regulatory content of the Banjul Charter. The Commission 
itself could not be active in a sua sponte sense, but required a commensurate occasion. This was more 
important than achieving clarity as to which legal nature befits these rights. Rachel Murray, Minutes of the 
28th Session, p. 64, unpublished. 
120
  Although it has to be noted that a growing number of cases concerning ESC rights is under consideration of 
judicial instances. I.e. the South African Supreme Court has recently decided on questions concerning the 
right of housing (enshrined in Art. 20 of the South African Constitution) and has chosen a differentiated 
approach: It has demanded from the government to set up “a coherent public housing program directed 
towards the progressive realization of the right of access to adequate housing within the state’s available 
means”. ( South Africa v Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (South Africa)) The Court continues, however, 
that “[the] precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a matter for the 
Legislature and the Executive. They must, however, ensure that the measures they adopt are reasonable.” In 
the authors view, this approach just shelves the problem. The question, if measures are “reasonable” again 
is not a judicial one. Where there is no money, no judgement can demand to spend it.  
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through the executive and legislative entities, and therefore the judiciary solution represents a 
certain interruption with regard to the principle of separation of powers. This question 
naturally gains explosiveness the less money is available to be spent.121 
In the jurisprudential debate, the opinion has prevailed that two aspects in particular are of 
special relevance in the legal treatment of ESC rights in relation to their justiciability: 
According to the literature, authors unanimously agree that ESC rights imply certain “core 
obligations” despite their incalculable scope.122 These vary on their part from right to right, 
and must be developed by the Human Rights Court. The second aspect, which has already 
been laid down in the so-called “Limburg Principles”, also seems to be significant in this 
connection:123 ESC rights can be explicitly taken into account if their governmental guarantee 
violates the ban on discrimination.124  
And so with regard to the application of ESC rights, the Human Rights Court is on the brink 
of a mostly undeveloped field that provides it with enormous possibilities: It can define the 
core areas of ESC rights by liberating them from their corset of informality and lending them 
appropriate justiciability. As a result, it would underscore their normative character and 
reflect the homogeneity and interdependence of the different human rights generations. In this 
way, the ESC rights would guarantee a minimum standard that imposes certain obligations on 
the states under consideration of the actually available resources.125 Thus considered, the ESC 
rights in the poor states of Africa – in which the anyway meagre resources are either siphoned 
off by an elite minority, flow into pompous buildings as national status symbols or the 
armaments apparatus is magnified at the cost of the population’s vested infrastructural 
                                                 
121
  Michael Dennis, David Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should there be an 
International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, in: 
AJIL 98 (2004) pp. 462-515, 514. 
122
  Compare: Peter Baehr, Human Rights - Universality in Practice, New York 1999, p. 35, Katarina 
Tomasevski, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in: ICJR 55 (1995), pp. 203-219, 208. 
The contents of these “core obligations” were also not specified on her part. In the case of the European 
Social Charter, the committee of experts pointed out the obligations of the individual contracting state on 
the basis of its special economic situation: Baehr, loc. cit.; however, such a development cannot be seen on 
a universal level. 
123
  The so-called “Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” were adopted within the scope of a conference initiated by the ICJ, which was 
supposed to specify the contents and scope of the ESC rights included in the ICESCR. The “Limburg 
Principles” are quoted in HRQ 9 (1986), p. 131 et seqq. 
124
  National and international courts and tribunals from all over the world already make use of this aspect of 
ESC rights. Comp. Center of Housing Rights and Evictions (Ed.), Leading Cases on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Summeries, 2006, this extensive colletion of jurisprudence is available under 
www.cohre.org/litigation.  
125
  Bruno Simma, “Der Ausschuß für wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte” (CESCR), in: VN 37 
(1989), pp. 191-196, 194. 
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rights126 – have a potentially major political and legal importance. The question as to whether 
a state complies with an obligatory ruling is a completely different matter and also may not be 
ignored by the Human Rights Court. But this should not change anything with regard to the 
fact that the Human Rights Court examines the adequacy of governmental compliance 
measures and compiles criteria which ensure the contractual implementation.  
Moreover, outside of these core areas the Human Rights Court can determine the 
discriminatory non-granting of ESC rights and work towards a uniform economic, social and 
cultural development within the realm of its further contents. However, such a progressive 
application of ESC rights requires special care and thoroughness from the Human Rights 
Court: The contracting states may not be imposed anything impossible through its ruling. The 
extent of discretionary powers with reference to the implementation of ESC rights, which is 
much more narrowly composed with regard to civil and political rights, must be retained by 
the Human Rights Court within reasonable limits. In the practical application, rulings in this 
rather “exotic” human rights sphere must also be particularly clearly formulated and well-
founded in terms of content in order to convince the addressees of its implementation.  
At any rate, the Commission’s experiences in the contradictory dealings with ESC rights to 
date are not suitable as an orientation guide: The processing of corresponding notifications 
which reached the Commission failed due to the cooperative refusal of the respectively 
affected states.127 Following their practice with regard to non-participation of states in the 
notification procedure, of regarding the statement of affairs presented by the complainant as 
undisputed128; the Commission determined general violations of ESC rights and called on the 
corresponding state in a likewise general manner “to draw all the legal consequences arising 
from the present decision”.129  
The international value of these statements is naturally very limited for the application of the 
material content of ESC rights under these circumstances. Here it is once again shown that the 
involvement of the states as international standard providers and simultaneous addressees of 
these standards is existential for the legal development through application and interpretation 
                                                 
126
  The conduct of the Ethiopian Government (i.e. the AU’s host country) in the border conflict with Eritrea 
may serve as an illustration: In the summer of 1999, eight million people in Ethiopia were threatened with 
starvation on account of a three-year drought, whereas the Government in Addis Ababa provided an 
estimated 600 million US dollars for defence spending in the 1998/1999 budgetary year. After this situation 
had been criticised on the diplomatic level by Germany, Ethiopia recalled its ambassador from Bonn for 
consultations due to “anti-Ethiopian propaganda”. Compare: Hungerkatastrophe in Ostafrika, in: the 
Tagesspiegel from 17.2.2000, p. 13. 
127
  Joined Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 vs. Zaire; Communication.  
128
  [Loc. Cit.], also Communication; 60/91 vs. Nigeria; 87/93 vs. Nigeria; 101/93 vs. Nigeria. 
129
  Communication 159/96 vs. Angola, Merits. 
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instances. 
2. Collective Rights  
The Banjul Charter includes a novelty in the sphere of international human rights 
codification.130 It is the only convention which guarantees the collective rights (third-
generation rights, as characterised by Vasak’s terminology) as positive rights.131 For one 
thing, the Charter formulates a collective equality requirement (Art. 19 AfrCHPR) and 
specifically guarantees the “rights of peoples’” to self-determination (Art. 20 I AfrCHPR), 
liberation from colonial foreign rule (Art. 20 II), to political, economical and cultural support 
in the liberation struggle (Art. 20 III AfrCHPR), to free disposal of the riches and mineral 
resources (Art. 21 I AfrCHPR), to lawful recovery of its property and adequate compensation 
in the event of unlawful removal of these riches (Art. 21 II AfrCHPR), to development and 
consistent involvement in the common heritage of mankind (Art. 22 III AfrCHPR), to 
national and international peace (Art. 23 I AfrCHPR) and to a satisfactory environment (Art. 
24 AfrCHPR). Even this brief overview clearly illustrates how less substantial and vague the 
individual collective rights are formulated. This also came about with full intention: Firstly, 
not to endanger the ratification of the Banjul Charter through the outbreak of further 
disagreements; and secondly to give the Commission the latitude for a dynamic treatment of 
this [at that time] still very young legal category.132 However, this opportunity did not ensue 
for the Commission, with one exception133, and so the original ambiguities consciously 
                                                 
130
  At this point, only the third-generation rights shall be addressed insofar as they are necessary for the 
question of their effect for the Human Rights Court. A detailed discussion of the development and 
problems in connection with third-generation human rights is not an element of this study and would lead 
too far. The numerous amount of literature is referred to, e.g.: Arming Bethel, Die Menschenrechte der 
Dritten Generation, Aachen 1991; Christian Tomuschat, Rights of People, in: Yvo Hangartner, Stefan 
Trechsel (Eds.), FS Hans Haug, Bern 1986, pp. 337-354; very differentiated: Wolfgang Benedek, Peoples’ 
Rights and Individual Duties as Special Features of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: 
Philip Kunig, Wolfgang Benedek, Costa Mahalu (Eds.), Regional Protection of Human Rights by 
International Law: The Emerging African System, Baden-Baden 1985, pp. 59-94; compare also the 
treatises in James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples, Oxford 1988. 
131
  One exception is to be made here in reference to the right to self-determination. This is already laid down in 
the two human rights covenants from 1966 and is meanwhile binding as a customary law or as a general 
legal principle — and is mainly perceived with ius cogens character. Compare: Karl-Josef Partsch, 
Menschenrechte und Rechte der Völker, in: VN 34 (1986), pp. 153-161, 154. 
132
  Kéba Mbaye, Les Droits de l‘Homme en Afrique, p. 173. 
133
  With the Communication 75/95 Katangese Peoples’ Congress vs. Zaire the petitioner attempted under 
reference to Art. 20 I AfrCHPR to assert the right of the Katangese population to self-determination, since 
the Government of Zaire suppressed the province’s endeavours towards independence. The Commission 
determined that the right to self-determination can be awarded substance in different ways: Through 
independence, self-Government, federalism, confederacy or any other form of relationship which 
corresponds to the wishes of the affected population, but which stands in complete unison with other 
acknowledged principles. The Commission saw itself as obligated to maintain Zaire’s independence and 
territorial integrity, and merely examined whether the members of the ethnic group werde denied the right 
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accepted still exist.  
And so the material content of the third-generation rights laid down remains completely 
shapeless. Insofar as they are not typical de-colonisation rights, virtually every statement of 
affairs may be subsumed in terms of content under one of their statements of fact.134 
Therefore the enforceability of their contents is negated in the literature. This is partially 
associated with the accusation that legal-political requirements are clad in juridical claims.135 
They are also partially qualified as prerequisite rights in the sense of a link between state 
sovereignty and individual human rights.136 
Apart from the problem of their concretion in terms of content, further unresolved questions – 
which ensue from the nature of the solidarity rights in connection with their justiciability – are 
posed in relation to the application of these provisions through the Human Rights Court, and 
two other components are featured in addition to the uncertainties in relation to ESC rights: 
Who is the beneficiary of these rights? Who is obligated by them?  
The “people” are favoured through the solidarity rights of the Banjul Charter. The 
Commission circumvented its definition in the only case presented to it, and merely implied 
that the petitioners are potentially favoured.137 In terms of jurisprudence, this term is 
approached in different ways. It is partially understood to be a community which is not even 
amenable to the external definition, because it identifies itself from historical, political and 
social roots as “people”.138 According to this view, every ethnic group could invoke the 
“peoples’ rights”, irrespective of what constitutes the core of its solidarity. In view of the 
manifold ethnic, religious and cultural differentiation possibilities in every single African 
country, this open term would lead to an incalculable amount of potential subjectivities with 
regard to these rights. For this reason the peoples’ quality through mere self-identification is 
                                                 
to participate in the management of public affairs (Art. 13 I AfrCHPR). After this review, the Commission 
rejected the complaint as unjustified, and recommended the complainant to assert the right to self-
determination in another variation which is compatible with the principles of sovereignty and integrity. 
Compare: “Institut pour les Droits Humains et le Développement” (Eds.), Compilation des Décisions de la 
Commission Africaine des droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, p. 39 et seqq. 
134
  Compare: Christian Tomuschat, Solidarity Rights (Development, Peace, Environment, Humanitarian 
Assistance), in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Bd. IV, Amsterdam et 
al. 1995, pp. 460-467, 463. 
135
  Martin Hacker, Völkerrecht und Nord-Süd Problematik vor der Generalversammlung, in: VN 2 (1980), pp. 
41-47, 45; similarly: Christian Tomuschat, Das Recht auf Entwicklung, in: GYIL 25 (1982), pp. 85-112, 
100.  
136
  Norman Paech/Gerhard Stuby, Machtpolitik und Völkerrecht, Baden-Baden, 1994, p. 547 et al. 
137
  “Que les Katangais comptent un ou plusieurs groupes éthniques, la question n’est pas là dans ce cas 
d’espèce.” Compare: “Institut pour les Droits Humains et le Développement” (Eds.), “Compilation des 
Décisions de la Commission Africaine des droits de l’Homme et des Peuples”, p. 39 et seqq. 
138
  “Un euple ne se définit pas. Il s’identifie.” Compare: Kéba Mbaye, Les Droit de l’Homme en Afrique, Paris 
1990, p. 173. 
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impracticable. The contrary approach understands the term “people” under reference to the 
motivation to create homogeneous nations – the “national folk” – within the existing colonial 
borders.139 This is substantiated with the peoples’ right of self-determination guaranteed in 
Art. 20 I AfrCHPR. To classify ethnic groups as “people” and thus the beneficiaries of 
solidarity rights would be diametrically opposed to the AU principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. On the other hand, this position also does not deal with all aspects of the 
heterogeneity prevailing in Africa within the various national folk.140 The ICJ, in 
collaboration with the UNESCO Committee of Counsellors on Peoples’ Rights, endeavoured 
towards a compromise and at the same time a manageability of third-generation rights, and 
listed the six following criteria, which shall fulfil the meaning of the term “people”. First of 
all, a “people” must associate a common history; secondly, it must be ethnically integrated; 
thirdly, it must show cultural and linguistic commonalities; and fourthly, it also has to show 
religious and ideological commonalities. Fifthly, the “people” must be comprehensible in 
geographic terms; and sixthly, must show a certain minimum number.141 
Whether these criteria would actually be helpful to the Human Rights Court in any application 
of the law may be doubted just like the question as to whether the Human Rights Court can 
infer the subject matter of a guarantee from these rights. The manifold scientific views on this 
topic follow the multiple structures of third-generation rights. Therefore an authoritative legal 
interpretation would always have to put up with the accusation of arbitrariness. The further 
the Human Rights Court penetrates in these amorphous areas, the more it has to anticipate that 
its legal findings remain unheard, because they find no acceptance amongst the addressees. 
The “rights of peoples” are moral guiding principles which partially cover basic human needs, 
and partially ensue from the value orientation of the international relationship or the political 
objectives of states under the realm of developing countries. What these rights are lacking is 
their enforceability. But this is necessary, even if they are juridically asserted. The Human 
Rights Court’s dealings with these rights will thus prove to be extremely problematic. It is 
                                                 
139
  Compare: Rudolf Dolzer, Die afrikanische Banjul-Charta der Rechte der Menschen und der Völker, in: 
Deutsche UNESCO-Kommission (Eds.), Menschenrechte und ‘Rechte der Völker’, Munich 1983, p. 28; 
Karl-Josef Partsch, The Enforcement of Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights: Observations and their 
Reciprocal Relation, in: Rudolf Bernhardt, John Anthony Jolowicz (Eds.), International Enforcement of 
Human Rights, Berlin et al. 1987, pp. 25-29, 28; differentiating according to individual rights: James 
Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: “Peoples” or “Governments”, in: James Crawford (Eds.), The Rights of 
Peoples, Oxford 1988, pp. 55-69, 58 et seqq. 
140
  Julia Swanson, The Emergence of New Rights in the African Charter, in: NYLSJICL 12 (1991), pp. 307-
333, 315; Richard Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, in: AJIL 82 (1988), pp. 80-101, 84. 
141
  Compare: Gino Naldi, The Organization of African Unity – An Analysis of its Role, New York 1989, p. 
125. 
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regrettable that of all legal bodies, the African Human Rights Court is the first 
implementation authority for third-generation rights over which the shadow of uncertainty 
looms over the nature, content, obligors and holders of rights. Like the codification of ESC 
rights in the Banjul Charter, the collective rights within the scope of state reports before the 
Commission may also prove to be positive; but as a basis for a judicial review they are – 
unlike the ESC rights – entirely unsuitable.142 Already when dealing with ESC rights the 
Human Rights Court has to apply a considerable extent of innovative ability and persuasive 
power in order to make sure its ruling are being implemented. The judicial review of third-
generation rights involves the risk that its legal decisions lose their seriousness, and possible 
even appear as mere fantasy rulings. 
3. Obligations 
In addition to individual rights, the Banjul Charter also codifies individual obligations as 
another special feature of the international treaty.143 These include abstractly kept obligations 
vis-à-vis the family, the state and the international community (Art. 27 AfrCHPR) as well as 
the obligation to respect and to promote fellow human beings (Art. 28 AfrCHPR). Art. 29 
AfrCHPR partially specifies these obligations and includes, for instance, the obligation to 
provide one’s national community with one’s intellectual and physical abilities, not to 
endanger the national security, to defend the territorial integrity, to employ one’s workforce 
and to pay the statutory taxes.  
The obligation catalogue may hardly gain significance for the African Human Rights Court. 
This has its obvious cause in the fact that individual obligations are defined and enforced on 
the state level within the scope of national personal sovereignty and cannot be pursued within 
the scope of international proceedings.144 At any rate, they could be cited by the Human 
Rights Court to specify the protective scope of individual rights. It appears that this has never 
occurred, at least not in the practice of the Commission.  
                                                 
142
  This difference is also illustrated by the efforts to adopt a facultative protocol to the ICESCR that provides 
a similar control mechanism like that of the ICCPR. A draft protocol is already at hand, and is an object of 
discussion. Compare: Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, E/CN.4/1997/105; compare also: Nowak, The need for an optional protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in: RICJ 55 (1995), pp. 153-165, 156 et 
seqq.; NJCM Commentary on the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, in: NJCM-bulletin 23 (1998), pp. 237-244. 
143
  Compare concnering the position of the individual in international law, Antonio Cassese, International Law, 
Oxford 2005, pp. 144 et seqq; Beate Rudolf, Völkerrechtliche Pflichten des einzelnen und Drittwirkung von 
Menschenrechten, in: same/Juliane Kokott (Eds.), Gesellschaftsgestaltung unter dem Einfluss von Grund- 
und Menschenrechten, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 91-116, 92 et seqq. 
144
  Rachel Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Oxford 2000, p. 112. 
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IV. The Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
Section 2 of the Banjul Charter includes under the heading “Protective Measures” the 
provisions concerning the “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 
(Commission). The organisational provisions are codified in Chapter 1 (Art. 30 to 44 
AfrCHPR). Chapter 2 assigns the Commission its responsibilities (Art. 45 AfrCHPR). 
Chapter 3 includes the procedural section (Art. 46 to Art. 59 AfrCHPR), and Chapter 4 
defines the principles to be applied by the Commission (Art. 60 to Art. 63 AfrCHPR).  
The Commission represents the only protective body that the Banjul Charter originally 
provides for. It is supposed to work towards the implementation of the Charter in the 
contracting states, safeguard the observance of its provisions and offer assistance with the 
solution on a supranational level in the event of conflict. The Human Rights Court is made 
available to the Commission after entry into force of the additional protocol. The future 
African human rights protection system thus follows the corresponding organisational terms 
with the American human rights protection system, which also provides for a Commission 
and a Human Rights Court. However, the Commission was abolished with the Eleventh 
Protocol to the European Human Rights Convention and replaced through the Standing 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). At this point it is shown on which organisational 
basis the Commission stands, which personnel and material resources are available to the 
Commission, with which competencies it is equipped and how it makes use of these. 
1. Organisational Framework  
First of all, the organisational framework in which it functions is the basis for an evaluation of 
the Commission. The concomitant provisions are found in Art. 30 to 68 AfrCHPR. 
a) Composition 
Commensurate with Art. 31 I AfrCHPR, the Commission consists of eleven members, who 
are selected “amongst African personalities of utmost standing” and “who are well-known for 
their high morals, integrity, impartiality and expertise in the realm of human and peoples’ 
rights, whereby the involvement of individuals with legal experience is to be taken into 
special consideration.”145 But the fact that the factual prerequisites are so vaguely maintained 
also results in the fact that rather unqualified members also belong to the Commission, 
                                                 
145
  In the inter-American system, the commissioners must be “personalities of high ethical character and must 
have acknowledged expertise in the realm of human rights” (Art. 34 ACHR). A provision concerning the 
qualification of commissioners is lacking in the European system. 
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whichdue to the marginal number of commissioners146 becomes immediately evident.147 The 
Banjul Charter does not call for any geographical consideration with regard to the 
composition.148 There is also no provision on the consideration of a balance of sexes within 
the Commission. The Commission consisted of men up until 1993. Since the 10th Session 
(1991), the participating NGOs thus formulated the urgent demand to also involve women as 
commissioners.149  
Much more serious, however, is the lack of an incompatibility provision in the Banjul 
Charter, which could safeguard the independence of Commission members. Of course, with 
the advice “it is not desirable to have the Headquarters of the Commission where political and 
administrative organs are located”, the Commission recommended that the OAU’s “Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government” emphasise their independence from the mother 
organisation through the fact that its headquarters should not be located in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, but in Banjul, Gambia.150 But this did not point the way towards the future political 
independence of the commissioners. This resulted in the fact that many members belonged 
and still belong to the Commission, whose profession is clearly incompatible with the 
responsibilities of a commissioner for human rights.–151 For instance, Commissioner 
Moleleki Mokama (1987-1993) was Chief Public Prosecutor in Botswana, and Commissioner 
                                                 
146
  Commensurate with Art. 20 ECHR (fomer version), one member per contracting state belongs to the 
European Commission on Human Rights. The Council of Europe had 41 members when the Commission 
was abolished. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights consists of only seven members (Art. 34 
ACHR). 
147
  For instance, the current commissioner from Malawi (Vera Chirwa) is to be assessed as such a 
“miscasting”. She was obviously recommended and elected as recognition for her personal fate. (together 
with her husband, she had been sentenced to death as a political prisoner under the Banda regime in 
Malawi). Under pressure from the African Commission (Communication 78/92, AI vs. Malawi), the 
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Her husband lost his life as a result of torture during the 
prison sentence. Unfortunately, she lacks a legal educational background. At the 28th Session of the 
Commission she restricted her remarks to current topics (Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict or the domestic political 
disturbances in the Ivory Coast), thus appealing to the conflict parties to engage in altruism and to obey the 
Ten Commandments, since human rights violations would not even emerge then. Rachel Murray, Minutes 
of the 28st session, p. 24, unpublished. 
148
  But an equitable geographical distribution has always been observed in de facto terms. At the moment, 
three commissioners come from West Africa, two from Central Africa, three from North Africa, one from 
East Africa and two come from southern Africa. 
149
  Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, The Hague 1996, p. 16; in the 
meantime, four women are members of the Commission. 
150
  Recommendation on the Headquarters of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Libreville, 28 April 1988, printed in: Recommendations and Resolutions, Banjul 1998, p. 7; another reason 
for the recommendation was that Gambia’s democratic development should be honoured. Moreover, 
Ethiopia only ratified the Banjul charter in 1997, whereas the president of Gambia (Jarawa) had strongly 
advocated the adoption of the Charter. 
151
  In contrast to the secretariat employees, the commissioners only perform their duty on a part-time basis, 
and otherwise pursue their original profession. Compare: U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, The Hague, 1997, p. 69. 
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Alexis Gabou152 (1987-1993) was Minister of the Interior in Congo. The professions of 
Commissioner Janaiba Johm (Chief Public Prosecutor in Gambia) and Commissioner 
Mohammed Ben Salem (Tunisian Ambassador in Ankara) can hardly be described as 
compatible with the position of an independent commissioner in the current staffing. This 
situation is a regular object of criticism on the part of the NGOs.153 On the other hand, the 
Commission rejects this criticism and arguments with the advantages which such a position 
would render in the home country for the promotion of human rights.154 In other respects, the 
impartiality would already be safeguarded through Art. 109 of the Commission’s Rules of 
Procedure (RP)155. Accordingly, no member of the commission may take part in the handling 
of communications if he or she has a personal interest in the case, or is involved in any 
decision which is in connection with the complaint. Furthermore, it is stated against the 
objection that the commissioners belong to the Commission as individuals commensurate 
with Art. 31 II AfrCHPR, and take the official oath to fulfil their obligations “impartially and 
conscientiously” in accordance with Art. 38 AfrCHPR.  
This does not go down well: The success or failure of a merely quasi-legal body is 
particularly contingent on its outwardly effective independence. It is the guarantor for the 
impartiality of the arbitration and thus an essential factor for the persuasive powers of its 
content. As a result, the Commission loses – independent of the actual quality of its work – its 
credibility in the same extent as its independence may be doubted.  
Of course, apart from the fact that the “Assembly of Heads of State and Government” elects 
the members of the Commission, the Commission cannot be accused of not adhering to 
incompatibility rules which are not included in the Charter. However, it allowed opportunities 
to create a remedy within the scope of its self-administration to expire without being 
exploited.  
For instance, the incompatibility rules of Art. 109 RP are excessively geared towards the 
                                                 
152
  Therefore Gabou was repeatedly called on by NGOs to resign. He refused to do so, but at the same time he 
was absent without excuse from several sessions. He was not re-elected when Congo once again put him up 
for the next election. Compare: Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
The Hague 1996, pp. 15 and 18. 
153
  Renate Meuer, Renate Mahnke, 200/96 WDdDBT, p. 9, unpublished. 
154
  Evelyn Ankumah, loc. cit.; in fact, there is a case in which a commissioner took advantage of his influence 
through his position in the home country and was able to bring about a consensus. Compare: Henry 
Kalenga v. Zambia, Communication No. 11/88, printed in “Compilation des Décisions de la Commission 
Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, Institut pour les Droits Humains et le Développement” 
(Eds.), Banjul, 1999, p. 6. 
155
  The Rules of Procedure (RP) were adopted in 1988 during the Second Session of the Commission in Dakar, 
Senegal. A slightly modified version has been valid since 6.10.1995. Insofar as nothing else is designated, 
the article numbers refer to this new version. Compare: Revised Rules of Procedure, printed in: AJICL 8 
(1996) 4, pp. 978 –1003. 
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discernment of the concerned commissioner instead of making an unequivocal statement that 
a commissioner is excluded from any handling of communications and state reports which 
pertain to his own country. The Commission could also recommend the OAU’s “Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government” to adopt independence and incompatibility guidelines which 
would then have to be heeded during the election of commissioners. At any rate, the current 
status of the Commission is incompatible with the responsibilities of an independent semi-
judicial body.  
b) Election of Commissioners 
The members of the Commission are elected via secret ballot by the “Conference of Heads of 
State and Government” from a list compiled by the contracting states to the Banjul Charter 
(Art. 33 AfrCHPR). The contracting states can each propose at most two candidates, of which 
only one may come from their own country, but both candidates must be citizens of a 
contracting state to the Banjul Charter (Art. 34 AfrCHPR). At the latest four months before 
the election of the commissioners the Secretary General of the OAI calls on the contracting 
states to submit their proposals. At the latest one month before the election, the Secretary 
General conveys the list of candidates to the heads of state and government (Art. 35 
AfrCHPR). The term of office amounts to six years. During the first election, four members 
of the Commission were only elected for two years, and another three members were only 
elected for four years (Art. 36 AfrCHPR), whereby one commissioner’s term of office was 
determined by lot (Art. 37 AfrCHPR). 
After the Banjul Charter entered into force on 21 October 1986 commensurate with Art. 63 III 
AfrCHPR, the members of the Commission were elected by the OAU’s following (23rd) 
“Conference of Heads of State and Government” on 29 July 1987, and the Commission was 
thus constituted.  
c) Relationship of the Commission to the OAU 
The position which a body assumes in the overall structure of an international institution is of 
great importance for the validity claim of its resolutions.156 The Commission was set up as a 
sub-organisation of the OAU (Art. 30 AfrCHPR). The specification of its organisational 
relationship with the mother organisation is partially found in the Banjul Charter and partially 
in the Standing Orders. 
                                                 
156
  Herbert Miehsler, On the Authority of Findings of International Institutions, in: Christoph Schreuer (Ed.), 
Autorität und internationale Ordnung, Berlin 1979, pp. 34-61, 47. 
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The supreme decision-making body of the OAU and AU, respectively, is the “Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government”. As already stated, it elects the commissioners in accordance 
with the provisions of Art. 31 to 37 AfrCHPR. It decides on amendments and extensions to 
the Banjul Charter (Art. 68 AfrCHPR). Furthermore, the Assembly handles the annual 
activity report of the Commission (Art. 54 AfrCHPR), and can additionally assign specific 
responsibilities (Art. 45 No. 4 AfrCHPR).157 But above all, the Assembly also decides on 
cases of massive human rights violations brought forward by the Commission (more on this 
further below). The Secretary General of the OAU or the AU Commission President functions 
as a link between the plenary body of the OAU and the Commission (Art. 35, 47 and 49 
AfrCHPR). He has the opportunity to take part in the Commission’s sessions and to address 
the Commission, but without having a right to vote (Art. 42 V AfrCHPR). Furthermore, he 
appoints the Commission Secretary and provides personnel and facilities which are necessary 
for the fulfilment of the Commission’s responsibilities.  
The relevance of the individual provisions for fulfilment of responsibilities through the 
Commission is most clearly disclosed in connection with their functional exercise in the 
course of this consideration. But it can be stated in advance that the narrow organisational and 
procedural integration with the mother organisation – in particular, the fact that the 
Commission does not have the final decision-making authority within the scope of its own 
processes – substantially diminishes the weight of its decisions.  
d) The Financing of the Commission  
Even the financial resources which are provided to an institution by the carrier organisation 
always have an indicative effect for the fundamental significance it is intended for. As far as 
that is concerned, a consideration permits conclusions pertaining to the political importance of 
the Commission within the OAU/AU.  
The Banjul Charter provides that the costs for personnel and material resources are to be 
defrayed from the regular budget of the OAU/AU (Art. 41, 44 AfrCHPR). The agreed budget 
shares its fate with the other items included in the total budget: Its disbursement is always 
with the proviso that the member states of the OAU/AU provide their contribution to the 
organisation. The deficient payment habits of member states of international organisations 
with regard to their contractual obligations are certainly a widespread phenomenon and no 
African peculiarity; but it is particularly evident with the member states of the OAU/AU: 
                                                 
157
  However, up to now the “Assembly of Heads of State and Government” still has not made use of the 
possibility of expansion of responsibilities; Communication of the Commission Secretariat (January 2007). 
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Many states always transfer only partial amounts, whereas others have not paid any 
contributions for over ten years.158 The Commission’s budget is only disbursed 
proportionately, and therefore stagnates at best on a low level. For instance, in the 1996/1997 
financial year only 576,000 US$ were paid out to the Commission.159 For this reason the 
prescribed length of meetings had to be cut, special meetings for current reasons could not be 
conducted,160 and unscheduled flights of chairmen were not even able to be financed. In the 
initial years, the secretariat was hardly able to carry out the constituency-level work at the 
very least.  
The Commission attempted to put things right by asking the Secretary General of the OAU 
for permission to also be able to accept foreign donations.161 Since the OAU is itself a 
beneficiary of extra-African donors,162 this permission was immediately granted. In the 
meantime, the Commission sessions are “financially accompanied”163 by the Ford 
Foundation, and western NGOs assume the extraordinary travel expenses of the 
commissioners.164 Five employees of the secretariat are financed with Danish assistance. The 
African Society (London) pays three employees and publishes the semi-annual “Review of 
the African Commission”. The European Union provides the necessary funds for the 
publication and distribution of the Banjul Charter as well as guidelines in different languages 
for the utilisation of the Commission. The resulting dependence of the Commission on extra-
                                                 
158
  For instance, 17 states had already lost their voting right in the organisation because they did not reduce 
their contribution arrears. Compare SZ from 1.3.1996, p. 4. The suspension of voting right is a frequently 
utilised means of international organisations in order to persuade their members to fulfil their payment 
obligations. Compare: Henry Schermers, Niels Bokker (Eds.), International Institutional Law, The Hague et 
al., 1996, §§ 1455 et seqq.; Philippe Sands/Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 
London 2001, pp. 576 et seqq; 541 et seqq. Ignatz Seidl-Hohenfeldern, Gerhard Loibl, Das Recht der 
Internationalen Organisationen einschließlich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften, Cologne et al., 1996 § 
2010. This sanction had an effect with regard to the willingness of its members to pay: The Sudan paid its 
membership fees for two years in the amount of 900,000 US$ because it absolutely wanted to secure the 
voting right for the summit meeting in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The contribution arrears diminished from US$ 
57.8 million (1995) to US$ 36.5 million (1996). But this was still the equivalent of more than twice the 
total annual budget of the OAU (US$ 29 million). Compare: Erfolg der OAU mit Strafkatalog in: FAZ 
from 21.06.1996, p. 9. 
159
  This is equivalent to 1.95% of the OAU’s total budget. Compare: Amnesty International, Organization of 
African Unity – Making Human Rights a Reality for Africans, 1998, p. 3. 
160
  Compare: Amnesty International, Organization of African Unity – Making Human Rights a Reality for 
Africans, IOR 63/01/98, August 1998, p. 8. 
161
  Recommendation on the Financial Rules and Regulations governing the Functioning of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, para. 6, printed in ACHPR – Resolutions and 
Recommendations, Banjul 1998, p. 8 et seqq. 
162
  Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, The Hague, 1996, p.28. 
163
  Compare: Ford Foundation, Annual Report 1999, p.89. The Ford Foundation also makes it possible for 
representatives of African NGOs to take part in Commission meetings. 
164
  For instance, all trips of the Special Rapporteurs on Prisons and Conditions are organised and completely 
financed by the Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation (NORAD) as well as by Penal 
Reform International (PRI). Communication from PRI, Paris. 
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African governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental sponsors is frequently 
criticised.165 Even the thesis that the Commission, as a body supported by extra-African 
protagonists, is merely a bridgehead for culturally-foreign influences is detrimental to its 
reputation.  
Anyhow, this form of financing contains the advantage that the system-immanent dependency 
of the Commission on the AU/OAU as a carrier organisation is at least reduced in financial 
terms. The implementation of politically disagreeable Commission activities can in this way 
at least not be hindered by the fact that no disbursement of funds takes place. And so political 
influence would have to be undertaken more openly, which makes it much more difficult at 
the same time. Nevertheless, despite external donations, the financial situation of the 
Commission is desolate and hinders the Commission in the effective implementation of its 
responsibilities. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who assessed the marginal 
financial resources as the main obstacle to the realisation of its work, also ascertained this 
fact.166 
e) The Secretariat of the Commission 
Since the Commission only meets for two sessions a year,167 the preparation and follow-up 
through the standing secretariat in Banjul, Gambia, is of crucial importance to the 
effectiveness of the Commission’s work. The Commission Secretary is appointed by the 
Secretary General of the OAU commensurate with Art. 41 AfrCHPR in conjunction with Art. 
22 No. 2 RP, and is not appointed by the Commission itself. In accordance with the 
Commission chairman, the Secretary is in charge of the secretariat operation, supports the 
members of the Commission in their work, serves as an intermediary for communications 
which arrive at the Commission and administers the archive.168 Furthermore, the secretariat 
makes tape recordings of the sessions and keeps them in safe custody,169 produces minutes on 
                                                 
165
  Vehemently, for instance by Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
The Hague 1996, p. 34 et seqq. She argues that as an independent body the Commission should also not be 
influenced by NGOs. In addition, she fears that “northern material dominance over Africa could result in 
the marginalization of Africans in the development of an effective human rights system for Africa” (p. 36). 
The mother organisation also has a conflicting relationship with foreign assistance. A member of the OAU 
Eminent Persons Advisory Panel is quoted as saying: “We don’t need external financing because we don’t 
want outsiders to control us”. Compare: Baffour Ankomah, Funding the Union, in: New African 408 (June 
2002), p. 15. 
166
  UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/93, para. 6. 
167
  Compare: Art 2 RP. 
168
  Compare: Art. 23 RP. 
169
  Compare: Art. 38 RP. 
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the results of the sessions and sends them to the participants.170  
For years on end this was the Commission’s organisational Achilles’ heel and stood more in 
its way than by its side during the fulfilment of its responsibilities: The first Commission 
Secretary obviously fulfilled neither the personal nor the professional prerequisites which 
such a position necessitates. Instructions were not followed, documents – amongst other 
things, an individual communication – were lost, translations were missing, letters were not 
forwarded,171 sessions were only deficiently prepared and available resources were not 
utilised. As a consequence of personal involvement – the OAU Secretary General appointed 
the Commission Secretary – the Commission itself could not replace an obviously flawed 
Secretary. Only upon the massive criticism of the NGOs – which unanimously called for his 
removal during the 12th Session of the Commission, because he proved himself to be the main 
obstacle to the work of the Commission172 – did a representative of the OAU Secretary 
General appear at the following session to form an impression of the situation. As a result, the 
Secretary was replaced by the General Secretariat.173  
In other respects, the inadequate financing through the OAU – particularly in the Secretariat 
realm – takes its toll: The Secretariat did not even have a copier or fax at its disposal during 
the first five years.174 Continuous understaffing is another reason which has a negative effect 
on the Secretariat’s work and thus on the results of the Commission.  
                                                 
170
  Compare: Art. 39 RP. 
171
  Incidentally, this problem also still crops up today — with far-reaching consequences. For instance, the 
London-based NGO “Interrights” submitted a communication against Botswana in which, amongst other 
things, it criticises that a woman condemned to death by the High Court of Botswana was not confronted 
with the crime, but the burden of proof for her innocence was communicated. This communication was 
submitted on 7.3.01 to the Secretariat per letter, fax and e-mail after prior telephonic notice. The 
Commission was urged to take provisional measures commensurate with Art. 111 RP due to the “pressing 
need for urgent intervention”. The occurrence remained unheeded for three weeks until the Secretariat 
forwarded the matter to the responsible commissioner who immediately addressed a fax to the president of 
Botswana on 29.3.01, and urged him “by virtue of Rule 111 (3) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure to 
ensure a stay of execution of the sentence imposed on Mrs. Bosch”. Mrs. Bosch was hanged on 30.3.01. 
Upon the inquiry from Interrights during the 31st Session in Pretoria as to why the provisional order had not 
been complied with, Commissioner Pytiana, who subsequently dealt with the Government of Botswana in 
this matter, responded: “According to the Government of the Republic of Botswana, the letter has not been 
received. We have no reason to doubt this.” The question as to why the matter was not handled for weeks 
on end in the Secretariat remained unanswered. The dossier is available with the author.  
172
  Compare: ICJ (Eds.), The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Work of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Geneva 1996, p. 30. 
173
  Wolfgang Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und 
nationaler Ebene, in: ZaöRV 54 (1994), pp. 150-181, 157. 
174
  Claude Welch, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and 
Assessment, in: HRQ 14 (1992), pp. 43-61, 55. 
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f) The Commission’s Relationship with NGOs 
From this difficult organisational situation it also ensues that the Commission cogently 
depends on the assistance of NGOs with regard to its activity. On the one hand, it hardly has 
the resources at its disposal in order to investigate human rights violations on the scene or to 
procure evidence, and on the other hand it may not deal with communications which 
“exclusively relate to information which is disseminated by the mass media”.175 In contrast to 
other regional human rights institutions176, NGOs can apply for observer status before the 
Commission and thus intensively participate in the work of the Commission.177 Then they 
have the right to participate in the Commission’s public sessions and to request the inclusion 
of certain items in the agenda.178 Whereas the Commission’s first sessions were still for the 
most part confidential, the agenda in this connection changed upon the pressure of the NGOs. 
The collaboration of the NGOs comes about above all through comments on the human rights 
situation in the home country or other African countries, and through involvement in the 
review of periodic state reports179 regarding the human rights situation.180 At the same time, 
the statements of the reporting states are compared with those of the NGOs (so-called 
“shadow reports”) by the Commission, which prevents the fact that the states take advantage 
of the Commission’s floor as a mere advertising platform through palliative reports.  
                                                 
175
  Compare: Art. 56 I No. 4 AfrCHPR. 
176
  In the European system, NGOs can acquire so-called “Consultative Status”, but this does not grant the 
extensive possibilities like an “Observer Status” before the African Commission. In the inter-American 
system, no formal recognition is provided for NGOs, even though in practice an interaction between the 
protective bodies with NGOs frequently occurs. Compare: Martin Ölz, Non-Governmental Organizations in 
Regional Human Rights Systems, in: ColHRLRev 28 (1997), pp. 307-374, 336 et seqq., 355 et seqq. 
177
  Art. 75 RP; at the present time (mid-2006), 267 NGOs have observer status. The first two NGOs which 
were awarded observer status were Amnesty International and the ICJ (in 1988). Compare: List of 
organizations granted observer status with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
DOC/OS (XXIX) 213b. 
178
  Art. 76 RP. 
179
  Art. 62 AfrCHPR. 
180
  In the meantime, however, many of the 267 recognised NGOs have withdrawn into passivity. They neither 
avail themselves of their right to participation in the sessions as observer nor provide written petitions or 
submit communications in accordance with Art. 55 AfrCHPR. In order to strengthen the cooperation with 
all NGOS, the Commission resolved at the 11th Session in Tunis (2 to 9 March 1992) that all NGOs with 
observer status shall prepare reports every two years, from which the activities and objectives of the 
respective NGO ensue. This should also serve as a certain form of quality control, since the Commission 
accused several NGOs of pursuing fundraising efforts with the observer status, and then diverting the 
financial means for this purpose. Many (127) for the most part regionally operating, very specialised NGOs 
have not submitted any report to date. Compare: Status of Submission of NGO Activity Reports as of 30th 
March 2001, DOC/OS (XXIX)/213b. This circumstance prompted the Commission to pronounce an 
ultimatum at its 24th Session in Banjul (22 to 31 October 1998), and to demand the submission of reports by 
the 27th Session (27 April to 11 May 2000 in Algiers) with the reference that otherwise the observer status 
of the tardy NGO would be withdrawn. Compare: Resolution on the Cooperation between the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and NGOs having Observer Status with the Commission, 
Banjul 31st October 1998. The Commission has not put this threat into action yet. 
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Moreover, the NGOs obtain another essential responsibility for the work of the commission: 
Neither the Banjul Charter nor the Commission’s rules of procedure call for a direct 
gravamen. Thus, to be a victim of a human right violation is not necessary to be entitled to file 
a complaint. It follows that third parties, in particular NGOs, can also submit communications 
on behalf of the victim. This is decidedly expedient, since an NGO is much more familiar 
with the proceedings before the Commission than a victim’s lawyer or even the victim 
himself/herself. At the same time, it is noteworthy that contrary to the otherwise customary 
tendency in Africa to avoid extra-African influences on its own legal culture, there is no 
restriction for African NGOs,181 and so international NGOs are also authorised to lodge 
complaints. In reality, this is extremely advantageous, particularly since special difficulties 
are frequently associated with regard to African NGOs bringing their own government before 
the Commission, since they are frequently exposed to reprisals which impede their other 
work. This is why national NGOs occasionally use international NGOs in order to take 
advantage of their independence, professionalism and reputation.182 Moreover, NGOs which 
publicly pursue their work are not based in all OAU member states.183  
In an effort to strengthen the involvement of African NGOs, the ICJ, in alternation with the 
African Society of Human Rights, has since the 10th Session of the Commission always 
sponsored a three-day NGO workshop before the commencement of the Commission session, 
in which representatives of the Commission also take part.184 For one thing, the African 
NGOs are thus introduced to the Commission’s working method. For another thing, this NGO 
community discusses supra-national concerns and presents the results and resolutions of the 
Commission during its session. An impression concerning the importance of NGOs for the 
Commission’s work is also gained by a look at the communications submitted to the 
Commission: Far more than half (66) of the communications decided up to 2003 were 
submitted by NGOs. In turn, 48 were attributed to international NGOs and only 18 were 
                                                 
181
  But this only applies restrictively to NGOs with an entirely extra-African effective radius: The petition of 
the Bangladesh Human Rights Commission was discussed at length at the 28th Session, because 
Commissioner Pytiana did not see any necessity to grant observer status to an NGO from Bangladesh. 
Rachel Murray, Report of the 28th Session, p 12; unpublished. 
182
  Wolfgang Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und 
nationaler Ebene, in: ZaöRV 54 (1994), pp. 150-181, 167. 
183
  Claude Welch, The Organization of African Unity and the Promotion of Human Rights, in: JMAS 29 
(1991), pp. 535-555, 553 et seqq. 
184
  Compare Martin Ölz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems, in: 
ColHRRev 28 (1997), pp. 308-374, 365. The resolutions and recommendations of the first ten workshops 
can be found in: ICJ (Eds.), The Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Work of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Geneva 1996. 
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attributed to African NGOs.185 Benedek ranks the cooperation with the NGOs amongst the 
“most fruitful developments in the work of the Commission”.186 He is to be agreed without 
restriction. The critiques and suggestions of the NGO community provided and still provide 
important stimuli for the working method of the Commission, and thus also for the positive 
further development of its results. They have ensured that the Commission works more 
transparently, and obvious weaknesses – such as the Secretariat – have been tackled and 
partially eliminated. The function of NGOs as counsel to the victim can also not be overrated.  
2. The Commission’s Responsibilities  
The most important criteria for the evaluation of an international human rights body are for 
one thing the competencies which have been intended by the supporting organisation, and for 
another thing the manner in which the body makes use of these competencies. Both aspects 
will be scrutinised in this section. The result constitutes the basis for answering the question 
regarding which place the Human Rights Court will assume in the African human rights 
protection mechanism, and in what way it takes advantage of the Commission’s merits and 
can balance weaknesses.  
The Banjul Charter assigns the following responsibilities to the Commission: The promotion 
and the protection of human and peoples’ rights, the interpretation of the Banjul Charter as 
well as those responsibilities which are delegated to it by the “Conference of Heads of State 
and Government”.187 Since the OAU’s plenary body still has not made any use of this last 
possibility to this very date (mid-2006),188 only the three first-mentioned functions are 
relevant to the study undertaken here.  
a) The promotional function  
How the promotion of human rights through the Commission has to look like exactly is only 
partially specified in the Banjul Charter. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the Commission to 
                                                 
185
  Compare: Institut pour les Droits Humains et le Développement (Eds.), Compilation des Décisions de la 
Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, Banjul 2000; With regard to the involvement 
of NGOs in the development of human rights in Africa, see: Harry Scoble, Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organizations in Black Africa: Problems and Prospects in the Wake of the Banjul-Charter, 
in: Claude Welch, Ronald Meltzer (Eds.), Human Rights and Development in Africa, Albany 1984, pp. 177 
- 203. 
186
  Wolfgang Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und 
nationaler Ebene, in: ZaöRV 54 (1994), pp. 150-181, 155. 
187
  Compare: Art. 45 AfrCHPR. 
188
  Umozurike states in this connection that in 1992 the Commission had monitored the presidential election in 
Mali. Compare: U.O. Umozurike, Six Years of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: 
Festschrift Bernhardt, pp. 635-645, 637. However, this came about at the request of the Government of 
Mali and was not an assignment of duties from the OAU’s “Assembly of Heads of State and Government”.  
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gather documents on human rights problems in Africa, to undertake research efforts on this 
topic, to organise seminars and conferences, to disseminate information, to support national 
and international human rights institutions and – “should the case arise” – to provide opinions 
and advice to governments.189 In addition, the Commission shall work out rules for 
integration of human rights, by which the African governments can orient themselves during 
their legislative activity.190 In other respects, the Commission’s cooperation with other 
African and international institutions dealing with the protection of human rights is 
desirable.191 Another promotional function is the state reporting procedure, which the Banjul 
Charter governs in Art. 62 AfrCHPR. Accordingly, every two years the signatory states have 
to submit a report on the measures taken as well as progress and difficulties with regard to the 
implementation of the Charter.  
aa) Promotional measures commensurate with Art 45 No. 1 AfrCHPR 
The Commission’s promotional measures according to Art. 45 No. 1 AfrCHPR are complex 
and depend, at least theoretically, on an action plan which the Commission prepares in order 
to concretise its assigned responsibilities.192 The African states are divided amongst the 
eleven commissioners with regard to the promotional activity: Each is responsible for the 
promotion of human rights and the Banjul Charter in up to six nations.193  
Problematic in this connection is the fact that the commissioners pursue their activity on a 
part time basis, and therefore they cannot befittingly expedite the promotion of human rights 
outside of the session. It is obvious that human rights can only be promoted by the 
commissioners on a limited basis during a two-week session in the manner prescribed by Art. 
45 No. 1 AfrCHPR. This is why the balance of the promotional measures turns out to be 
rather meagre.194 Up until 1998 there were a number of countries which a commissioner had 
                                                 
189
  Compare: Art. 45 No. 1 a) AfrCHPR. 
190
  Compare: Art. 45 No. 1 b) AfrCHPR.  
191
  Compare: Art. 45 No. 1 c) AfrCHPR; these promotional activities explicitly formulated in the Banjul 
Charter alone make the gross discrepancy between the Commission’s financial endowment and 
responsibilities obvious and underscore the urgent necessity for a productive and widespread cooperation of 
the Commission with the NGO community. 
192
  The current plan concerns the “Mauritius Plan of Action”, which the Commission adopted on 21 October 
1996 in Mauritius. 
193
  U.O. Umozurike, Six Years of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: “FS 
Bernhardt”, pp. 635-64, 636. 
194
  Perhaps the most noteworthy promotional measure as defined by Art. 45 No. 1 AfrCHPR was to rate the 
proclamation of 21 October, the anniversary of the Banjul Charter’s entry into force, as “African Day of 
Human Rights”. Compare: Resolution on the Celebration of an African Day of Human Rights, 5th Ordinary 
Session, 1989, Benghazi, Libya. The OAU’s “Conference of Heads of State and Government” supported 
this proposal and advised its members to celebrate the anniversary “by organising activities aimed at 
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never set foot in.195 Especially in nations such as Kenya, where – contrary to Art. 25 
AfrCHPR – the ratification of the Banjul Charter had not even been announced to the 
population,196 a more intensive and well-planned deployment of the responsible 
commissioner would have been desirable.  
The Commission has only reluctantly carried out the documentation and information mandate. 
Up until 1994 the Commission did not even have a registry or documentary department.197 
This also resulted in the fact that the scarce time in the periodic sessions was squandered for 
useless repetitions, since the corresponding documents were not duly archived.198  
Of course, the commissioners participate in numerous international seminars and visit African 
universities now and then, but these activities are only insufficiently communicated by the 
Commission itself.199 On the other hand, the African press does not show enough self-interest 
in the Commission’s activities in order to compensate for the information deficit. 
The Commission attempted to respond to this deplorable state of affairs in its action plan 
(Mauritius Plan of Action):200 Special importance shall be attached to the presence of 
journalists at the ordinary sessions. Workshops for journalists shall expedite the 
communications of the Banjul Charter and the Commission’s mode of operation in the 
African media, particularly in radio. The Banjul Charter shall also be translated into African 
languages and be increasingly distributed to interested parties. Special human rights courses 
shall be prepared for African jurists and a “Human Rights Award” shall be set up for 
deserving activists. The documentation department shall install a basic inventory of literature 
pertaining to human rights, international law, African constitutions, court decisions of human 
rights and international human rights periodicals. In addition, the action plan also includes a 
                                                 
promoting human and peoples’ rights”. Compare: Resolution on the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 27th Ordinary Session, Abuja, Nigeria, 1991, AHG/Res.202(XXVII); both resolutions are 
printed in: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Recommendations and Resolutions, 
Gambia 1998. 
195
  Compare: Geographical Distribution of Countries Among Commissioners for Promotional Activities, 
DOC/OS/36e (XXIII). 
196
  Wolfgang Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und 
nationaler Ebene, in: ZaöRV 54 (1994), pp. 150-181, 175. 
197
  Rachel Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law, Oxford 
2000, p. 15. 
198
  Compare: Amnesty International, Credibility in Question, IOR 63/02/98, p. 9. 
199
  Normally they are listed as a summary annexe to the annual activity reports. An explicit report on a seminar 
is prepared on an extremely rare basis. For instance, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Seminar on 
National Implementation of ACHPR into Internal Legal Systems in Africa, in: Sixth Annual Activity 
Report ACHPR/RPT/6th Annexe VIII, Final Report on the African Conference on Journalists and Human 
Rights in Africa, ibid, Annexe IX. But the annual reports are not easily accessible for everyone. With the 
activities of the Commission organised by international NGOs the reports are compiled by the concerned 
organisation itself, printed and passed on to the Commission. 
200
  Compare: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Mauritius Plan of Action p. 4 et seqq. 
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supporting programme for strengthening the Secretariat area and the Commission’s protective 
mandate.  
Even this brief insight into the Mauritius Plan of Action sufficiently shows that the 
Commission is not nearly able to come to terms with the manifold responsibilities. The 
reasons for this lie for one thing in the Commission’s insufficient endowment: First of all, all 
targeted objectives signify an enormous financial expenditure which the Commission can 
hardly bear. For another thing, the objectives are so vaguely formulated that a tangible result 
is still not in sight. Another reason for the prospective failure of the plan is also the lacking 
attention which is also shown by the Commission. A systematic approach by the individual 
commissioners is not recognisable. This may also be due to the fact that the plan itself sets no 
priorities and above all things explains no personal responsibilities.  
Last but not least, the commissioners purely and simply lack the time to intensively dedicate 
themselves to the promotional tasks, since the main emphasis of their activity lies in the 
handling of communications and the implementation of the state reporting procedure. This is 
also why no reference is made to the plan in the periodic sessions. Therefore the upshot of the 
Commission cannot turn out to be very positive: Most of the objectives in connection with the 
promotion of human rights will be found again in the follow-up plan which the Commission 
will prepare at the end of 2007. On the whole, the Commission’s working methods insofar as 
its responsibilities ensuing from Art. 45 No. 1 lit. a AfrCHPR are concerned, are capable of 
and in need of optimisation in many respects.  
However, this does not apply to the assignment of duties ensuing from Art. 45 No. 1 lit. c 
AfrCHPR, the cooperation with institutions which deal with the promotion and the protection 
of human rights.201 As mentioned, however, this is not due to the Commission in the first 
place, but rather to the involved NGOs. The responsibility ensuing from Art. 45 No. 1 lit. b 
AfrCHPR, to work out principles and rules pertaining to the solution of legal problems in 
connection with human rights, according to which African governments can align themselves, 
is in direct conjunction with the interpretation responsibility ensuing from Art. 45 No. 3 
AfrCHPR. Therefore it will be explained at a later point. 
bb) The state reporting procedure commensurate with Art 62 AfrCHPR  
In comparison with the manifold complaint procedures in the realm of human rights 
protection, the preparation of state reports and their review constitute the control modality 
                                                 
201
  Compare: The statements pertaining to the Commission’s relationship with NGOs, above p. 
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with the lowest encroachment effect on state sovereignty.202 For this reason state reports are a 
widespread and stable method for the implementation of contractual human rights 
obligations203 and are also applied in the African regional system:204 Commensurate with Art. 
62 AfrCHPR, the contracting states are obligated, every two years since the Banjul Charter’s 
entry into force, to submit a report on the legal and other measures which they have taken for 
implementation of the rights guaranteed by the Banjul Charter.205  
The Banjul Charter itself does not determine which body deals with the state reports; neither 
does Art. 45 include any assignment of competence for the Commission concerning this. But 
at its third Session, the Commission recommended the “Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government” to officially make it responsible for the examination of the state reports and at 
the same time authorise it to prepare guidelines for the submission of state reports.206 The 
“Conference of Heads of State and Government” complied with this request at its 24th 
                                                 
202
  Compare: Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights Petitions and Individual Complaints, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(Ed.), United Nations, Vol. I, Munich 1995, pp. 619-627, 623 et seqq. 
203
  Reporting systems are found in the following universal instruments: Art. 22 of the Convention on Forced 
and Compulsory Labour (UNTS 39, 55); Art 21 of the Convention concerning suppression of human 
trafficking and the exploitation of prostitutes from 21.05.1950 (UNTS 93, 217), Art. 18 et seqq. of the New 
York Convention on the Political Rights of the Woman from 31.03.1953 (UNTS 193, 135), Art. 7 of the 
Convention against Discrimination in the Teaching System from 15.12.1960 (UNTS 429, 93), Art. 9 of the 
International Convention concerning Elimination of any Form of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
07.03.1966 (UNTS 660, 195) Art. 40 ICCPR from 19.12.1966 (UNTS 999, 171) Art. 16 et seqq. ICESCR 
from 19.12.1966 (UNTS 993, 3), Art. VII et seqq. of the International Convention on Fighting and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid from 30.11.1973 (UNTS 1015, 243), Art. 19 of the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Humiliating Treatment (anti-torture convention) from 
10.12.1984 (GAOR, 39th Session Resolutions, p. 197), Art. 12 of the International Convention against 
Apartheid in Sports from 10.12.1985 (A/Res 40/64, Annexe, p. 115 et seqq.), Art. 44 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child from 20.11.1989 (A/Res 44/25, Annexe, p. 3 et seqq.), Art. 73 of the International 
Convention regarding the Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Family Members (migrant worker 
convention) from 18.12.1990 (not in force yet) (A/Res 45/158). On a regional level, state reporting systems 
exist in Art. 57 ECHR, Art. 21 et seqq. of the European Social Charter and in Art. 42 ACHR. The 
University of Potsdam Human Rights Centre dealt with the various state reporting systems at its 3rd 
Colloquium in 1996; compare: Eckard Klein (Ed.), The Monitoring System of Human Rights Treaty 
Obligations, Berlin 1998. 
204
  With regard to state reporting system, compare: Felice Gaer, First Fruits - Reporting by States under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: NQHR 10 (1992), p. 29-42; Messeletch Worku, 
Entwicklungstendenzen des regionalen Menschenrechtsschutzes – Die Afrikanische Charta der Rechte des 
Menschen und der Völker, Berlin 2000, p. 118 et seqq. 
205
  Normally, three objectives are differentiated in the state reporting procedure: The instruction concerning 
measures which are taken for implementation of the rights included in the treaty, the instruction concerning 
the progress of their implementation and the communication concerning difficulties in the implementation. 
Compare: Gerd Oberleitner, Reporting Obligations under Regional Human Rights Conventions, in: AJPIL 
49 (1995), p. 291-313, 296. Art. 62 AfrCHPR only addresses the first objective in this connection. 
However, the Commission has addressed this abridgement as far as possible within the scope of its rules of 
procedure (standing orders), and expanded the reporting obligation to include the progress in the 
implementation as well as – insofar as it is possible – to include the inhibitory factors of implementation. 
Compare: Art. 81 I RP [new version]. 
206
  Compare: Recommendation on Periodic Reports, 1st Activity Report, Annexe IX. 
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Session.207 As a result, the Commission included the state reporting procedure in its rules of 
procedure208 and developed guidelines regarding the form and content of reports, which they 
adopted at their fourth Session.209 
The Commission described the urgent objective of this state reporting procedure as the 
establishment of a “constructive dialogue” between the reporting state and the monitoring 
body.210 This dialogue is not to be understood as a confrontation, and the questions posed to 
the state representatives are not to be understood as an attack, but as positive and beneficial 
criticism in relation to the human rights situation and the legal situation in the respective 
country. The Commission and the reporting state are partners with regard to an objective, 
namely the promotion of human rights.211  
In order to achieve this objective, the Commission installed guidelines, which the states shall 
keep to with regard to the preparation of state reports.212 The procedure is oriented towards 
the reporting systems on the UN level, such as the committees of the ICCPR (Art. 40 ICCPR) 
and the ICESCR (Art. 16 ICESCR).213 After ratification of the Charter and expiry of two 
years, the states first have to submit an initial report which is the basis for the treatment of the 
following periodic reports. In this initial report, the governments are expected to present the 
fundamental conditions for the complete implementation of the rights included in the Banjul 
Charter. Accordingly, the Commission differentiated between the individual legal categories 
included in the Banjul Charter for the guidelines for the initial and periodic reports, and 
described in extreme detail which information it anticipated with regard to the individual 
rights and freedoms.  
First of all, the initial report shall summarily include how the rights and freedoms in the 
reporting state are protected by constitutional and simple legal norms, whether they can be 
asserted directly from the Banjul Charter before national courts, or whether they first have to 
be implemented into national law, which legal protection possibilities are open to citizens and 
                                                 
207
  Compare: Felice Gaer, First Fruits: Reporting by State under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, in: NQHR 10 (1992), p. 29-42, 30. 
208
  Art. 81 to 86 RP 
209
  Compare: 3rd Annual Activity Report, Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, 
AFR/COM/HPR/ACTVY/ RPT (III) Annexe IV. 
210
   “The urgent desire of the Commission is that this system of periodic reports would create a channel for 
constructive dialogue between the states and itself on Human and Peoples’ Rights.” Compare: Introduction 
to the African Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, 2nd Activity Report, Annexe VII. 
211
  According to Commissioner Badawi at the 9th Session of the Commission; compare: Astrid Danielsen, The 
State Reporting Procedure under the African Charter, Copenhagen 1994, p. 16. 
212
  Compare: Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, AFR/COM/HPR. 5 (IV). 
213
  Gerd Oberleitner, Reporting Obligations under Regional Human Rights Conventions: The African and 
European Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective, in: AJPIL 49 (1995), p. 291-313, 291. 
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which other measures the state has taken in order to safeguard the compliance with these 
rights. Furthermore, the initial report shall provide insight on restrictive provisions as well as 
advances and difficulties with regard to the implementation of the Banjul Charter.214 All 
information in the report is to be substantiated by the concerned state through enclosure of the 
corresponding legal texts and other expressive documents.  
After this basic report, a periodic report concerning advances, impediments and planned 
projects – which also takes into consideration the Commission’s comments and suggestions 
with regard to the preceding report – is to be submitted every two years.215 
Gaer assesses the guidelines catalogue as “more confusing than helpful”.216 This criticism is 
not to be rejected out of hand: The guidelines are partially unsystematic217, unbalanced218 and 
overloaded with repetitions, which complicates the preparation of a report oriented towards 
these guidelines. The Commission has endeavoured not to omit any aspects in the catalogue 
in order to obtain the most comprehensive response from the reporting states,219 but it has 
overrated this intention in proportion to the catalogue’s other objective, namely to present a 
clear and lucid guideline for state reports.  
The submitted state reports are publicly handled in the course of the Commission sessions, 
and are available as freely accessible documents from the Commission Secretariat.220 The 
reports shall be presented by a delegation of the states which subsequently answers the 
questions of the commissioners. But what actually sounds like a productive stage for an 
objective discussion regarding cooperative formulation of problem solutions usually proves to 
be very arduous in reality. There are several reasons for this: For one thing, this lies in the 
submitted state reports and the willingness of the states to cooperate. Quite frequently, these 
can only partially or unsatisfactorily meet the claims predetermined by the Commission. Up 
                                                 
214
  Compare: Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, I No. 1 to 5. 
215
  Compare: Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, I No. 7 to 9. 
216
  Felice Gaer, First Fruits: State Reporting Procedure under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, in: NQHR 10 (1992), p. 29-42, 31. 
217
  For instance, they incorporate the individual right to participation in cultural life of one’s own community 
(Art. 17 II AfrCHPR) in people’s rights, Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, III No. 14. 
218
  The catalogue neglects civil and political rights in favour of economic, social and cultural rights and in 
favour of peoples’ rights. This conclusion is permitted already by the extent to which the individual legal 
categories are addressed in the guidelines: Two pages for the political and civil rights, ten pages for the 
economic, social and cultural rights and five pages for peoples’ rights. 
219
  This has certainly also led to the fact that the catalogue also includes guidelines for a section of the report 
on the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid and the elimination of any form of 
discrimination against the woman; Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, VI and VII; both are legal 
areas which the Banjul Charter does not even provide any reporting obligation for. 
220
  Compare: Art. 82 RP. 
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until today many countries have not even submitted the basic report,221 whereas others have 
not delivered any periodic reports222 or did not present their reports verbally before the 
Commission,223 — which noticeably inhibits the dialogue. Up to now, only nine states have 
met the requirements and submitted all reports, even if they were not submitted and presented 
punctually.224 Some submitted reports can be evaluated at most as persiflage with at most 
rudimentary content, or no material content whatsoever.225 This disregard on the part of most 
states with regard to their obligations ensuing from the Banjul Charter permits clear 
conclusions as to the general political will for support of the Commission and thus the African 
protective system.  
Picking up the thread of the stated relevance of NGOs for the Commission’s work, their 
involvement, particularly in the procedure according to Art. 62 AfrCHPR, assumes major 
significance. The NGOs provide the commissioners with information or alternative state 
reports (shadow reports) which would not be otherwise accessible to the Commission. As a 
result, they enable a far more effective questioning of government representatives through the 
commissioners. NGOs cannot interrupt during the lectures of the delegates, but after the 
questions of the commissioners they have the opportunity to speak and publicly draw 
attention to their point of view. This may also ensue in unproductive talks in which the state 
and NGO representatives heap reciprocal defamations on each other, but also constructive 
dialogues in which one attempts to approach existing problems. But on the whole it must be 
                                                 
221
  This includes nearly half of the OAU’s members, namely 24 nations (Botswana, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Comoro Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zambia). Compare: Status of 
Submission of Periodic Reports by State Parties, DOC/OS (XXVIII) 184 a. 
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  15 states: Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Togo, Gambia (as the Commission’s host country), Senegal, Tunisia, Zimbabwe; loc. cit. 
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  Benin, Egypt, Ghana und Namibia; loc. cit. For one thing, this results from the lack of cooperative 
willingness on the part of the states. For instance, no Government representative from Benin who could 
present the national report at the intended time was able to be found at the 27th Session in Cotonou, Benin. 
Only shortly before the conclusion of the session the minister of justice had to present the report 
(completely unprepared) and answer the questions of the commissioners. But on the other hand, 
organisational incompetence on the part of the Commission also plays a role: The Commission repeatedly 
failed to inform Government representatives about the pending handling of the respective state reports. 
Compare: Astrid Danielsen, The State Reporting Procedure under the African Charter, Copenhagen 1994, 
p. 88 et seqq. 
224
  Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Mali, Libya, Rwanda, Swaziland, South Africa and Uganda; loc. cit. 
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  For instance, the first version of the initial report from Nigeria, which was incidentally three years overdue, 
included – in addition to a cover letter – only excerpts from the Nigerian constitution. The report comprised 
all of four pages. The first report from Ghana contained (on five and a half pages) the description of only 
11 legal bills since 1961 — and included neither voucher copies nor more far-reaching information. 
Compare: Astrid Danielsen, The State Reporting Procedure under the African Charter, Copenhagen 1994, 
p. 76 et seqq. 
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balanced that the state reporting procedure according to Art. 62 AfrCHPR and Art. 81-86 RP 
suffers under substantial organisational deficiencies, and in its present expression the 
requirements of a fruitful, constructive and comprehensive dialogue between the Commission, 
governments and NGOs are only met on a restrictive basis. Nevertheless, the idea of a 
consensus-promoting dialogue seems to be the right starting point for a necessary change 
process, and is at least capable of development with the state reporting procedure. But in the 
future the Commission has to muster much more time and energy in order to gradually 
dismantle the political displeasures on the part of the governments. 
b) The protective function 
The Commission’s second responsibility is the protection of human and peoples’ rights in 
accordance with Art. 45 No. 2 AfrCHPR. This competence is the more important one in view 
of the study’s initial question: Since the Commission performs quasi-judicial duties with the 
protective function, the existing system can be isolated and evaluated in terms of its actual 
protective effect with the help of the following consideration. In this context, whatever 
protective mechanisms are provided for – and to what extent their protective effect withstands 
the Commission’s dependency on other bodies of the OAU or political realities – shall be 
presented.  
The Banjul Charter provides for two types of communications which initiate a protective 
procedure before the Commission: The communications from contracting states (Art. 47-54 
AfrCHPR) and “other communications” (Art. 55-59 AfrCHPR). The authors of the Banjul 
Charter refrained from enumerating those authorised to lodge complaints with the expression 
“other communications”. This should certainly prevent the fact that after the adoption of the 
Charter, the governments were deterred from its ratification because they could be pulled by 
too many sides into a procedure before the Commission. Nevertheless, with this formulation 
one wanted to at least keep a door open for an individual complaint procedure, since the 
political situation in the inception period did not allow this.226 
aa) Communications from contracting states (Art. 47-54 AfrCHPR) 
The procedure on account of a state communication can be initiated through two occasions: 
For one thing, through the communication of two states due to the fact that their bilateral 
negotiations concerning a state of affairs – which entails a violation of the provisions of the 
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Banjul Charter – have failed, combined with the request to the Commission for mediation 
(Art. 47, 48 AfrCHPR). Mbaye sees this possibility as a typical expression of African 
consensus-oriented conflict solution.227 For another thing, the unilateral communication of a 
state to the Commission is also possible. In this case, one state is of the opinion that another 
state has violated the provisions of the Banjul Charter (Art. 49 AfrCHPR). In view of artificial 
colonial creation of frontiers in Africa, this possibility of state complaint – particularly with 
regard to violation of collective rights – can acquire decisive importance if, for instance, one’s 
own ethnic group in the neighbouring state is the victim of genocide or is otherwise 
persecuted or discriminated against.228  
Although there would be no dearth of such occasions, not a single state complaint has been 
lodged to this very day.229 Not the least due to the marginal political respect which the 
Commission experiences as a protective institute from AU member states, it is not surprising 
that the Commission has still not been presented with any consensual communication in 
accordance with Art. 47, 48 AfrCHPR. Even a communication commensurate with Art. 49 
AfrCHPR, which would present a direct affront to a member country of the AU, seems rather 
unlikely in light of the sensibility of diplomatic relations.230 The dissent between intended 
protective possibilities and effects and the political reality comes to light with regard to the 
institute of state complaints. For this reason the protective mechanism has been up to now 
characterised by complete insignificance for the development of the African human rights 
protection system. This is why the “other communications” are befitting of practical 
relevance.  
                                                 
227
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  Wolfgang Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und 
nationaler Ebene, in: ZaöRV 54 (1994), p. 150-181, 158. 
229
  Communication from the Commission Secretariat in March 2006; the inter-American human rights 
protection system, which also provides for a state grievance procedure, acts in exactly the same way. The 
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27 (2000), p. 619.). 
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  However, this restraint is also noticeable with all other human rights state grievance procedures. Compare 
the very detailed overview in Scott Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human 
Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking?, in: HRQ 10 (1988), p. 249-303, 271 et seqq. As a 
further reason for the lacking utilisation of the state grievance procedure, Leckie cites the considerable 
financial, logistical and temporal resources which such procedures demanded from complainant states; 
compare: loc. cit. p. 254. The comparatively highest utilisation of the state grievance procedure is recorded 
in the ECHR regime. Compare: Søren Prebensen, Inter-State Complaints under Treaty Provisions – The 
Experience under the European Convention on Human Rights, in: HRLJ 20 (1999), p. 446-455, 446. 
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bb) “Other communications” (Art. 55-59 AfrCHPR) 
With the “other communications” the fathers of the Banjul Charter have created a complaint 
procedure which left the Commission decisive contextual competencies with regard to the 
precise sequence of this procedure. Only the periphery of this procedure has been explicitly 
governed in the Banjul Charter, which shall find a brief consideration for the time being. It 
will be addressed in the following as to how the Commission has worked out the procedure 
and puts it into practice.  
(1.) Formal prerequisite of a communication (Art. 56 AfrCHPR) 
First of all, the Banjul Charter determines that the Commission only deals with a 
communication if the author is recognisable, even if this author requests anonymity (Art. 56 
No. 1 AfrCHPR). This requirement is expanded through Art. 104 No. 1 a) RP, which also 
calls for the statement of age, occupation and the address of the complainant.231 However, the 
Commission has made it clear that at the same time this does not have to mean that those 
actually aggrieved must be mentioned by name.232 The Banjul Charter does not impose any 
further prerequisite on the author’s personal data. In particular, there is no admissibility 
prerequisite that the complainant is a national of a contracting state or an African state. As a 
result, the Banjul Charter enables a complaint procedure with worldwide access.233 
Furthermore, in accordance with Art. 56 No. 2 AfrCHPR, the communication must be 
compatible with the Charter of the OAU and the Banjul Charter. Moreover, commensurate 
with Art. 56 No. 3 AfrCHPR, the communication may not be written in a disparaging or 
insulting language against the concerned state and its institutions or vis-à-vis the OAU. 
Commensurate with Art 56 No. 4 AfrCHPR, communications which exclusively ensue from 
mass media messages are also inadmissible. This provision also speaks for the Commission’s 
interpretation that the aggrieved party and the author of the communication need not be the 
                                                 
231
  At any rate, despite mentioning names, the non-mention of the address led to the inadmissibility of the 
communication. Compare: Communication No. 70/92 Ibrahima Dioumessi, Sekou Kandé, Ousmane Kaba 
vs. Guinea, printed in: Institut pour les droits Humains et le Développement” (Eds.), Compilation des 
Décisions de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, Banjul 2000, p. 71. As a 
reason, the Commission indicated that all attempts by the secretariat to ascertain a valid address had failed, 
and that the author of the communication could not take part in the procedure without a postal address. 
However, all other requirements of the rules of procedure are basically not necessary to prevent anonymity 
and to ensure an orderly procedural sequence. Therefore, in case of doubt, it seems very questionable as to 
whether a complainant is actually obligated to mention more than just his name and his address. 
232
  “The African Charter requires that communications indicate their authors, these authors need not be the 
victims or their family”, Communication No. 25/89, quoted according to: Chidi Odinkalu, Camilla 
Christensen, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State 
Communication Procedure, in: HRQ 20 (2998), p. 235-280, 250. 
233
  Up to now the Commission has received 357 such communications (status: April 2008). 
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same individual, because with the term “not exclusively” it is made clear that a direct 
involvement of the author is not necessary, but that the author merely has to present more 
detailed information than he has obtained from the mass media. This provision again 
emphasises the considerable relevance which the NGOs are also befitting from this scope of 
activity of the Commission, since only they are able to inform themselves on the scene 
unbureaucratically. Furthermore, Art. 56 No. 5 AfrCHPR determines that – insofar as it is 
available – the communication can only be submitted after exhaustion of domestic legal 
recourse, unless this appellate procedure obviously takes an unduly long time.234 The 
underdeveloped juridical practice in some African countries is counterbalanced with these 
restrictions. In addition, the communication has to be submitted “within a reasonable period” 
after exhaustion of domestic legal recourse or in the absence of such legal recourse or, in the 
event of an unforeseeable decision, after the period which the Commission establishes (Art. 
56 No. 6 AfrCHPR). Art. 56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR also precludes the admissibility of the 
communication if it “comprises a case that has already been settled in conformity with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations or the Banjul Charter.” On a universal level, 
the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations235 and – after entry into force of the 
Supplementary Protocol to the Convention concerning Elimination of any Form of 
Discrimination Against the Woman, which provides for the introduction of an individual 
complaint procedure – the CEDAW Commission236 also come into question as relevant 
instruments for settlement of a dispute. 
This “ne bis in idem” principle shall prevent duplicity and inconsistencies in one and the same 
matter before various bodies; therefore there are also appropriate provisions in the 
corresponding regional human rights conventions.237  
And so no formal prerequisites are imposed on the admissibility of “another communication” 
by the Banjul Charter itself. On the contrary: The situation in Africa is taken into account in a 
special way by virtue of the fact that the Commission can refrain from the prerequisite of the 
exhausting of legal recourse and by not predetermining any direct exclusion deadline, and the 
                                                 
234
  In the past, the Commission has shown itself to be forbearing in this regard. Compare with practical 
examples: Chidi Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedure of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, in: TLCP 8 (1998), p. 359-405, 382 et seqq. 
235
  Fatsah Ouguergouz, La Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, Paris 1993, p. 336. 
236
  An individual complaint before the rest of the treaty monitoring bodies of other universal human rights 
codifications – such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee against 
Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child – is inadmissible. 
237
  Compare: Art 46 I lit. c ACHR, Art. 27 I lit. b [current version] ECHR or Art. 35 II lit. b [new version] 
ECHR, respectively. 
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Commission is also granted discretion in this connection.  
(2.) Entitlement of communication  
Since the Banjul Charter does not address the question of who is entitled to file a 
communication, it was up to the Commission to close this gap. In its rules of procedure the 
Commission has decided on the broadest possibility and stated that individuals as well as 
NGOs can submit communications (Art. 114 RP [current version]).238 This possibility of 
popular complaint has a special value in developing regions: NGOs can thus take over the 
advocate function for victims who are not able to call the Commission on their own because 
of lacking legal knowledge or financial capacity. In comparison with its procedure in the 
subsequent years this decision on the part of the Commission is to be described as unusually 
bold, since for quite a while it has refrained from fully utilising its latitude let alone pushing 
its limits.  
(3.) The communication procedure 
The actual procedure of “other communications” starts when a communication is declared as 
admissible. It is only imprecisely and vaguely formulated by the Banjul Charter. Art. 58 I 
AfrCHPR stipulates that a further procedure takes place if, after consultation, the Commission 
gains the impression “that one or more communications obviously refer to special cases 
which are indicative of a vast number of massive or serious violations of human rights”. In 
this connection the Commission also stood before a procedural rule that was unclear, 
complicated and in need of interpretation. And here they also decided in favour of an 
interpretation which would enable the further procedural sequence for a spectrum of 
communications that was as broad as possible. Therefore a vast number of violations with 
regard to a majority of those concerned as well as with regard to repeated violations vis-à-vis 
an individual are available. The violation can be intrinsically massive or this character can 
                                                 
238
  In the literature it is doubted whether the Commission was even authorised to such a decision. Benedek and 
Murray see the sole basis for an individual communication under the prerequisites of Art. 58 AfrCHPR. 
Compare: Wolfgang Benedek, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: How to make it more 
effective, in: NQHR 11 (1993), pp. 25-40, 31 or Rachel Murray, Decisions by the African Commission on 
Individual Communications under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: ICLQ 46 (1997), 
pp. 408-415, 412 et seqq. On the other hand, Udeme Essien draws a clear line between Art. 56 and Art. 58 
AfrCHPR, and construes two different competencies from that point of view. Compare ibid: The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Eleven Years After, in: BHRLR 93 (2000), pp. 93-110 (103 et 
seqq.). In reference to the dispute status, see: Chidi Odinkalu, Camilla Christensen, The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication 
Procedure, in: HRQ 20 (1998), pp. 235-280, 240. However, in the meanwhile 20-year practice of the 
Commission, no party has ever questioned its jurisdiction, which makes the dispute appear to be merely 
academic. 
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develop only through special circumstances.239 This almost formal juridical differentiation 
has far-reaching consequences: It enables the continued procedural course of individual 
communication in which the violation is criticised individually.  
Only after the communication has been declared admissible does the Commission inform the 
concerned government commensurate with Art. 117 RP and ask for an opinion. But in reality, 
this designated possibility of participation has the disadvantage that the actual procedure 
stagnates if the concerned state does not respond.240 Meanwhile, in the event of definitive 
absent response, the Commission has thus moved on to concluding the consultation on the 
basis of the evidence available to it.241 If the Commission comes to the conclusion that the 
prerequisites of Art. 58 I AfrCHPR are at hand, it either submits recommendations in order to 
resolve the existing conflict situation or merely determines the violation of rights.242 It 
subsequently conveys the results of its consultation to the concerned state and the “Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government”.243 Commensurate with Art. 58 II AfrCHPR, the latter 
one can petition the Commission for a detailed inquiry into the matter, and commensurate 
with Art. 120 No. 3 RP, the Commission can assign this inquiry to a special correspondent 
from its midst or a task force. In urgent cases, such an inquiry can also be ordered by the 
Secretary General of the OAU (Art. 58 III AfrCHPR). Both have never occurred.  
In harmony with the principles of the OAU, Art. 59 I AfrCHPR orders the absolute 
confidentiality of all “measures taken in the course of the procedure”, unless the “Conference 
of Heads of State and Government” explicitly determines something else. Only the 
Commission’s annual activity report is released for publication after it has been reviewed by 
the Conference (Art. 59 III AfrCHPR).244 On the other hand, all consultations concerning 
                                                 
239
  Keba Mbaye, “Les Droits de l’Homme en Afrique”, Paris 1993, p. 248 et seq. ; U.O. Umozurike, Six Years 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: FS Bernhardt, pp. 635-645, 642. 
240
  At its 13th Session the Commission resolved to communicate the notifications if necessary by diplomatic 
means via the OAU’s General Secretariat in order to verify receipt. This decision took into account the fact 
that many states prolonged the procedure through mere denial of the reception. Compare: Wolfgang 
Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und nationaler 
Ebene, in: ZaöRV 54 (1994), pp. 150-181, 159. 
241
  This approach is covered through Art. 119 No. 4 RP. 
242
  In a more recent decision, the Commission expressed for the first time its expectation that these 
recommendations will be followed. For instance, in the communication procedure 211/98 Legal 
Resources/Zambia it determined a convention violation, called on the Government to bring its laws into 
conformity with the Banjul Charter, and – this is the special feature – called on the Government to explain 
in the subsequent state report how the recommendation has been implemented. It remains to be seen 
whether a practice for a follow-up procedure will be developed with regard to the decisions. 
243
  Art. 120 No. 2 RP. 
244
  This fact repeatedly encounters strong resistance within the ranks of NGOs. For instance, Amnesty 
International proposed that a Paragraph IV should be added to Art. 59 which explicitly empowers the 
Commission to publish all other reports according to its own notion. Compare: Amnesty International, 
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incoming communications, and all evidentiary submissions and proof are undertaken in 
private session under exclusion of the general public. For a long time, the resolutions and all 
data pertaining to the communication were still inaccessible after conclusion of the procedure. 
In the past, the strict compliance with these confidentiality provisions in conjunction with an 
unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of these provisions through the Commission led to the 
fact that not even a relative protection of the victim through publicity was guaranteed245 But 
since 1994 the Commission’s practice in this connection has promisingly changed. This 
subject shall be briefly broached in the following. 
(4.) The Commission’s latest practice  
The starting point for the modified understanding of confidentiality is the interpretation of the 
“measure” in the protective procedure (Art. 59 AfrCHPR), since only this comes under the 
confidentiality provision. This interpretation should emerge as narrowly as possible, since 
particularly the publicity of a procedure can cause a state to align its behaviour with 
international obligations. For instance, Benedek argues that the mere compilation of a report 
and the included recommendations should not be evaluated as such “measures”.246 The 
modified practice is ascertainable starting from the 15th Session of the Commission. South 
Africa and Rwanda could be pilloried without political risk: South Africa was still not a 
member of the OAU, and the procedures in Rwanda showed an exorbitant extent of human 
rights violations — even for African circumstances. South Africa was called on to put a stop 
to racist violence and to accept the election result as soon as the elections had been judged as 
fair and free by the international election observation commission.247 Rwanda was censured 
because of massive human rights violations and extralegal executions, international 
organisations were called on to intervene, and the special correspondent for extralegal and 
arbitrary executions was instructed to report on the situation in Rwanda in the following 
session.248  
                                                 
Observations on Possible Reforms of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, London 1993, p. 
4. 
245
  Mugwanya describes these confidential provisions as a “ghost that has dangerously assailed the human 
rights project”. Compare George Mugwanya, Realizing Universal Human Rights Norms through Regional 
Human Rights Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System, in: IICLR 9 (1999) pp. 35-50, 48 et seqq. 
246
  Wolfgang Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und 
nationaler Eben, in: ZaöRV 54 (1994), pp. 150-181, 160. 
247
  Resolution on South Africa from the 15th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 18-27 April 1994, Banjul, Gambia, printed in: African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Recommendations and Resolutions, Banjul 1998, p. 24. 
248
  Resolution on the Situation in Rwanda of the 15th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 18-27 April 1994 Banjul, Gambia, printed in: African Commission on Human and 
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The Commission took another essential step at this session: As mentioned, up to the then 
point in time, all information which had any connection whatsoever with “other 
communications” were kept confidential under reference to Art. 59 I AfrCHPR. However, an 
annexe was added to the report of the 15th Session, which for the first time provided insight 
concerning pending and already concluded communications. The names of complainants, the 
reason for the complaint, the contracting states concerned and quite a bit of information 
regarding the course of the procedure were included. Such procedural reports are obligatory 
elements of the annual action report which is published in accordance with Article 59 III 
AfrCHPR after it has been reviewed by the “Conference of Heads of State and Government”. 
But up to this point in time the Commission has refrained from capitalising on these reports 
and from attempting to ease the confidentiality provisions through the back door. And so the 
Commission’s annual action report, including all sensitive information in the annexe, was 
available to the “Conference of Heads of State and Government”. It was now faced with the 
decision of rejecting the report commensurate with Art. 59 III AfrCHPR and insisting on the 
adherence to confidentiality or yielding to the Commission. With regard to the first 
alternative, it would have further curtailed the Commission’s anyhow hardly existing 
authority before the individual states, and moreover presented itself as an assembly of 
reactionaries. For this reason it released without objection the annual report in the version 
submitted by the Commission. Since that time, further communication procedures have been 
published as an annexe in every report. But the Commission’s practice of dealing with the 
communications in non-public session is unchanged.  
After this initial emancipation, the Commission vehemently condemned the military putsch in 
the host country Gambia at its 16th Session as a “flagrant and grave violation of the right of 
the Gambian Peoples to freely choose their government”, and unmistakably called on the 
military government “to transfer power to freely elected representatives of the people”.249 At 
its ensuing session the Commission adopted a resolution on the situation in Sudan, in which 
referred to the gross human rights violations of the Sudanese government and called on the 
government to immediately take all necessary steps to safeguard the observance of human 
                                                 
Peoples’ Rights; Recommendations and Resolutions, Banjul 1998, p. 23. 
249
  Resolution on The Gambia from the 16th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 25 October – 3 November 1994, Banjul, Gambia, printed in: African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights; Recommendations and Resolutions, Banjul 1998, p. 30. A communication 
from Gambia’s overthrown head of state – who criticised the most varying violations of the Banjul Charter 
through the military Government – reached the Commission in this connection. The Commission heaved 
the communication with several difficulties above the admissibility threshold and determined quite a few 
violations of rights. Compare: 147/95. 
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rights.250 At the same opportunity the Commission adopted a resolution pertaining to the 
situation in Nigeria, and called on the Nigerian military government to restore the rule of law, 
to respect freedom of speech and freedom of the press, to grant protection of minorities and to 
release all political prisoners.251 In this connection the Commission referred to the case of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, which provoked considerable international attention. The Nigerian 
government subsequently lodged a protest with the Commission, saying this body violated the 
confidentiality provisions of Art. 58, 59 AfrCHPR through the resolution. The Commission 
pointed out that the resolutions did not come under the definition of “measures” as defined by 
Art. 59 I AfrCHPR, because this provision only referred to the protective procedures as such 
and the resolution was not in any connection with a pending communication.252 Moreover, in 
connection with the Saro-Wiwa problem, the Commission took a historic step when it called 
its first Special Session on the human rights situation in a member country, vehemently 
criticised the human rights situation in Nigeria, and announced that it would communicate a 
report on the matter to the UN Secretary General and to the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.253  
And so the Commission is on the best route to overcome its – partially self-erected – barriers 
with regard to the confidentiality of measures, and is gradually losing the shyness before 
unequivocal words and decisive approach.  
(5.) The protective functionality of the complaint procedure  
The distribution of competencies between the Commission and the “Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government” presented above has different consequences in the protective 
procedure: For one thing, it is another obstacle on the long procedural route, since the 
Conference only meets once a year, and is therefore only able to make a decision on the 
arrangement of a detailed inquiry on an annual cycle. But much more serious is the fact that 
with the Commission’s finding of justice, the concerned states accrue absolutely no legal 
                                                 
250
  Resolution on Sudan, 17th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 13-
22 March 1995 Lomé, Togo, printed in: ibid, p. 32. 
251
  Resolution on Nigeria, 17th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
13-22 March 1995, Lomé, Togo, printed in: ibid, p. 34. 
252
  “There is no bar on resolutions of the Commission being disseminated however the Commission sees fit”, 
Account of Internal Legislation of Nigeria and the dispositions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Doc. II/ES/ACHPR/4 No. 7, quoted according to: Rachel Murray, The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law, Oxford 2002, p. 172. 
253
  Final Communiqué of the 2nd Extra-Ordinary Session (the first was held regarding the issue of the 
Commission’s host country) of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 18-19 December, 
Kampala, Uganda, printed in: ICJ (Eds.), The Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in the 
Work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Geneva 1996, p. 207 et seqq. 
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obligations much less sanctions due to their non-compliance. Here lies the decisive weakness 
of the protective system. On top of that is the fact that the states are frequently no more 
impressed by the transmittal of the Commission’s findings of justice and recommendations 
due to its absence of legal authority than by the proclamations of various NGOs which call for 
the observance of human rights.254  
The further procedure also does not promise any distinct increase of protective effect. As soon 
as the Commission calls in the “Conference of Heads of State and Government”, the situation 
assumes a political character: Two decisions on the political level ensue as to whether a 
detailed inquiry even comes about and whether, if necessary, a conclusive recommendation is 
submitted to the Conference. On top of that is the fact that a political body – in which a series 
of authorities responsible for human rights violations have a voting right – decides in this 
procedure. As a result, up to now there has also been no resolution adopted with which the 
Commission has been called on to engage in detailed inquiries. Therefore a comparison 
between these so-called “in-depth studies” and normal consultations cannot be made.255 Of 
course, the Conference has still also not adopted any conclusive recommendation of the 
Commission let alone adopted a resolution regarding human rights violations in a member 
state. Therefore the protective effect of the further procedure approaches nil value.  
In principle, publicity remains in de facto terms as the Commission’s only “weapon” in order 
to exert the pressure of the general public on governments and to achieve a certain degree of 
protective effect. However, the Banjul Charter also intended to defuse this means as much as 
possible and leave it in the hands of the mother organisation. But the credibility of an 
international human rights authority stands and falls with the public presentation of its 
findings, which conveys trust to the citizens and commands the respect of the governments.256 
                                                 
254
  The Commission aptly emphasised this circumstance and in a consideration regarding the strengthening of 
the protective mechanism referred to the “difficulties in which the Commission found itself in the course of 
the past years vis-à-vis the attitude of State Parties [...] has been to generally ignore its recommendations.”, 
Compare: Non-Compliance of State Parties to adopted Recommendations of the African Commission: A 
Legal Approach, Doc/OS/35(b) (XXIII). 
255
  Murray argues in this connection that the implementation of a detailed inquiry would also be possible 
without the OAU’s request, since Art. 46 AfrCHPR stipulates that the Commission is allowed to “make use 
of all appropriate inquiry methods”. Compare: Rachel Murray, Serious or Massive Violations under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparison with the Inter-American and European 
Mechanism, in: NQHR 17 (1999), pp. 109-133, 122. 
256
  With regard to the effect of the general public as means to put pressure on implementation, compare: 
Nanette Dumas, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An International Human Rights Court and Other 
Proposals, in: HICLRev (1990), pp. 585-608, 607; Joseph Warioba, Monitoring Compliance with and 
Enforcement of Binding Decisions of International Courts, in: Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), pp. 41-52, 50 
et seqq.; also very graphic: David Weissbrodt, Maria Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of International 
Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina 1976-1983, in: MinnLRev 75 (1991), pp. 1009-1035, 1030 
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But the pressure of the general public is insufficient as the only protective effect. The desired 
effects do not ensue: The AU heads of state neither pass on this pressure to the concerned 
state nor do western states normally respond with sanctions. A state in which human rights 
violations have been determined thus does not perceive itself as subject to any serious foreign 
or economic political constraints which could cause it to take action. Domestic political 
pressure is also insufficiently created through this form of public relations, since the annual 
reports – along with the “shame register” – may well be freely accessible documents, but 
these must be requested by the Commission. Suitable multipliers are required to make them 
known to a broad public. However, as explained above, the cooperation of the Commission 
with the African press is less fruitful. On the whole, this publicity is rather an opportunity for 
states which take advantage of the cooperation with the Commission in order to suitably 
position themselves before the small circle of interested insiders in matters of human rights 
and to present themselves as constitutional and freedom-loving nations.257  
c) The interpretation of the Charter 
The third responsibility intended for the Commission encompasses the interpretation of the 
Banjul Charter. And so it also takes over classic-judicial responsibilities. Art. 45 No. 3 
AfrCHPR stipulates that the Commission interprets all provisions of the Banjul Charter “at 
the request of a contracting party, a body of the OAU or an organisation recognised by the 
OAU”. But in view of the above findings with regard to the willingness of the states and other 
bodies of the OAU to cooperate it is no longer astonishing that not a single inquiry of this 
nature has reached the Commission. In this connection, Art. 45 No. 1 b) AfrCHPR 
additionally instructs the Commission to formulate in writing “principles and rules for 
solution of legal problems in connection with human and peoples’ rights, on which the 
African governments can expand with their legislative activity”. The Commission ignored this 
responsibility up until 1992. At its 11th Session in Tunis (March 1992) it dealt with the 
judicial rights guaranteed in the Banjul Charter (Art. 7 AfrCHPR), and adopted a resolution in 
which it concretises the provision on the basis of the international standard.258 On the same 
occasion it concretised the rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of association (Art. 20, 
                                                 
et seqq. 
257
  For instance, the Commission evaluates as a success the fact that more and more states invite the 
Commission to hold its periodic sessions there. At the 31st Session in Pretoria the Commission received 
official invitations straightaway from three national delegations. 
258
  Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial, 11th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Tunis 2-9 March 1992, printed in: African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Recommendations and Resolutions, Banjul 1998, p. 16. 
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21 AfrCHPR), and called on the governments not to truncate these rights through their 
legislation.259 In 1995, the Commission adopted a resolution on anti-personnel mines, and 
stated that the utilisation of such land mines represents a violation of Art. 4 AfrCHPR (Right 
to life and physical intactness).260 And so the interpretations made until now are rather 
sporadic and have hardly met any response amongst the addressees. The handling of 
communications and state reports are in the foreground of the Commission’s work. Up to 
now, scarce time and lacking preparatory work have prevented the Commission from being 
able to devote enough energy to this task. This is why up to now a tangible further 
development of the rights guaranteed in the Banjul Charter has not been brought about 
through the interpretation of the Banjul Charter’s provisions.  
d) The Commission in the protection system — interim result  
The preceding chapter examined which responsibilities are intended for the Commission, with 
which competencies it is provided, and in which manner it faces these responsibilities and 
applies its competencies. 
Insofar as the Commission’s promotional responsibility is concerned, it has been determined 
that the absolutely meaningful projects and concepts regarding sensitisation and better 
understanding for the problem field human rights and regarding continental dissemination of 
the Banjul Charter frequently stagnate in their realisation due to financial scarcity or never get 
beyond the idea phase. But since this area has a special importance for Africa, the absence of 
perceivable successes is particularly regrettable here. The promising state reporting 
procedure, which is based on the idea of a consensus-promoting dialogue, frequently does not 
exhibit the desired successes due to lack of willingness to cooperate amongst the states. As a 
reverse side to the fundamental ideas of this consensual procedure there is also no operative 
handling on the part of the Commission to force the states to collaboration. The 
Commission’s only applicable means is its powers of persuasion. Here it lacks the time to 
overcome lacking political will through the application of appropriate persistence.  
With regard to its protective responsibility the Commission lacks the institutional 
competencies in order to bring about a direct protective effect, because it merely submits a 
                                                 
259
  Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Assembly and Association, 11th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Tunis 2-9 March 1992, printed in: African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Recommendations and Resolutions, Banjul 1998, p. 17. 
260
  Resolution on Anti-personnel Land Mines, 17th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 13-22 March 1995, Lomé, Togo, printed in: African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Recommendations and Resolutions, Banjul 1998, p. 37. 
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recommendation to the concerned states and can only draw the AU’s attention to the situation. 
As a result, an indirect protective effect does not ensue either, since the Commission does not 
have enough political weight which could bring the concerned states to voluntary 
implementation of its recommendations.  
A more far-reaching protective effect does not emerge from the politicised second phase of 
the procedure, since first of all the AU lacks the political will, and secondly, any decision 
would proceed without consequences as long as the organisation would not also threaten and 
implement sanctions in the event of contravention.  
The Commission cannot sufficiently comply with the protective responsibility in two aspects 
due to lack of competency: On the one hand, it can hardly ensure protection of the victim 
since it is always dependent on political goodwill; and on the other side, it is therefore also 
not able to establish any case law that could prevent comparable violations in the future. 
Competency and protective responsibility are not only incongruent here, but devolve far apart 
from each other.  
As the Commission’s only applicable means of exerting pressure, publicity is also not suitable 
for expanding the required domestic and foreign political pressure which could overcome the 
lacking cooperative will of many states. This is also due to the fact that these means are not 
adequately utilised by the Commission, and much information may be theoretically accessible 
but is hard to procure in reality.  
Nevertheless, in this point the Commission has gone through a remarkable emancipation, 
since it extensively sidestepped the original intention of the confidentiality provisions and has 
meanwhile institutionalised this detour. Moreover, the Commission has established 
precedents which have been met with approval even in the ranks of the OAU. As a result, it 
increases its trustworthiness vis-à-vis the general public, and gains maturity vis-à-vis political 
bodies of the OAU, since it acquires the right to take an independent position on such human 
rights issues.  
The Commission’s interpretation responsibility does not show any competence weaknesses 
(the Commission could in its own discretion pursue any further development of the law within 
the scope of Art. 45 No. 1 b) AfrCHPR), but up to now it has not in practice devoted itself in 
a form which entailed recognisable results. The main reason for the hesitant utilisation of this 
possibility lies once again in the Commission’s work overload.  
In addition to the Commission’s individual institutional weaknesses, it can be summarised 
that a simultaneous fruitful implementation of all the organisational responsibilities intended 
for it appears to be impossible: The modestly measured period which is available to the 
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Commission at the actual working sessions is not nearly enough to cope with this workload. 
Deficient financial and personnel resources prevent the permanent Secretariat from being 
assigned corresponding responsibilities for independent implementation.  
Based on this background, the Protocol on the Establishment of the Human Rights Court shall 
be examined in the following chapter. 
   
4. Chapter: The Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Establishment of the 
African Court  
The Commission will be supported by the Court after its inauguration. The African protective 
system will be given a completely different face through the expansion by a fully-juridical 
authority. The individual provisions of the Protocol on the Establishment of the Court will be 
analysed in the following. In particular, it will be shown which institutional and procedural 
provisions the Court is based upon and what effects they have. Building on this, an 
assessment can be made as to whether and to what extent the court will be able to compensate 
for the aforementioned inadequacies in the African human rights protection system.  
After a brief outline on the political background and the evolutionary history of the protocol, 
the institutional range of norms will be examined for this purpose. The competencies of the 
Court and the procedural provisions shall be taken into consideration afterwards. After all, the 
so-called “other provisions” – which will also be taken into consideration – are also relevant.  
I. The historic-political background  
The geopolitical changes since the end of the East-West conflict also had a decisive influence 
on the political landscape of the African continent. Two of these aspects are of special 
importance for the OAU’s mode of procedure with regard to human rights. 
The upheavals in Eastern Europe led to an increased democratisation pressure which many 
regimes could not resist.261 In 1990, the student protests in Benin, which forced the Marxist 
one-party system to resign262 and paved the way for a multiparty system263, set the ball 
rolling. This incident triggered a veritable wave of democratisation in Africa, which took 
along a vast number of states.264 This resulted in a staffing in the “Conference of Heads of 
                                                 
261
  Special influence is also attached here to the inglorious end of the Ceausescu regime in Rumania, which 
showed a great catalyst effect in the countries of Africa. Comp. Joachim Betz, Volker Matthies, Dritte Welt 
im Abseits? Folgen der Ost-West-Entspannung, in: ibid (Eds.), Jahrbuch Dritte Welt 1991, Munich 1990, p. 
39. 
262
  The pressure was flanked by the credit freeze which France, as a former colonial power, was able to impose 
on the Kerekou regime without having to expect its own losses in light of Benin’s marginal economic 
importance. Comp. Stefan Brüne, Die französische Afrika-Politik, Baden-Baden 1995, p. 143. 
263
 Keesing’s Record of World Events (KRWE) 1990, pp. 37238 et seqq. Dieter Nohlen (Ed.), Third World, 
Reinbek 1998, p. 90. 
264
  In 1998, nine of the political systems on the continent were considered to be independent, 18 others as 
semi-independent and only 21 as authoritarian; in 1989, this ratio was 2 to 3 to 43. Comp. Stefan Mair, 
Democratization in Africa, in: Der Überblick, 2/99, pp. 50-54, 50. Unfortunately, this process was not 
characterised by uniform continuity. The numerous military putsches in the meantime – for instance, in 
Niger, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and recently in the Central African Republic and Mauritius – are 
severe setbacks in this development. In other respects, even in most countries in which multiparty 
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State and Government” that was adapted to the changed circumstances: Quite a few autocrats 
and dictators were replaced in the OAU’s decision-making body through more progressive 
heads.265 
In addition to this obvious effect, the end of global bipolarity had a political-economic effect 
that must be mentioned in this connection: In the East, the support for the countries of the 
Third World ceased abruptly and irreplaceably, since the former Eastern Bloc states found 
themselves more or less as financially developing nations in the new economic order after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.266 The former socialist-aligned countries of Africa now sought – 
in addition to the former Bloc partners – financial and economic assistance in the West, which 
reduced the development aid resources in light of the stagnating economies and budgetary 
problems.  
On the other hand, the political interest of donor countries in the West towards strategic zones 
of influence for containing communism lapsed with the global ideological confrontation. The 
loss of the strategic importance of African countries was accompanied by the loss of their 
political significance, and thus the interest of the West in development-political cooperation. 
Most of the states in Africa were already marginalised in economic terms. At the same time, 
the economic support of dictatorial and totalitarian systems justified with global political 
                                                 
democracies prevail, neo-patrimonial structures and deficient understanding of basic democracy are to be 
observed; this casts doubt on the actual content of the democratisation. This is why “Afro-pessimism” has 
gained adherents in the realm of political science, who attempt to formulate this phenomenon with terms 
such as “delegation democracies”, “democratic dictatorships”, “patrimonial democracies” and “façade 
democracies”. Comp. Gero Erdmann, Hoffnung für die Demokratisierung in Afrika? Stand und 
Perspektiven, in: JEP 16 (2000), pp. 111-129, 116 et seqq. For instance, in 1993 the Government of 
Equatorial Guinea permitted the establishment of political parties, but made the deposit of 150,000 US 
dollars (with a per capita annual income of 350 US dollars) for the electoral commission as a prerequisite 
for recognition. The Governments of Ghana, Guinea, Niger and Tanzania proceeded in a similar manner in 
order to keep the political opposition within manageable limits. Comp. Akwasi Aidoo, Africa: Democracy 
without Human Rights, in: HRQ 15 (1993), pp. 703-715, 708. But the democratic reality also frequently 
turned out to be difficult in the actual positive direction. For instance, in 1998 the 103rd political party was 
established in the Republic of Benin (5.6 million inhabitants); compare: African Research Bulletin (ARB) 
13251 A.  
265
  Other states (14) took precautions against the protests and implemented reforms from above in order to 
remain in power through cosmetic corrections in the constitution or to re-legitimise them through 
superficially fair elections. And so dictators such as Daniel arap Moi (Kenya), Omar Bongo (Gabon) and 
Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo) survived this wave of democratisation. Comp. Rainer Tetzlaff, Afrika 
zwischen Demokratisierung und Staatszerfall, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 21/98, pp. 3-15, 11. 
But since they had to provide at least a democratic outward appearance, they also changed their behaviour 
within the organisation. 
266
  In 1988, the development aid of the Eastern Bloc states – in particular the Soviet Union – to the socialist-
oriented developing countries amounted to only 4.7 billion US dollars (of which 70 % flowed into the 
member states of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON)), but it secured the survival of 
countries such as Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia. Comp. Stephan Klingebiehl, Nach dem Ost-West-
Konflikt: Chancen und Risiken für die Dritte Welt, in: epd-Dritte-Welt-Information, 1/1993, pp. 1-8, 2. 
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considerations increasingly came under domestic political pressure in the donor countries.267 
The USA, Japan, France, Great Britain and Germany set up criteria the fulfilment of which 
was coupled with the development aid.268 These included political pluralism, the compliance 
with the rule of law, the fight against corruption, the granting of freedom of the press and the 
observance of human rights.269 Unlike the bilateral donors, the World Bank – in accordance 
with its statutes (Art. IV, Sect. 10 of the World Bank Convention,270 which constitutes a ban 
on intervention in domestic affairs) – is not provided with political influence possibilities 
through its financial policy, but it focuses on good governance271 and accountability.272 
Despite the ban on intervention in its statutes, in practice there are cases in which the World 
Bank has reacted in financial-political terms to human rights violations in cooperation states: 
In 1974, for instance, loans to Uganda were suspended in view of the atrocities of the Amin 
regime, and the liquidation of all credits was stopped.273  
                                                 
267
 Comp. Franz Nuscheler, Entwicklungspolitik, 4th edition, Bonn 1996, p. 24. 
268
  Such measures had considerable importance particularly in countries where foreign financial assistance had 
a major share of GNP. These were above all states which were characterised by subsistence agriculture. 
Countries such as Nigeria or Zaire, in which the revenue sources were secured through oil, gold and 
diamond exports, were less impressed by the termination of development cooperation. Comp. Heiko 
Meinhardt, Externe Akteure und Demokratisierung in Afrika, Hamburg 2001, p. 51. Moreover, the 
economic interests of western countries in mineral-rich “kleptocracies” (or also individual western oil 
companies such as Elf-Aquitaine in Congo or the Shell concern in Nigeria) complicated an effective 
disciplining of such countries through embargo measures. Comp. Rolf Hanisch, Internationale 
Demokratieförderung: Gründe, Motive, Instrumente, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, in: ibid (Ed.), 
Demokratieexport in die Länder des Südens, Hamburg 1996, pp. 3-91, 48. 
269
 Comp. David Williams, “good governance” and the Ideology of Transformation, in: William Hale, 
Eberhard Kienle (Eds.), After the Cold War: Security and Democracy in Africa and Asia, New York 1997, 
pp. 227-249, 229. 
270
 UNTS 2, 134. 
271
  The concept “good governance” has been specifically developed by the World Bank in order to sidestep the 
ban on non-intervention in internal affairs. It encompasses a series of prerequisites to which the assistance 
to developing countries is linked within the scope of the conditionality of the standby credits. For instance, 
this includes a more efficient, transparent public sector, constitutional structures, pluralism and freedom of 
the press. Comp. Adrian Leftwich, Democracy and Development, Cambridge 1996, p.17. 
272
  With regard to these criteria, compare: Dana Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for 
Greater Accountability, in: HarvHRJ 15 2002, pp. 205-226, 220 et seqq. Whereas the World Bank is 
oriented towards the procedural technocratic approach to these key terms, and thus quite pragmatically 
makes the underlying conditions of Governmental and administration processes the subject of discussion 
under further exclusion of political implications, the OECD nations by contrast expand the governance 
agenda by explicit political demands such as the demand for democracy and the observance of human 
rights. Comp. Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The World Bank, UNDP and 
Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, in: ARV 44 (2006) pp 381-405, 390 et seq.; Olaf 
Nielinger, Democracy and good governance in Africa, Hamburg 1998, p. 105 et seqq. This is why critics 
accuse the World Bank of insufficiently combating the lack of political participation as well as political and 
social injustices in many recipient states. Comp. Robin Broad, John Cavanagh, Walden Bello, Der Markt 
ist nicht genug, in: John Cavanagh, Marcos Arruda, Daphne Wysham (Eds.), 50 Jahre Weltbank und IWF, 
Hamburg 1994, pp. 21-35, 22; Korinna Horta, Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights and the World Bank, 
HarvHRJ 12 (2006), pp. 227-243, 231 et seqq., with examples of questionable World Bank projects in 
Africa’s dictatorial regimes. 
273
  Comp. with further examples: Victoria Marmorstein, World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights 
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And so many African states immediately felt compelled to enter into development-political 
competition due to two aspects: Since they were no longer considered by the Eastern Bloc 
states, the socialist-aligned states had to turn towards new creditors and accept their 
conditions. The former western-oriented states were now in competition with the former 
socialist states, whereas the western donor countries linked political demands with the 
development aid. The de-ideologisation – and with that the scarcity of development-political 
assistance of the donor countries – additionally intensified this competitive pressure.  
Since all African states are represented in the OAU, the OAU’s political activism in matters 
of human rights was also subjected to change. The first step is found in a declaration by the 
“Conference of Heads of State and Government” on the political and socioeconomical 
situation in Africa according to the fundamental changes in the world.274 There the 
responsibility of governments for Africa’s development is recognised, and it is stated that “a 
political environment, which guarantees human rights and the observance of the rule of law 
assures high standards of probity and accountability particulary on the part of those who hold 
public office. In addition, popular-based political process ensures the involvement of all, 
including, in particular, women and youth in the development efforts.” This declaration 
constituted the foundation for the “Declaration on the introduction of a mechanism for 
conflict prevention, management and solution within the OAU” that was adopted in 1993.275 
Contrary to the otherwise sacrosanct principle of nonintervention, the central body of the 
Conflict Management Division has specific intervention competencies in the event of 
conflict.276 Kioko sees the declaration from 1990 as the intellectual basis for the establishment 
of a Court.277 The altered awareness in matters of human rights was also manifested on the 
ministerial level. The “Cairo Agenda for Action on Relaunching Africa’s Socioeconomic 
Transformation” was resolved at an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers in 1994 
                                                 
Factors in Loan Decisions, in: JILE 13 (1978), pp. 113-136, 128; for the legal basis of this development, 
compare: John Ciociari, The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank Credit Decisions, in: 
CorILJ 33 (2000), pp. 331-371, 342 et seqq. 
274
 Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 26th Ordinary Session, 9-11 July 1990, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, AHG/Decl. 1 (XXVI). 
275
 Until then the field of conflict management on the African continent was determined by and contingent on 
extra-African interests: In 1992, the Portuguese Government mediated the peace treaty between the parties 
in Angola; between 1991 and 1992 Italy paved the way for the truce in the Mozambique civil war; the USA 
intervened in Ethiopia (1992) and Somalia (1993). Comp. Cedric de Coning, The Role of the OAU in 
Conflict Management in Africa, in: Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peace-building 10 (1997), 
www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No10/deConing.html. 
276
  The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa provides an overview on the mode of operation and 
backgrounds of this mechanism at www.uneca.org. 
277
 Ben Kioko, The Road to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: ASICL 10 (1998), pp. 70-86, 
73. 
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and recommended to the “Conference of Heads of State and Government” for adoption.278 In 
the agenda, the importance of the declaration from 1990 is once again underscored, and it is 
recommended “to launch programmes to promote national unity, especially through the 
politics of inclusion and a culture of tolerance among the various segments of our peoples and 
among the countries in Africa, based on the principles of respect of human rights and dignity, 
free and fair elections, as well as respect for freedom of the press, speech, association and 
conscience”. 
II. The development process for the protocol  
The demand for a juridical authority within the African protective system was clearly 
formulated in 1991 at the first NGO Workshop.279 The NGOs provided similar 
recommendations at the following workshops. In 1993, the ICJ organised a seminar in Dakar, 
Senegal, in which Commission representatives also participated. The seminar recommended 
the OAU Secretary General to ask the “Conference of Heads of State and Government” for 
permission to prepare a protocol on the establishment of an African Court, since “it goes 
without saying that efforts toward obtaining the international protection of human rights in 
Africa [...] will remain unfinished if Africa does not establish a genuine human rights 
jurisdiction.”280 The OAU General Secretariat did not take up this request, but in June 1994 
the OAU’s “Assembly of Heads of State and Government” adopted a resolution at its 30th 
Session in Tunis, which called on the OAU Secretary General “to convene a meeting of 
government experts to ponder in conjunction with the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights over the means to enhance the efficiency of the Commission in considering 
particularly the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights“.281  
In cooperation with the government of South Africa, the OAU Secretary General 
subsequently organised a conference of experts in Cape Town from 6 to 12 September 
                                                 
278
  The agenda was adopted at the following session of the “Conference of Heads of State and Government” in 
1995. 
279
  “Given the problems facing the African Commission and the un-exhausted potential with the mandate of 
the commission, it is considered appropriate that the question regarding the establishment of an African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights be deferred at the present time.” Conclusions and Recommendations 
of the First NGO Workshop, para. 9, printed in: ICJ (Eds.), The Participation of Non-Governmental 
Organisations in the Work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Geneva 1996, p. 22; 
with regard to the role of NGO’s within the scope of the pre-history to the protocol, compare: Martin Ölz, 
Die NGOs im Recht des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes, Vienna 2002, p. 376 et seqq. 
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  ICJ (Eds.), Summary Report of the Days of Reflection on the African Charter and the African Commission, 
Dakar, Senegal, 13-15 January 1993, p. 8. 
281
  AHG/Res. 230 (XXX), para. 4. 
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1995.282 The group of experts283 discussed a preliminary draft which African jurists had 
prepared with the support of the ICJ and other NGOs, and adopted the first draft of a protocol 
to the Banjul Charter (Cape Town Draft).284 This was sent from the OAU General Secretariat 
to all member states with the request to send back suggestions for change and comments as 
promptly as possible. The suggestions should then be forwarded together with the draft to the 
next rotational (64th) Session of the OAU’s “Council of Ministers”285 for adoption of a 
resolution so that it could be submitted to the “Conference of Heads of State and 
Government” for final adoption.  
However, the ministerial conference postponed the deliberation of the protocol draft to its 
following meeting from 24 to 28 February in Tripoli, Libya, since only very few member 
states complied with the request of the General Secretariat to submit an opinion and therefore 
wanted to give the Council of Ministers more response time.286 At this (65th) Session, the 
ministerial conference resolved the text to be revised once again by the group of experts, 
whereby the already submitted comments and annotations should be taken into 
consideration.287  
The OAU Secretary General subsequently organised the second conference of experts, which 
was held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, from 11 to 14 April 1997.288 The text was once again 
modified (Nouakchott Draft) and recommended by the group of experts for adoption by the 
“Conference of Heads of State and Government”, which was supposed to take place in 
Harare, Zimbabwe in June 1997. The Council Minister, who prepared this conference, once 
again dealt with the protocol draft at the 66th Session, and determined that there was still 
insufficient response on the part of the member states. Therefore he once again called on the 
governments of the member states to send in their annotations and suggestions for change. At 
                                                 
282 Mutoy Mubiala, Vers la Création d’une cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, in: Congo – 
Afrique, 1998, pp. 83-92, 84. 
283
  Present were 56 participants, among them 23 representatives of African states. Comp. Report of the 
Government Experts’ Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
para. II; printed in: ICJ (Eds.), The Participation of NGOs in the Work of 6th African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Geneva 1996, p. 252. 
284
  Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PRO(1) Rev. 1, printed in: RADIC 8 
(1996), p. 493 et seqq. and ZaöRV 58 (1998), p. 727 et seqq. 
285
  64th Session from 1 to 5 July 1997 in Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
286
 Ibrahim Badawi, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 




 Report of the Second Government Legal Expert Meeting, (OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(II) Rev. 1; The 
diminishing interest of the OAU states in the protocol is expressed in the limited number of participants at 
this conference: only three people were present. Comp. Mutoy Mubiala, Vers la Création d’une Cour 
Africaine de Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, in: Congo-Afrique, 1998, pp. 83-92, 85. 
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the same time, he empowered the General Secretary to organise a third conference of experts, 
in which diplomatic representatives of the member states should also participate so that the 
final version of the protocol could come about289 and be passed on to the Conference 
Ministers.290 Subsequently, the text once again had to be passed on for the fourth time to the 
Council of Ministers for resolution in order to ultimately submit it to the OAU’s “Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government” for adoption.291  
The third conference of experts met from 8 to 11 December in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, once 
again modified the text (Addis Ababa Draft), and passed it on as directed to the Conference 
Ministers, which was also held in Addis Ababa on the next day. The justice ministers made a 
few amendments and eventually recommended the draft to the Council of Ministers for 
adoption.292 In June 1998, this final version without further amendments passed the 68th 
Session of the Council of Ministers in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which forwarded it to the 
“Conference of Heads of State and Government”. This group signed the protocol in the same 
month.293  
This unusual procedure had its relevant cause in the lack of interest with which the 
governments of the member states responded to the protocol. Since the extension of the 
response phase through the Council of Ministers had more or less no effect, the advocates of 
the protocol had to bring in the big guns: The assignment of diplomatic representatives to the 
third meeting of experts as well as the specially created Conference Ministers also served to 
force the member states to grapple with the protocol at all.  
III. Protocol concept 
It is certainly attributable to this complicated development process that the protocol’s 
composition lacks stringency and structure: The preamble is followed by an initial 
institutional section in Articles 1 und 2. Articles 3 to 10 include jurisdictional and procedural 
provisions. Organisational provisions are once again found in Articles 11 to 25. Another 
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  The Conference Ministers had been specifically called into being for this purpose. Comp. Ibrahim Badawi, 
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: RADIC 9 (1997), pp. 943-952, 945; Mutoy Mubiala, Vers la 
Création d’une Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, in: Congo-Afrique, 1998, pp. 83-92, 
84. 
290
  Doc Amb/Cttrr/Rpt (V). 
291
  CM/Dec. 348 (LXVI). 
292
  Communiqué by the Ministers and Attorneys-General of the Member States of the OAU; compare: Report 
of the Secretary General on the Conference of Ministers/Attorneys-General on the Draft Protocol on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CM/2051 (LXVII) Annexe 1. 
293
  34th Session from 8 to 10 June 1998 in Addis Ababa. 
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procedural section follows (Art. 26 to 31), followed by two organisational provisions again 
(Art. 32 and 33). Articles 34 and 35 include general provisions concerning ratification and 
amendments. The consideration of the protocol undertaken here does not follow the 
succession of its provisions, but rather its systematic togetherness.  
IV. The preamble to the protocol  
The preamble prefixes the protocol in its first paragraph: That freedom, equality, justice, 
peace and dignity are the essential objectives for implementation of the justified wishes of 
African peoples. Paragraph II confirms that the Banjul Charter adheres to the rights, freedoms 
and obligations of people and nations which have been resolved in declarations, conventions 
or other instruments by the OAU or other international organisations. Here the preamble 
already points out that not just the provisions of the Banjul Charter are available as a legal 
source. In addition, Paragraph III recognises that the Banjul Charter is based on a double 
objective: On one hand the promotion and on the other hand the protection of the rights, 
freedoms and obligations of people and nations. The previous efforts of the Commission are 
acknowledged in Paragraph IV. This may even be understood as a delicate reference that its 
efforts can certainly not be described as sufficient. Paragraph VII is clearer: It shows the firm 
conviction to be able to achieve these two objectives of the Banjul Charter only through the 
establishment of a Court of Human Rights “to complement and reinforce the functions of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights”294. The fundamental relationship of the 
Court with the Commission is addressed here: It shall complete and strengthen the 
Commission’s functions. As a result, a second protective institution is created, which appears 
alongside the Commission.295 Paragraph V of the Preamble is reminiscent of the resolution 
(AHG/Res.230 (XXX)) in which the General Secretariat is supposed to convene the first 
conference of experts. Paragraph VI then also mentions the three conferences of experts in 
which the protocol was prepared. 
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  Preamble Paragraph VII. 
295
  This corresponds to the protective system in the ACHR: Commensurate with Art. 33 ACHR, the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Court for Human Rights function as 
responsible protective bodies. The European protective system has changed in this connection since the 
entry into force of the 11th Supplementary Protocol to the Human Rights Convention (1.11.1998): The 
European Human Rights Commission was abolished in favour of the European Court for Human Rights. 
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V. The organisation of the Court 
Article 1296 specifies that the Court is established within the OAU, whose organisation, 
competencies and procedural rules are stipulated in the protocol. Article 2 governs the 
relationship of the Court with the Commission by specifying that the Court complements the 
protective mandate that has been assigned to the Commission by the Banjul Charter in 
accordance with the protocol’s provisions. And so the arrangement is anything but detailed or 
definitive. However, the formulation “complement” indicates that a co-ordination of both 
bodies is assumed with regard to the protective responsibilities. This also ensues from the 
protocols of the conferences of experts297 and ministerial conferences.298 A certain degree of 
conflict potential always emerges from such a co-ordination. Which problems are faced and 
how the protocol attempts to counteract them will become clear in the course of the 
consideration with the help of the respective provisions.  
1. Composition of the Court 
Commensurate with Article 11, eleven judges belong to the Court. They must be citizens of 
OAU member states and possess personal qualities of the utmost reputation from the ranks of 
jurists, and also dispose of acknowledged practical, legal or academic expertise and 
experience from the realm of human and peoples’ rights. The formulation of such claims 
contributes to the quality of the Court and thus that of its judicial decisions.299  
The relationship between the organisation’s member states and the number of judges 
corresponds – provided that the protocol is ratified by all contracting states – to the inter-
American protective system.300 On the other hand, the ECHR specifies that the number of 
judges corresponds to the number of contracting states.301 The arrangement made in the 
protocol is certainly meaningful for the African protective system: For one thing, it lacks an 
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  Articles without more detailed specifications refer to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, compare Annexe 
I. 
297
  “In this context, the meeting reached a consensus that the proposed court will not replace the commission 
but would complement and reinforce its mandate.” Comp. Report of the Government Expert Meeting on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights/HPR (I), para. 17. 
298
  “The court will not replace the commission nor will it be hierarchically superior to the Commission. 
Indeed, the court will complement the protective mandate of the Commission.” Comp. Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Council of Ministers, 65th Ordinary Session, CM/1996 (LXV), para. 9. 
299
 Jens Meyer-Ladewig, ECHR-Commentary,, Baden-Baden 2003, Art. 22, Rd. No.: 2. 
300
 The ACHR provides for seven judges (Art. 52 I ACHR). However, the OAS also has only 35 member 
states, whereas the OAU has 53. 
301
  Art. 20 ECHR (in the version as amended by the 11th Supplementary Protocol). 
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arrangement corresponding to Art. 27 II ECHR in the protocol, according to which the 
national judge of a participating party is automatically a member of the panel deliberating the 
case. For this reason, a number of judges corresponding to the quantity of member states is 
not necessary for the African Court. For another thing, a Court staffed with 52 judges – in the 
optimal case – would necessitate an enormous administrative apparatus which the AU would 
with certainty not be able to finance.  
The arrangement that the judges merely have to be citizens of the mother organisation’s 
member states302 and not members of contracting parties also follows the inter-American 
system.303 This particularly has the pragmatic advantage – particularly in the phase in which 
very few states have ratified the protocol – that the nominating states are not dependent on the 
domestic personnel resources, which are not sufficiently available in some countries, either on 
account of their size or their deficient educational system. Moreover, Art. 11 II specifies that 
not more than one citizen each from one and the same state may belong to the Court. This 
corresponds to the provisions of the ACHR304 and – with restrictions – also the ECHR.305 
What has always been criticised with regard to the composition of the Commission is 
positively included in the protocol: The progressive equality of rights has been manifested in 
Art. 14 II, which specifies that a well-balanced ratio of sexes is to be heeded during the 
process of nomination. The arrangement is extended in Art. 14 II, in which it is incumbent 
upon the “Conference of Heads of State and Government” “to ensure that there is adequate 
gender representation”. In the event that the nominations of states do not show any well-
balanced ratio, it is up to the Conference to correct this. The arrangement found here is unique 
in international comparison306 and sends an important signal, particularly for Africa: The 
                                                 
302
  Comp. Art. 52 I ACHR. 
303
  The ECHR entirely refrains from such a requirement, however. For instance, the Principality of 
Liechtenstein has already nominated a Canadian (Professor MacDonald), whom the Parliamentary 
Assembly has also elected as a judge. Comp. Hans Christian Krüger, Die Auswahl der Richter für den 
neuen Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, in: EuGRZ 24 (1997), pp. 397-401, 398. However, 
such an arrangement would be inconceivable in the protocol, since the African legal culture has not yet 
concluded its self-discovery process and frequently attempts to avert extra-African influences. Comp. 
Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, The Hague 1996, p. 36. 
304
  Comp. Art. 52 II ACHR. 
305
  After entry into force of the 11th Supplementary Protocol, the ECHR refrains from an explicit ban in order 
to make allowances for the fact that the election of a judge to the European Court for Human Rights should 
not be made contingent on a criterion such as citizenship. Comp. Hans Christian Krüger, Die Auswahl der 
Richter für den neuen Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, in: EuGRZ 24 (1997), pp. 397-401, 
399. However, the guidelines to the reform protocol recommend that nevertheless in principle two judges 
of the same nationality should not belong to the Court. Comp. “Erläuternder Bericht zu Protokoll No. 11 
zur europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention”, Item 59, printed in: EuGRZ 1994 p. 333. 
306
  Such an arrangement would also be desirable for the two other regional protective systems: For instance, 
only nine female judges (out of 44 positions) currently serve at the European Court for Human Rights. 
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consistent continuation of the process of equality of rights started in Africa is shown here. A 
well-balanced official staffing will ensure that the rights of the woman, which have been 
neglected for a long time, are appropriately taken into consideration. In other respects, during 
the selection the “Conference of Heads of State and Government” also has to ensure the 
representation of the regions and Africa’s legal traditions within the judiciary.307 Here the 
protocol has also formulated with positive rights the practices which have in the meantime 
been exercised without statutory basis during the staffing of the commission.  
2. Election of the judges 
The election process is governed by Art. 12 to 14. It has been mentioned above that adequate 
gender representation shall be ensured already during the process of nomination according to 
Art. 12 I. The contracting States to the protocol may nominate up to three candidates, whereof 
at least two must be nationals of the proposing state. This procedure equals the Inter-
American protection system.308 Contracting states to the ECHR, in contrast, may list up to 
three candidates but there is no nationality requirement whatsoever.309  
According to Art. 13 I, after entry into force of the protocol the contracting states have been 
asked by the Commission of the AU to nominate the candidates within 90 days upon receipt 
of the request. Thereupon, the Secretary General provided the member states of the AU – not 
only the contracting states – with a list of nominees (Art. 13 II). The involvement of all 
member states has two reasons: First, as stated above, the protocol allows contracting states to 
the Protocol to nominate candidates from other countries.310 As a result, states whose citizens 
were nominated have a legitimate interest to be informed on this nomination. Secondly, 
according to Art. 14 I the candidates are being elected by the Assembly of Heads of States 
and Governments of the AU, and thus by all member states of the AU. Therefore the identities 
of the candidates have to be revealed beforehand.  
                                                 
Comp. Council of Europe information at http://www.echr.coe.int. On the other hand, until 2000 there has 
been only one single female judge at the Inter-American Court. Nowadays three female judges serve at the 
Court; comp. OAS information, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/composiciones_anteriores.cfm; see also: Jo 
Pasqualucci, Sonia Picado, First Woman Judge on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in: HRQ 17 
(1995), pp. 794-806, 797. 
307
  Art. 14 II. 
308
  Art. 53 ACHR. 
309
  Art. 22 I ECHR. 
310
  A view on the elected judges reveals, however, that no contracting State has made use of this possibility. 
The judges are without exception nationals of contracting parties to the protocol: Mr. Fatsah Ouguergouz, 
President (Algeria), Mr. Jean Emile Somda (Burkina Faso), Mr. Gerard Niyungeko (Burundi), Ms Sophia 
A.B. Akuffo (Ghana), Mrs. Kellelo Justina Masafo-Guni (Lesotho), Mr. Hamdi Faraj Fanoush (Libya), Mr. 
Modibo Tounty Guindo (Mali), Mr. Jean Mutsinzi (Rwanda), Mr. El Hadji Guissé (Sénégal), Mr. Bernard 
NGOepe (South Africa), Mr. George W. Kanyeihamba (Uganda). 
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The judges shall be elected by secret ballot, while the Assembly is obliged to ensure that there 
is representation of the main regions of Africa and that there is adequate gender representation 
(Art. 14 II, III). 
Considering the initial election which took place on 22nd January 2006, it must be noticed that 
the Assembly has not completely implemented the requirements of the protocol concerning 
the nomination and election procedure. Only two female judges have been nominated and 
elected. However, the main regions of Africa are represented within the board. 
3. Term of office 
According to Art. 15 I the judges are elected for a period of six years and can be re-elected 
only once. This corresponds to the Inter-American provision which also orders a six year 
period of office and the singular re-election possibility.311 Upon entry into force of the 11th 
additional protocol to the ECHR the term of office has been curtailed from formerly nine312 to 
now six years while at the same time restrictions concerning the re-election have been totally 
dismissed.313 The six year period of term is to some extend criticized to be determined too 
shortly. Judges needed, according to the respective arguments, in practice at least two years to 
get familiarized with their position with the effect that a short term office regulation 
weakened the efficiency of a Court.314 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that a long term 
of office of nine or more years contains the danger that an insufficiently qualified judge 
occupies the position and thus hampers the effective work of the chamber over this long 
period of time. The African provision in question seems to seek a compromise between the 
two possible embodiments of the term of office and their respective advantages and 
disadvantages.  
This is also true for the restricted re-election possibility in Art. 15 I. Unrestricted re-election 
possibility bears the advantage that qualified judges can be preserved for the Court, while it 
runs the risk that Governments try to put pressure on judges with reference to their upcoming 
election. A vivid example in this connection is the case of the former judge at the ECtHR 
Pantîru from Moldavia who defied the pressure of its home country during a pending 
complaint procedure and voted against Moldavia. Pantîru’s re-election has afterwards been 
                                                 
311
  Art. 54 ACHR. 
312
  Art. 40 I ECHR [current version]. 
313
  Art. 23 I ECHR. 
314
  Comp. Norbert Engel, Status, Ausstattung und Personalhoheit des Inter-Amerikanischen und des 
Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, in: EuGRZ 30 (2003), pp 122-133, at p. 129 with regard 
to the fomer european provision. 
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circumvented by Moldavia under obscure circumstances and he was sued for obviously 
constructed malfeasances.315 The protocol’s terms regulation minimizes comparable dangers 
while at the same time allows a qualified judge to keep his/her position for a twelve year 
period of time. 
In order to avoid that a change of judges interferes with the Court’s administration of business 
the terms of four judges elected at the first election expire at the end of two years while the 
terms of four more judges expire at the end of four years (Art. 15 I).316 A judge elected to 
replace a judge whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the 
predecessor’s term (At. 15 II). This provision ensures the synchronism of the election periods 
and the AU does not permanently have to go through a costly and complex nomination and 
election procedure for a single judge who replaces another during his current term of office.  
According to Art. 15 IV all judges except the President perform their functions on a part-time 
basis. On this crucial point the African Court again follows the example of its Inter-American 
counterpart which likewise operates on a part-time basis. However, this was also the case with 
its European counterpart until its transformation into a permanent Court after entry into force 
of protocol 11. This functional metamorphose was one of the key issues of the reformation 
process.317 The shape of the African Court was object of circumstantial discussion during the 
development process for the protocol. One objection against a part-time Court was the fear of 
the delegates that judges could loose their impartiality should they hold another position. The 
suggestion was to either reduce the number of judges to seven and create a permanent Court 
or to appoint at least a few additional judges to work permanently beside the President. The 
proponents of the present configuration of the Court argued that the lack of money precluded 
a permanent Court and, moreover, the expected case load would not justify a permanent Court 
for the beginning.318 The ministers agreed on a compromise: They voted for the part-time 
court but incorporated into Art. 15 VI the wording that “the Assembly may change this 
arrangement as it deems appropriate.”  
                                                 
315
  Norbert Engel, Status, Ausstattung und Personalhoheit des Inter-Amerikanischen und des Europäischen 
Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, in: EuGRZ 30 (2003), pp 122-133, at p. 130, comp. also the country 
report „Moldavia“ of the International Helsinki Federation of Human Rights of 2002, p. 235, available 
under www.ihf-hr.org. 
316
  A corresponding provision can be found in the ACHR (Art. 54 ACHR, comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-
American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 124) and for the same reasons in Art. 23 I ECHR. 
317
  Volker Schlette, Das neue Rechtsschutzsystem der europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, in: ZaöRV 56 
(1996) pp. 905-976, at pp. 935 et seqq.  
318
  Comp. Ibrahim Badawi, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: RADIC, 9 (1997), pp. 943-952, at. 
948. 
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This decision for a part time operating Court has several impacts: the most apparent is the 
length of the complaint procedures. The examination of a complaint extends significantly if 
the competent body works part-time only.319 The trouble to schedule parties, their 
representatives, witnesses and amici curiae concordantly are well known in all legal systems. 
In Africa these difficulties are striking due to incapable infrastructure.320 Should the Court 
like the Commission hold its sessions twice a year any minor aberration of the plan would 
lead to a prolongation of the complaint procedure for a period of six months. In this vein 
procedural delays of a couple of years may occur without any factual reasons. This would 
reduce the legal protection effect significantly.321 
Art. 15 VI at least shows the development goal of the protocol. One may thus hope that the 
case load of the Court will justify a permanent judicial body soon and that the Assembly will 
grade the African Court up to a permanently operating. 
4. Impartiality and incompatibility rules 
Provisions on the impartiality and incompatibility are spread in the protocol. It has been 
mentioned that according to Art. 11 the judges are elected in an individual capacity and 
therefore perform their office without any external order. After their election, the judges of 
                                                 
319
  Judge Picardi of the IACtHR describes this effect as „very frustrating, indeed“. Judge Buergenthal adds 
another negative consequence by answering the question if a part-time court downgrades the quality of the 
findings: “The answer is yes. […] Usually it is very frustrating because we really do not have much time to 
think about an opinion.” Comp. Linda Frost, The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Reflections of Present and Former Judges, in: HRQ 14 (1992) pp. 171-205, at pp. 187 et seq. 
320
  E.g. Commissioner Umozurike could not attend the 2nd extra-ordinary session of the African Commission 
concerning the human rights situation in Nigeria “due to communication problems.” Comp. 9th Annual 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1995/1996, AHG 20/207 
(XXXII), p. 4. 
321
  One of the most ostensive Communications of the African Commission in this regard was the complaint on 
behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders: In September 1994 the first communication reached the 
Commissions’ Secretariat alleging a violations of the right to life and fair trail considering the death penalty 
which was imposed on all defendants by a Nigerian drumhead court martial. On its 16th session in October 
1994 the Commission dealt with the Communication for the first time but deferred its decision on the 
admissibility to its next session to obtain more information from the Nigerian Government. On its 17th 
session in March 1995 the Commission declared the Communications as admissible and deferred the matter 
to its next session because the Nigerian Government had not shown any reaction to the Commissions 
requests for information. The Commission therefore invited the Nigerian Government to send a 
representative to its next session to promote the deliberation of the matter. Since this representative did not 
show up the Commission decided to send an on-site mission to Nigeria and deferred the Communication to 
its next session. On its 19th session (April 1996) the Commission heard the oral pleadings of the 
complainants and the Nigerian representative but deferred its decision again to wait for the results of the 
planned on-site mission. This mission was finally set up in March 1997. The mission came up with results 
in November 1997. On its 23rd session in April 1998 “la Commission, du fait du manque de temps, n’a pas 
pu prendre une decision sur ces communications.” On its 24th session the Commission decided on the 
merits and held the communications as founded and the Banjul Charter as violated by Nigeria. Ken Saro-
Wiwa and the Ogoni leaders had been executed by a shooting command three years ago (November 10th 
1995). 
 V. The organisation of the Court 
  81 
the Court have to make a solemn declaration to discharge their duties impartially and 
faithfully (Art. 16). Moreover, Art. 17 I guarantees the independence of the judges322 “in 
accordance with international law”.323 A judge must not hear a case in which he/she has 
previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for one of the parties or as a member of a 
national or international court or a commission of enquiry or in any other capacity. Any doubt 
on this point shall be settled by decision of the Court.324 
Another way to ensure the independence of judges is to grant immunities.325 These are 
conferred upon the judges by Art. 17 IV: “The judges of the Court shall enjoy, from the 
moment of their election and throughout their term of office, the immunities extended to 
diplomatic agents in accordance with international law.” International law applicable in this 
conjunction is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCD).326 Of special 
relevance are Artt. 26 to 36 which grant absolute immunity from criminal proceedings and 
constricted immunity from civil processes under the jurisdiction of the host country.327 The 
personal immunity is distinguishable to the functional. Personal immunities granted by the 
protocol – in divergence to Art. 39 VCD - are effective within the time limits laid down in 
Art. 17 III (“throughout their term of office”). However, with regard to the functional 
immunity Art. 17 IV declares that the judges must not be held liable for any decision or 
opinion issued in the exercise of their functions. It has unlimited after-effect according to Art. 
39 II 2 VCD. 
Immunities for the judges do not suffice to ensure the neutral and objective process conduct. 
Also Rules of incompatibility are necessary to safeguard these attributes and also to document 
the independence of the Court and therefore strengthen the authority of its judgements. 
                                                 
322
  The Cape Town Draft contained a much more illustrative wording on the very spot: “The Court shall 
decide matters before it impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with law, without any 
restrictions, undue influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any 
quarter or for any reason.” (Art. 15 I Cape Town Draft). Tunesia regarded this wording as “excessive”. 
States would deem as “potentially guilty parties; comp. Observations and Comments of the Government of 
Tunesia on the Draft protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, CM/1996 (LXV) Annex III (e) p. 4. The Nouackchott 
Conference met these concerns and diffused the wording. 
323
  Here the protocol refers to Art 14 I CCPR. This provision enshrines the liberal maxim of the separation of 
powers and especially the independence of justice, comp. Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary, Art 14 No 
2. 
324
  Art. 17 II. 
325
  Wenckstern assumes that a high judgeship has to be connected with adequate attributes of prestige and 
honourableness to appear attractive for the most capable persons. Insofar the vanity of the jurists - 
according to Wenckstern - is also met by granting diplomatic immunities. Comp. Manfred Wenckstern, 
Immunity of International Organisations, in: Handbuch des internationalen Zivilverfahrensrechts Bd. II/1, 
p. 213. 
326
  UNTS Vol. 500 pp. 95 et seqq. 
327
  Comp. the restrictions of Art. 31 I VCR. 
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Art. 18 declares the position of judge of the Court as incompatible with any activity that 
might interfere with the independence or impartiality of such a judge or the demands of the 
office as determined in the Rules of Procedure of the Court. The protocol thus leaves it to the 
Court to profile the requirements for the impartiality of its judges. In reverse, it is up to the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments to anticipate these requirements when 
nominating and electing the first bench of the Court. 
According to Art. 22 a judge is excluded from a case if he/she is national of any State which 
is party to a case submitted to the Court. Thus the fathers of the protocol here have decided in 
favour for the nemo debet esse judex in causa sua doctrine and against the mode of the other 
regional pacts. The ACHR expressly governs that if a judge is a national of any of the States 
Parties to a case, he shall retain his right to hear that case.328 The ECHR on the other hand 
provides that the judge with the citizenship of the State party ex officio is member of the 
competent chamber that hears the case. Should no titular judge obtain the citizenship of the 
State Party concerned it has to appoint another person to take part in the hearings as an ad-hoc 
judge.329 This regulation assures that the Court gets a substantiated state of knowledge of the 
law system and domestic laws of the State Parties.330 
Krisch assumes that the modus operandi of the protocol might be a reaction to the negative 
experiences with the members of the African Commission who were accused of prejudice 
time and again.331 However, the embodiment of the African provision has different roots: 
Originally the Cape Town Draft provided for a provision according to which a judge retained 
his rights to hear the case even if his country of citizenship was party to it.332 The 
Governments of Egypt, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Madagascar all raised the objection 
that in this case States that are not represented in the bench would have to obtain the right to 
appoint an ad-hoc judge. To avoid this complex and complicated procedure the Nouackchott 
Conference modified this provision into its converse.333  
                                                 
328
  Art. 55 I ACHR. In order to redress balance, however, Art. 55 II provides that in these cases the other State 
Party has the right to appoint a person of its choice as an ad-hoc judge. 
329
  Art. 27 II ECHR. In contrast to the respective provision of the ACHR, it is obligatory under the ECHR to 
appoint an ad-hoc judge. 
330
  Scott Davidson, The Interamerican Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p. 128; Callewaert, No. 7 to 
Art. 27, in: Pettiti, Decaux, Imbert (Eds.) La Convention Européenne des droits de l’Homme, p. 756. 
331
  Nico Krisch, The Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, in: ZaöRV 58 (1998), 
pp 713-726; at p 717; similar: Inger Österdahl, The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: RACHPR 7 (1998), pp. 132-150, at 135. 
332
  Art. 19 I Cape Town Draft. 
333
  Report of the Second Government Legal Expert meeting on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/ACHPR/HPR/RPT(2). para. 39. 
 V. The organisation of the Court 
  83 
5. Cessation of office 
A judge can only be suspended or removed from office by the unanimous decision of the 
other judges if he/she has been found to be no longer fulfilling the required conditions to be a 
judge of the Court.334 According to Art. 10 II such a decision, however, does not become final 
until it is set aside by the Assembly at its next session. The Assembly therefore functions as 
the ultimate resort concerning the suspension of a judge. Whereas according to Art. 73 ACHR 
in the Inter-American system the disciplinary power over the judges also lies in the hands of 
the OAS assembly, the ECHR excludes political bodies from the decision on the question 
whether or not a judge is to be suspended.335 Also the Cape Town Draft came up with 
significant different wording at this place: “Such judgement of the Court [on the suspension 
of a judge] shall be final and take effect immediately.”336 However, Nigeria and Tunesia 
objected that it was the Assembly after all that was responsible for the election of the judges 
and consequently it had to keep this responsibility for their removal. These deliberations led 
to the respective revision of the provision.337  
The adopted version does not seem to be felicitous because of two aspects: Firstly, the 
authority of the Court is weakened since it depends on political backup in urgent self-
administrative matters such as the suspension of a judge. More important, if a judge has been 
found incapable by all his/her colleagues, what would be the effect if the assembly 
countermanded this decision? The work flow and processes of the bench would be severely 
deranged since the judge concerned would have to stand against ten opposing colleagues for 
the rest of his/her term of office.338 Moreover, Art. 10 II does not clarify the status of the 
judge concerned between the decision of the other judges and the assembly (that only holds 
one annual meeting).339 Thus the question arises if the judge concerned is allowed to take part 
                                                 
334
  Art. 19 I. 
335
  Comp. Art. 24 ECHR (here only a two-thirds-majority of the judges is necessary in contrast to the 
prerequisite of unanimity under the Protocol.) However, Scott Davidson stresses, that the commensurate 
with Art. 73 ACHR any sanctions against judges must be approved not only by a two-third majority vote of 
the assembly but also of the Parties to the Convention which prevents political interferences of singular 
disaffected State Parties, Scott Davidson, The Interamerican Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p. 
131. 
336
  Art. 17 II Cape Town Draft. 
337
  Report of the Second Governmental Legal Expert Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(2) para 36. 
338
  On this account Nigeria suggested to discharge the Court completely from any such decision and to assign 
this competence to the assembly exclusively, Report of the Thiird Governmental Legal Expert Meeting 
(enlarged to include Diplomats) on the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(III) Rev. 1 para 25. 
339
  Gino Naldi, Konstantin Magliveras, the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Evaluation 
and Comparison, in: RADC 8 (1996), pp. 944-970, at 947. 
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in the ongoing proceedings until the assembly has decided on the suspension. If the answer is 
positive, it needs to be answered if the decision of the assembly is effective ex nunc or ex tunc 
and in the latter case whether the interim decisions of the Court with the contribution of the 
later suspended judge remain valid. From this perspective the former version of the provision 
appeared to be more consistent while at the same time less complicated in its consequences. 
6. The Board 
According to Art. 23 the Court shall examine cases brought before it, if it has a quorum of at 
least seven judges. Since according to Art. 11 the Court consists of eleven judges it follows 
that there will be only a single board to consider the complaints.  
However, the Cape Town Draft still allowed the Court to constitute two chambers each of 
which manned by at least five judges „if the necessity arises“.340 Tunisia saw the problem that 
there was no institution that would reassign the judges to the new chambers and determine 
each chamber’s competencies.341 Although the conference of ministers discarded this demur 
and pointed out that these matters should be solved by the Court’s rules of procedure „where 
it properly belongs“342 the Nouackchott Conference deleted this addendum according to 
which the Court could be split up into two chambers.343 
Envisioning only one chamber the protocol follows its Inter-American counterpart. The 
IACtHR is quorate with five (from a total of seven) judges.344 The ECHR on the other hand 
has refined the chamber system after entry into force of the 11th protocol: the Court sits in 
committees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of 
seventeen judges, depending on the state of procedure.345 Especially the creation of the Grand 
Chamber which on the hand is responsible for inter state complaints and such individual 
complaints that raise serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention, or 
where the resolution of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a 
                                                 
340
  Art. 20 Cape Town Draft. 
341
  Observations and Comments of the Government of Tunisia on the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 
20, CM/1996(LXV)Annex III (e) p. 2. 
342
  Report of the Secretary General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Council of Ministers 65th Ordinary Session, CM/1996(LXV) para 30. 
343
  Report of the Second Governmental Legal Expert meeting on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(2), para 40. 
344
  Art. 23 I Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
345
  Art. 27-32 ECHR, comp. for an overview on the deliberation procedure and competencies of the Chambers 
and Committees Mark Villinger, The 11th additional protocol in practice, in: SZIER (1999) pp. 79-95, at p. 
81 et seqq. 
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judgment previously delivered by the Court346 and on the other hand quasi functions as a 
Chamber of appeal „in exceptional cases“347 is seen as a fundamental novum in the scope of 
the Court’s reform.348 Such a detailed chamber system surely would not fit the needs of the 
African Court. However, it must nevertheless be doubted that the provision in force displays 
the best solution: The Commission underlined in its comments to the Nouackchott Draft that 
it would not be wise to lay down a fix quorum of seven judges for each stage of the procedure 
since the record of the Commissions deliberations showed that it faced difficulties every now 
and then to reach the neccesary quorum.349 Secondly, this stare quorum would foreclose any 
division of work of the Court however natured, since all present judges would be bound to the 
single chamber.350 These objections remained unheard, however. The provision of the Cape 
Town Draft surely was more adaptive; should the caseload of the Court become unbearable 
for one chamber one day instead of a mere internal decision of the Court the complicated 
diplomatic process of an amendment of the protocol would have to be started by the member 
States.  
However, the Court might bypass the terminatory character of Art. 23 for certain phases of 
the complaint procedure. Starting point of such a deliberation is a narrow interpretation of the 
wording „examine“ in Art. 23: The Court should consider the possibility to exclude at least 
the handling of apparently inadmissible complaints from the scope of Art. 23. The Chamber 
would be discharged at least insofar and could spare its time for deliberations on legally 
comprehensive complaints.351  
                                                 
346
  Art. 30, 31 ECHR. 
347
  Art. 43 ECHR. 
348
  Comp. Volker Schlette, Das neue Rechtsschutzsystem der europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention in: 
ZaÖRV 56 (1996) pp. 905-976, at p. 950 et seqq.; Andrew Drzembczewski, The Internal Organisation of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in: LHRQ 3 (1999) pp. 109-128, at 110 et seq. 
349
  Art. 43 III AfrCHPR also constitutes the quorum of seven with regard to the Commission. However, at its 
16th session only eight Commissioners could take part two of whom became sick during the deliberations. 
The Commission proceeded with the session nonetheless, Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, The Hague 1996, p. 50. The Commission decided on on the merits of nine 
communications, declared five as admissable and rejected seven more as inadmissable, comp. Final 
Communiqué of the 16th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 25 October – 
3rd November 1994, para 47. Such a modus operandi is equivocal even for a quasi judicial organ like the 
Commission. For the Court it would be absolutely intolerable since it would cast doubts on any decision of 
the chamber. 
350
  Report of the Secretary General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Council of Ministers, 66th Ordninary Session, CM/2020(LXVI)1997, para. 18. 
351
  It was expected in the course of the reformation of the European system that the Committees would declare 
up to 95 percent of the complaints (terminatory) as inadmissable before they are being considered by the 
Chamber, Alistair Mowbray, Reform of the Control System of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
in: Public Law 1994 (p540-552, at 547; same, A New European Court of Human Rights, in Public Law, 
1993, pp´. 419-426, at 424. The Committees have fully complied with these expectations: 95,9 percent of 
the complaints have been declared indamissable in 2006, comp. www.echr.coe.int/ 
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7. Seat of the Court 
The seat of the Court is not governed by the protocol itself. Instead Art. 25 I assigns the States 
parties to the protocol to determine the seat of the Court. The wording of Art. 25 is nearly 
identical with Art. 58 I ACHR. While all member Stats of the AU are involved in the election 
process of the judges, only ratifying States select the seat of the Court.352 
Although Senegal has not only been the first to ratify the protocol but has expressly given 
notice of its interest to become the host country of the Court the States parties agreed upon 
Arusha, Tanzania, as its seat. While the proximity of Senegal to Gambia, the host country of 
the Commission, undoubtfully would have facilitated the co-operation between the two 
institutions353 there was first and foremost one aspect that militated in favour of Tanzania: the 
Court could utilize the facilities developed for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
which is based in Arusha and is supposed to have completed its mandate by the end of 
2008.354  
However, in congruence with its Inter-American correspondent, according to Art. 25 I the 
African Court may convene in the territory of any Member State of the AU when the majority 
of the Court considers it desirable, and with the prior consent of the State concerned. 
The seat of the Court can only be changed by the Assembly of the AU „after due consultation 
with the Court“.355 It remains remarkable in this context, that concerning the initial decision 
only the States parties to the protocol are entitled to vote whereas in case of a change of seat 
the whole assembly has voting power.356  
8. Financing 
According to Art. 32 the expenses of the Court, the emoluments and allowances for the judges 
as well as the budget of its registry, shall be determined and borne by the AU, in accordance 
                                                 
statisticalinformation.htm. 
352
  While the Nouackchott Draft has entitled the complete assembly to decide on the seat of the Court, the third 
Expert Conference added the endorsement „from among States parties to the protocol“, comp. Report of the 
Third goverment Legal Expert Meeting (enlarged to include Diplomats) on the Establishement of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/ACHPR/RPT.(III) Rev. 1 para 30. 
353
  Even in the Inter-American system the distance between the Comission (Washington, USA) and the Court 
(San José, Costa Rica) hinders the concerted performance of their common task and is jointly responsible 
for their lacking concurrence, comp. Victor Rodriguez, David Marc, The Development of the Inter-
American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a Modern Day Critique, in: NYLSJHR 16 
(2006) pp. 593-633, at p. 622. 
354
  Comp. Completion strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, available under 
www.ictr.org. 
355
  Art. 25 II. 
356
  It is conjecturable that the third Expert Meeting has utterly overlooked to revise the second paragraph of 
Art. 25 after having amanded its first; comp. footnote 352. However the field of appliaace of Art. 25 II is so 
narrow that this mere editorial mistake will most probably never have any effect. 
 VI. Jurisdiction of the Court 
  87 
with criteria laid down by the AU in consultation with the Court. 
Since the AU has to budget the costs, all AU members pay fort he Court according to their 
institutional financial obligations. This has the advantage that a ratification of the protocol 
does not result in additional financial claims of the mother organization for the state 
concerned.357 On the other hand, because of the financial undersupply of the AU358 the costs 
of the Court will lead to a congruent shortage for other cost units of the AU, such as the 
Commission. Secondly, the allocation from the AU will most probably be everything but 
generous. The Court will therefore share the fate of the Commission and have to rely on 
foreign benefits.  
VI. Jurisdiction of the Court  
After the presentation of the Court’s organization, it shall now be investigated as to how its 
jurisdictions have been defined. In this connection the protocol differentiates between two 
areas of jurisdiction: Contentious jurisdiction (Art. 3) and advisory opinion (Art. 4).  
1. Contentious jurisdiction 
With regard to jurisdiction, Art. 3 I specifies that this includes all cases and disputes which 
are submitted to the Court, and which have the interpretation and application of the Banjul 
Charter as well as the protocol and any other human rights instruments (that have been 
ratified by the concerned states) as content. In the event of ambiguities, the Court itself shall 
decide (commensurate with Art. 3 II) whether the matter is subject to its jurisdiction or not.359  
                                                 
357
  In 1990 the current president of the Commission, Umozurike, argued with this point in his letter to all 
Heads of States and Governments of these countries that still had not ratified the Banjul Charter: „As we go 
through the latest list of ratifications, we notice that Your Excellency’s State is not yet included. That does 
not imply that you are not concerned with the activities of the Commission. Your Excellency’s State helps 
to fund the Commission through ist contribution to the OAU [...] What remains therefore is to formerly 
recognize your interest, obligations and responabilities under the Charter. I am convinced, Your 
Excellency, that it will be in furtherance of Your Excellency’s States’ role in Africa to ratify the Charter 
and give formal recognition to the activities you are already performing in furthering the promotion and 
protection of human rights, printed in: 3rd Activity Report, Annex II. 
358
  However, the AU tried to generate its budged in any possible way. The Eminent Persons Advisory Panel 
had proposed the African Diaspora should contribute 10 USD per month fort he benefit of the AU. It is also 
debated to tax 1 USD on every intercontinental flight from and to Africa, comp. Baffour Ankomah. Funding 
the Union, in: New African, 408 (June 2002) p 15. 
359
  In this connection, the Ivorian Government argued that with this provision the Court is the “judge of its 
own cause”. Therefore they proposed consulting the Commission – which should decide about such cases – 
in the event of such ambiguities. Comp. Comments of the Embassy of Côte d’Ivoire in Ethiopia, CM/1996 
(LXV) Annex III (h). Such a proposal is out of the question, since the competence of the court would 
depend on the Commission. However, the jurisdictional competence normally lies with the judiciary 
authority. The PCIJ has already stated in this connection that “as a general rule, any body possessing 
jurisdictional powers has the right in the first place itself to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction”. 
Comp. Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement, 1928 B 16, p. 20. Senegal’s proposal remained also 
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a) Waiver of a recognition of competence  
The jurisdiction of the Court is already given if they have the matter at hand and if this relates 
to the said subject matter. And with that the African Court differs significantly from its Inter-
American counterpart. The ACHR makes the jurisdiction of the Court contingent on whether 
the involved state has recognised this through special declaration.360 Such a declaration can 
be issued unconditionally, with reciprocity proviso, for a specific period or for specific 
cases.361 The advantageousness of the African provision in contrats to the American cannot 
be underscored enough. 
The protocol on the establishment of an African Court of Human Rights would be nearly 
worthless with a provision corresponding to the ACHR. Since the establishment of the Inter-
American Court was an integral component of the ACHR, at least the obligation to accept the 
material portion was achieved through the mere ratification of the ACHR even if the signature 
states did not accept the jurisdiction of the Court. But with a reservation of consent 
concerning the jurisdiction of the African Court, the mere ratification of the protocol – insofar 
as the protection of human rights is concerned – would be to a great without any effect. 
However, the current version of Art. 3 I was by no means undisputed. In particular, Tunisia 
saw the sovereignty of the states as endangered, and proposed to incorporate such a 
reservation of consent.362 Fortunately, neither the Conference of Experts363 nor the 
                                                 
completely ignored. 
360
  Art. 62 III ACHR, comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, pp 
205 seqq. 
361
  Compare Art. 62 II ACHR; up until today (end of 2006), 22 out of 35 OAS member states have issued the 
“Recognition of Competence”. Meanwhile, Peru had attempted to revoke this recognition during a 
procedure (Castillo Pertuzzi v. Peru, ruling from 30.5.1999). The Peruvian president Fujimori perceived 
“that the Court was infringing on Peru’s sovereignty”, because the Court ruled that Peru arranged its 
national security and order law in conformity with the convention. Comp. Monica Tinta, Individual Human 
Rights v. State Sovereignty: The Case of Peru’s Withdrawal from the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, in: LJIL 13 (2000), pp. 985-996, 988; see also: Douglass Cassel, Peru 
withdraws from the Court – will the Inter-American Human Rights System meet the challenge?; in: HRLJ 
20 (1999), pp. 167-175. However, in its ruling the Court did not consider the mere revocation as an actus 
contrarius. The Convention does not provide for the separate revocation of the declaration of consent; the 
termination of the entire Convention is only open to the contracting states commensurate with Art. 78 
ACHR. The Court obviously relied on the fact that Peru would shrink back from the political 
announcement effect that a complete withdrawal from the American Convention on Human Rights would 
have. In retrospect, it was correct with regard to this risky assessment. In this case, the president of the 
European Court for Human Rights also explicitly approved the legal opinion of the Inter-American Court in 
a letter to his American colleagues. Comp. Press Announcement from the Inter-American Court from 
2.10.1999; CDH-CP13/99, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/pr23-99.html. 
362
  “Regarding the court’s jurisdiction in matters and in view of the fact that those subject to such jurisdiction 
are sovereign States, it is vital to provide that such jurisdiction can only apply to States which at the time of 
signing or acceding to the protocol, do accept that it shall be fully binding and mandatory.” Comp. 
Observations and Comments of the Government of Tunisia on the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
CM/1996(LXV) Annexe III (e), p. 2. 
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Conference of Ministers was convinced by the necessity of this restriction.364  
b) Scope of jurisdiction (ratione materiae) 
Commensurate with Art. 3 I, the jurisdiction of the Court covers the provisions of the Banjul 
Charter, the additional protocol and also other relevant human rights instruments, which are 
ratified by the concerned states. Therefore the jurisdiction of the African Court exceeds that of 
the other regional courts of human rights: The Inter-American Court365 and the European 
Court for Human Rights366 are only responsible for cases which pertain to the respective 
human rights convention. The ECHR only explicitly includes the supplementary protocols in 
this connection. 
At the same time, the question is posed as to what is exactly meant by “any other human 
rights instruments”. In this regard, Österdahl states that the formulation “instruments” goes 
much further than the term “treaties”, because it not only encompasses binding international 
law conventions, but all written human rights documents as well as mere declarations.367 In 
light of the clear wording of Art. 3 I, which clarifies that the human rights instruments must 
be ratified by the respective states, such a conclusion appears untenable, however. With a 
ratification a state declares that it is bound through a binding treaty under international law 
(Art. 2 I lit. b VCLT).368 However, mere declarations do not engender any obligations under 
international law. As a result, they are not able to be ratified. Therefore they cannot be 
subsumed under the term “other human rights instruments”.369  
                                                 
363
  The Cape Town Conference of Experts clearly recognised that “such a provision would nullify the 
effectiveness of the Court”. Comp. Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CM/1996 (LXV) para. 20. 
364
  Even Tunisia ultimately signed the protocol in the current version, even though it has not yet been ratified. 
Comp. Status of Signature/Ratification/Accession – OAU Human Rights Treaties, Doc/OS(XXVIII)/ 
INF.25. 
365
  The Inter-American Court can prepare advisory opinions under the prerequisites of Art. 64 ACHR as well 
as concerning provisions of other agreements which pertain to the protection of human rights in the 
American states, but the contentious jurisdiction applies only to the Convention (Art. 62 III ACHR).  
366
  Comp. Art. 32 I ECHR. 
367
  Inger Österdahl, The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: A 
comparative Critique, in: RACHPR 7 (1998), pp. 132-150, 136. 
368
  Comp. Antonio Cassese, International Law, Oxford 2005, p. 170; Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg, Die 
völkerrechtlichen Verträge als Hauptrechtsquelle des Völkerrechts, in: Knut Ispen (Ed), Völkerrecht, 4th 
Edition, Munich 1999, pp. 92-179, 110. 
369
  At this point, Österdahl also addresses the matter of how this term is to be understood. In his opinion, three 
possibilities come into consideration: First of all, the other human rights instrument that the Court wants to 
apply must be ratified by all of the protocol’s contracting states. Secondly, the protocol’s contracting 
parties must be the same as those of the other instrument; or thirdly, the states against which a complaint 
has been filed, or respectively, if a state lodges the complaint, it must have ratified the other instrument. 
Comp.: Inger Österdahl, The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, in: RACHPR 7 (1998), pp. 132-150, 139. The first two possibilities of interpretation clearly miss 
the matter. They would limit the scope of application to such an extent that its inclusion in the protocol 
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In contrast to the Inter-American Court, which has the competence to issue advisory opinions 
regarding other such agreements which pertain to protection – especially in the American 
states370 –, the African Court is not regionally bound.371 And so regional African as well as 
universal agreements come into consideration as the basis of opinions and rulings: For one 
thing, on a universal level this includes the human rights pacts, but for instance also the 
Convention on elimination of any form of discrimination against the woman372, the 
convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or humiliating treatment or punishment373 
and the convention on the rights of the child.374 Relevant regional agreements include the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,375 the OAU Convention on 
Refugees376 and, after entry into force, the protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.377  
However, references to human rights are also found in African economic pacts. For instance, 
in the treaty on the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States378 
(ECOWAS Treaty) such rights which are also in connection with economic collaboration are 
particularly formulated. This includes rights pertaining to entry, residence and 
                                                 
would not be justifiable. The only comprehensibly possibility remains with a limitation of the third 
interpretation. The human rights instrument must be ratified by the state against which the complaint has 
been lodged. 
370
  The IACtHR’s first advisory opinion (Other Treaties) especially dealt with the question what exactly is 
meant by the phrase in Art. 64 I ACHR “other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the 
American states” Comp. hereunto Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 
1997, pp. 232 et seqq., 243 et seq. 
371
  Only the Nouakchott Draft defines at the same point the jurisdiction of the Court for “any other applicable 
African human rights instrument”. Comp. Art. 3 I Nouakchott Draft. This restriction was only removed at 
the Third Conference of Experts in Addis Ababa. At the same time, the clarifying formulation was adopted 
with respect to the fact that the instruments must be ratified. These substantial amendments were only 
tersely commented on in the conference protocol: “These Articles [Art. 3 and 4] were adopted unanimously 
with minor amendments”; compare: Report of the Third Government Legal Expert Meeting (enlarged to 
include Diplomats) on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT.(III) Rev. 1, para.16. 
372
  1249 UNTS 13. 
373
  ILM 24 (1985) 535. 
374
  ILM 28 (1989) 1448. 
375
  999 UNTS 171; comp. also: Frans Viljoen, Supra-national human rights instruments for the protection of 
children in Africa, in: CILSA 31 (1998), pp. 199-215.  
376
  1001 UNTS 45; comp. also: Chibinga Chintu, Refugees - eternally displaced?, in: SAHRR 6 (2000), pp. 2-
12. 
377
  Doc/OS/34c/(XXIII) Annex; this protocol draft concretises the rights included in the Banjul Charter, 
especially the rights of women. It bluntly addresses many problem situations in Africa: For instance, it 
prohibits, amongst other things, any genital mutilation and infibulation; and for one thing, it massively 
strengthens the political rights, but also the woman’s rights in marriage. Compare also: Martin Semalulu 
Nsibirwa, A brief analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa, in: AHRLJ 1 (2001), pp. 40-57. 
378
  Members of ECOWAS are 15 West African states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo). With 
regard to the development and objective of ECOWAS, comp.: Dirk van den Boom, Regionale Kooperation 
in Westafrika: Politik und Probleme der ECOWAS, Hamburg 1996, p. 10 et. seqq. 
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employment.379 But particularly to be emphasised are the freedom of information and press 
rights which are documented in the agreement and which otherwise exceed the customary 
protection on a regional African level.380 However, in contrast to the Banjul Charter, it must 
be stated that the ECOWAS Treaty does not assign any individual rights solely from the 
wording, but only obligates the states amongst each other.381 Therefore a Court jurisdiction 
for standards from the ECOWAS Treaty also only comes into question if a violation of these 
standards is denounced by ECOWAS contracting parties. However, it is problematic that the 
ECOWAS has created a separate, fully-adjudicating monitoring body with the Community 
Court.382 In other respects, other universal and regional human rights conventions applicable 
to the African Court also provide specific monitoring mechanisms which handle 
complaints.383  
c) Relationship to the jurisdiction of other (quasi-) juridical bodies  
With the jurisdictional extension of Art. 3 I to all ratified human rights instruments the risk 
increases that various international bodies will enact irreconcilable decisions. This would, in 
turn, have negative effects on the unifomity of the international law system.384  
                                                 
379
  Comp. Art. 59 ECOWAS Treaty, including the appurtenant protocol: A/SP/1/7/86; both printed in: AJICL 
8 (1996), pp. 187 et. seqq and pp. 228 et seqq. (respectively). 
380
  Comp. Art. 66 ECOWAS Treaty. Also particularly in view of the recent intensification of provisions 
regarding the press in the western countries of Africa (Togo, Ivory Coast and Guinea), these provisions 
have an enhanced importance. With regard to the freedom of the press situation in Africa, see the 2006 
Annual Report of the organisation “Reporters sans Frontières” under http://www.rsf.org/. 
381
  An individual justification under international law is regularly provided only if the individual is granted the 
authority to demand a specific action or omission through an international law standard. Comp. Antonio 
Cassese, International Law, Oxford 2005, p. 146; Shigeki Miyazaki, Internationaler Schutz der 
Menschenrechte und Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit, in: FS Hermann Mosler, pp. 581-597, 586. 
382
  Art. 15 ECOWAS Treaty: The Court was first inaugurated in August 2000, although the convention 
amendment which provided for the establishment of the Court already entered into force in 1993. Comp. 
Kofi Oteng Kufur, Securing Compliance with the Judgements of the ECOWAS Court, in: AJICL 8 (1996), 
pp. 1-11, 2. The Court only adopted its rules of procedure a year later. Comp. ECOWAS Court adopts 
Rules of Procedure, in: The Guardian (Lagos, Nigeria) from 9.8.2001, p. 3. 
383
  On a regional level, this is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, where the specially 
created protective committee can also obtain individual communications (Art. 44 of the Charter); on the 
universal level, provisions concerning individual grievances are stipulated in the following conventions: 
1. Facultative Protocol to the ICCPR, Art. 14 RDC, Art. 22 Anti-torture Convention, Art. 77 of the Migrant 
Worker Convention, Art. 34 ECHR, and Art 44. ACHR. After entry into force of the Supplementary 
Protocol to the Convention concerning the Elimination of any Form of Racial Discrimination of the 
Woman, individual grievances can also be submitted to the CEDAW Commission. In the meantime, efforts 
have also been made to introduce an individual grievance procedure before the East African Court, the 
judiciary body of the East African Community. Comp. The East African from 03.03.03, p. 4. 
384
  Comp. Jonathan Charney, International Law and Multiple International Tribunals, in: RdC 271 (1998), pp. 
101-373, 134; ibid. The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and 
Tribunals, in: NYUJILP 31 (1999), pp. 697-708, 699; as far as international organisations are concerned, 
Ignatz Seidl-Hohenfeldern and Gerhard Loibl see the danger here “that their right flutters here”. Comp. 
ibid: Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen einschließlich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften, 6th 
Edition, Cologne et al, 1996, § 1372. The President of the ICJ has outlined the problem as follows: 
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The protocol did not react to these difficulties ― despite the extensively arranged competence 
of the Court’s ratio materiae. For instance, in contrast to the Commission’s interpretations, 
which merely apply provisions of the Banjul Charter, the Community Court could be seen as 
the more pertinent institution for human rights questions arising from the ECOWAS 
Treaty.385 The rest of the monitoring bodies utilised through the concerned treaty could also 
most likely be referred to and judged via its interpretation.  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights argued in its opinion on “other treaties” that the 
possibility of colliding decisions exists in every national legal system in which not all courts 
are hierarchically structured; from that point of view, conflicts cannot be avoided. On an 
international law level, this risk of preparing opinions on all legal issues already exists 
through the competence of the ICJ, for which a different body is originally responsible.386 
Actually, the first argument is not really convincing: Whereas on the national level court 
decisions can be asserted in terms of sovereignty and the intended effect can be lent by the 
states authorities, in light of the deficit of enforcement in international law, decisions from 
international law institutions live from their clarity and unanimity. Both of these aspects are 
severely restricted through contradictory decisions.  
But the Inter-American Court also recognises that in its case there is no serious risk of 
collision, because contradictions could only emerge within the scope of advisory opinions in 
which the legal binding force of rulings is missing.387 But the situation with regard to 
contentious jurisdiction is different in the African system.388 This is why Österdahl sees the 
interpretation of such universal human rights conventions – but also all regional pacts which 
show human rights references – through the Court as inept, and recommends that they should 
only be inspired by them; but any direct application should be avoided.389  
                                                 
“Overlapping jurisdiction also exacerbates the risk of conflicting jurisprudence [...]. [T]he proliferation of 
international courts gives rise to a serious risk of conflicting jurisprudence, as the same rule of law might be 
given different interpretations in different cases.” Address by H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of 
the International Court to the United Nations General Assembly, 26 October 2000 A755 PV 41, agenda 
item 13, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/pv/a55pv41.pdf. 
385
  On top of that is the fact that Art. 22 I ECOWAS Protocol provides for the jurisdictional exclusivity of the 
ECOWAS Court: “No dispute regarding interpretation or application of the provisions of the Treaty may be 
referred to any other form of settlement except that which is provided for by the Treaty or this Protocol.” 
386
  Opinion of the Inter-American Court from 24.09.1982, No. OC-1/82 on “other treaties” which are subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Court for rendering an opinion (Art. 64 ACHR); printed in: EuGRZ 11 (1984), pp. 
196-202 No. 51; in the original: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A 1982, p. 1 et seqq. para. 
51, available under http://www.corteidh.or.cr/. Compare Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human 
Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, pp. 243 et seqq, also: M. C. Parker, “Other Treaties”: The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Defines its Jurisdiction, in: AULRev 33 (1983), pp. 211-246. 
387
  Regarding the binding effect of advisory opinions, see below p. 103 et seq. 
388
  For the binding force of rulings, see below p. 174 et seqq.  
389
  Inger Österdahl, The Jurisdiction Rationae Materiae of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
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On the other hand, such an extensive jurisdiction of the Court is to be warmly greeted. For 
instance, the multifariously codified human rights can thus be petitioned before a single 
agency, and must not be asserted before the respective committees in the far-distant jungle of 
the United Nations’ monitoring bodies. This bundled competence can contribute a great deal 
towards harmonisation and standardisation of human rights adjudication in the African 
system. At the same time, it strengthens the weight of the Court as a regional, 
comprehensively responsible instance in matters of human rights, and thus reinforces the 
tenor of its rulings. But the Court must itself encounter the risk of colliding decisions, and if 
at all possible avoid any contradictoriness in the interpretations. The predictability of judicial 
decisions is quite essential in international law. States can only be motivated through this 
“guarantee of legal certainty” to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of international 
adjudicating bodies.390 So that its course remains calculable, the Court should – as soon as it 
is posed with a question of interpretation by another human rights instrument – scrutinise 
whether this has already been handled by any respectively responsible monitoring body. If 
this is the case, it also gains credibility on the universal level and has an effect on the unity of 
the international legal system, if it sufficiently refers to its views and insofar as its factual 
prejudicial effect391 is accepted, and as it is either assumed or otherwise a divergence has 
been substantially justified.392  
2. Advisory opinions 
Art. 4 I specifies that at the request of an OAU member state, the OAU itself, one of its bodies 
or another African organisation recognised by the OAU can prepare an opinion on any legal 
matter in reference to the Banjul Charter or any other relevant human rights instrument. And 
                                                 
in: RACHPR 7 (1998), pp. 132-150, 137 et seq. 
390
  Compare also: August Reinisch, Richterrecht im Völkerrecht?, in: JRP 9 (2001), pp. 294-303, 302; he 
argues that central elements of legal certainty such as stability and predictability – and even a “stare 
decisis” on the part of the judiciary would necessitate an international adjudicatory body. 
391
  Although in international law there is no “stare decisis” as in Anglo-American law, the judiciary (with its 
authority) has the same effect on subsequent decisions or a different decision-making body; comp. Malcom 
Shaw, International Law, 4th Edition, Cambridge 1997, p. 86. Shabtai Rosenne also expounds on the 
decisions of the ICJ concerning this matter: “While there is no formal hierarchy of international courts and 
tribunals, the pre-eminence of the Permanent Court and the present International Court is today generally 
accepted. Any other international adjudicatory body which ignored relevant dicta and decisions of the 
International Court would jeopardize its credibility”; compare ibid. The Law and Practice of the 
International Court 1920-1996, The Hague 1997, p. 1609 et seq. However, the ICJ is very cautious with 
regard to the legal qualification of its judiciary. For instance, it hardly proceeded any further in the Teheran 
hostage case, in which it described its preliminary decision as “settled jurisprudence”. Compare the only 
monographic work concerning the question of precedence through ICJ rulings: Mohamed Shabuddeen, 
Precedent in the World Court, Cambridge 1996, p. 154 et seq. 
392
  See also: Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting 
Jurisdiction – Problems and Solutions, in: Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), pp. 67-104, 102. 
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so it is left up to the Court as to whether it complies with the request for preparation of an 
opinion or rejects this request. The opinions are to be substantiated in accordance with Art. 4 
II. While doing so, every judge is empowered to render a dissenting opinion.  
In contrast to the competence concerning contentious jurisdiction, the protocol no longer 
makes any reference to this jurisdiction on the part of the Court. For this reason the procedure, 
insofar as it is governed in Art. 4, has already been discussed at this point.  
a) Roots and divulgence of advisory opinions in international jurisdiction 
The approach to provide an international judicial organ not only with the competence for 
contentious jurisdiction but also to clarify abstract legal questions, originates from the 
continental-European legal realm whereas it was uncommon for the anglo-American.393 The 
PCIJ was the first international court to be granted the competence to issue advisory opinions 
beyond pending legal disputes.394 Its successor, the ICJ, again was entrusted with this 
function.395 Apart from the ICJ, only three international judicial organs have been consigned 
to issue advisory opinions. Among those are the ITLOS396 and both of the regional human 
rights Courts ECtHR397 and IACtHR398. However, amongst those organs the procedural 
configuration concerning the petition authority (ratione personae) and the competence ratione 
materiae differs significantly. While especially the advisory opinion procedure before the ICJ 
holds manifolds complications, the admissibility of a petition to issue an opinion before one 
of the regional Courts is less complicated. This is due to the fact that the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ as the “World Court” is nearly overarching whereas the other Courts only consider a 
small field of international law (Regional Human Rights Law and, respectively, Law of the 
Sea). Therefore, the ICJ is much more sensitive towards the decision of whether or not to 
issue an opinion upon request. The ICJ sees the danger, that “the Court […] could intervene in 
any question related to the constitutional rights and the act6ivities of any of the main bodies 
of he United Nations or specialised agencies, or on any problem of the interrelations between 
                                                 
393
  Felix Amerasinghe, Jurisdicion of International Tribunals; The Hague 2003, p. 503; Michla Pomerance in: 
Muller, Raic (eds), The international Court, p 272; Comp. for the different views on advisory opinions 
Manley Hudson, in: HarvLRev 37 (1924), pp. 971 et seqq. 
394
  Art 14 Charta of the League of Nations. Comp. concerning the drafting history in this connection Michla 
Pomerance, The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and the UN Eras, Baltimore 
1973, pp. 25et seqq. 
395
  Art. 96 UNC, Art. 65 et seqq. ICJ Statute. 
396
  Art. 191 ITLOS Statute. 
397
  Art. 47 ECHR. 
398
  Art. 64 ACHR. 
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States under the pretext of receiving a request for advisory opinions”399 Here, the Courts 
refers to the danger of political malpractice of the applicant.400 
b) Discretionary power 
To counteract this danger some Courts have the procedural power to dismiss an application. 
Apart from the ICJ, whose broad scope of jurisdiction makes this absolutely necessary, only 
the European Court of Human Rights has this kind of discretionary power. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights as well as the ITLOS pursuant to the respective 
conventional provision are obliged to comply with a request to render an advisory opinion.401  
The African Court, however, has been given the discretionary power wheter or not to render 
an opinion by the protocol, as follows from the wording of Art. 4 I: “The Court may provide 
an opinion”. In light of the international advisory practice it is doubtful hat the Court will ever 
make use of this power. While there was no application for an advisory opinion before the 
European Court until now whatsoever, the ICJ has never refused an application on account of 
its discretion but always rendered the requested advisory opinion.402 
c) Petition authority  
The enumeration of those authorised to petition already indicates peculiarities. Not only all 
bodies of the OAU,403 but also all OAU members as well as the protocol’s non-ratifying 
                                                 
399
  Application for review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion ICJ Reports, 1987, para 439. 
400
  ICJ Judge Winiarski holds that „the formal addressee of the opinion may be the organ which requested it, 
but the real addressees were the Parties […], the Organisation and public opinion”. Peace Treaties Case, 
ICJ Reports 1950, p 57 (Dissenting opinion). 
401
  Although Art. 64 ACHR clearly does not envisage discretionary power by its wording, the IACtHR has 
denied to issue an opinion which referred to a question pending before the IACHR. The IACtHR gave 
systematical reasons for its competence to dismiss the application: “The Court believes that a reply to the 
questions presented by Costa Rica, could produce, under the guise of an advisory opinion, a determination 
of contentious matters not yet referred to the Court, without providing the victims with the opportunity to 
participate in the proceedings. Such a result would distort the Convention system. Contentious proceedings 
provide, by definition, a venue where matters can be discussed and confronted in a much more direct way 
than in advisory proceedings. This is an opportunity which cannot be denied to individuals in contentious 
proceedings who do not participate in the later proceedings. Whereas the interest of individuals in 
contentious proceedings are represented by the Commission the latter may have different interests to 
uphold in advisory proceedings.” Advisory Opinion No. 12, OC-12/91, Series A No. 12, para 28. Comp. 
Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p. 237, 241 et seq. 
402
  Felix Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction of International Tribunals; The Hague 2003, p. 538; Comp. Georges Abi-
Saab, On discretion: Reflections on the Nature of the Consultive Function of the International Court, in: 
Boissons, Sands (eds.) International Law, The International Court and Nuclear Weapons, Camebrindge 
1999, pp. 36-50, who at p 49 remarks with regard to the nuclear weapons opinion that the ICJ has given up 
its discretion: “One thus can reasonable conclude that in spite of its formal tribute to tradition the 1996 
advisory opinion has hammered yet another, if not the last coffin of the theory of discretion.”. 
403
  The wording, “the OAU or one of its bodies”, is misleading, since international organisations are only 
capable of acting through one of their bodies. Comp. Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 4th Edition, Munich 1999, § 
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parties – and for another thing all African organisations recognised by the OAU – are 
authorised to file a petition.404 In comparison with the other regional courts for human rights, 
in particular with the European Court for Human Rights, this is a very wide range of entities 
authorised to file a petition.405  
In particular, those authorised – from “any African organisation recognised by the OAU” – to 
file a petition pose questions in this connection. It cannot be gathered from the wording 
whether IGOs or NGOs are meant by this. It is merely conspicuous that the protocol clearly 
differentiates at other points between NGOs and IGOs.406 The travaux préparatoires are also 
not capable of eliminating this uncertainty. If this uncertainty is referred to in the 
jurisprudence, NGOs are perceived as included under reference to the identical passage in Art. 
45 III AfrCHPR, which the Commission cites for interpretation of the Charter.407  
As a result, this interpretation would increase the probability that the Court is presented with 
legal questions from which it can develop a fruitful human rights jurisdiction. 
d) Subject matter of advisory opinions 
Commensurate with Art. 4 I, all matters pertaining to the Banjul Charter and any other 
relevant human rights instrument are the subject matter of advisory opinions. Insofar as the 
subject matter of advisory opinions is concerned, it differs from that of contentious 
jurisdiction due to the fact that the requirement for ratification of the human rights instrument 
has been refrained from. But moreover, since it concerns mere advisory opinions, of which no 
binding effect is due, hardly any problems ensue. States that file petitions for advisory 
opinions in all probability merely refer to human rights instruments which they have ratified 
                                                 
6 No. 14. A distinction between the bodies created through the OAU’s foundation charter (Art. VII: 
Conference of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, General Secretariat, Mediation and 
Arbitration Commission) and bodies created through further agreements (for instance, the Commission for 
Human Rights) should possibly be elucidated here. 
404
  Only African IGOs, but not NGOs are meant in this case. This ensues in connection with Art. 5 III, which 
explicitly speaks of non-Governmental organisations. For instance, the aforementioned ECOWAS, the East 
African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (CEEAC) come into question as organisations authorised to file a 
petition. On the other hand, entities not authorised to file a petition (due to lack of continental affiliation) 
are organisations such as the League of Arab States ― even if a majority of the members are African states. 
405
  Commensurate with Art. 47 I ECHR, only the Committee of Ministers is authorised to file a petition before 
the European Court. All OAS members and the bodies of the OAS are also authorised to file a petition 
before the Inter-American Court, but not other organisations (Art. 64 I ACHR). 
406
  Comp. Art. 5 I lit. e and Art. 5 III. 
407
  Comp. Nico Krisch, The Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: ZaÖRV 58 
(1998), pp. 713-726, 718; Martin Ölz, Die NGOs Im Recht des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes, 
Vienna 2002, p. 376 et seqq.; as both are under reference to Evelyn Ankumah who explains that the 
Commission has already interpreted Charter provisions at the request of NGOs. Compare ibid: The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, The Hague et al, 1996, p. 26. 
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or according to which they intend to comply with.  
With regard to the jurisdiction of the Court in matters of opinion, the ACHR has incorporated 
an interesting aspect, which is unfortunately not found again in the African protocol: “At the 
request of a member state of the organisation [the OAS], the Court can prepare an opinion for 
this state in relation to the compatibility of the provisions of its internal law with the 
aforementioned international law convention.”408 The wording of Art. 4 I does not preclude 
the request for such an opinion, but the explicit reference to this useful possibility would be 
advantageous.409 But on account of the OAU-sacrosanct principle of non-intervention, the 
need of African states for such an assessment of the national legal system through an 
international committee is probably not especially pronounced.410 It might also not be 
awakened through an explicit reference to this possibility. This is why the lack of this 
reference will hardly have any negative practical repercussions.  
aa) Jurisdictional restriction with regard to Commission investigation  
Commensurate with Art. 4 I 2, matters411 which are associated412 with an object of 
investigation through the Commission are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court for 
opinions. On the one hand, an investigation through the Commission takes place if questions 
regarding the interpretation of the Banjul Charter are submitted or if it performs interpretation 
work of its own initiative; but on the other hand, also as soon as a communication is at hand. 
This means that a blocking effect for the opinion-related jurisdiction of the Court also 
                                                 
408
  Art. 64 II ACHR; comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p. 
249 et seqq. The Inter-American Court has been granted discretionary power by the Convention in this 
conjunction. 
409
  For instance, the clause has led to many adaptations of national legal systems in the Inter-American region. 
Not only Costa Rica – which can be ascribed the pioneering role in matters of human rights protection in 
America – has adapted its press laws after review through the IACtHR. Comp. Jo Pasqualucci, Advisory 
Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in: StJIL 38 (2002), pp. 241-288, 285. Even 
Guatemala, at that time still under the military regime of General Rios Montt, discontinued (after an 
opinion) the implementation of executions, which had been ordered by military courts beyond any rule of 
law. Comp. Charles Moyer, David Padilla, Executions in Guatemala as Decreed by the Courts of Special 
Jurisdictions in 1982-83: A Case Study, in: HRQ 6 (1984), pp. 507-518, 509. 
410
  For instance, also: Gino Naldi, Konstantin Magliveras, Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: 
The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: NQHR 16 
(1998) 4, pp. 431-456, 440. 
411
  This restriction was not included in the Cape Town Draft, but was only added at the Third Conference of 
Experts. Comp. Report of the Third Government Legal Experts Meeting (Enlarged to include Diplomats) 
on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT. 
(III), para. 16. 
412
  The European Court is much more restricted in its opinion competence. For instance, it may neither prepare 
opinions on matters, which relate to the content or the extent of rights in the ECHR and the appurtenant 
protocols, or on such matters which the Court or the Committee of Ministers could decide due to 
proceedings introduced in accordance with the ECHR. Comp. Art. 47 II ECHR (new version). 
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emerges as soon as a communication – the content of which tallies with that of the opinion to 
be prepared through the Court – is available to the Commission. This is an attempt by the 
protocol to establish the intended coordination of the Court and the Commission and also to 
avoid duplicities. This attempt has not been completely successful for several reasons: A 
coordination of both bodies was reached to the extent that the petitioner can optionally request 
the compilation of an opinion before the Commission as well as the Court.413 However, the 
restriction of the Court’s jurisdiction does not achieve the desired effect. For one thing, only 
the Court’s jurisdiction for opinions is restricted, but not that of the Commission in the event 
that the Court is concerned with a question. For another thing, only such matters which are 
currently being handled by the Commission are excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction with 
regard to opinions.414 As soon as this treatment found its conclusion, the Court’s jurisdiction 
with regard to the same matter of opinion is revived. This can lead to duplicity as well 
conflicting results. Therefore this provision for the realm of opinions does not lead to any 
unequivocal jurisdictional separation between the Court and the Commission, and only 
insufficiently prevents possible conflicts or duplicities. But since the Court itself can decide 
on the acceptance of an opinion petition, it is left with the possibility to take these omissions 
into consideration. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Commission’s interpretation 
task and the Court’s opinion competence remains open.  
bb) Relationship to the Commission’s interpretation task  
The commission’s interpretation task is bipartite. Art. 45 AfrCHPR assigns the Commission 
[in No. 1 b)] the task of formulating written principles and provisions for solving legal 
problems in connection with human rights and the rights of peoples’, in which the African 
governments can build on during their legislative activity. In Art. 45 No. 3, the Commission is 
instructed – at the request of a contracting parts, a body of the OAU or another organisation 
recognised by the OAU – to interpret all provisions of the Banjul Charter.  
With regard to the initial development of the Commission’s interpretation task commensurate 
with Art. 45 No. 1 b) AfrCHPR, there is a technical-procedural difference to the Court’s 
opinion competence: In contrast to the Commission, the Court cannot interpret or put in 
concrete terms provisions of the Banjul charter of its own accord, but is thus restricted to the 
                                                 
413
  Nevertheless, only the Court is entitled to a right of rejection, but not the Commission. Comp. Art. 45 No. 3 
AfrCHPR. 
414
  Art. 4 I: “[...], provided that the subject matter is not related to a matter being examined by the 
Commission”. 
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cases submitted. However, in terms of content this results in a considerable (only theoretical 
up to now, due to lack of demand) intersection ― as soon as the Court must interpret a 
provision in connection with a complaint at hand, and which has already been handled by the 
Commission. Art. 45 No. 3 AfrCHPR assigns the Commission to interpret all provisions of 
the Banjul Charter on request. Even though no authorised entity has made use of this 
possibility, the same contextual intersection as in Art. 45 No. 1 b) AfrCHPR ensues. 
However, the Court’s interpretation competence encompasses – commensurate with Art. 4 I 
and in contrast with that of the Commission – not just the provisions of the Banjul Charter, 
but also that of the protocol and “any other relevant human rights instrument(s)”. And so this 
precludes an overlapping of competence, at least with regard to all provisions which are not 
manifested in the Banjul Charter, but does not solve the remaining potential conflict. 
Therefore the relationship of the Commission’s interpretational efforts with those of the Court 
is problematic. Of course, Art. 2 points out that the Court merely supplements – and does not 
completely assume – the Commission’s protective task, and an intended equalisation of the 
Court and the Commission would also necessitate observance of the provisional interpretative 
efforts. Art. 4 I suggests that the judicial opinions exclude such matters which are already 
being handled through the Commission.  
But various reasons speak against an observance obligation on the part of the Court: For one 
thing, international law interpretational efforts which are not undertaken in a contradictory 
procedure are formally seen as powerless, since they lack a legal binding effect. Moreover, 
the Court’s institutional status speaks against its obligation to observance of interpretational 
works of a mere quasi-judiciary body like the Commission.  
And so the Commission’s interpretational efforts are not formally capable in any way 
whatsoever of imposing restrictions on the Court; yet the Commission should treat this entity 
with utmost respect. The parallelism of human rights interpretation is absolutely necessary if 
one intends to achieve acceptance. Moreover, the interpretations must offer reliable legal 
guidelines which endure throughout the sphere of the recognising institution. Art. 45 No. 1 b 
AfrCHPR particularly illustrates this necessity, which binds the Commission’s 
interpretational competence to a purpose: The formulations should serve the African 
governments as an orientation resource during the formation of their national legislative 
activity in conformity with human rights. It would be very detrimental to the system if the 
behavioural pattern placed on the Court by the Commission is invalidated through divergent 
interpretations.  
4. Chapter: The Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Establishment of the African Court 
  100 
e) Excursus: Legal consequences of opinions  
In this connection, the question is posed with regard to the general effect of advisory opinions 
from international bodies. The Inter-American Court explicity stated in relation to its opinion 
competence that opinions do not display a binding effect comparable with a ruling.415 Also 
the ICJ has stated: “an advisory opinion is strictly advisory and an opinion.”416 This also 
corresponds to the prevailing opinion in the realm of jurisprudence.417 Formally considered, 
an advisory opinion lacks formal418 as well as material419 validity.  
Notwithstanding, even interpretations of international judicial organs, whether they are 
binding or not, enjoy a high level of expressiveness.420 “In practice”, accordings to ICJ Judge 
Zoricic, “an advisory opinion […] in regard to a dispute between States is nothing elso than 
an unenforcable judgement.”421 Judge Azevedo even assigns “an enforceablity sui generis 
somewhat in the nature of a verdict or a writ” to the opinons.422 The ICJ, by nature, tries to 
prevent its opinions from being considered as a worthless law report. It therefore has taken 
into account the probable reaction of States concerned while issueing the opinion. The ICJ 
recognizes that “the consent of an interested Stae continues to be relevant, not for the Courts 
competence, but for the appreciation of the propriety of giving an opinion.[…] In certain 
circumstances, such lack of consent may render the giving of an advisory opinion 
incompatible with the Courts judicial character.”423 As stated above, the ICJ has not found 
this necessary until this very day.424 
Another consideration shows that opinions despite their lacking binding force may be very 
                                                 
415
  Compare its opinion on “other treaties”: see footnote 386 above on page 95. 
416
  Peace Treaties Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, at p. 71. 
417
  Comp: Hugh Thirlway, Advisory opinions of international Courts, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Ed.), 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. I, Amsterdam et al. 1995, pp. 38-48, 38. In contrast, Costa 
Rica’s constitutional court advocates a noteworthy divergent opinion, that the state which has assigned the 
task perceives the advisory opinion as binding. Comp. Pedro Nikken, “La Función Consultativa de la Corte 
Ineramericana de Derechos Humanos”, San José, 2001, p. 178 with corresponding verification of 
adjudication. 
418
  The content of the formal validity is that the decision can no longer be affected with legal remedies. Thus 
said, the formal validity impedes the continuation of the dispute in the same procedure, and ensures the 
survival and the content of the judicial ruling for the future. Comp. Walther Habscheid, 
Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen zum Problem der materiellen Rechtskraft des Zivilurteils, in: FS 
Charalambos Fragistas, pp. 527-556 (p. 530). This principle is also considered as a general legal principle 
in international law. Comp. Alfred Verdross, Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, Berlin 1984, § 601, 
p. 383 (with other addenda). 
419
  Material validity gives rise to the fact that the same matter in dispute cannot be the content of a new 
procedure. And so material validity precludes that a formal, legally binding ruling is influenced through a 
renewed procedure. Comp. Walther Habscheid, loc. cit. 
420
  Felix Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction of International Tribunals; The Hague 2003, p. 509. 
421
  Peace treaties Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p 101. 
422
  Peace treaties Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p 186 et seq. 
423
  Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p 25. 
424
  Comp. footnote 402 above at page 99. 
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valuable for the development of international law: Even for binding judgements on the 
international law level there is hardly any possibility of sanctions in the event of non-
compliance with a ruling, much less its compulsory implementation.The non-compliance with 
the rulings of an international judiciary body at best infringes upon international law of 
contract, yet the plausibility of rulings contributes a great deal more to their general 
acceptance than the mere prospect of the violation of a treaty.425 This is why opinions must 
not inevitably possess a lower weight than rulings.  
However, the only basis for the authority of non-authoritarian acts of interpretation is their 
rationality.426 And so their observance lives from their persuasive power. For one thing, this 
emerges from the authority of the recognising institution, but for another thing also decisively 
the contextual comprehensibility and unanimity of the decision within the concerned legal 
realm. Thus, an advisory opinion – like an obiter dictum – becomes a jurisdictional 
connecting point and because of references in reasons given for other judgements, an advisory 
opinion garners a very far-reaching efficacy, which may entail the accaptance of the 
protagonists under the jurisdiction of the recognising institution. However, in international 
law the authoritative power of an advisory optinion, just like that of a binding judgements, 
stands and falls together with the degree of the protagonits’ acceptance of the recognising 
institution.  
VII. The judiciary process  
The protocol’s rules of procedure have a multifarious importance. For one thing, contentious 
jurisdiction in practice will be the essential point of intersection between the Court and the 
Commission. Insofar, the protocol defines the relationship between both institutions.  
On the other hand, the mode of operation and effectiveness of a judiciary body are crucially 
dependent on the procedural configuration of its competencies. This can neutralise any 
promising jurisdictional power of the body, or otherwise lend it a far-reaching radius of 
action.  
In addition, the proceeding is not only a means to reach a verdict, but it also develops side 
effects which can lend it a considerable value added: And so a rational and comprehensible 
configured process is an essential factor for the legitimacy of the procedural entity’s decision-
                                                 
425
  Also, Juliane Kokott, Das Interamerikanische System zum Schutz der Menschenrechte, Heidelberg 1986, p. 
154. 
426
  Robert Jennings, The Judicial Function and the Rule of Law in International Relations, in: FS Robert Ago 
Vol. III, Milan 1987, pp. 139-161, 145. 
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making.427 At the same time, a court procedure that follows the principles of “due process” – 
irrespective of its outcome – improves the acceptance of the ruling, and is partially able to 
supersede material justice.428 The orientation towards “due process” is of essential 
significance ― particularly for human rights protective entities which also monitor the 
adherence to the respective conventionally-guaranteed fundamental rights of justice.429 Of 
course, no international procedural law exists in the sense of a homogeneous regulatory 
matter,430 but the scientific formulation of a broad court rulings under international law has 
certainly crystallised into procedural standards which embody the “rule of law” before 
international tribunals and courts.431 They are described as “minimum procedural 
standards”432, “principles of judicial procedure”433 or as “fundamental procedural norms”434. 
Amongst these standards are the impartiality of the recognising entity, the procedural equality 
of the parties to the dispute and the transparency of the proceedings.435 
And so three aspects are the focus of the following investigation: For one thing, this pertains 
                                                 
427
  Comp. Jürgen Habermas, Wie ist Legitimität durch Legalität möglich? In: Kritische Justiz 20 (1987), pp. 
1-16; he states that the rationality of a legally institutionalised procedure should vouch for the moral 
validity of the procedurally achieved results. Niklas Luhmann even sees the pivotal task in the legitimating 
function of the procedure, and thus entirely shoves aside the procedural function which helps to arrive at 
the result. Comp. ibid: Legitimation durch Verfahren, 2nd Edition, Darmstadt 1989, p. 121.  
428
  This aspect is the topic of legal-sociological and social-psychological procedural justice research. The 
procedural result is more easily accepted by the procedural loser, even if he (she/it) is not convinced of the 
correctness of the decision, insofar as the loser experienced the procedure as fair and just, and was allowed 
to present arguments. Comp. Klaus Köhl, Verfahrensgerechtigkeit, in: ZfRSoz 14 (1993), pp. 1-34, 20; 
Allan Lind, Tom Tylor, The social psychology of Procedural Justice, New York 1988, p. 52.  
429
  Comp. Raimond Brescia, Procedural Justice and International Human Rights: Towards a Procedural 
Jurisprudence for Human Rights Tribunals, in: YJIL 18 (1993), pp. 559-605, 566 et seq.  
430
  Hugh Thirlway, Procedure of international courts and tribunals, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopaedia 
of Public International Law, Vol. III, Amsterdam et al. 1995 pp. 1128-1133, 1128, ibid.; Procedural Law 
and the International Court, in: FS Jennings, pp. 389-405, 389; Natasha Affolder: Tadic, the anonymous 
witness and the sources of International Procedural Law, in: MJIL 19 (1998), pp. 445-494, p. 448. The fact 
that procedural rules in international law receive less attention than material might also lie in the ICJ’s 
assessment that it does not enjoy the same relative importance before international courts as before national 
courts. For instance, in the Palestine Concessions case the PCIJ stated: “The Court, whose jurisdiction is 
international, is not bound to attach matters of form the same degree of importance which they might have 
in municipal law" (PCIJ Series A No. 2, p. 34). The ICJ confirmed this approach in its decision in the 
Northern Cameroon case through consenting reference to the aforementioned passage. Comp. ICJ Reports 
1963, p. 15 et seqq., 28. 
431
  Kenneth Carlston, The Process of International Arbitration, New York, 1946; V.S. Mani, International 
Adjudication: Procedural Aspects, New Delhi, 1980; Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by 
international Courts and Tribunals, 2nd Edition, Cambridge 1993. 
432
  Kenneth Carlston, The Process of International Arbitration New York, 1946, p. 36. 
433
  Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by international Courts and Tribunals, 2nd Edition, 
Cambridge 1993, p. 258. 
434
  V.S. Mani, International Adjudication: Procedural Aspects, New Delhi, 1980, p. 19. 
435
  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann also counts – without corresponding substantiations from the realm of 
international court rulings – the requirements of “completeness of the procedural rules, [...] democratic 
legitimacy and enforceability of the rules”; compare ibid: How to promote the international rule of Law, in: 
JIEL 1 (1998), pp. 25-48, 26. 
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to the question of how the relationship of the Court with the Commission was procedurally 
configured. It is also to be examined whether the procedure contributes towards the 
legitimation of the Court and its rulings, or whether it appears worthy of critique under this 
point of view. Lastly, it shall be examined whether the procedure comes up to the 
aforementioned criteria of “due process”.  
1. Complaint authority  
In this context, who is even authorised to submit complaints before the Court and participate 
as a party to the proceedings possesses special relevance. This depends on what extent the 
Court can provide direct individual protection, and to what extent it can develop a beneficial 
human rights jurisprudence from the cases presented to it. This is why this question was 
amongst the most contentious regulatory areas in the developmental phase of the protocol.  
The ultimate answer is found in Art. 5, which definitively enumerates those authorised to 
lodge a complaint. There a differentiation is made between states, international organisations, 
the Commission as well as NGOs and individuals. 
a) States  
The prerequisites under which states can turn to the Court with a complaint are specified in 
Art. 5 I lit. b to d. First of all, amongst those authorised to lodge a complaint are contracting 
states which have already submitted a complaint436 before the Commission (Art. 5 I lit. b) ― 
i.e. have initiated a communications procedure commensurate with Art. 47 AfrCHPR. In 
accordance with Art. 5 I lit. c, the states against which the communications procedure has 
been brought against are also authorised to lodge a complaint.  
As stated above,437 the Banjul charter provides two types of communications procedures: One 
that can be initiated through states, and one that can be initiated by individuals and NGOs. Of 
course, the protocol does not expressly separate the circumstances here, but it ensues from the 
connection that – according to Art. 5 I c) – only such states against which a state 
communication procedure is underway, but not such states against which individuals have 
initiated procedures are authorised to lodge a complaint.438 This is logical, since a state 
                                                 
436
  In contrast to the Banjul Charter, which at this point uses the euphemism “communications”, the protocol 
creates conceptual clarity with the expression “complaints”. However, this was only brought about at the 
last Conference of Experts. 
437
  See above chapter II. 
438
  Art. 5 I c authorises “the state party against which the complaint has been lodged with the Commission”. 
“The complaint” refers in this connection to Art. 5 I b, which authorises the state “which has lodged a 
complaint to the Commission.”. 
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complaint before the Court concerns a contradictory procedure with which one governmental 
protagonist objects to another, but does not concern a state party which can defend itself 
against an individual complaint. The state against which an individual communication has 
been submitted before the Commission commensurate with Art. 55 AfrCHPR only has the 
possibility to refute the infringement of which it is accused by the complainant. However, the 
concerned state does not have the possibility to seek quasi legal protection against the 
individual’s accusations before the Court. At any rate, it is conceivable that a state applies 
with the Court for an advisory opinion on the compatibility of its behaviour with the 
convention in question. However, in this case it would have to be noted that the Court cannot 
prepare such an opinion as long as the Commission is entrusted with the case.439 
In addition to these transferred procedural introductions, the protocol (by virtue of Art. 5 I d) 
provides states whose citizens have been the victim of a human rights violation the possibility 
of direct complaint before the Court. This nationality requirement is a serious difference to 
the state communications procedure before the Commission and the state complaints 
procedure of other regional pacts ― but also other universal conventions, which all renounce 
a direct interest of the state lodging the complaint.440  
This renunciation is connected with the “ordre public function”, which is ascribed to human 
rights treaties:441 With state complaints the state lodging the complaint intends that the party 
opposing the complaint exercises its public authority in a conventional manner, and, if 
necessary, adapts its legal system or its legal or administrative practice to the convention 
provisions. The struggle against individual human rights violations and thus the protection of 
the individual is only a side effect.442 And so the state complaint works towards the 
establishment of an objective order and towards the development of uniform standards. 
Insofar as that is concerned, the instrument of state complaint reflects in a special way the 
                                                 
439
  Comp. Art 4 I.  
440
  Comp. Art. 45 I ACHR, 33 ECHR SP 11. On a universal level: Art. 11 I Convention on the Elimination of 
any form of Racial Discrimination; Art. 41 ICCPR, Art. 42 SP ICCPR; Art. 21 Anti-torture Convention; 
Art. 13 Convention against Apartheid in Sport; Art. 76 Migrant Worker Convention (not yet in force). 
441
  Essential hereto is the decision of the European Commission for Human Rights in the case of Austria vs. 
Italy (Yb. 4, 1961, p. 116 et seqq.), in which it came to the conclusion that the contracting states do not 
concede reciprocal rights and obligations for the purpose of safeguarding the respective national interests, 
but wanted to establish a common “ordre public” in the purview of the ECHR (loc. cit. p. 140). Art. 60 V 
VCLT, which precludes the suspension or termination of treaties as a permissible response to a substantial 
treaty violation in “treaties with humanitarian character”, is also set forth in order to substantiate the 
objective order which human rights treaties unfurl. This prohibition is attributable to the fact that – due to 
the “erga omnes” character of such conventions – any suspension or termination would not only apply to 
the defaulting state, but also third states. Comp. Walter Kälin, Menschenrechtsverträge als Gewährleistung 
einer objektiven Ordnung, in: BDGV 33 (1994), pp. 9-48, 10. 
442
  Katrin Weschke, Internationale Instrumente zur Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte, Berlin 2001, p. 17. 
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“erga omnes nature” of contractually guaranteed human rights.443 For this reason, a direct 
interest of the state lodging the complaint – as is depicted by the nationality of a victim of 
human rights violations – is entirely renounced with regard to the admissibility of a state 
complaint.444 
The Banjul Charter’s state complaint procedure was also accordingly conceived. In particular, 
the difference to the communications procedure before the Commission – which for its part 
does not provide any nationality criterion in harmony with the international standard – makes 
the protocol’s provision appear as little coherent: According to the wording of the protocol, 
states can alternatively criticise the violation of the human rights of single individuals before 
the Commission (as a communication commensurate with Art. 47 or 49 AfrCHPR) as well as 
a complaint before the Court (commensurate with Art. 5 I lit. d). However, if states intend to 
proceed against an abstract violation of human rights in contracting states and enforce the 
objective guarantee of codified human rights, Art. 5 I lit. d blocks the direct path to the Court, 
whereas Art. 5 I lit. b unblocks access again after the initiation of a corresponding 
Commission procedure.  
No pertinent justification whatsoever for this incoherency can be found in the negotiation 
protocol. On the contrary: The possibility of direct complaint was only included very late in 
the protocol. Only the Nouakchott Draft provided state complaints for states which have 
either initiated a Commission procedure or were the object of such a procedure.445 In light of 
the restraint of the states (repeatedly criticised by the delegations and legal experts within the 
scope of the Nouakchott Conference) with regard to the recourse of the Commission 
procedure446, it may certainly be presumed that this provision was intended as an activation 
function in relation to the state complaints and that states should be offered a further 
possibility of international discussion. At any rate, this did not succeed through the final 
version of Art. 5 I lit. d. 
                                                 
443
  Wolfram Karl speaks very aptly in this connection of the “erga omnes partes nature”, since only the 
corresponding parties to the convention are entitled to the right of state complaint. Compare ibid: 
“Besonderheiten der internationalen Kontrollverfahren zum Schutz der Menschenrechte”, in: BDGV 33 
(1994), pp. 83-122, 108. 
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  The admissibility of (state) complaints against abstract infringements through an adverse legal position or a 
general practice finds its procedural equivalent in the relaxation of requirements pertaining to the 
exhaustion of legal recourse. Comp. Jochen Abr. Frowein, No. 10 to Art. 24 in: Jochen Abr. Frowein, 
Wolfgang Peukert (eds.), “Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention - ECHR-Kommentar”, 2nd Edition, Kehl 
et al, 1996; D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
London 1995, p. 613 et seq. 
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  Comp. Art 5 I lit. b and lit. c Nouakchott Draft. 
446
  Report of the Second Governmental Legal Expert Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXR/AFCHPR/RPT(2) para. 23. 
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In addition, the restriction of the complaint subject matter in Art. 5 I lit. d to the complainant’s 
citizens who are able to be individualised (“state parties whose citizen is a victim”) appears to 
preclude a state complaint which purports the violation of the human rights of entire ethnic 
peoples or citizens. This would also contradict the objective character of the control process. 
Unlike the individual protection procedure that focuses on the interests of the individual, the 
state complaint procedure is directed at the compliance with a legal system that is in 
conformity with a convention. Insofar as that is concerned, a restriction of the state complaint 
to violations with regard to citizens who are able to be individualised (as suggested in Art. 5 I 
lit. d) is outlandish in the realm of human rights control mechanisms. Such a requirement is 
relevant within the scope of state responsibility; more precisely said: within the realm of 
diplomatic protection.447  
In summary, it must be stated (with regard to the “direct complaint by states” featured in the 
protocol) that it lacks a meaningful concept. The complaint procedure formulated by Art. 5 I 
lit. d presents itself less as a human rights control instrument, but rather as a regional 
procedure for enforcement of diplomatic protection.  
b) The Commission 
Commensurate with Art. 5 I lit. a, the Commission itself is entitled to refer cases to the Court. 
The human rights commissions in all regional human rights pacts are or were entitled to this 
right.448 With regard to passing on the procedure through involved states, there is a significant 
difference in the case of the Commission: The Commission can not only be concerned with 
state complaints, but above all with individual complaints (according to African terminology, 
with “other communications”).449 This opens up a very broad scope of application for the 
submission of cases through the Commission.  
c) Individuals and NGOs 
The most controversial question in the entire protocol was that pertaining to the complaint 
authority of individuals and NGOs. At the same time, its reply was of vital importance for the 
future of the Court. The consultative states were confronted at this point with partially 
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 Compare with the so-called “Genuine Link” to Wilhelm Karl Keck, Diplomatic Protection, in: Rudolf 
Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. I, Amsterdam et al, 1995, Vol. I, pp. 
1045-1067, 1049; Antonio Cassese, International Law, Oxford 2005, p. 376; Kay Hailbronner, Der Staat 
und der Einzelne als Völkerrechtssubjekt, in: Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (Ed.), Völkerrecht, 2nd Edition, 
Berlin 2001, p. 161-266, 203 et seq. 
448 
 Comp. Art. 61 I ACHR, Art. 48 a) ECHR (current version). 
449
  See above chapter II. 
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diametrical views, which substantially compounded arriving at a compromise. The Cape 
Town Draft provided for (in Art. 6 I, under the heading: “Exceptional Jurisdiction”) a 
complaint authority procedure for individuals, NGOs and even pluralities of individuals “on 
exceptional grounds” ― without the fact that these entities had to have previously brought 
about a communications procedure before the Commission in accordance with Art. 55 
AfrCHPR.450 “Exceptional grounds” thus had to be at hand for the direct access to the Court 
only. As a result, Art. 6 I of the Cape Town Draft implied the general application authority of 
individuals, NGOs, and pluralities of individuals’ ― without the fact that these entities had 
been mentioned in the actual regulation concerning the application authority (Art. 5 of the 
Cape Town Draft). The merely implied regulation of decisive questions seems to be a popular 
stylistic device in the African process of human rights codification. Even the fathers of the 
Banjul Charter formulated the statutory basis of the individual communication so innocently 
and hedged in by clauses that the present-day communications procedure before the 
Commission was only recognisable with a great deal of imagination and optimism. According 
to one of the authors this was their precise intention.451 
Whereas the provision of Art. 6 I Cape Town Draft was perceived as too restrictive and the 
meaninglessness of these “exceptional grounds” were criticised from the NGO side,452 it 
received antagonistic and broader criticism from the state side: Quite a few state 
representatives saw the risk that the Court will be inundated by individual complaints and 
recommended “that Article 6 [...] in the present wording reduces, if not removes, the 
importance and the effectiveness of the Commission”.453 During the Nouakchott Conference 
it became clear that this very broad access possibility was not to be asserted for individuals 
and NGOs. State representatives distanced themselves all too clearly from the original 
version. Many states – and quite vehemently, Nigeria and Sudan – advocated the possibilities 
of more narrowly formulating an individual or popular complaint, and also making it 
contingent on a special declaration of consent.454 The legal experts attempted to defuse the 
provision during the Conference: Only in “urgent cases or serious, systematic or massive 
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  Comp. Art. 6 Cape Town Draft, OAU/LEG/EXP/ACHPR/HPR (I). 
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 Comp. Keba Mbaye, “les Droits de l’Homme en Afrique”, Paris 1992, p. 237.  
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 Statements on the viewpoint of NGOs pertaining to the respective procedural state, insofar as nothing else 
is featured, were made by Okontubo Ige, Legal Officer for Africa at the ICJ. 
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 Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso. Similar: Commentary of the Embassy of 
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violations of human rights” should individuals and NGOs be authorised to lodge a complaint. 
Moreover, complaining NGOs had to possess observer status before the Commission. Before 
the Court could decide on the presentation of these prerequisites, it had to obtain the 
Commission’s opinion. In addition, a complaint through individuals and NGOs presupposed 
the defendant’s prior declaration of consent.455  
The NGO forum protested with all its might against this draft, and rightly argued that the 
previous anticipation of a decision by the Commission – particularly in the cases mentioned 
by Art. 6 I of the Nouakchott Draft – were unreasonable and nonsensical. Cases of greater 
urgency or systematic human rights violations should not be postponed by the Court in order 
to consult the Commission (which only sits on a semi-annual basis). It also turned out that to 
date only individual and popular complaints in accordance with Art. 55 AfrCHPR arrived at 
the Commission, so that de facto only this group was functionally able to petition the Court. 
The prerequisites under which individuals and NGOs are enabled to such involvement should 
for this reason not be set too high.  
The Commission also expressed itself similarly in the following Conference of Ministers. 
They opposed an obligatory consultation of the Commission (slotted in ahead, with regard to 
the admissibility of a complaint) through the Court, and recommended not to make the 
jurisdiction pertaining to such complaints contingent on any other prerequisite than the overall 
ratification of the protocol.456 However, these qualms found no response at the Third 
Conference of Experts.  
Art. 5 III formulates the ultimate solution: “The Court may entitle relevant Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the Commission, and individuals to 
institute cases directly before it, in accordance with Article 34 VI of this Protocol.” 
Nothing else but a declaration of consent clause is concealed behind Article 34 VI. And so the 
Court’s jurisdiction for individual and popular complaints is facultative and now depends on 
whether the contracting state renders a special declaration during the ratification or at a later 
point in time with Art. 5 III. Of the previous ratifying nations, only one state (Burkina Faso) 
has submitted a corresponding declaration of consent to date.  
Many authors see a decisive weakness of the protocol in this provision.457 At first glance, an 
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 Comp. Art. 6 Nouakchott Draft, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (2). 
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 CM/2020 (LXVI) Annexe III para. 1. 
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 Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights Court: a two-legged Stool?, in: HRQ 21 (1999), pp. 342-363, 
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unrestricted possibility of complaint for individuals and NGOs before the Court would 
certainly be desirable. For one thing, it would offer increased protection of the individual, and 
for another thing it would present the Court with the opportunity to develop a wide spectrum 
of human rights jurisprudence. On the other hand, during the expert conferences it had 
become all to clear that the vast majority of potential contracting states simply does not want 
such a possibility of complaint that is incalculable for them. The sovereignty protection of a 
facultative clause facilitates the ratification of the protocol for many states.458 In turn, this is 
not only vital for the inauguration of the Court, but its jurisdictional breadth is decisively 
contingent on how many breaches of the law will be pending before the Court. Nonetheless, 
complaints can be filed against states ― if not directly by individuals or NGOs, at least 
through the intervention of the Commission before the Court. If the Commission receives an 
individual communication in accordance with Art. 55 AfrCHPR, the path towards the Court is 
open via Art. 5 I lit. a. It is not even forced through the protocol to bring a separate procedure 
to conclusion, but the case can be immediately presented to the Court.  
The provision arrived at is therefore quite advantageous: Individual and popular complaints 
can be brought before the Commission in a roundabout way, whereas the facultative clause 
unfurls an appeasing effect and thus facilitates the ratification of the protocol for states which 
do not have an all to great interest in the further development of regional human rights 
protection systems.459 
aa) Evaluation of the African solution in an international comparison  
The ratione personae competence of the African Court also need not shy away from 
international comparison: Individuals have no application authority whatsoever before the 
Inter-American Court; “only the contracting states and the Commission have the right to 
present a case before the Court”.460 After the abolition of the European Human Rights 
Commission, every natural person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals is 
authorised to bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights. However, only the 
violation of personal rights can be criticised within the ECHR’s legal protection 
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  Comp. Patricia Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit als Instrument friedlicher Streitbeilegung, Baden-
Baden 2003, p. 153; she states that “the more obligatory the jurisdiction of a Court is, the lesser is the 
willingness of states to submit themselves to the jurisdiction”.  
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 Also: Laura San Martín Sánchez de Muniáin, Comentarios acerca de la Creación de un Tribunal Africano 
de Derechos Humanos y de los Pueblos, in: ADI 15 (1999), pp. 505-528, 520. 
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  Comp. Art. 61 ACHR. Manuel Vargas, Individual Access to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
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framework.461 As a result, a complaint authority for NGOs which would like to allege a 
violation of another person’s rights is ruled out.  
But NGOs enjoy exactly this capacity before the African Court. The considerable importance 
of the NGOs in the African human rights protection system has already been pointed out.462 
As far as the African Court is concerned, the involvement of NGOs and therefore their active 
legitimation is also imperative in order to be able to have a functional effect. The involvement 
takes place either indirectly, through communications to the Commission commensurate with 
Art. 55 AfrCHPR (which, if necessary, forwards this to the Court), or – after corresponding 
declaration of consent – also directly through the complaint before the Court .  
In this connection, it is also worth mentioning that Art. 5 III merely specifies that the 
complaining NGOs must have observer status before the Commission. And so the 
Commission has a decisive influence on the circle of actively legitimised NGOs. However, in 
light of the amount of NGOs with this status463 this cannot be seen as a restriction of the 
active legitimation that is particularly worth mentioning. On the contrary, it seems to be more 
important that the protocol has refrained from making the active legitimation of NGOs 
contingent on their affiliation with a signatory state or a member state of the AU. This was 
vehemently demanded in order to counter the “risk of inundation of the Court by applications 
of international watchdogs”.464 However, it has already been stated that particularly the large 
internationally active NGOs such as Amnesty, International PEN or the ICJ possess a very 
important role in the African protection system due to their structural arrangement and 
independence. It would have been extremely disadvantageous to do without their 
involvement, whereby one would have excluded them from the development process from the 
very beginning through an admissibility criterion such as nationality.  
The advantageousness of the “popular action” or popular complaint possibility also cannot be 
emphasised enough in view of the individual protective effect. Most popular communications 
submitted before the African Commission criticise infringements of such individuals who 
either for actual or personal reasons are not able to look for legal protection on their own. On 
the other hand, the disadvantages which popular complaints normally entail – namely an 
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immense number of complaints – come to bear465 neither before the African Human Rights 
Commission, nor do they diminish the Court’s capacity for work.  
Before entry into force of the 11th Supplementary Protocol, the situation looked completely 
different under the ECHR, and corresponded to the still current provisions of the ACHR. Only 
contracting parties and the Commission had the right to bring a case before the European 
Court.466 For individuals there was only the possibility to lodge a complaint with the Human 
Rights Commission. But this was only possible if the concerned contracting state “had 
rendered a declaration, according to which it recognised the jurisdiction of the Commission in 
this area”.467 And so the facultative clause already took effect with procedures before the 
Commission. Fortunately, the Banjul Charter did not necessitate any declaration of consent to 
bring individual complaints before the Commission. But insofar as the African Court is 
concerned, the negative attitude of many African states vis-à-vis the individual and popular 
complaint possibility on account of the protocol’s facultative clause (Art. 34 VI) will initially 
lead to the fact that the direct path to the Court is frequently blocked for individuals and 
NGOs. Then it is the Commission’s task to bring any received communications as a 
procedure before the Court. This is why the question is posed as to which procedural status 
the complainants have before the Court if an individual complaint will be transferred to the 
Court through the Commission.  
bb) Involvement capacity of non-governmental protagonists in the procedural 
transfer through the Commission  
The procedural rights of individual complainants – whose complaint was not submitted to the 
Court by the Commission – are not included in the protocol. But at the same time this also 
concerns the Court’s procedural affairs and thus self-government affairs, which the Court 
must clarify within the framework of its rules of procedure (RP). This is why it has a decisive 
influence on the complainant’s procedural position. In view of the fact that in the foreseeable 
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 In contrast to the African Commission, the vast number of incoming complaints with the European 
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4. Chapter: The Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Establishment of the African Court 
  112 
future few states will submit the declaration of consent commensurate with Art. 34 VI ― and 
individuals and NGOs will therefore have only very restricted direct access to the Court, the 
position of the individual in case of transmitted complaints is of decisive importance for the 
Court’s mode of operation. A strong complainant position relieves the burden on the 
Commission with regard to procedural preparation and management, safeguards the 
observance of individual interest, and thus leads to more effective legal protection through the 
African Court.  
A look at the development in Europe468 shows the spectrum of possibilities: Under the 
ECHR, which provided for no complaint authority whatsoever before entry into force of the 
9th Supplementary Protocol, the Rules of procedure of the European Court of Human Rights 
(RP ECtHR) were very restrictive with regard to the consideration of individuals. In the 
original standing orders, the individual was not even directly mentioned as the victim of the 
human rights violation being treated; for instance, a mention would have granted the 
individual a personal right of application or speech. However, the Court had stated (in a case 
already brought before it, against the objection of Ireland as the defendant state) that the 
Commission, as guardian of the public interest, is allowed to inform the Court about the views 
of the complainant in the case at issue.469 The Commission delegation undertook this task 
through reading the comments of the aggrieved parties in the oral hearing.470 Ten years later, 
the Commission delegates in the “Vagrancy” case availed themselves of a procedural 
possibility granted to them via Art. 29 I RP ECtHR ― according to which they “may, if they 
so desire, have the assistance of any person of their choice”. The lawyer of the complainant 
and victim offered this assistance to the Commission delegation.471 As such he enjoyed a 
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right of speech commensurate with Art. 37 RP ECtHR. The representative of the Belgian 
government firmly objected to this procedure of the Commission delegation. The application 
of Art. 29 I RP ECtHR completely drained Art. 44 ECHR (current version), according to 
which only states and the Commission were allowed to invoke. Moreover: Such a procedure 
“would defeat [...] the whole spirit of the Convention under which [...] individuals may not 
plead before the court.”472 The Court dismissed this objection,473 but stated that the assisting 
person is under strict supervision of the delegates.474 The Commission delegation 
subsequently proceeded to submit the complainant’s statements as a Commission document, 
and allowed themselves to be accompanied by the complainant’s lawyer in the oral 
hearing.475 In the procedural practice this led to the fact that the lawyer was able to submit 
contextual facts in a relatively unbound manner, and was thus also able to present the 
complainant’s standpoint.476  
In 1983, the European Court of Human Rights reacted to this development and reformed its 
standing orders, in which it gave the complainant substantially more consideration: In Art. 30 
RP ECtHR (new version), the complainant was granted a formal participatory status, which 
corresponded to the previous procedural practice. The complainant had the right to be 
represented by a lawyer or another person allowed by the president of the ECtHR. Art. 40 I 
RP ECtHR (new version) even enabled the complainant to file applications for a hearing of 
evidence. As a result, the complainant was not only passively represented, but could also co-
arrange the procedural course. The compatibility of these provisions with Art. 44 ECHR 
(current version) – according to which individual complainants are not capable of being a 
party to legal proceedings – is difficult to bring about, and can only be achieved with a 
restrictive interpretation of the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings.477 Therefore the 
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inconsistent with Article 44 of the Convention”; loc. cit. 
475 
 If the complainant was a lawyer, he himself was also authorised as a Commission assistant as defined by 
Art. 29 I RP. Comp. Paul Mahoney, Developments in the Procedure of the European Court of Human 
Rights: the Revised Rules of the Court, in: YEL 3 (1983), p. 127-167, 130 et al. 
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  Comp. Frank Schellenberg, Das Verfahren vor der Europäischen Menschenrechtskommission und dem 
Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, Frankfurt/M 1983, p. 214. 
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 Whereas the English version of Art. 44 ECHR absolutely allowed such an interpretation (“Only the High 
Contracting Parties and the Commission shall have the right to bring a case before the Court”), the French 
version cast doubt on this possibility (“Seules les Haute Parties Contractantes et la Commission ont qualité 
ou se présenter devant la Cour”). 
4. Chapter: The Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Establishment of the African Court 
  114 
purport of this “party capacity” is merely the capacity to initiate a procedure before the Court 
or to terminate through withdrawal of the action, settlement or acknowledgement. In this 
manner the ECtHR circumvented the individual complainant’s constitutive restrictions as far 
as possible in accordance with Art. 44 ECHR (current version).  
Similarly, the IACHR recently allowed the individual complainant to participate in its 
procedure. In 1996, it amended its standing orders478 and added an article that allowed the 
procedural representative of the victim or their next of kin to independently make statements 
and file motions for admission of evidence with regard to the question of compensation (Art. 
23 RP IACHR [current version]). And so the IACHR responded to the victim’s considerable 
vested interest insofar as the indemnification for injustice suffered is concerned. Shortly after 
this amendment of the standing orders, the procedural status of the individual complainant 
was extensively expanded through a further amendment, which has only been in force since 1 
June 2001479: Since the complaint has been allowed, the victims themselves, their relatives or 
their procedural representative can now make their own statements and file their own motions 
for admission of evidence throughout the entire procedure.480 As a result, individual 
complainants are not only procedurally involved in the matter of indemnification (which is 
more or less answered as an annexe to the proceedings in the main action), but even in the 
actual procedure.  
This development offers the African Court a valuable orientation resource. As far as possible, 
it should absolutely make use of the opportunity to intensively incorporate the actual 
complainant into the judicial procedure via the rules of procedure. The consent clause of Art. 
34 VI would be to a large extent annulled in its negative repercussions if – despite lacking 
active legitimation and involvement capability before the Court – individuals or NGOs were 
to possess quasi procedural management authority. The African Commission took a long time 
until it gradually began to exploit the room to manoeuvre in its standing orders relinquished 
by the Banjul Charter. Nevertheless, the Court is in the advantageous situation of not having 
to position itself for the time being as a regional human rights protection body ― an unknown 
working model on the African continent up until the inauguration of the Commission. Insofar 
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 The rules of procedure were adopted on 16 September 1996 with effect from 1 January 1997; available 
under www.1umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/rule1-97.htm. 
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 New rules of procedure available under www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic18.htm. 
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 Art. 23 I RP IACtHR (new version): However, if several victims or relatives or procedural representatives 
take part in the process, they must agree on one spokesman who is authorised as the sole procedural 
management representative. If no agreement is reached, the Court decides; compare: Art 23 II, III RP 
IACtHR (new version). 
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as that is concerned, the Commission has prepared the ground well. Therefore it should be 
possible for the Court to progressively plug the protocol’s existing gaps in the sense of an 
effective judiciary protective process.  
d) Excursus: Interventions by third states 
Art. 5 II allows third states to apply with the Court for admission as an intervening (third) 
party “when a State Party has an interest in a case”. This provision is formulated in an 
extremely vague manner. In the course of negotiations it has even lost contrast: The 
Nouakchott Draft necessitated a “legal interest” – which was also not further specified, 
however – for a possible third-party intervention.481 On this score, it was concluded that – in 
relation to the treatment of interventions commensurate with Art. 62 ICJ Statute482 – the 
Court could orient itself towards the methodology of the ICJ.483 This is comparatively severe: 
“The court should only admit such intervention if, in its opinion, the existence of this interest 
is sufficiently demonstrated.”484 In addition, the third-party intervention is only allowed with 
the ICJ as long as and insofar as the legal interest of the intervening third-party relates to the 
case. In the handling of other aspects they lose their participatory status.485 But since the 
protocol sufficiently allows any interest to apply for a third-party intervention, the Court has a 
free hand as to whether it allows this or not. Incidentally, within the framework of its standing 
orders the Court can draft more precise criteria for this interest, and make the admission 
contingent on its observance.  
In comparison with the provisions of the corresponding regional pacts, the protocol presents 
itself as extremely intervention-friendly: The ACHR does not even provide for such a third-
party intervention; the ECHR enables only an optional participation of the complainant’s state 
of origin in accordance with Art. 36 I ECHR.486 In the interest of the administration the 
president of the Court can give further contracting parties or other concerned individuals who 
are not complainants the opportunity to comment and to participate in the oral hearings.487 On 
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  Comp. Art. 5 II Nouakchott Draft, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (2). The provision was reformulated at 
the Third Conference of Experts. But the minutes of the meeting do not give any indication of an 
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 Statute of the International Court from 26.6.1945, UNCIO 15, pp. 335 et seqq. 
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 Gino Naldi, Konstantin Magliveras, The proposed African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: 
RADIC 8 (1996), pp. 944-970, 950. 
484 
 As already featured in the PCIJ “Wimbledon Decision”, Series A, No. 1 (1923), p. 12. 
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  Shabtai Rosenne, Intervention in the International Court, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1993, p. 149; ibid., 
The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-1996, The Hague et al,. 1997, p. 1526. 
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 The state of origin is then entitled to submit written comments and to participate in the oral hearings. 
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  These rights can be granted in conformity with Art. 61 IV RP ECtHR, subject to conditions and 
stipulations. 
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the other hand, the protocol’s provision is especially preferable for the young African Court, 
which after its inauguration will surely not be the focal point of continental interest. This is 
why – particularly at the outset of its activity – third-party intervention applications should be 
granted as much as possible in order to enlarge its radius of action and its international 
response. In view of the fact that African states regularly exercise restraint when it comes to 
taking a position against the human rights policy of other member states, such applications 
will be kept within narrow limits anyway — if they are even placed!  
Naldi and Magliveras obviously see this differently, when they state (as a disadvantage of the 
possibility of third-party intervention) that an examination of “legal interest” could have led 
to substantial procedural delays. With the renunciation of the legal interest aspect in the 
resolved protocol, they perceive the considerable danger that states would excessively utilise 
their right to third-party intervention to intentionally impede the work of the Court.488 In view 
of the previous indifference of the states in the African legal protection system, this danger 
hardly exists, and the Court may await it calmly. Another danger, namely the non-compliance 
with the Court through the African community of states, weighs much heavier in comparison.  
e) African international organisations  
In the international comparison, the protocol contains another unique component, as it also 
provides African IGOs with party status in accordance with Art. 5 I lit. e. Unlike Art. 4, which 
only enumerates those authorised to file applications for advisory opinions, Art. 5 grants 
authority “to submit cases to the Court” ― i.e. makes references to the litigious procedure. 
This provision seems initially bewildering. Neither is an IGO contracting party to the Banjul 
Charter or to any other applicable treaty, nor is the protocol technically prepared for the 
accession of an IGO.489 And so African IGOs can themselves be bound in terms of content to 
a human rights codification, which asserts the vested rights therein. With this provision IGOs 
are granted a procedural legal position which is linked neither with a procedurally nor a 
materially corresponding obligation. And so in terms of contractual law it concerns a 
provision for the benefit of third parties, and thus the regulatory purview of Art. 36 VCLT IO. 
It ensues from Art. 36 Para. I VCLT IO that such a provision is admissible if the beneficiary 
IGO consents positively and within its own relevantly aligned organisational provisions.490  
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 Comp. Gino Naldi, Konstantin Magliveras, Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: The Protocol 
on the Establishing of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: NQHR 16 (1998), pp. 431-456, 
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Unlike the state complaint, the complaint possibility of international organisations 
underscores the objective character of the complaint procedure, since even the element of 
reciprocity is renounced here. Art. 36 Para. II VCLT IO counteracts any abuse of this 
procedural position, which includes the obligation for a third-party beneficiary IGO to 
observe the exercise of these rights in the commitments stipulated in the treaty.  
One may wonder whether the relevance of this provision can ever be proven. When 
considered optimistically, perhaps the institutional transformation of the African regional 
organisation – which shows a certain proximity to the European system491 – will lead to a 
similar discussion as to how it will be managed in Europe with regard to a potential accession 
of the European Union to the ECHR.492 At any rate, provisions pertaining to “party capacity” 
have been provided for in the protocol. 
2. Admissibility of complaints  
Admissibility prerequisites of the judiciary procedure are only sporadically found in the 
protocol. The Court must specify within the framework of its standing orders exactly which 
obligations are necessary for the admissibility of a complaint. Which prerequisites the 
protocol provides, what latitude remains with the Court and how this is to be meaningfully 
utilised is examined at this juncture.  
a) Protocol guidelines for individual complaints  
The protocol addresses the admissibility prerequisites in Art. 6. However, this merely deals 
with complaints in accordance with Art. 5 III ― i.e. with individual or popular complaints. 
The protocol explicitly refers to Art. 5 III only in Art. 6 I; however, the admissibility criteria 
of Art. 56 AfrCHPR – which in turn only apply to “other” non-governmental communications 
– are applied via Art. 6 II. The admissibility of other possible complaints, for instance through 
the Commission or contracting parties, is not treated in Art. 6.493 This also shows the 
                                                 
which formulates a refutable assumption of consent that third states accept the legal positions granted to 
them through the foreign treaty. The reason lies in the IGO’s fundamentally restricted power to act. The 
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importance that has been attached to the individual complaint in comparison with the 
remaining complaint possibilities during the protocol’s establishment process.  
aa) No Necessity of a prior Commission procedure  
The question as to whether individuals must have gone through the Commission procedure 
before they can bring the matter before the Court has great importance in this connection. The 
institutional integration of both human rights protection bodies largely depends on that, this 
question determines the Commission’s future relationship with the Court. The ACHR494 as 
well as the ECHR495 presuppose the prior conclusion of the procedure before the Commission 
before the path to the Court can be taken. Before the African arrangement in this matter is 
considered, it seems helpful to elucidate the meaning and purpose of such inserted 
Commission procedures.  
These Commission procedures are essentially ascribed two functions: First of all, they should 
relieve the burden on the respective Court. They fulfil this task by investigating the relevant 
facts and drawing up a final report that shall provide the Court with a qualified legal 
opinion.496 Secondly, an intermediary role devolves upon the Commission.497 A commission 
procedure is not confrontationally arranged in the manner that is a court procedure. It enables 
the involved states to avoid a procedure before the Court and to settle the dispute amicably.  
The protocol does not (in terms of positive law) govern the question regarding a prior 
implementation of a Commission procedure, which in view of its procedural importance leads 
to the inference that the conclusion of a communications procedure before the Commission is 
not an admissibility prerequisite in the African system. The preparatory works to the protocol 
also allow this conclusion. Art. 8 II of the Nouakchott Draft formulated the exact opposite: 
“The Court shall not consider a case originating under the provisions of Article 55 of the 
Charter until the Commission has considered the matter and prepared a report.” This 
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 Art. 28 Nr. 2, 47 ECHR (current version); Art. 48 I lit. f, 49 ACHR. 
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requirement was omitted without replacement after extensive debate at the Third Conference 
of Experts.498 With regard to how many other admissibility prerequisites (which were 
predetermined in the first versions of the protocol), these were also left up to the Court for 
clarification in its rules of procedure. The reason for this does not clearly emerge from the 
minutes of the meeting.  
However, in view of its fundamental functionality presented above, the African system is also 
not at all designed for a pre-slotted commission procedure: For one thing, in light of its own 
work overload the Commission is not at all able to provide meaningful and effective relief 
work for the Court through investigation of facts and legal processing. This is why a 
compulsory pre-inserted commission procedure would not live up to the realities. It would 
lead to doubling of the work and binding resources which the human rights entities in Africa 
simply could not miss without nullifying their results. Procedures would be protracted to such 
an extent that an individual protective function on the part of the Court would be omitted from 
the very outset.499  
The second function of a preliminary procedure – the possibility of a consensual settlement of 
dispute – also does not justify the pre-insertion of a commission procedure. The procedure 
before the African Court is also not entirely arranged in a confrontational manner. In Art. 9, 
the Court was expressly shown the possibility “to reach an amicable settlement in a case 
pending before it”. And so the Commission is not the only entity in which an amicable 
settlement of dispute can take place through mediation. Therefore neither involved states nor 
individuals will be cut off from a friendly settlement because of a lacking preliminary 
procedure.  
The fundamental functionality of a commissional preliminary procedure in the case of the 
African protection system is substantially restricted for these reasons: As long as the 
individual access remains closed through a lacking declaration of acceptance (Art. 34 VI), the 
African Commission constitutes the only channel for individuals to set the protective system 
in motion anyway. A one-time rendered declaration must be able to substantiate the 
absolutely necessary division of labour between both protective entities if it should not lead to 
a slackening of the system. It is also incompatible with the coordination amongst the bodies 
targeted with the protocol, to regard the communications procedure before the Commission as 
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merely a preliminary procedure whose importance is exhausted in the fulfilment of an 
admissibility criterion. Therefore it is to be hoped that the Court will refrain from a pre-
inserted commission procedure during the preparation of its standing orders. 
bb) Commission consultation  
Art. 6 I specifies that with regard to the question of admissibility of an individual or popular 
complaint commensurate with Art. 5 III, the Court can obtain the opinion of the Commission, 
which shall send this as quickly as possible to the Court. Here the protocol attempts once 
again to emphasise the jurisdictional interconnection between Commission and Court. But 
this provision does not contain a greater regulatory depth. A Commission consultation, which 
should seem necessary to the Court whatever the question may be, would also surely have 
been possible without an explicit reference in the protocol.  
This provision also possibly has less of its own contextual importance, but rather explains 
itself from its historical context. It is the result (more precisely said: the ‘remnant’) of the 
dispute concerning the question of the complaint authority of individuals. Art. 6 I initially 
included the very widely formulated complaint possibility for individuals and NGOs with 
“exceptional grounds”. After the first drafts for arrangement of the complaint authority were 
met with widespread criticism, the state representatives attempted to constrict access to the 
Court as much as possible for individuals and NGOs. This also included a Court obligation to 
prior consultation of the Commission as soon as an individual complaint has been submitted. 
This obligation, which had already substantially protracted the admissibility procedure, was 
transformed into a mere possibility of consulting the Court within the framework of a 
dispute.500 Therefore Art. 6 I has only a very limited importance and a rather declaratory 
effect for the question regarding admissibility of an individual complaint. 
cc) The Banjul Charter’s admissibility criteria  
However, Art. 6 II is not lacking in far-reaching purport: There it is specified that the Court 
decides on the admissibility of an individual complaint, and therefore must take into 
consideration the provisions of Art. 56 AfrCHPR. Art. 56 AfrCHPR stipulates under which 
prerequisites a so-called “other communication” is admissible to the Commission. The 
formulation of Art. 6 II, “the Court shall rule on the admissibility of cases taking into account 
the provisions of Article 56” indicates that the Court – unlike the Commission, which 
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compulsorily has to observe the provision – is not bound to these admissibility criteria in 
every case, but that in exceptional cases it can refrain from the precise observance of these 
criteria and can declare the case to be admissible.501 This presents the Court with the 
possibility of a dynamic interpretation in order to heave such complaints with minor technical 
or procedural deficiencies over the threshold of admissibility.  
(1.) No anonymity 
Article 56 No. 1 AfrCHPR specifies that the complaint must indicate the author, even if this 
person requests anonymity. This provision concerns an internationally recognised procedural 
prerequisite which should prevent the fact that a judiciary body or its regestry has to grapple 
with querulous complaints.502 On the other hand, there are a series of understandable reasons 
which justify a legitimate interest of the complaint’s author to withhold his/her identity in the 
process. The standing orders of ECtHR considered this circumstance in Art. 37 III, which 
gives the complainant the opportunity to apply for the confidentiality of his/her personal data. 
Such an application must be submitted separately, and is granted by court presidents only in 
justified exceptional cases. In the event of a granted application, the complainant is only 
referred to in the procedural course with anonymous initials (X or Y).503 The Inter-American 
Commission for Human Rights faces this interest quite clearly: Even in the original 
application the complainant shall communicate whether he/she would like to disclose his/her 
identity or not to the corresponding state (Art. 28 b RP IACHR). Passing on the data in the 
course of the procedure is only considered if the complainant has given his/her explicit 
consent to this (Art. 30 II 1 RP IACHR).504 However, the African Commission’s rules of 
procedure no longer provide such a possibility for the author of a communication.505  
However, the Court would inspire confidence and fulfil its protective function if it assured the 
confidentiality of the complainant’s personal data in exceptionally special cases. To be 
considered in this context are complaints in which case the victim himself/herself does not file 
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a RP (old version). In the new version of the rules of procedure, this possibility was expunged, and instead 
tightened the requirements with regard to the scope of personal data. 
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the complaint: An anonymity requirement would be absurd in this case, since at any rate the 
identity of the complainant must be known to the defendant state so that any infringement can 
be brought to an end or redressed at all506 ― but this data should be submitted by a third 
party, which in the event of the disclosure of identity has to reckon with substantial 
impediments in the course of procedural preparation or other repressive measures through the 
defendant state. This is especially pertinent, since the protocol as well as the Banjul Charter 
lack a provision according to which contracting states are obligated to ensure the utilisation of 
regional complaint procedures before the Commission or the Court, and to refrain from any 
hindrance.507 But as long as individual complaints only reach the Court via the Commission 
(because the protocol’s facultative clause blocks direct access for individuals), a complainant 
will not be able to lay claim to any confidentiality of their data anyway. 
However, due to the admissibility of popular complaints, not the naming of the victim by 
name before the Court, but only that of the complainant will also be necessary, as the 
Commission has also recognised.508  
(2.) Compatibility of the complaint with the Banjul Charter  
According to Art. 56 I No. 2 AfrCHPR, the complaint must be compatible with the Banjul 
Charter. Due to the extensive jurisdiction of the Court, under which (commensurate with Art. 
3 I) not just the Banjul Charter falls, but also “any other relevant human rights instrument”, 
the Court must adapt this admissibility prerequisite to its jurisdictional purview. A complaint 
can be personally (ratione personea), locally (ratione loci), factually (ratione materiae) and 
temporally (ratione temporis) incompatible with the underlying convention. These formal 
criteria of admissibility examination partially overlap with other admissibility criteria such as 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the complainant’s active legitimation. However, the practice 
of international judiciary panel shows that decisions on formal questions are not infrequently 
substantiated on a general basis, instead of being justified with the respective procedural 
provision.509 
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(a) Ratione personae 
The personal incompatibility of the individual complaint with the convention can lie in the 
identity of the complainant or the appellant (ratione personae).  
First of all, in accordance with Art. 5 III, any natural person is capable of being a party to 
legal proceedings. The criteria to be capable of being a party to legal proceedings – i.e. the 
capacity to take necessary procedural actions or to undertake such actions through a 
procedural representative – are not specified. According to national procedural law, they 
generally depend on the legal capacity of those seeking legal protection.510 Whereas a 
handling differentiated in accordance with fundamental rights has evolved in the realm of 
German constitutional jurisdiction,511 the European institutions have always examined 
complaints pertaining to juveniles512 or individuals with limited legal capacity513 without 
making a problem out of the capacity of being a party to legal proceedings. This is also 
adequate in view of the special protective purpose of human rights codifications, which go 
beyond those of civil law or public-law standards, and which simply do not grant any 
fundamental legal positions. Therefore the African Court should proceed accordingly in 
comparable cases. At any rate, the protocol does not contain any obstructive procedural 
specifications. 
In addition, any NGO with observer status before the Commission is capable of being a party 
to legal proceedings. A lacking or disallowed observer status thus leads to inadmissibility of 
the complaint due to lack of “party capacity”. Therefore, should the Commission carry out its 
notice to disallow observer status to such NGOs which do not meet their reporting 
obligations,514 120 out of the present-day 247 recognised NGOs could lose their observer 
status, and with that their active legitimation.515  
The capacity of juristic persons (legal entities) to be a party to legal proceedings is governed 
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neither in the protocol nor in the Banjul Charter. Whereas the protocol in Art. 5 III only 
speaks of individuals, the Banjul Charter has deliberately spared the matter of “party 
capacity” in “other procedures” and left the matter up to the Commission for clarification.516 
Therefore legal entities can be recognised as capable of being a party to legal proceedings 
with any difficulties, and thus without being in contradiction to Art. 56 AfrCHPR, even 
though this has not yet come about due to lack of applicable practice.  
On the other hand, the Court first has to apply Art. 5 III insofar as active legitimation is 
concerned, and is thus faced with the problem that legal entities are not to be regarded as 
“individuals”. Nevertheless, it should be possible for the Court to examine violations of the 
rights of legal entities, insofar as their ‘party-capable’ legal representative files an orderly 
complaint. This speaks in favour of the fact that neither the protocol nor the Banjul Charter 
requires a personal gravamen on the part of the complainant for active legitimation.517 The 
protocol namely assigns “all cases and disputes [...] concerning the [...] application of the 
Charter, this Protocol or any other relevant human rights instrument” to the Court. (Art. 3). 
The assertion of personal rights is thereby not necessary. As a result, this jurisdiction of the 
Court also encompasses all cases which are a matter of disputes concerning the legal positions 
of juristic persons. For instance, freedom of speech, freedom of religion (in the event of 
churches organised under private law), guarantee of ownership or procedural laws can be 
applicable to legal entities. The fact that the protocol did not award any “party capacity” to 
legal entities may not therefore stand in the way of the assertion of their rights through a 
representative capable of being a party to legal proceedings.518 In other respects, a procedural 
transfer would also be conceivable if the legal entity has brought a communications procedure 
                                                 
516 
 In contrast to this, “any non-Governmental legal entity that is recognised in one or more member states of 
the organisation” (Art. 44 ACHR) has the possibility under the ACHR to lodge complaints. Also under the 
ECHR, any “non-Governmental organisation or group of individuals” (Art. 35 SP 11 ECHR) can turn to the 
Court. This includes legal entities, as well as incorporated and unincorporated associations and churches 
organised under private law. Comp. Clare Ovey, Robin White, The European Convention on Human 
Rights, Oxford 2006, p. 482; Wolfgang Peukert, No. 16 to Art. 25 in: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Wolfgang 
Peukert (eds.), Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Kehl et al., 1996. 
517 
 This is a noteworthy difference to Art. 34 ECHR SP 11: The complainant must present substantiated and 
conclusive evidence here, through which the affected sovereign act or the affected omission of sovereign 
action in the conventionally guaranteed right is violated and thus directly affected. If this gravamen is 
lacking, the rationae personae complaint will be dismissed as incompatible with the convention. Comp. 
Clare Ovey, Robin White, The European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford 2006, p. 482; Wolfgang 
Peukert,No. 20, 28 to Art. 25 in: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Wolfgang Peukert (eds.), Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention, Kehl et al. 1996; Jens Meyer-Ladewig, ECHR-Commentary, Baden-Baden 
2003, No. 10 et seqq. to Art. 34. The lack of this requirement is also compulsory in view of the 
admissibility of popular complaints in the African system. 
518
  See also: John Mubangizi, Andreas O’Shea, An African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in: SAYIL 
24 (1999) pp: 256-269, 265. 
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before the Commission.  
Moreover, the inadmissibility of the ratione personae complaint can ensue from Art. 56 No. 2 
AfrCHPR if the complaint is directed at a state which is not a contracting state to the Banjul 
Charter. But since the jurisdiction of the Court also extends to other human rights instruments, 
this prerequisite must also be applied to rights asserted from other conventions. If a complaint 
is directed at a state that did not ratify the protocol or has not recognised the jurisdiction of the 
Court commensurate with Art. 34 VI, this also leads to inadmissibility of the ratione personae 
complaint.  
In addition, the appellant’s lacking passive legitimation – i.e. their lacking legal jurisdiction 
with regard to the rights at issue – leads to ratione materiae inadmissibility. For instance, this 
is the case with complaints which address breaches of the law against other individuals or 
non-governmental legal entities. 
(b) Ratione materiae 
The competence ratione materiae is not explicitly mentioned in the protocol and in the Banjul 
Charter. However, it ensues from the competence assignment of Art. 3 I that the Court only 
deals with cases which include disputes concerning the protocol, the Banjul Charter or other 
ratified human rights codifications. This expresses the matter of course that the Court can 
only monitor the conventions put under its control for their adherence. The ratio materiae 
competence is an admissibility criterion that deals with the question of alleged human rights 
violation and thus indirectly with the material object of the complaint.  
Ratione materiae incompatible with the Banjul Charter or with the human rights instrument to 
be applied are thus complaints (if they assert rights or criticise infringements) which are not 
included in the underlying convention or are prohibited by the respective convention. For 
instance, the Commission received several communications in which only general misconduct 
like corruption as such, rudeness or immorality of citizens and state functional institutions 
were criticised.519 But the limit as to whether such complaints are already inadmissible under 
ratione materiae or are otherwise merely unfounded is fluid and nebulous.520 Therefore, in the 
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 Comp. Communication 1/88 (Frederick Korvah vs. Liberia), Communication 104/93 (Centre for the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers / Algeria). 
520
  P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 2nd Edition, The Hague 1990. p. 163 et seq.; Laurids Mikaelsen, European Protection of Human 
Rights, Germantown 1980, p. 154; James Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Oxford 1969, p. 313; Frede Castberg, The European Convention on Human Rights, Leiden 1974, p. 
62; compare also: Frank Schellenberg, Das Verfahren vor der Europäischen Kommission und dem 
Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, Frankfurt 1983, p. 40 et seq. 
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event of doubt it seems more meaningful not to act prematurely in the admissibility decision 
regarding the material-legal compatibility of the complaint with the convention.   
(c) Ratione temporis 
A regional court of human rights can only decide on a complaint if the underlying alleged 
infringement occurred at a point in time whilst the court was responsible for complaints 
against the concerned state (competence ratione temporis).521  
In principle, international treaties do not develop any retroactive effect if the set of 
agreements does not explicitly stipulate something else.522 This is why a complaint before the 
African Court is thus ratione temporis incompatible with the Banjul Charter, and thus 
inadmissible, if the asserted infringement occurred temporally through the state before its 
legal obligation to the convention.  
But since the jurisdiction of the African Court only comes into play after the legal obligation 
of states to the underlying human rights convention anyway, the question is posed as to how 
to proceed with complaints which have their temporal origin after the legally binding effect of 
the basic convention, but before ratification of the supplementary protocol through the 
corresponding state party.  
In view of the fact that the corresponding human rights codifications explicitly provide the 
possibility to preclude such a retroactive effect through submission of an appropriate 
proviso,523 it seems only logical in such cases to fundamentally assume a retroactive effect up 
until entry of obligations from the underlying convention.524 After all, upon entry of the 
binding effect the contracting state has to assume the obligation to protection of the rights 
included in the convention, irrespective of whether it has undersigned the Supplementary 
Protocol or not. This is why the granting of procedural rights cannot have any influence on 
the ratione temporis competence.  
It must also accordingly apply for the case at hand that a contracting state only subsequently 
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 In this connection, the rationae temporis competence is less the consequence of conventional regulations, 
but rather the product of general rules of international (contractual) law. Comp. Marc-André Eissen, 
Jurisprudence de la Commission européenne des Droits de l’Homme - Décisions en matière de compétence 
ratione temporis, in: AFDI 9 (1963), pp. 722-734, 723. 
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 Comp. Art 28 VCLT. 
523 
 Comp. Art. 62 II ACHR, Art. 25 II and Art. 46 II ECHR (current version). 
524 
 Jo Pasqualucci even sees this legal consequence as an international law principle; compare ibid: 
Preliminary Objections before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Legitimate Issues, Illegitimate 
Tactics, in: VirgJIL 40 (1999), pp. 1-114, 40. Also van Dijk and van Hoof assume – under reference to 
decisions of the European Commission for Human Rights – a fundamental retroactive effect up to the entry 
of the binding effects of the basic convention. Comp. ibid. (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, The Hague, 3rd Edition 1998, p. 13. 
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ratifies the facultative clause for individual complaints, and the basis of the individual 
complain lies before this point in time. The fact that the individual is only enabled the 
possibility of direct complaint through submission of the declaration of acceptance in 
according with Art. 34 VI does not release the state from its previous obligation to safeguard 
the compliance with the codified human rights. The declaration of acceptance is in other 
respects a question of ratio personae competence, and is not in connection with the question 
of when the asserted infringement has occurred.  
The protocol does not explicitly provide that a contracting state can preclude the retroactive 
effect. But this is also not necessary in order to present a proviso with regard to the retroactive 
effect. In terms of international contractual law, the presentation of provisos during the 
ratification of a convention or subsequent accession only precludes this if the convention 
explicitly prohibits this, and only permits specific provisos to which the concerned proviso 
does not belong or otherwise the proviso is incompatible with the object of the treaty.525 The 
protocol does not prohibit any provisos, nor does it permit only certain provisos. The fact that 
the corresponding regional pacts explicitly show the possibility of a retroactive effect 
exclusion proviso526 make it clear that such a proviso is not directed at their objective, and is 
therefore compatible. This is why the contracting states can effectively present a retroactive 
effect proviso upon the ratification of the protocol527, and thus withhold the ratio temporis 
competence for past infringements.528  
However, the requirement for the restriction of this possibility then ensues if the repercussions 
of an infringing intervention which occurs before the jurisdictional inauguration also still 
persist afterwards. For instance, complaints which entail a lasting professional disbarment or a 
lasting imprisonment are to be thought of here. In the European and Inter-American system in 
such cases it was always assumed that the rationae temporis competence is given.529 This is 
also easy for the African Court to advocate on account of the topical binding effect of the 
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 Comp. Art. 19 lit. a to c VCLT. 
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 Comp. Art. 62 II ACHR, Art. 25 II, 46 II ECHR (current version) in conjunction with Art. 6 SP 11. 
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 However, this did not take place in the states which have ratified the protocol up to the current point in 
time. 
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 But through a proviso they cannot limit the Court’s jurisdiction with regard to complaints that criticise 
human rights violations which have occurred after ratification of the protocol or after submission of the 
declaration of acceptance. This would contradict the objective and purpose of the treaty and thus violate 
Art. 19 lit. c VCLT. Comp. Jo Pasqualucci, Preliminary Objections before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Legitimate Issues, Illegitimate Tactics, in: VirgJIL 40 (1999), pp. 1-114, 42. 
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 Comp. Stefan Trechsel, Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention - Ihr Schutz der persönlichen Freiheit 
und die schweizerischen Strafprozessrechte, Bern 1974, p. 79 et seq. The case of Blake vs. Guatemala (Ser. 
C No. 27) is referred to with regard to the Inter-American practice, whereby the Court explicitly states that 
“the lack of jurisdiction rationae temporis does not apply to continuous crimes” (loc. cit. para. 24). 
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protocol’s procedural law provisions.530  
On the other hand, it may well appear differently for the mere non-elimination of the 
consequences of an earlier intervention. To assume a ratio temporis competence here would 
signify the temporal scope of the Court’s jurisdiction against the effectively declared will of 
the contracting states, insofar as they have presented a retroactive effect proviso.  
(3.) Formal requests  
With the general reference to the Banjul Charter’s criteria, an admissibility provision – which 
is unique in international comparison – makes its arrival in the procedure before the Court. 
Art. 56 I No. 3 AfrCHPR requires an inadmissibility decision on the part of the Court for 
complaints which “written in disparaging or defamatory language against the concerned state 
and its institutions or vis-à-vis the OAU”. An international institution should be entrusted to 
independently discipline obscene complainants in the course of the proceedings. The insertion 
of this provision in the Banjul Charter’s admissibility catalogue illustrates the fear of the at 
that time young African states to experience a loss of prestige through the communications 
procedure. The Commission, which also had to apply this provision, subsequently took 
exaggerated consideration and presented itself as remarkably stringent in this respect.531 As a 
result, it unnecessarily stifled the access to a communications procedure. In this connection, 
the Commission underestimated the fact that the term “communication” constitutes nothing 
different than a euphemism for “complaint”. Complaints – especially insofar as violations of 
human rights are concerned – also frequently include unequivocal words which are supposed 
to underscore the respective concern or also otherwise ill-considered (due to the 
circumstances of the case) but excusable statements which a complainant got carried away 
with. This is why indiscriminately dismissing the entire complaint as inadmissible is 
definitely counterproductive to individual protection.532 Not only in the interest of individual 
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  However, in this constellation a ratifying state also has the possibility to effectively preclude the ratio 
temporis competence through producing an appropriately formulated proviso. Comp. Tom Zwart, The 
Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions - The Case Law of the European Commission of Human Rights 
and the Human Rights Committee, Dordrecht et al. 1996, p. 135. 
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 For instance, a communication – in which the torture of prisoners and the withholding of their food was 
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2000, p. 105 et seqq. 
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protection, but also not to rob itself of the substantive legal substance of the complaint, the 
Court should show tolerance in the application of this provision, particularly since the 
question regarding when the admissibility prerequisite is fulfilled lies within its discretion. In 
other respects, like any adjudicating court, it retains the liberty to correct behavioural 
grievances of those involved in the proceedings through judicial reference. In addition, the 
Court could consider adjourning the proceedings for as long as the complainant’s improper 
behaviour persists, instead of immediately employing the inadmissibility decision as a 
disciplinary measure. On the other hand, the inadmissibility can be easily advocated with 
regard to continued infraction on the part of the complainant. 
(4.) Complaints supported by mass media  
In Art. 56 I No. 4 AfrCHPR, the Banjul Charter’s catalogue provides for the inadmissibility of 
complaints which “are exclusively based on news which has been disseminated by the mass 
media”. In view of the possibility of popular complaint, this admissibility provision should 
prevent the fact that communications procedures – whose material content cannot be verified 
by the complainant in any way whatsoever – are opened before the Commission. This 
provision has never proven to be problematic in the communications procedure before the 
Commission, and will also probably not do so in the judiciary proceedings. This is a matter of 
course with regard to complaints which those allegedly affected by human rights violations 
submit on their own. Even NGOs which criticise third-party infringements have always met 
this requirement in the Commission practice, since the organisations active in the regional 
protection system are either in direct connection with the victim or obtain their information 
from the respective national representatives. In other respects, the provision also does not 
prohibit the reference to media information. In several communications procedures, the 
Commission itself has taken “judicial notice” of specific circumstances in the concerned 
country via media reportage, and regarded this information as given facts in its 
substantiation.533  
(5.) Local remedies rule 
                                                 
Human Rights, 2nd Edition, The Hague 1990. p. 70 with regard to the practice of the European 
Commission. In this connection, it is to be added that in cases entailing defamatory or offensive statements 
on the part of the complainant, the European Human Rights Commission normally first of all issued a 
warning and suggested correcting the concerned passages in order not to have to dismiss the complaint as 
abusive. Compare in particular the decisions pertaining to the complaints 2724/66 (C 22, 94) and 6029/73 
(C 44, 134). 
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 Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, The Hague et al. 1996, p. 64. 
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Art. 56 I No. 5 AfrCHPR specifies that a communications procedure can only be initiated if 
the domestic legal recourse – insofar as it is available – has been exhausted, unless this 
appellate procedure takes an unduly long time. The rule pertaining to the exhaustion of 
domestic legal remedies (local remedies rule) is a principle recognised under international 
law534, and became established in human rights conventions from the right of diplomatic 
protection.535 The state acting contrary to the convention must be provided beforehand with 
the opportunity to remedy the human rights violations caused by its bodies and authorities 
with its own means and within its own legal system before it has to answer for its actions 
under international law.536 The governmental institutions can also ensure a comprehensive 
preliminary examination of the actual and legal aspects of a complaint, and thus substantially 
facilitate the compatibility examination of the national legal situation with regard to 
convention obligations through an international body. Another essential reason for the local 
remedies rule is the exoneration of the international legal protection bodies, which are 
supposed to protect them against premature and thus possibly superfluous utilisation.537  
This filter function turned out to be particularly effective for international human rights 
institutions and for complainants as a particularly difficult procedural hurdle to take. For 
instance, the European Commission declared almost half of all complaints as inadmissible 
due to the non-exhaustion of the domestic appellate procedure,538 whereas the rule is handled 
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 The ICJ described the local remedies rule in the “Internal Trade” case as a “well-established rule in 
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  The sovereignty principle and the general international law prohibition of the intervention in internal affairs 
signifies for the legal remedies rule above all protection of the Governmental legal system and the 
Governmental jurisdiction vis-à-vis external influences. Comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-American 
Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 158 with reference to the Gallardo Case; Georg Dahm, Die 
Subsidiarität des internationalen Rechtsschutzes, in: FS Hans Dölle, Vol. 2 pp. 3-33, p. 8. 
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Menschenrechtsbeschwerde, Marburg 1972, p. 43. 
538 
 While doing so, it developed a very detailed arbitral practice in relation to the individual case, of which the 
individual facets shall not be addressed in more detail at this juncture. A particularly comprehensive 
overview is offered by Tom Zwart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions, Dordrecht et al. 1994, p. 
189 et seqq.; see also: Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Munich 2003, p. 
73 et seqq. 
 VII. The judiciary process 
  131 
more flexibly by the Inter-American Commission.539  
The restrictions of the applicability of the local remedies rule to available legal remedies of 
adequate duration in Art. 56 I No. 5 AfrCHPR corresponds with the general right of 
diplomatic protection that limits the local remedies rule merely to effective domestic 
procedures.540 These exceptions illustrate that the possibility of states to invoke the prior 
exhaustion of domestic legal course corresponds to the obligation to ensure effective legal 
protection for the individuals through an independent judiciary, which results from the 
fundamental judiciary rights of Art. 7 AfrCHPR.  
The African Commission even expanded the exceptions to the local remedies rule with 
reference to Art. 7 AfrCHPR via the pure wording of Art. 56 I No. 5 AfrCHPR. In its decision 
against Malawi it stated that the exhaustion of domestic legal recourse is not necessary insofar 
as laws or the legal practice violate the obligation from Art. 7 AfrCHPR.541 Such an 
interpretation offers the African Court – via the admissibility hurdle of Art. 56 I No. 5 
AfrCHPR – the possibility to lodge complaints against states whose executive branch 
constantly intervenes in the judicial procedure or whose legal system does not meet the 
requirements of a fair procedure, and which have not undertaken domestic legal recourse for 
this reason.  
Moreover, the Commission recognises another exception to this requirement, which explains 
the nature of the matter and which will also be applied by the Court in the respective 
complaint procedure due to the fundamental parallelism of the admissibility prerequisites: 
The language thus entails complaints which concern general cases of human rights violations. 
To presuppose the exhaustion of legal recourse for all questionable cases would make such a 
procedure impossible. The Commission’s standing orders do not differentiate between general 
and individual cases. But this differentiation crystallised from the Commission practice in 
connection with the local remedies rule.542 In general cases of human rights violations, the 
chances of success for a domestic procedure are restricted from the very beginning due to a 
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 Comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, pp 158 et seq.; 
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 Comp. Karl Doehring, Local Remedies, Exhaustion of, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law, Vol. II, Amsterdam et al. 1995, pp. 238-241, 239 et seq. The local remedies 
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potential governmental toleration more proximate than with individual cases. Moreover, for 
instance in cases pertaining to laws which violate human rights or administrative practice, a 
remedy can be provided at best in a particular case, but cannot change any legislative measure 
or administrative practice. This is why an appropriate exception to the local remedies 
requirement is adopted in the Inter-American543 as well as (with a few restrictions) in the 
European human rights protection system544.  
The African Commission recently developed a remarkable exception. In several decisions 
they renounced the implementation of domestic procedures because out of justified fear of 
reprisals the complainant either went into hiding in his own country545 or otherwise fled 
abroad.546 With this exception the African Commission has created a unique possibility to 
circumvent the local remedies rule,547 which substantially deviates from its legal foundation 
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 The local remedies rule was first introduced in 1965 within the framework of an amendment of the 
IACHR’s statutes, which juristically arranged the Commission procedure and should also extend to cases of 
individual human rights violations and its competencies with regard to individual complaints. From that 
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seqq. 
544
  The local remedies rule is not applied before the ECHR, particularly with regard to state complaints which 
do not address the violation of rights of a specific person, but are generally addressed against laws or 
administrative practices which are contradictory to the convention. If, on the other hand, the agencies 
responsible for the convention violation are to be identified, domestic procedures must be taken against 
them. Exacting demands are also placed on such an administrative practice by gearing towards a general 
approval of the higher supervisory authorities. Comp. Wolfgang Peukert, No. 2 et seqq. to Art. 26 in: 
Jochen Abr. Frowein, Wolfgang Peukert (eds.), “Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention”, 2nd Edition, 
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recourse, if, first of all, the complainant cannot come up with sufficient financial means to take legal 
recourse, or secondly, if the complainant is thus prevented from legal counsel because the lawyers refuse 
assumption of a mandate due to fear of reprisals. Comp. Advisory Opinion of August 10, 1990, OC-11/90, 
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manner with regard to the second question: “It is clear that the test to be applied must be whether legal 
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(Art. 56 I No. 5 AfrCHPR), and therefore attests to a high degree of institutional 
emancipation. This meanwhile consolidated arbitral practice also presents the Court with the 
possibility to adequately consider the repressive and instable political environment in several 
African states in the matter of exhaustion of legal recourse. In other respects, this exemption 
provision is more than adequate: A complainant is not reasonably expected to exhaust the 
national legal recourse at the risk of his/her life or his/her health, as conversely it may not be 
to the advantage of states with repressive regimes that they restrain the path of legal recourse 
for those seeking legal protection through threatened coercive measures. States which invoke 
the local remedies rule in such constellations before an international human rights body act 
inconsistently, and it is great credit to the Commission that they have already paved the way 
for the Court to adequately confront this contradictoriness.  
However, the Commission has not eliminated a different (in Africa, an exorbitant, frequently 
occurring phenomenon) national procedural impediment: Namely the non-exhaustion of 
governmental legal remedies due to financial necessity. As it stood on the verge of this 
problem, the Commission explicitly decided against it.548 The Commission feared such an 
exception would lead to an overload with so many cases that they would no longer be able to 
cope with this.549 This decision falls severely behind the international standard, which is 
particularly regrettable in view of the vast number of theoretically lodged complaints before 
the African Commission.  
In the Inter-American protection system, in which the majority of contracting parties are also 
developing or threshold countries, and in which a considerable percentage of the population 
therefore lives below the poverty line, an exception to the local remedies rule is expressly 
recognised in this connection.550  
Of course, the African Commission is to be granted that – in contrast to the Inter-American or 
even the European human rights institutions – it suffers to a great extent from financial and 
personnel need, and is therefore forced to select the incoming communications. But shifting 
the standard onto the complainant’s financial situation is certainly not the most objective way 
                                                 
representation was necessary in order to exhaust the appropriate remedies, and whether such representation 
was in fact available” (ibid. para. 38). And although the IACtHR did not provide any unequivocal answer, 
it signalised its willingness to examine such complaints which the Commission would pass on to it in a 
particular case, and thus to take the possibility of such an exception into thorough consideration, comp. 
Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, pp 166 et seqq. 
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to a meaningful and necessary selection, and may also not conform to the standards which the 
Banjul Charter itself sets.551 This becomes particularly clear if the equality principle from Art. 
2 AfrCHPR is taken into account: “Everyone has a right to enjoy the rights and liberties 
recognised and guaranteed in this Charter, without distinction […] of social origin, means or 
other status.” But Art. 3 AfrCHPR, which also ensures equality before the law and guarantees 
the right to equal protection through the law, is hard to bring into accord with this practice. 
The African Court should urgently change this arbitral practice. Indeed, the protocol provides 
that a free legal assistance is ensured in a judicial procedure “where the interests so 
require.”552 It would be nonsensical to fundamentally intend to ensure legal aid in one’s own 
court procedure, and at the same time to actually exclude rightful claimants from the 
utilisation of legal aid in the process of complaint dismissal on account of non-exhaustion of 
domestic legal recourse due to financial necessity.  
(6.) Time limit  
If a complainant has exhaustively taken national legal recourse, the Court can deal with 
his/her complaint commensurate with Art. 56 I No. 6 AfrCHPR only under the further 
prerequisite that this is pending within a reasonable period of time after the exhaustion of 
legal recourse, or in the absence of such legal recourse or in the event of an unforeseeable 
decision after the point in time which the Court determines. This extremely elastic time limit 
provision differs significantly from the procedural arrangement of the corresponding regional 
courts of justice, which have a strict six-month period as a standard.553 Instead, it allows the 
African Court – as well as even the Commission – every liberty to decide on the admissibility 
of complaints, which under other regional regimes would have long since had to have been 
dismissed as lapsed. As a result, the Court can determine its own complaint time limits and 
scale its standards to such an extent that endless human rights questions (not already in the 
admissibility stage) escape through setting a time limit on the complaint. In consideration of 
the fact that the time limit constitutes a main reason for inadmissibility of complaints before 
                                                 
551
  Of course, as a body of the Banjul Charter the Commission itself is not a contracting party, and is not 
bound in its actions to the provisions of the Charter. But it is obvious that human rights protection bodies 
can only expect an observance of their standard setting from contracting parties if it also adheres to this. In 
this sense, see also: Andrew Butler, Legal Aid before Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies, in: ICLQ 
49 (2000), pp. 360-389, 383. 
552
  Art. 10 II 2. 
553
  Comp. Art. 46 I lit. b ACHR, 35 I ECHR SP 11. But it is thanks to this circumstance that the originally 
provided admissibility prerequisites have been generally position in the Court’s rules of procedure, and thus 
the arrangement has been placed in their hands. Only the Noakchott Draft provided a three-month time 
limit after conclusion of obligatory Commission procedure; compare: Art. 8 III Nouakchott Draft. 
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the ECtHR, the protocol’s reference to the time limit provision of Art. 56 AfrCHPR has to be 
seen as very generous. This has not even brought about a single inadmissibility decision in the 
Commission practice, and is also extremely flexibly applicable in the judicial procedure — 
i.e. overall a heartening and beneficial divergence from the international admissibility 
standard. 
(7.) No other settlement of dispute  
As a final admissibility criterion, Art. 56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR specifies that cases which have 
already been settled by the concerned states in accordance with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, the OAU Charter or the Banjul Charter may not be brought before the 
Court. And so the provision differentiates between regime-internal settlements of disputes and 
such which have been settled by other international institutions.  
(a) Settlement through international institutions  
In the latter respect, this provision should guarantee the formal and substantial legal force of 
decisions by international judiciary panels, insofar as they result in this and avoid duplicities. 
In other respects, it also secures the respect of formerly promulgated decisions and prevents 
their erosion through conflicting decisions. In the international comparison, the arrangement 
in the Banjul Charter complies the least with these protective objectives: The ECHR as well 
as the ACHR provide for the inadmissibility of a complaint as soon as this “has already been 
submitted to another international investigative body” (Art. 35 II lit. b ECHR SP 11) or 
insofar as “the petition or communication […] is pending decision in another international 
law procedure” (Art. 46 I lit. c) ACHR).554 And so the starting point in time is always the 
acceptance of the complaint in the respective international procedure (pending suit)555 and not 
the settlement of the dispute (as in the Banjul Charter).  
Therefore, according to the wording of Art. 56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR, the mere pendency does not 
actually stand in the way of the admissibility procedure of a complaint before the Court. 
Nevertheless, in it’s heretofore only relevant case the Commission already decided to declare 
the communication inadmissible due to the pendency of a procedure with another 
                                                 
554
  Although the Inter-American Commission may consider complaints as admissible despite their pending 
before other international bodies as long as these procedures do not end up in an “effective settlement”. 
However, the exact meaning of this constraint remains unclear, comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-American 
Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, pp. 170 et. seqq. 
555
  Comp. Wolfgang Peukert, No. 19 to Art. 27 in: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Wolfgang Peukert (eds.), ECHR-
Kommentar, 2nd Edition, Kehl et al. 1996; Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention, Munich 2003, p. 97; Juliane Kokott, Das interamerikanische System zum 
Schutz der Menschenrechte, Berlin et al. 1986, p. 74. 
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institution.556 Of course, the Commission’s decision may be understandable (it obviously did 
not want to dissociate itself from the international standard and undermine the authority of the 
other international body through acceptance of the procedure), but it thus restricted the 
provisions of the Banjul Charter at the expense of individual protection. If taken literally, Art. 
56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR is not even geared towards the final decision of another international 
judiciary panel, but towards the actual settlement of the dispute ― i.e. towards the 
governmental implementation of the decision, if necessary.  
The retention of the Commission’s decision would have two disadvantages: For one thing, it 
would lead to the fact that states which do not carry out this implementation in a manner that 
is contrary to international law would not have to fear a renewed examination of the matter 
before the African Court. Insofar as that is concerned, the ne bis in idem principle would 
benefit them to a certain extent,557 although they did not comply (or did not comply in due 
time) with the decision of the initially adjudicating judiciary panel. 
For another thing, in the event of dismissal for reasons of inadmissibility through the other 
international adjudicating body, the individual seeking legal protection would be burdened 
with the risk that disadvantages would emerge from the utilisation of several legal protection 
bodies with different admissibility prerequisites, since this obstructs any other international 
legal protection through the recourse of first instance. In the event of a dismissal of a 
complaint as unfounded, the individual also runs the risk of losing the rights they are entitled 
to because they are guaranteed in conventions which do not include the ratio materiae 
competence of the adjudicating first instance. But this also contradicts the assumptive 
intention of the regime member states, which have ultimately ratified various conventions 
with different monitoring bodies in order to offer the individual particularly comprehensive 
protection.  
The African Court, which is at least given the procedural possibility of a renewed procedure, 
                                                 
556
  Communication 69/92, Amnesty International v. Tunisia, printed in: Institute for Human Rights and 
Development (eds.), Compilation of Decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Dakar 2002, p. 357. 
557
  The ne bis in idem principle is even seen by Francois Monconduit, (La Commission Européenne des Droit 
de l’Homme, Leiden 1965, p. 342 et seq.) and Jo Pasqualucci, (Preliminary Objections before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Legitimate Issues, Illegitimate Tactics, in: VirgJIL 40 (1999) pp. 1-114, 
59) as the basis of the respective inadmissibility provision. However, the basic principle has its main area 
of application in the (national and international) law of criminal procedure, where it brings about a ne bis in 
idem effect for the benefit of the individual. Insofar as that is concerned, states are less in need of protection 
than before human rights bodies, in which case only the facts of the case they themselves consented to will 
be decided upon. This is why only very limited importance is attached to the basic principle on the 
international state level. Compare also: Juliane Kokott, “Das interamerikanische System zum Schutz der 
Menschenrechte”, Berlin et al. 1986, p. 73, footnote 306. 
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should therefore not dismiss a complaint– which is pending before another regime – as 
inadmissible without having seen it. It can meet the aforementioned protection objectives 
(legal security and legal unanimity in international systems) by waiting on the decision of the 
respective judiciary panel and acknowledging it accordingly. If necessary, its importance can 
be strengthened even more through the reference in its own procedure.  
However, only such institutions whose decisions display legal force or lead to an otherwise 
individually case-related settlement of a dispute were allowed to come into question from the 
very beginning as potentially conflicting bodies.558 Nevertheless, this admissibility 
prerequisite is extremely problematic, since many international protective procedures 
frequently lead to a mere recommendation or a report instead of a ruling, and thus have a 
more marginal legal protection effect.559 
(b) Settlement through bodies of the Banjul regime ― at the same time, 
comments on the inter-institutional relationship of the Court with the 
Commission  
Art. 56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR also precludes disputes settled on a regime-internal basis as the 
admissible subject matter of a complaint before the Court. This initially means that the Court 
does not deal with complaints which have already been submitted to it ― which corresponds 
to the general legal principle of res judicata, and according to which the legally-binding 
adjudicated matters cannot be brought before the Court again.560 The consensus of complaints 
is at hand if the complainant as well as the subject matter of the complaint and the underlying 
facts of the case is identical.561 In contrast to the provision of the ECHR and ACHR, the 
Banjul Charter does not specifically mention an exception to the additional appearance of new 
evidentiary facts,562 but insofar as new facts are available or insofar as an inadmissibility 
criterion (such as the non-exhaustion of domestic legal recourse) is omitted, this does not 
                                                 
558
  Comp. Robert Norris, Bringing a Human Rights Petition before the Inter-American Commission, in: 
SClLR 20 (1980), pp. 733-771 (743); Juliane Kokott, loc. cit. p. 75. 
559
  See also: Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Munich 2003, p. 97. 
560
  See also: Art. 47 lit. d Alt. 1 ACHR, Art. 35 I lit. b Alt. 1 ECHR SP 11; with the legal situation in other 
international adjudicating bodies: Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts 
and Tribunals, Cambridge 1993, p. 336 et seqq. 
561
  Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Munich 2003, p. 95; compare also the 
definition of the European Human Rights Commission: “lorsqu’il y a identité d’objet, de partie et de 
cause”, E 202/56 YEC 1, 1900. 
562
  “The Court does not deal with an individual complaint lodged in accordance with Article 34, which has 
already been submitted to another international investigative body, and does not contain any new facts”, 
Art. 35 II lit. b ECHR SP 11; “The Commission dismisses the communication submitted in accordance with 
Art. 44, if the communication is essentially identical with a petition/communication previously examined 
by another international organisation”, Art. 47 lit. d ACHR (emphasis in italics by author). 
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particularly concern identical complaints, since they are based on an expanded statement of 
affairs. In other respects, Art 28 II of the protocol specifies that “the Court may review its 
own decision in the light of new evidence [...]”. Thus said, the protocol restricts the binding 
effects of rulings for cases in which new facts justify a readmission. As a consequence, the 
admissibility of such readmission procedures cannot fail because of Art. 56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR. 
But this admissibility rule additionally concerns the much more complex issue regarding 
whether the path to the Court – insofar it has even been paved for individuals through special 
state declaration in accordance with Art. 34 VI – is blocked through a prior utilisation of the 
Commission. Two constellations are possible in this connection: First of all, the individual 
communication could be dismissed by the Commission as inadmissible or as unfounded, and 
the complainant could subsequently submit the matter to the Court. Secondly, a complainant 
(successful before the Commission) could bring the matter before the Court because the 
infringement determined by the Commission has not been remedied by the contracting state.  
According to the wording of Art. 56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR, the latter constellation is not 
particularly to be regarded as a settlement. But on the contrary, it is to be regarded as the 
continuation of a dispute, even if this has already been juristically processed by the 
Commission as part of the Banjul regime.  
On the other hand, a dismissal of an individual communication through the Commission 
raises the much more fundamental question as to whether the Court can function quasi as an 
instance of appeal or appellate court for Commission decisions. If a communication from the 
African Commission has been dismissed as inadmissible or unfounded, the wording of Art. 56 
I No. 7 AfrCHPR in the two original versions (“des cas qui ont été réglés”/“cases which have 
been settled”) cannot be quoted ― no matter whether a settlement of dispute is to be assumed 
or not in these cases.  
However, Art. 56 AfrCHPR originally also includes only admissibility prerequisites for the 
single-stage procedure before the Commission, and was not conceived to govern the legal 
relationship between the Commission and the new Court. Insofar as that is concerned, the 
solution of the problem must be geared towards the protocol itself and the most meaningful 
constellation must be determined via legal comparison. But the African legal protection 
bodies have a unique relationship with each other, which complicates a comparative solution 
with regard to this aspect.  
This uniqueness is above all substantiated in the fact that in the former dual European 
protection system and in the Inter-American protection system individuals had – or 
respectively, have – no possibility whatsoever to review a decision of the respective 
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Commission before the Court, because they enjoyed – or respectively, enjoy – no standing 
before the respective Court whatsoever.563 The respective Commission had to bring 
individual complaints before the Court, which precluded a conflict situation.  
In preparatory works to the protocol it became clear that no hierarchy should emerge between 
both protective entities in favour of the Court.564 But such a hierarchy would be the result if 
the Court were to once again advise on communications already denied by the Commission 
within the framework of a complaint procedure. On the other hand, the Court is supposed to 
complement and strengthen the Commission’s functions in accordance with Paragraph VII of 
the preamble to the protocol. The fundamental difference in the effectiveness between the 
Commission procedure and the Court procedure is that the first procedure ends with the 
Commission’s mere recommendations, whereas the second procedure leads to a final 
judgement. From that point of view it can be argued that a successfully implemented 
Commission procedure is strengthened by a further Court procedure in its effect, and 
therefore with such a second procedure the Court fulfils its task from Art. 2: “to complement 
the protective mandate of the Commission”.  
On the other hand, no successfully implemented communications procedures are called into 
question here,565 but rather cases in which the complaint has either been dismissed as 
unfounded or as inadmissible by the Commission ― i.e. in which either admissibility 
prerequisites were not given or otherwise the Commission did not recognise any 
infringement. But the Court’s task to complement the protective mandate of the Commission 
sorts itself out, insofar as this is not even mandated. In accordance with the principle of 
complementarity, an individual complaint which contains the judicial review of decisions by 
the Commission must be considered as settled on a regime-internal basis (as defined by Art. 
56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR), and therefore must be declared inadmissible as it could be finally 
                                                 
563
  This only changed in the European system with the entry into force of the 9th Supplementary Protocol to the 
ECHR, which also enabled access to the Court for individuals insofar as the complaint-opposing state had 
ratified the protocol. But in this case an appeal possibility was created for such cases which raise a “serious 
question of interpretation or application of the convention” (Art. 48 II ECHR SP 9). Moreover, the prior 
passage of Commission procedures was necessary, and a hierarchical coordination of both bodies was not 
even intended. Comp. Council of Europe, Protocol No. 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Explanatory Report, Strasbourg, 1990, p. 7. 
564
  “The court will not replace the commission, nor will it be hierarchically superior to the Commission. 
Indeed, the court will complement the protective mandate of the Commission.” Comp. Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Council of Ministers, 65th Ordinary Session, CM/1996 (LXV), para. 9 
565
  As presented above, such complaints which had the non-compliance with Commission recommendations as 
content were able to be considered either as not settled (as defined by Art. 56 I No. 7 AfrCHPR) or as 
extended statement of affairs, and thus (as complaints not identical with the Commission communication) 
declared as admissible. 
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rejected within the framework of the Commission’s examination competence. On the other 
hand, if in such cases the Court deems the dispute to be admissible as a complaint, it sets itself 
up as the last instance, and establishes a hierarchy between itself and the Commission, 
although the protocol is construed to prevent such a hierarchy. This was also relinquished to 
the Court for observance during the preparation of its rules of procedure.566  
As for the question regarding whether an individual communication dismissed by the 
Commission can be submitted to the Court, it is decisive whether the Commission was 
conclusively able to settle the dispute within the framework of its examination competencies. 
Since the same substantive law – namely the admissibility prerequisites of Art. 56 AfrCHPR 
– is to be applied with admissibility decisions before both bodies, a dismissal of a 
communication through the Commission is to be treated as inadmissible as a dispute already 
settled on a regime-internal basis, and its renewed review before the Court is not admissible 
insofar as no new facts emerge ― i.e. particularly since no grounds for inadmissibility are left 
out.  
The inadmissibility prevents the examination in the matter. It no longer depends on a potential 
human rights violation. It makes the Court’s responsibility to strengthen the protective 
mandate of the Commission superfluous, since in the event of inadmissible communications 
this entity is not particularly called upon for protection of human rights through the 
examination of human rights violations.  
On the other hand, however, the Court can handle a communication which was declared as 
admissible by the Commission but was dismissed as unfounded. Here the Court can quite 
certainly supplement the protective mandate of the Commission, since it has a much broader 
substantive competence spectrum than the Commission. Whereas this entity can only 
determine violations of the Banjul Charter’s provisions, the Court’s competence ratione 
materiae also encompasses “any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States 
concerned” (Art. 3 I).567 This is why the principle of complementarity would also not be 
avoided, because the examination in the matter before the Court can apply to other legal 
levels than those before the commission. In other respects, the individual would be withheld 
from the assertion of any rights arising from other relevant agreements, if his/her complaint 
were to be dismissed by the Court as inadmissible, since the Commission did not determine 
                                                 
566
  Compare with Art. 8: “The Rules of Procedure shall lay down the detailed conditions under which the 
Court shall consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind the complementarity between the Commission 
and the Court.”. 
567
  Comp. ratione materiae competence above on p.92 et seq. 
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any violation of rights under the Banjul Charter.  
But in conclusion it is to be maintained that the constellations treated in this connection may 
have very little practical relevance, since there is no discernible reason for individuals to 
initiate a Commission procedure if they could just as easily lodge a complaint before the 
Court. The scope of application is restricted to cases in which an individual communication 
was brought before the Commission and the state opposing the complaint only ratifies the 
facultative clause of Art. 34 VI afterwards. At any rate, during the drafting of its rules of 
procedure the Court should make sure not to diminish the institutional integrity of the 
Commission, and to respect its decisions instead of allowing a possible unrestricted 
examination competence.568 
b) Admissibility of state complaint  
In view of the (up to this very day non-existent) state communication practice before the 
Commission, the state complaint procedure before the Court will hardly acquire any 
significance within the foreseeable future, yet the procedure should be elucidated for the sake 
of completeness.  
Typically, the protocol includes no specifications whatsoever for the admissibility procedure 
with regard to complaints which have been initiated by other entities capable of being a party 
to legal proceedings (other than individuals). This is unusual in comparison with the other 
regional pacts – which prescribe a series of admissibility prerequisites for state complaints569 
– as well as in view of the state communications provided by the Banjul Charter, for which 
specific requirements are also provided.570 
                                                 
568
  The earlier practice of the European Court can also serve as a negative example in this regard. It insisted, 
against the resistance of the Commission, on its competence to also decide on admissibility issues within 
the framework of the Commission procedures, compare the ruling in the De Wilde case from 18.6.1971, 
Series A Vol. 12 para. 47 et seqq. (50). Paradoxically, this only came to bear as soon as it was submitted by 
the Commission as a complaint deemed to be admissible, since the determination of inadmissibility through 
the Commission was final and prevented a further judicial procedure. This led to the unilateral granting of a 
“legal remedy” for the contracting state opposing the complaint, since only this entity had an interest in the 
renewed examination of a positive admissibility decision. Comp. Wolfgang Peukert,No. 2 to Art. 27 in: 
Jochen Abr. Frowein, Wolfgang Peukert (eds.), ECHR-Kommentar, 2nd Edition, Kehl et al. 1996; Frank 
Schellenberg, Das Verfahren vor der Europäischen Kommission und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für 
Menschenrechte, Frankfurt 1983, p. 179 et seqq. 
569
  The most elaborate admissibility catalogue for state complaints was provided by the ACHR in Art. 46, 
which – with the exception of the provisions concerning personal data of the complainant – is identical with 
the provisions for individual communications. The ECHR also provides (in Art. 35 I SP 11 for state 
complaints) for the exhaustion of domestic legal recourse and a time limit of six months. 
570
  Art. 47, 48, 50 AfrCHPR and Art 49, 50 AfrCHPR; with regard to the state complain procedure, see above 
on p. 50 et seq. 
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aa) Procedural party autonomy  
The complaint authority with regard to state complaints before the African Court differs 
significantly from the rest of the regional systems. The ACHR as well as formerly the ECHR 
requires the prior invocation of the respective Commission and the prior conclusion of this 
procedure as a prerequisite for the Court to investigate a matter.571  
The protocol completely refrained from the intervention of the Commission with the initiation 
of a direct state complaint in accordance with Art. 5 I lit. d.  
But even with the transferred state communications in accordance with Art. 5 I lit. b and c 
there is no addendum in the protocol which prescribes the conclusion of the respective 
Commission procedure. Art. 5 I lit. b and c can thus be understood to such an extent that the 
concerned procedure before the African Commission does not have to be concluded before 
the Court can be invoked by the parties.  
This interpretation also corresponds to the historical consideration. Art. 8 I of the Cape Town 
Draft provided for the inadmissibility of state complaints “originating under the provisions of 
Article 49 of the Charter until such time that the Commission has prepared a report in terms 
of Article 52 of the Charter”. And so the prior conclusion of the Commission procedure was 
presupposed for the admissibility. In addition, Art. 8 III of the Cape Town Draft required the 
observance of a three-month time limit after conveyance of the Commission report. After 
intensive discussion, the last Conference of Experts in Addis Ababa decided in favour of the 
deletion of these prerequisites. In other respects, Art. 8 was quite rightfully deemed to be 
unsystematic and unnecessary.572 Indeed, the provision seemed to be hardly practicable: 
Under the title “Conditions for Considering Communications” it incoherently governed the 
prerequisites for state complaints which originated in a communication in accordance with 
Art 49 AfrCHPR as well as for individual complaints which were assessed before the 
Commission in accordance with Art. 55 AfrCHPR. However, it did not specify such 
admissibility criteria for state complaints in accordance with Art. 47 AfrCHPR and for 
complaints which would be submitted by the Commission or IGOs.  
The article was therefore deleted without replacement, and the matters of admissibility have 
now been placed in the hands of the Court, in which case the Court’s rules of procedure are 
referred to in the final version of Art. 8. At the same time, the article was also systematised by 
                                                 
571
  Comp. Art. 61 II ACHR and Art. 47 ECHR (current version), respectively. 
572
  Report on the Third Government Legal Expert Meeting (enlarged to include Diplomats) on the 
Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT. (III) 
Rev.1, para. 19. 
 VII. The judiciary process 
  143 
name and renamed “Consideration of Cases”. Previous efforts to determine the admissibility 
criteria pertaining to state, Commission and IGO complaints were completely abandoned.   
And so at this juncture it must be stated that the protocol – unlike the corresponding regional 
pacts – not only provides for a direct complaint in accordance with Art. 5 I lit. d (without any 
intervention on the part of the Commission), but also does not require the prior conclusion of 
the Commission procedure with regard to the transferred state complaint. Therefore, 
according to the provision specified in the protocol, states can also submit their complaint to 
the Court in the ongoing Commission procedure in accordance with Art. 5 lit. b and c.  
But how do these deviations make themselves felt? In particular, the state complaint 
procedure before the Commission has an arbitral character. Art. 52 AfrCHPR explicitly 
obligates the Commission to bring about an amicable settlement. But at any rate, an actual 
adjudication of the dispute does take place in the form of an opinion (Art. 53 AfrCHPR), but 
not through an obligatory judgement. As far as that is concerned, the state complaint before 
the Commission is systematically arranged as a procedure that is submitted before the 
adjudication procedure. However, the decision concerning the implementation of this 
preliminary procedure is placed in the hands of the opposing parties through the provision 
made in the protocol.  
If a state (against which a complaint is lodged before the Commission) itself brings a case 
before the Court before the procedure has been concluded, this is unproblematic. Based on its 
own decision, in which it abandons the preliminary procedure, it accepts the possibility of an 
incriminating ruling.  
The matter is to be assessed differently if a contracting party – which initially brought a state 
complaint procedure before the Commission – submits the matter to the Court in accordance 
with Art. 5 I lit. b, or if it refers the matter directly in accordance with Art. 5 I lit. d. In these 
cases a state is summoned before the adjudicating body against its will. As a result, it is 
deprived of the possibility to informally discontinue its infringements in a non-contradictory 
procedural sequence (and thus for the most part without loss of prestige) and thereby avert 
judicial proceedings. 
Such considerations could be useful to unwilling states as a reason to delay the ratification of 
the protocol. On the other hand, with the decision of a state in favour of the establishment of 
an International Court, the ratifying parties necessarily incur the risk of themselves being 
affected by its mode of operation. Based on this general background, states which expect a 
loss of sovereignty through the adjudication of the Court will therefore more than likely 
refrain from the ratification of the protocol than be discouraged by the possibility for a 
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complaint to be lodged directly before the Court via Art. 5 I. This consideration is academic 
anyway, particularly in light of the fact that the Commission does not have a single state 
complaint at hand, which it could have passed on to the Court or could have lodged directly 
before the Court.  
But the implications which this provision shows for the relationship between the Court and 
the Commission are interesting. The Commission’s quasi-judiciary responsibility is massively 
devaluated through the party autonomy which is granted in Art. 5 I573 ― less through the 
freedom of choice before the submission of a complaint as rather the abstract possibility of 
parties to discharge the Commission in every procedural stage of the process and to call in the 
Court. This curtails the Commission’s institutional integrity and authority. Since the potential 
positive effects which would emanate from this provision – for instance, the easing of the 
Commission’s workload or a faster conclusion of the procedure – will probably not be 
brought to bear due to lack of practical application, this arrangement of admissibility is not to 
be assessed as optimal. The Commission (which is already politically underweight anyway) 
would not have to be procedurally depreciated at a point in which no actually noticeable 
advantages whatsoever are created as a countermove for the African human rights protection.  
In other respects, the protocol will not live up to its objective of establishing an institutional 
parity relationship with this party autonomy. It is also little understandable that Art. 4 rules 
out the Court’s advisory opinion jurisdiction for such issues which are being handled by the 
Commission, whereas a state complaint procedure can be transferred by the parties at any 
time in the process from the Commission to the Court. 
On the other hand, the protocol has positioned the detailed rules of procedure through Art. 8 
in the Court’s standing orders, and left this with extensive free hand in the arrangement 
(compare Art. 33). Here the Court is left with the possibility to counteract this devaluation of 
the Commission in procedurally technical terms and to qualify or eliminate the party 
autonomy granted by the protocol. 
                                                 
573
  To prevent this was the argumentation of the advocates of the original provision, which provided for the 
Commission’s prior conclusion: “in Article 8, the jurisdiction of the Commission is outlined and does not 
include a conciliatory role similar to the role played, for instance, by the European Human Rights 
Commission, which strives to seek an amicable solution before issuing, if it fails, an opinion on the liability 
of the defending Member State”. Comp. Observations and Comments of the Government of Tunisia on the 
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CM/1996 (LXV) Annexe III (e), p. 3. Through the original version 
of Art. 8 of the Cape Town Draft, the Commission’s institutional importance was strengthened to the extent 
that state complainants were deprived of their party autonomy. However, this original version also entailed 
considerable disadvantages: Individual complaints were likewise only admissible as soon as a Commission 
procedure was concluded. Regarding this matter see also below on p. 122 et seqq. 
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bb) Banjul Charter prerequisites with regard to transferred procedures  
The Banjul Charter’s admissibility prerequisites for the corresponding procedure before the 
Commission must be at hand, at least for states which are involved in a state communications 
procedure before the Commission and subsequently turn to the Court ― i.e. in cases 
pertaining to Art. 5 I lit. b (states which have lodged a state complaint before the 
Commission) and Art. 5 I lit. c AfrCHPR (states against which a complaint is lodged before 
the Commission). However, as stated above, the Court should specify in its rules of procedure 
that the respective Commission procedure has to be concluded in order to preserve the 
Commission’s institutional integrity.  
It also follows that the decision on the admissibility of a state communications procedure is to 
be made by the Commission. In this connection, the necessity was already presented that the 
Court respects the admissibility decision once it has been made by the Commission. And so as 
soon as a complaint spoken of in this context reaches the Court, the judicial re-examination 
concerning the existence of admissibility criteria which the Banjul Charter provides for state 
communications would be extremely counterproductive to the development of a uniform 
African human rights standard, since this would immediately intervene in the Commission’s 
original sphere of competence.  
cc) Local remedies rule 
The prerequisites which the Court could examine within the framework of the admissibility of 
a state complaint are to be gathered from the realm of international practice due to lack of 
provisions in the protocol. This is why there should be no initial doubt that the local remedies 
rule is accepted into the admissibility catalogue as an expression of procedural prerequisites 
in keeping with customary international law. In terms of legal conventions, this principle is 
already embodied in all multilateral human rights instruments which provide for a state 
complain procedure.574 The Banjul Charter is also oriented towards this international standard 
with regard to state communications procedures.575 And so there is no reason for the African 
Court to deviate from this standard in its rules of procedure. The protection under 
international law is always of a subsidiary nature, and has to give way to national legal 
                                                 
574
  Comp. Art. 46 I lit. a ACHR, Art. 35 I ECHR SP 11, Art. 41 I lit. c ICCPR, Art. 11 III of the Convention 
concerning the Elimination of any Form of Racial Discrimination, Art. 21 I lit. c of the Anti-torture 
Convention; and Art. 76 Migrant Worker Convention. 
575
  Comp. Art. 50 AfrCHPR. 
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remedies.576 A state that provides an effective legal protection system through its legal system 
has a right that this system is exhausted before it has to be justified on the international 
level.577 A differing provision in the Court’s rules of procedure could possibly present a 
further impediment for ratification-willing AU member states.   
dd) Time limit  
Amongst the human rights conventions, only the ECHR has specified the requirement of an 
observance of a time limit.578 No preclusive period is planned for state petitions before all 
other international convention bodies.579 This is why a time limit for complaints may also not 
be of particular relevance to the African Court ― particularly in view of the fact that African 
human rights instruments also traditionally attach no considerable value to the compliance 
with stricter time limits for complaints, possibly also because of their comparably minor 
utilisation.580 This is why the Court will not make use of a specified preclusive period in 
order not to unnecessarily restrict access to the state complaint procedure, which is unlikely 
anyway.  
c) Admissibility of Commission petitions  
As mentioned, there are also no provisions in the protocol for the admissibility prerequisites 
with regard to Commission petitions. However, as an integral component of the protection 
systems it would also not be advisable to give the Commission a catalogue of formal 
prerequisites which its petitions would have to fulfil.  
                                                 
576
  Comp. Georg Dahm, Die Subsidiarität des internationalen Rechtsschutzes, in: FS Hans Dölle, Vol. 2 pp. 3-
33, p. 6. 
577
  Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 158. 
578
  Comp. Art. 35 I ECHR SP 11. 
579
  The observance of a time limit for the admissibility of a corresponding state complaint is not required 
before the IACtHR, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child or the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families; compare the overview with Scott Leckie, The Inter-State 
Complaint Procedure in International Human Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking, in: 
HRQ 10 (1988), p. 302 et seq. (249-303). 
580
  In addition to the Banjul Charter and the protocol, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child also refrains from the provision of a time limit for complaints (compare Art. 44 I). But it is to be 
noted that the introduction of a time limit for complaints for states was certainly discussed in the 
preparatory work of the protocol. In particular, Madagascar was of the opinion that a three-month time limit 
is necessary. Comp. Commentary of the Embassy of the Republic of Madagascar to Ethiopia, Report of the 
Secretary General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, CM/1996 (LXV) Annexe III (i). 
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aa) Conclusion of the Commission procedure 
Here the absence of a provision in the protocol concerning the prior conclusion of a 
Commission procedure also leads to comparable questions as with regard to party-related 
procedural transfers. States can be prevented from the implementation of a consensus-oriented 
preliminary procedure through the passing-on of an ongoing communications procedure. But 
in the case of transfer through the Commission the protocol’s provisions state that an 
independent decision of the Commission justifies passing on the procedure to the Court at any 
stage. As directed, the Court shall supplement and reinforce the Commission’s protective 
functions (Preamble Section VII, Art. 2). Therefore as an originally responsible protective 
body the Commission has to have the possibility to activate this supplementation of its 
function and to initiate the full judiciary procedure as soon as it deems it to be opportune. 
Particularly in cases in which a fast and effective response from regional protective bodies is 
necessary to prevent severe, irreparable damage, it can be useful from the Commission’s point 
of view to immediately pass the matter on to the Court.  
bb) The implementation of own complaints  
The protocol does not include any provision regarding the question as to whether the 
Commission is only authorised to lodge a complaint if either a state complaint or otherwise an 
individual complaint is at hand. And so it is not specified as to whether it can merely transfer 
a procedure or otherwise also invoke the Court sua sponte and is able to open up a new 
procedure. As already mentioned, the conclusion of the Commission procedure is always 
necessary in the Inter-American as well as in the European regional system581 before a 
complaint authorisation before the Court can even come about.  
But precisely in the African Court’s protocol this is not the case, and so the conclusion is 
obvious not to make the admissibility of a Commission petition contingent on a complaint 
procedure at hand from the Commission. This conclusion also ensues from the above-stated 
arguments pertaining to the functional supplementation through the Court and its parity 
relationship with the Commission. The Commission shall not merely remain a “toothless” 
body slotted in ahead of the actual judicial proceedings. On the contrary, its own functions 
shall be substantiated and reinforced with the inauguration of the Court (Art. 2, Section VII of 
                                                 
581
  In the European system, the application authority of the European Human Rights Commission on account 
of the reciprocity proviso of Art. 46 II ECHR (current version) was granted only if it concerned a procedure 
that has been initiated through individual complaint. Comp. Frank Schellenberg, Das Verfahren vor der 
Europäischen Kommission und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, Frankfurt 1993, p. 174 
et seq. 
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the preamble).  
That is why the constellations are to be considered in which an independent opening of 
procedures before the Court seems possible. At the same time, the rebuke for infringements 
which refer to the institution of the Commission must be distinguished from those which are 
perpetrated through an infringement against individuals (or, if applicable, vis-à-vis third-party 
states).  
During the realisation of its responsibilities in accordance with the Banjul Charter, the 
Commission is frequently confronted with the difficulty that states do not comply with 
requests within the framework of the communications procedure according to Art. 55 
AfrCHPR and ignore its arrangements.582 According to the Banjul Charter, the contracting 
states also do not enter into any explicit obligation to comply with the final recommendations 
of the Commission. And so a treaty violation which the Commission could rebuke before the 
Court is not at hand in such cases.  
But the matter at hand is different is different with regard to the failure to comply with its 
provisional measures. In a communications procedure against Nigeria, the Commission 
determined that the failure to comply with the provisional measures represents a violation of 
Art. 1 AfrCHPR.583 This view is quite justifiable:584 After all, the arrangement of provisional 
measures is a type of safeguarding arrangement which is supposed to maintain the status quo 
                                                 
582
  Impressive insofar the Commission’s self-knowledge in its own study “Non-Compliance of State Parties to 
adopted Recommendations of the African Commission: A Legal Approach”, para. 7: “The aim of this study 
is to propose series of solutions for the Commission’s consideration whilst highlighting the difficulties in 
which the Commission found itself in the course of the past years vis-à-vis the attitude of State Parties, 
which with the exception of Cameroon, has been to generally ignore its recommendations.” In other words: 
Only Cameroon had shown respect for the Commission’s findings. 
583
  Comp. Communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/96 against Nigeria, para. 112, printed in: 
Compilation des Décisions de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, Institut pour 
les Droits Humaines et le Développement (eds.), Banjul 2000, p. 184 et seq. 
584
  The ECtHR saw this differently. In the Cruz-Varaz case (ruling from 20 March 1991, Series A 201, p. 36, 
EuGRZ 18 (1991), pp. 203-216), the Court denied the binding effect of the European Commission’s 
provisional measures because the competence to undertake such measures could not be inferred from the 
Commission itself, but only from the Commission’s rules of procedure (Art. 36 [current version]). Unlike 
the Commission, the Court (with ten to nine votes) saw no treaty violation in the non-compliance with the 
measure, since the possibility of issuing provisional measures is not stipulated in conventional terms, but 
can only be inferred through the rules of procedure. The ruling has been frequently and rightfully criticised 
in the literature under reference to the meaning and purpose of the convention, namely the protection of 
people with the goal of effective realisation of codified rights. Comp. Lawrence Collins, Provisional and 
Protective Measures in International Litigation, in: RdC 234 (1992) III, pp. 13-298, 190 et seqq.; Karin 
Oellers-Frahm, Zur Verbindlichkeit einstweiliger Anordnungen der Europäischen Kommission für 
Menschenrechte, in: EuGRZ 18 (1991), pp. 197-199, 198 et seq.; Rudolf Bernhardt, Interim Measures 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, in: ibid. (eds.), Interim Measures indicated by 
International Courts, Heidelberg 1994, pp. 95-114, 100 et seq.; P. van Dijk, G.J.H. van Hoof (Eds.), Theory 
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague 1998, p. 62; Jochen Abr. Frowein 
No. 52 to Art. 25 in: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Wolfgang Peukert (eds.), ECHR-Kommentar, 2nd Edition, Kehl 
et al. 1996. 
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up until the decision-making. Of course, the provisional measures lack the formal legal force, 
but their observance is indispensable for the implementation of a communication procedure 
which the concerned state voluntarily submitted to through ratification. This is why to assume 
an infringement upon non-compliance with these safeguarding measures seems to be 
understandable. However, implementation or sanction mechanisms are not available to the 
Commission.  
Naturally in this case the Commission could transfer the entire communications procedure. 
But this entailed the disadvantage that the Court would then have to conclude the entire 
procedure on its own, and would have to determine a violation of subjective rights, instead of 
merely examining the infringement through non-compliance with the Commission’s 
directives. Based on this background, a recourse to the Court – and thus an active legitimation 
of the Commission sua sponte – is quite justified, and corresponds to the protocol’s intention, 
since only in this way can the Commission perform its protective task in a strengthened 
manner. The Court’s competence ratione materiae also thoroughly allows such a 
consideration. The procedural objects of contentious jurisdiction commensurate with Art. 3 
are namely “all cases and disputes [...] concerning the interpretation and application of the 
Charter”. This also includes disputes concerning the observance of obligations beyond the 
actual human rights catalogue of the Banjul Charter.  
And so in such cases the Commission must be entitled to an original complaint authorisation. 
This is also why an active legitimation of the Commission is to be seen as positive ― if the 
Commission would like to proceed against a contracting state which does not comply with its 
other obligations ensuing from the Banjul Charter (for instance, the non-compliance with 
provisional arrangements or perhaps also the obligation regarding submission of state reports 
in accordance with Art. 62 AfrCHPR585).586 This would be an entirely new form of utilisation 
of an international court of human rights. With the existing mechanisms the courts are 
restricted to the implementation of transferred or direct individual or state complaints. For 
instance, in the case of the ECHR, the respective Commission always participated in the legal 
procedure, yet it could and can not lodge an actual Commission complaint. 
                                                 
585
  However, in terms of content such a complaint would be questionable, since the state complaint procedure 
in a non-contradictory dispute with the concerned state particularly serves to remedy difficulties and 
problems with regard to the implementation of characteristic provisions. A complaint targeted at the 
submission of a state report would seem to be counterproductive. 
586
  See also: Frans Viljoen, Some Arguments in favour of and some against an African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, in: ASICL 10 (1998), pp. 1-21, 11; also: Ota Amoah, The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights – An Effective Weapon for Human Rights? RADIC 4 (1992), pp. 226-245, 239. 
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However, another question is whether the Commission also has an original complaint 
authorisation in cases in which it claims a violation of human rights, but there is no 
communication at hand in accordance with Art. 55 AfrCHPR. Of course, there exists not just 
an individual interest, but in view of the ordre publique function of the regional pact there is 
also a public interest in the granting of human rights, and the Commission is mandated in Art. 
30 AfrCHPR with the protection as well as with the promotion of human rights. Nevertheless, 
to ascribe it a function as ‘ombudsman’ is highly problematic: After inauguration of the 
Court, the Commission retains all competencies, including the responsibility for receipt of 
communications in accordance with Art. 55 AfrCHPR and state complaints. This also 
obligates the Commission to strict neutrality beyond the realm of judicial activity. A change 
of function quasi to public prosecutor of human rights violations before the African Court is 
not to be brought into harmony with this requirement. For instance, the Commission itself has 
emphasised that it can only respond very generally to human rights violations – but not 
specifically – as long as a communication in accordance with Art. 55 AfrCHPR is not at hand. 
d) Admissibility of complaints from international organisations  
It can only be conjectured as to which requirements are to be arranged for the admissibility of 
a complaint. But the local remedies rule may undoubtedly be utilised as a routine legal 
admissibility prerequisite with human rights violations. Since no IGO is a contracting party to 
the Banjul Charter, the prior implementation of a Commission procedure as an admissibility 
criterion is ruled out from the very beginning. But in view of the novel aspect of this 
procedure, it remains to be seen whether the Court specifies further admissibility criteria.  
3. Course of procedure 
The protocol only pays perfunctory attention to the course of the further procedure. Thus said, 
the actual formulation is incumbent upon the Court, which has to govern the procedure within 
the framework of its rules of procedure.587 
a) Principle of public trial  
One of the most momentous procedural differences of the judicial procedure for 
communication procedure before the AfrCHPR – that provides for strict confidentiality 
during the treatment of communications588 – is laid down in Art. 10 II: “The Court shall 
                                                 
587
  Art. 8. 
588
  Art. 106 RP AfrCHPR. 
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conduct its proceedings in public.” The fact that the protocol codifies the principle of public 
trial and does not place it (like other rules of procedure) up to the Court shows which degree 
of relative importance was attributed to this regulation. The principle of public trial also 
applies to the IACtHR and the ECtHR, but is also merely laid down in the standing orders 
there.589 
Art. 10 was provided with the article designation “Hearings and Representation” (notionally 
“proceedings”); however, not only is the oral hearing recorded by Art. 10 II, but also the 
written proceedings. Therefore it is also to be assumed that all documents within the scope of 
a procedure are to be made immediately accessible to the public, and the principle of public 
trial gain acceptance for all procedural stages.590 
The stigma of achieving results – the legality of which is not discernible behind closed doors 
in obscure proceedings – is supposed to be removed with this regulation from the African 
legal protection system. The Commission has already attempted to do this, but is strongly 
truncated by its own procedural guidelines. The entire communication procedure is closed to 
the public, only completed proceedings are published. The proceedings before the Court seem 
to be much more promising under this aspect: Not only the rulings must be published, but the 
procedural approach also has to be understandable so that the administration of justice yields 
a self-contained human rights concept that offers orientation and establishes legal security. 
Art. 10 I 2 gives the Court the possibility to exclude the public from proceedings insofar as 
this is provided in the standing orders. This is a practical regulation that allows the parties 
involved in the dispute to file an appropriate request, of which the Court decides. For 
instance, if a complainant or appellee strives for a conciliatory solution, the exclusion of the 
general public could facilitate an amicable settlement. 
b) Representational regulation 
Commensurate with Art. 10 II, any party can be represented by a legal adviser of their choice. 
A special qualification for the representative, for instance special knowledge of the law,591 is 
not called for. Presumably this takes into account the fact that many representatives would not 
fulfil such a prerequisite. If one concludes from the experiences of the Commission, NGOs 
                                                 
589
  Art. 14 RP IACtHR; Art. 33 RP ECtHR. 
590
  This is also the modus operandi for the ECtHR. The documents in a complaint matter can be perused by the 
interested general public at the Court’s seat in Strasbourg; compare: Mark Villinger, Handbuch der 
Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, No.: 197. 
591
  However, this is demanded for in Art. 36 RP ECtHR concerning advisors and representatives in the 
proceedings before the ECtHR. 
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would frequently appear on behalf of an individual before the Court, and only in rare cases do 
their representatives possess special knowledge of the law.  
A legal adviser can perceive all tasks which are incumbent upon the complainant. However, 
pursuant to Art. 10 II, the utilisation of a legal adviser before the AfrCtHPR is not 
obligatory.592 It ensues that the complainant retains the capacity to personally plead in every 
procedural stage. 
c) Right to legal aid 
In light of the complex formal and substantive issues of potential legal matters before the 
Court, any procedure entails a fundamental risk that a structural inequality emerges between 
the individual complainant and the appellee state party, which can appear before the Court 
with the support of its entire juridical apparatus. This particularly applies if a complainant 
does not have sufficient financial means to establish a certain equality of “legal weaponry” 
through professionally qualified legal counsel. Also in light of the fact that a procedure before 
the Court requires the prior exhaustion of legal recourse and thus entails substantial financial 
expenditures on the part of the complainant, the legal assertion of convention rights is 
threatened with failure due to lack of funds. 
In contrast to the Banjul Charter, the protocol reacted to this danger and determined in Art. 10 
II 2 that “free legal representation may be provided where the interests of justice so require”. 
The protocol follows the European system with the right to legal aid.593 A right such as in 
proceedings before the AfrCHPR is not provided for in the Inter-American protection 
system.594 
The protocol pursues a noble – but in terms of its purview, a hard to achieve – objective with 
                                                 
592
  Unlike before the ECtHR, where the complainant at least has to be represented at oral hearings (Art. 36 
1111 RP ECtHR); compare: Mark Villinger, Handbuch der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 
Zurich 1999, p. 134 et seqq.; Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, London 1995, p. 664 et seqq. 
593
  Comp. Chapter X (Art. 91 et seqq.) RP ECtHR. 
594
  With reference to the Inter-American system, Scott Davidson argues with the fact that “many of the claims 
are fact driven and do not require precise legal analysis, and so […] applicants do not necessarily suffer 
greatly from the lack of legal assistance”; cited in Andrew Butler, Legal Aid before Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies, in: ICLQ 49 (2000), p. 362, footnote 7. This is certainly true. However, the lack of a 
right to legal aid in the Inter-American system nevertheless is a shortcoming in the system. On the one 
hand, the procedural standards of a human rights monitoring body should serve national legal systems as an 
orientation which the Inter-American system surely does not in this concern. On the other hand, in contrast 
to the ECtHR, the IACtHR does not even award successful complainants the incurred procedural costs as 
compensation; compare: Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, Oxford 1999, p. 
307. This is remarkable insofar as the IACtHR itself estimated the costs for implementation of a procedure 
before the Inter-American human rights bodies at $80,000. Compare same, Future Remedies in the Inter-
American System, in: ASIL Proceedings 92 (1998) pp 202-206, at p. 204. 
 VII. The judiciary process 
  153 
this provision: the realisation of rights for the indigent. The difficulty lies in the fact that the 
Court could not initially make arrangements in its own proceedings, but had to configure the 
national proceedings so that this provision achieved its objective. Indeed, the Commission 
does not recognise the non-exhaustion of legal recourse due to financial necessity as an 
exception to the local remedies rule, because it fears being inundated with complaints 
otherwise.595 Therefore the legal route to the Commission is blocked for individuals if they 
have not pursued national means of legal resource due to lack of funds. If impoverishment 
does not entail lack of rights and the Banjul Charter loses credibility as a result (as Art. 10 II 2 
seeks to prevent), the Court has to resort to other selection standards in order to prevent a 
paralysis through an excess of work. Correspondingly, the AfrCHPR would have to adapt its 
practice of adjudication in order to ensure a coherency of admissibility criteria. 
The greatest significance of the right to legal aid ensuing from Art. 10 II 2 also lies here. 
Indeed, the financial assistance provided by the Court is surely not enough to be able to “buy” 
highly-qualified legal advice for the complainants. The payments in the European system 
have already been measured so low596 that a qualified procedural representative needs another 
motivation to present a case before the ECtHR. In the literature, the rates are assessed as “not 
generous”597, “meagre if not derisory”598, and “a little more than a nominal payment”599. 
Such assessments may be understated for the African Court’s future regulation of costs. This 
is why the right to legal aid stipulated in Art. 10 II 2 is more than likely due less to the effect 
that complainants receive legal aid than they otherwise would not have received; on the 
contrary, the consequence is that the non-exhaustion of legal recourse due to financial 
necessity cannot be assessed by the Court as a reason for inadmissibility, without this 
contradicting Art. 10 II 2.  
In other respects, the granting of the right to legal aid has a further fundamental advantage; 
however, this can only be taken into account if the financial configuration allows it: The 
decision-making on the part of a judiciary body will be made much easier if both sides are 
competently represented, since a majority of juridical argumentation work is performed by 
procedural representatives, and the judiciary authority only has to examine their decisional 
                                                 
595
  Concerning the local remedies rule comp. above on pp. 134 et seqq.  
596
  Comp. the overview at Andrew Butler, Legal Aid before Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in. ICLQ 49 (2000), 
pp. 360-389, at p. 365. 
597
  Nikolaos Sansonetis, Costs and Expenses, in: Ronald Macdonald, Franz Matscher, Herbert Petzold (Eds.), 
The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, Dordrecht et al. 1993, pp. 755-773, 762. 
598
  D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention an Human Rights, London 1995, 
p. 665. 
599
  Luke Clements, European Human Rights: Taking a Case under the Convention, London 1994, p. 97. 
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relevance.600 But in light of the anticipated extreme shortage of finances, it cannot be 
expected that juridical competence can be bought with the right to legal aid. Therefore one 
hopes that the Court acquires a sufficient reputation in order to promise university lecturers, 
lawyers and other qualified personnel a correspondingly high gain in prestige for their 
representation that compensates the financial disadvantage. 
d) Unhindered implementation of individual complaint procedure 
The protocol grants any person, witnesses or representatives who appear before the Court the 
protection and all facilitations which are necessary for exercise of their function and for 
fulfilment of their obligation vis-à-vis the Court.601 This obligation is a special 
characterisation of the cooperative obligation which the contracting states undertake with 
regard to the judicial proceedings.602 It targets the unhindered implementation of the judicial 
procedure which the states have already been subject to through ratification of the protocol 
and, should the occasion arise, through submission of a declaration pursuant to Art. 34 VI 
with regard to the right of individuals to file a complaint. The deliberate hindrance of the 
judicial procedure is thus already inadmissible according to general international law, since it 
represents a treaty infringement.  
The protection of Art. 10 III includes any individual who is of relevance in a procedure, i.e. 
the natural parties, their legal counsel, witnesses and experts. This general reference to 
provisions of international law may have the advantage vis-à-vis detailed regulatory immunity 
provisions (such as those also enacted by the Council of Europe in a separate agreement603) 
— that there is no ensuing deterrent effect which could further decelerate the ratification.  
e) Law of evidence 
Naturally the Court has to determine the relevant facts in order to examine whether a 
conventional infringement exists. At the same time, commensurate with Art. 26 II, it initially 
takes into account the petitions of the involved parties. But insofar as it deems necessary, it 
                                                 
600
  The former President of the European Commission, Humphrey Waldock, has put it like this: “Legal aid is 
essential not only to from the point of view of fairness to the individual but also from the point of view of 
the effective discharge of the Commission’s responsibilities under the Convention. For the Commission 
will be in a much better position to give a correct decision, if both sides of a case have been adequately 
presented to it by the parties.“, YEC 1963, p. 91. 
601
  Art. 10 III. 
602
  Comp. Art. 26 I. 
603
  Comp. the European Agreement relating to Persons participating in Proceedings of the European 
Commission and Court of Human Rights (ETS 67) or, upon entry into force of Protocol 11, the European 
Agreement relating to Persons participating in Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights (ETS 
161), respectively. 
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can conduct its own ascertainment of facts. Thus said, the principle of judicial investigation 
applies to the Court in restricted form: It is not bound to the motions for the admission of 
evidence; insofar as it does not deem the admissions of the parties to be sufficient, it officially 
investigates the facts. 
International law lends international bodies only limited competencies, which can 
substantially compound an official ascertainment of facts. This is why the taking of evidence 
essentially depends on the willingness of the involved states to cooperate and to give offers of 
proof.604 Since these entities take on the role of “defendant” in human rights complaints 
procedures insofar as they appear as appellees, their unrestricted cooperation cannot always 
be assumed. On the contrary: The proceedings before the AfrCHPR clearly show that states 
are frequently not even willing to officially take cognizance of the pendency of a 
procedure605, that they submit their admission with substantial delay606, or otherwise do not 
respond to enquiries at all.607 However, this phenomenom is not restricted to African 
Countries but is widely spread in international human rights proceedings.608 
Therefore this fact is to be appropriately taken into account for the apportionment of the 
burden of proof. Otherwise not only particularly renitent parties would be favoured and 
cooperatively adversely affected, but complainants from corresponding states would also have 
to fear a procedural discrimination in addition to the already suffered (at least claimed) human 
rights violation. The AfrCHPR responded to this difficulty by regarding the admissions of the 
party filing the complaint as given, insofar as they are not contested by the state. This practice 
may not have particularly influenced the respective states, since the Commission procedure 
only concludes with nonbinding recommendations. The certain view of risking an 
incriminating, legally binding ruling – if enquires are not responded to – could contribute 
towards a willingness to cooperate, however. For instance, the ECtHR also accepts a reversal 
of the burden of proof in the event of cases – in which only the government has access to 
essential information – if they belatedly submit (or do not submit at all) the information 
                                                 
604
  Unfortunately, the obligations of the states with regard to the hearing of evidence in international judicial 
proceedings (especially Articles 10 and 11) – which were already provided for in the Harvard Draft on 
Judicial Assistance (1939) – were never applied. This is why in actuality the proposals sacrificed nothing. 
Compare: J.G. Rogers, A.H. Feller (Reportesr), Research in International Law under the Auspicies of the 
aculty of the Harvard Law School, in: AJIL 33 (1939) Supplement, in particular pp. 104 et seqq. 
605
  Comp. complaint procedures 59/91; 60/91; 87/93; 101/93. 
606
  Comp. complaint procedures 27/89; 46/91; 49/91; 99/93. 
607
  Comp. complaint procedures 219/98; 201/97; 74/92; 40/90. 
608
  Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 144. 
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without justified reason.609 
In order to secure the cooperation of the states, they are obligated in accordance with Art. 26 I 
2 to grant all necessary facilitations for implementation of the investigations. 
Article 26 II conclusively defines the law of evidence – i.e. the Court makes its decision on 
the basis of oral and written evidence as well as expert opinions. Thus said, the law of 
evidence is by no means treated in detail by the protocol. Usually such regulatory objects are 
also counted amongst the autonomous organisational realm of the international authority610, 
so that their detailed formulation is to be undertaken by the Court within the scope of its 
standing orders. 
The remarkable aspects of this provision also seems to be less due to the evidentiary 
components than the participatory obligation which were imposed on the states through 
Section I with regard to the implementation of official hearing of evidence. The fact that on-
site missions are not accepted or intentionally boycotted is amongst the negative experiences 
of the Commission’s work. With Art. 26 I 2 the Court is directly provided with a 
conventionally demandable obligation to cooperate which can positively influence its results. 
VIII. Provisional arrangements 
Like virtually all international judicial bodies, the AfrCtHPR has the possibility to make 
provisional arrangements.611 Provisional arrangements are defined as court orders which 
govern the extra-procedural conduct of parties with regard to the judicial decision throughout 
the duration of the pending suit.612 The protocol devotes itself to this complex in Art. 27 II: 
“In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to 
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary.”  
Thus said, the procedure of provisional arrangement is at least opened ex officio in accordance 
                                                 
609
  Jens Meyer-Ladewig, ECHR Commentary, Baden-Baden, 2003, No. 3, Art. 38. 
610
  Mojtaba Kazazi, Burden of Proof and Related Issues – A study on Evidence before International Tribunals, 
The Hague et al. 1996, pp. 176 et seqq., 177. 
611
  Compare the heretofore exhaustive representation in Jerzy Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court, 
Boston 1983, pp. 4-11. The judicial bodies inaugurated thereafter also have regular access to such a 
possibility; merely compare Art. 26 RP Iran-US Claims Tribunal; Art. 89 et seqq. RP ITLOS; amongst the 
exceptions are the various human rights committees, which in comparison with the protective authorities of 
the regional pacts feature much fewer intervention competencies (Committee on the Rights of the Child; 
Human Rights Committee; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; 
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families). Only 
the Committee against Torture can arrange provisional measures (Art. 109 RP). 
612
  Karin Oellers-Frahm, Die einstweilige Anordnung in der internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit, Berlin et al. 
1975, p. 11. 
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with Art. 27 II and not via party motion. Since the provisional measure can only occur after 
submission of a complaint, the parties themselves most probably will refer to the necessity of 
the measure. Whether the Court expands Art. 27 II within the framework of its standing 
orders and grants the parties involved in the proceedings a formal right to file a motion613 (or 
not) may not be of importance to the decision regarding the issuance of a provisional 
arrangement.614 
Bernhardt explains that provisional measures would have to be the exception in international 
human rights protection procedures.615 In principle, complaints procedures are construed to 
examine past human rights violations. Only in isolated cases a previous claimed human rights 
violation had a present-day effect in a manner that would call for the provisional measures.616 
This exception is based on the consideration that provisional measures usually have to occur 
before conclusion of the admissibility examination. But since over 90 percent of the submitted 
complaints would be rejected as inadmissible, an extensive handling of the provisional 
measures would damage the legitimate interests of the affected state if the inadmissibility or 
groundlessness of the complaint is brought out in retrospect.617 
This view may be applicable for the legal protection within the ECHR regime; however, in 
the two other regional systems the structural differences lead to a different conclusion. The 
chairperson of the AfrCHPR summarised this structural difference as follows: “Most of the 
cases that the European system processes relate to arrest and detention guarantees and fair 
administration of justice, and not the chilling and harrowing violations in other parts of the 
world.”618 
                                                 
613
  Comp. Art. 39 RP ECtHR; Art. 25 I RP IACtHR; Art. 37 RP ICJ. 
614
  The AfrCHPR did not provide the individual with a formal right to file a request for a provisional measure , 
yet in practise it only acts when the complainant has asked for it. 
615
  Rudolf Bernhardt, Interim Measures under the European Convention on Human Rights, in: same. (Ed.), 
Interim Measures indicated by International Courts, Berlin et al. 1994, pp. 95-114, 102. 
616
  Ibd. pp. 97, 101 with reference to extradiction or expulsion cases, comp. To this also Hans Christian 
Krüger, Vorläufige Maßnahmen nach Art. 35 der Verfahrensordnung der Europäischen Kommission für 
Menschenrechte (insbesondere in Ausweisungs- und Auslieferungsfällen), in: EuGRZ 23 (1996), pp. 246-
349, 347 et seq.  
617
  Rudolf Bernhardt, Interim Measures under the European Convention on Human Rights, in: same (Eds.), 
Interim Measures indicated by International Courts, Berlin 1994, pp. 95-114, 102. 
618
  Dankwa, Conference on Regional Systems of Human Rights Protection in Africa, the Americas and 
Europe, in: HRLJ 13 (1992), pp. 314-326, p. 316. However, this structural difference does not mean that 
provisional measures of decisive importance in the ECHR regime cannot also arise for the concerned 
individuals. But these cases are overwhelming limited to extradition cases through which the complainants 
risk death or maltreatment. In at least three cases (Cruz Varas, DS, SN and BT vs. France; Mansio vs. 
Sweden) the disregard for the provisional arrangement of the European Commission through the state party 
led to torture and inhumane treatment of the complainants: Hannah Garry, When Procedure involves 
Maters of Life and Death: Interim Measures and the European Convention of Human Rights, in: EPL 7 
(2001), pp. 399-432, p. 420. 
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The classification of the pending complaints before the IACHR also reflects this reality: over 
70 percent of the 800 cases with which the Commission was occupied in 1996 denounced a 
violation of the right to life and/or physical integrity. In only five months it applied for 26 
provisional arrangements in order to protect people whose lives were in danger.619 This 
proportion is not sensational to such an extent before the AfrCHPR, but out of the 288 
submitted communications, at least 60 concerned such cases in which a comparable violation 
of rights was denounced. Yet the African Commission makes relatively cautious use of the 
instrument of provisional arrangement.620 Nevertheless, the order of provisional arrangement 
is the only means at the disposal of a human rights authority, for instance to delay the 
enforcement of death penalties or to attain the protection of witnesses. This is why provisional 
arrangements can play a significant role in the practice of the African Court. 
The cardinal question in connection with interim provisions of international authorities is 
always that pertaining to their legal repercussions for the addressees. The ICJ for the first time 
authoritatively affirmed the long since contentious question regarding whether provisional 
arrangements of the Court had a legally binding effect621 in its La Grand case.622 This 
question is assessed quite differently amongst the regional courts of human rights. In the 
Inter-American system, the legally binding effect of provisional decisions by the IACtHR is 
called into question neither by the literature nor the concerned states.623 The situation is 
                                                 
619
  Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Seminario sobre el Sistema Interamericana de Promocion 
y Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos 2 al 4 de Diciembre de 1996, Conclusiones de la Comision 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y Minutas de las Exposiciones Realizadas por los Participantes, 
OAE/Ser/L/V/II.95, Doc. 28, para 14. More restictive in this concection John Macdonald, Interim 
Measures in International Law, with special reference to the European System for the Protection of Human 
Rights, in: ZaÖRV 53 (1992), pp. 703-740, 721.  
620
  Communication 60/91 vs. Nigeria; Joined Communications 93/92, 88/93, 91/93 vs. Togo; Communication 
87/93 vs. Nigeria; Joined Communications 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 vs. Nigeria. Comp. On the practice of 
the African Comission Gino Naldi, Interim Measures of Protection in the African System for the Protection 
of Human and Peoples‘ Rights, in: AHRLJ 2 (2002), pp. 1-10, 6 et seqq. 
621
  Comp. Jerome Elkind, Interim Protection: A Functional Approach, The Hague, et al. 1981, pp. 25 et seqq.; 
Lawrence Collins, Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation, in: RdC 243 (1992 III), 
pp. 13-238, 216 et seqq.; Karin Oellers-Frahm, Die einstweilige Anordnung in der internationalen 
Gerichtsbarkeit, Berlin et al. 1975, 105 et seqq.; same Interim Measures of Protection, in: Rudolf Bernhardt 
(Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Bd. II, Amsterdam et al. 1995, pp. 1027-1034, 1029; 
Hugh Thirlway, The Indication of Provisional Measures by the International Court, in: Rudolf Bernhardt 
(Eds.), Interim Measures indicated by International Courts, Berlin et al. 1994, pp. 1-36, 28 et seqq. Jerzy 
Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court, Boston et al. 1983, pp. 280 et seqq. 
622
  Comp. hereonto Karin Oellers-Frahm, Der Internationale Gerichtshof stärkt die Stellung des Individuums 
im Völkerrecht und klärt wichtige Fragen der internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit, in: NJW 54 (2001), pp. 3688-
3690, 3689; Jochen Abr. Frowein, Provisional Measures by the International Court – The LaGrand case, in: 
ZaöRV 62 (2002), pp. 55-60, 57; comprehensive on this decision: Robert Jennings, The Lagrand Case, in: 
LPICT 1 (2002), pp. 13-54, on the question of the legal effect pp. 29-36. 
623
  Jo Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-American Human Rights System: An Innovative 
Development in International Law, in: VandJTL 26 (1993), pp. 803-863, 847 
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different in the European system: In the Cruz Varas case, the ECtHR had to cope with the 
binding effect of provisional decisions in the ECHR regime. It came to the conclusion – with 
a scant majority of ten to nine votes – that the provisional arrangements are not legally 
binding.624 
What are the reasons for these different assessments, and what conclusions are to be drawn 
for these provisional arrangements on the part of the African Court? First of all, the legal 
assessment of the question pertaining to the binding effect of provisional measures has to take 
into account the various wordings. Based on the formulation of Art. 41 of the ICJ statutes, 
“The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any 
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either 
party”, the conclusion was repeatedly drawn that they entailed no compliance obligation for 
the addressees as a consequence.625 Since the corresponding provision of the European 
Commission for Human Rights was similarly softly formulated, the ECtHR also put forward 
the wording argument in the Cruz Varas case against a binding effect of the provisional 
measures.626 
In comparison with the competence of the IACtHR regarding the issuance of provisional 
measures, Art. 63 II ACHR states in much more unambiguous language: “The Court shall 
adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent.” In demarcation to the provisions of 
the ECHR and also corresponding to the provisions of the ICJ Statute, this formulation is also 
concluded with regard to the binding effect of the provisional measures of the IACtHR.627 In 
consideration of the fact that Art. 27 II was formulated in the same wording as Art. 63 II 
ACHR, this initially also speaks in favour of the binding effects of provisional arrangements 
through the African Court. 
                                                 
624
  Judgement of 20 March 1991, Series A 201, para 102: „The Court considers that the power to order binding 
interim measures cannot be inferred from either Article 25 I in fine, or from other sources. It lies within the 
appreciation of the Contracting Parties to decide whether it is expedient to remedy this situation by 
adopting a new provision notwithstanding the wide practice of good faith compliance.“ comp. footnote 584 
above on p. 154. 
625
  Comp. Jerzy Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court, Boston 1983, pp. 263 et seqq., 280-287; Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court, Vol II, Cambridge 1986, p. 548. 
626
  „[...] Rule 36 cannot be considered to give rise to a binding obligation on Contracting Parties. Indeed this is 
reflected in the wording [...] of Rule 36 itself ("may indicate any interim measure the adoption of which 
seems desirable").” Cruz Varas vs. Sweden, judgement of  20 March 1991, Series A 201 para. 98. 
627
  Comp. Jo Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-American Human Rights system: An Innovative 
Development in International Law, in: VandJTL 26 (1993), pp. 803-863, 848 et seq.; in favour fort he same 
differentiation by wording, Michael Addo, Interim Measures under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, in: EJIL 10 (1999), pp. 713-132, 723; less decided but tending towards the same direction Karin 
Oellers-Frahm, Die einstweilige Anordnung in der Internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit, Berlin et al. 1975, p. 
108. 
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In other respects, the ECtHR based the rejection of the binding effect on the fact that the 
ECHR itself did not embrace the competence to enact provisional measures, and such 
measures can only be gathered from the RP.628 But since the competence of the African Court 
can rest on its conventional basis – exactly like that of the IACtHR – and not merely on 
procedural rules, this also speaks in favour of a legally binding effect of its provisional 
arrangements. 
The systematic interpretation of Art. 27 II does not lead to any other result. Whereas the 
position of Art. 41 ICJ Statute was cited – under Section III (“Procedure”) instead of Section 
II (“Competences”) – as an additional argument against the binding effect of its measures,629 
the methodology of Art. 27 II makes the opposite conclusion obvious. The provisional 
measures are governed in the same provision as the content of the rulings. This leads to the 
conclusion that the same legal importance is to be attached to them. 
Moreover, it is to be pointed out that the AfrCHPR also sees its provisional measures as 
obligating.630 And this is the case, although the Banjul Charter does not contain any 
corresponding provision; but the issuance of provisional arrangements is only based on Art. 
111 RP. Moreover, Art 111 RP is so mildly formulated that at first glance a binding effect is 
not even self-evident, but merely a functional approach to justify it: “The Commission may 
inform the State party concerned of its view on the appropriateness of taking provisional 
measures to avoid irreparable damage being caused to the victim of the alleged violation.”631 
But the fact that this interpretation of the Commission remained uncontested on the part of the 
state surely was not due to their understanding, but was rather due to their non-cognizance. 
The Commission’s decision was at least greeted in the literature.632 As welcome as this 
interpretation may well be, the Commission rendered less persuasive contextual work in order 
to substantiate their view.633 
                                                 
628
  „In the absence of a provision in the Convention for interim measures an indication given under Rule 36 
cannot be considered to give rise to a binding obligation on Contracting Parties.“, Cruz Varas vs. Sweden, 
judgement of 20 March 1991, Series A 201 para. 98. 
629
  Comp. Jerome Elkind, Interim Protection, A Functional Approach, The Hague, et al. 1981, p. 155 et seq.  
630
  The Commission assessed Nigerias non-compliance with a provisional measures as a breach of Art. 1 
AfrCHPR; compare hereunto above p. 154.  
631
  In fact, this softness equals the respective provisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Art. 
86). However, no binding effect is attached to the HRC’s provisional measures, comp. Scott 
Davidson,Procedure under the Optional Protocol, in: same, Alex Conte, Richardo Burchill (Eds.), Defining 
civil and political Rights: the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Aldershot 
2004, pp. 17-32, 27.  
632
  Gino Naldi, Interim Measures of Protection in the African System for the Protection of Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights, in: AHRLJ 2 (2002), pp. 1-10, 8. 
633
  The Comission commented this importat step lapidaryly: „Rule 111 of the Commission’s Rules of 
procedure aims at preventing irreparable damage being caused to a complaint before the Commission. 
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On the other hand, the AfrCtHPR is in the advantageous position of being provided with a 
comparatively broad legal foundation for the binding force of its provisional measures. 
Therefore, just like the IACtHR, it should not even question the binding force of its 
provisional arrangements and characterise its claim of compliance in this manner. 
IX. Procedural termination 
As a rule, contradictory proceedings can be terminated on the part of the parties as well as 
through the judiciary authority. At the first opportunity, the protocol governs only the 
amicable settlement and lastly the promulgation of a ruling. All other forms of procedural 
termination – such as the withdrawal of complaint, an acknowledgement or the possibilities of 
the judicial deletion of a complaint upon factual abandonment of a complaint – are not 
addressed, and therefore are to be procedurally organised by the Court.  
1. Amicable settlement 
First of all, Art. 9 declares that the Court can works towards an amicable settlement between 
the parties. This settlement can be brought about in any procedural stage. The reference to an 
amicable settlement in a lawsuit appears to be somewhat out of place insofar as the violation 
of fundamental human rights is concerned. On the other hand, for instance, the amount of a 
compensatory sum for damages suffered is definitely an object that can be added as an 
appropriate solution for the complainants in the course of an amicable settlement.634 
However, an individually negotiated compensation can be considered as insufficient insofar 
as a state is not willing to redress a conventional violation through unconventional law or an 
administrative practice. Therefore Art. 9 specifies that an amicable settlement only comes into 
consideration in conformity with the Banjul Charter.635 
In a two-stage legal protection system, the responsibility of bringing about an amicable 
settlement through negotiations with the involved parties is normally exclusively incumbent 
                                                 
Execution in the face of the invocation of Rule 111 defeats the prupose of this important rule. The 
Commission had hoped that the Government of Nigeria would respond positivley to its request for a stay of 
execution pending the formers determinatioon of the communication before it. [...] That this is a violation 
of the Charter is an understatement.“ Comp. Communication No. 137/94, 139/94, 154/94, 161/97, para. 115 
et seq. , abgedruckt in: Compilation des Décisions de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et 
des Peuples, Institut pour les Droits Humaines et le Développement (Hrsg), Banjul 2000, pp. 184 et seqq. 
The Commission did not, however, dismantle the (seeming) contradiction that although its findings and 
recomendations have no binding effect, their provisional measures still have to obeyed to. 
634
  A.C. Kiss, La Function de Conciliation, in: HRJ 2 (1969), pp. 221-233, 225. 
635
  The IACHR has in Art 41 RP put it more vividly: „The Commission may terminate its intervention in the 
friendly settlement procedure if it finds that [...] any of the parties does not display the willingness to reach 
a friendly settlement based on respect for human rights.“ 
4. Chapter: The Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Establishment of the African Court 
  162 
on the respective commission,636 since – in contrast to the Court – the human rights 
commissions are not juridical authorities, and the actual purpose of the amicable settlement 
consists of precisely avoiding a juridical dispute.637 
In the African system, the parties involved in the dispute have two different authorities – the 
Commission as well as the Court – before which they have the possibility to seek an amicable 
settlement. But this may not initially result in any major consequences in a two-stage 
procedure, since the conciliatory responsibility still devolves upon the Commission: In fact, 
the main motivation for states to reach an amicable settlement is omitted as soon as the matter 
is pending before the International Court.638 
On the contrary, the fact that this conciliatory element was nevertheless explicitly accepted in 
the judiciary proceedings before the AfrCtHPR testifies to a certain duplication of function 
within the protection system, which takes into account the fact that the two-stage as well as 
the single-stage protective process is provided for. In single-stage full judiciary proceedings it 
can be absolutely meaningful for antagonistic states to show willingness to cooperate, since 
the judicial ruling concerning a conventional violation can be avoided and a face-saving 
solution can be added to the legal dispute.  
2. Behaviour of the parties 
The procedural termination through behaviour of the parties – for instance, through formal 
withdrawal or mere abandonment of the complaint – is not governed in the protocol. This is 
why it must be taken into consideration by the Court within the scope of its standing orders. 
Since the parties involved in the dispute are unrestrictedly entitled to litigation, it has to be 
possible for them to autonomously decide on the further pursuit of a complaint. This always 
involves the risk of a possible unconventional influence of the adversarial states on the 
complainants. It will not always be possible in conventional bodies to examine whether their 
                                                 
636
  Comp. Art. 48 I lit. f ACHR, Art. 28 lit. b ECHR (current version). 
637
  Comp. the judgement of the IACtHR in the Gallardo Case, Ser. A No. G101/81, para 24: „The Court lacks 
the power to discharge the important function of promoting friendly settlements, whithin a broad 
conciliatory framework, that the Convention assigns to the Commission precily because it is not a juridical 
body.“, comp. also Jo Pasqualucci, Preliminary objections before the Inter-Amercian Court of Human 
Rights: Legitimate Issues And Illegitimate Tactics, in: VirgJIL 40 (1999), pp. 1-114, 80 et seq. , Hans 
Krüger/Carl Noørgaard, Reflections concerning friendly settlement under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, in: FS Gérard Wiarda, Köln 1988, 329-335, 329; comp. concerning the legal questions in 
the Gallardo case and the jurisdiction of the IACtHR Thomas Buergenthal, The European and Inter-
American Human Rights Court: Beneficial Interaction, in: FS Ryssdal, Köln et al. 2000, pp. 123-133, 127 
et seq.; also: Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 143 et seq.  
638
  Comp. Michael O’Boyle, The Legacy of the Commission to the new Court under the eleventh Protocol, in: 
EHRLRev 3 (1997), pp. 211-228, 220 et seq.  
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decision actually rests on a free manifestation of will.639 However, the necessary admissibility 
of a unilateral procedural termination already follows from the fact that a procedure without 
the cooperation of the parties is only practicable under considerable difficulties. This is why it 
is also procedurally laid down in the European as well as the Inter-American system.640 In 
order to keep a procedure particularly worthy of litigation, the provisions provide that the 
procedural termination can be refrained from if general importance is attached to it.641 This is 
why an appropriate configuration through the AfrCtHPR is self-evident. 
3. Ruling 
During the judgement of an international judicial authority, considerable importance is to be 
attached to its decision on the merits. The questions pertaining to how and in which manner 
their rulings came about, which contents they can have, how they take effect and above all 
how their effectiveness is secured provide decisive references to the body’s possibilities of 
effect. The protocol governs this complex with the provisions of Articles 27-31. 
a) Reaching a verdict 
Commensurate with Art. 28 I, a ruling should be made within 90 days after conclusion of 
deliberations. This provision was first adopted at the Nouakchott Conference in order to take 
the principle of procedural acceleration into consideration.642 None of the corresponding 
courts faces such a deadline. It is also doubtful that an effect of procedural acceleration 
actually ensues. For one thing, it basically sets a false point of departure for this purpose: the 
time-consuming judgment phase is not the mere execution of the ruling, but rather the 
decision-making. In turn, no deadline can be set on the basis of practical considerations and 
the unpredictability of the effort involved. For another thing, a deadline is always optional as 
long as its commencement is not stipulated, but lies in the discretion of the regulatory 
addressees. The “conclusion of considerations” mentioned by Art. 28 I is such a hardly 
fixable commencement of deadline. It is incumbent upon the Court to decide when 
considerations are concluded. This is why this deadline provision may hardly have any 
practical effects on the procedural duration.  
                                                 
639
  However, in cases in which no amicable settlement has been reached, but the communication petitioner still 
did not attend the proceedings, the AfrCHPR has merely determined that the communication will be deleted 
from the register; for instance, compare the communications: 93/93; 108/93; 201/97. 
640
  Art. 37 ECHR, Art. 52 RP IACtHR, Art. 52 RP IACHR. 
641
  Art. 37 II ECHR, Art. 64 RP ECtHR (judgement in default); Art. 52 RP IACtHR and Art. 52 RP IACHR, 
comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 144. 
642
  Report of the Secretary General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples'‘Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT (2), para. 43. 
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The ruling will be made through a majority decision of the chamber, in accordance with Art. 
28 II. The protocol does not present a provision in case of parity. The IACtHR643 as well as 
the ECtHR644, but also other international judiciary authorities,645 provide the respective 
presiding judges with the then deciding vote. This rule will most probably be implemented in 
in the rules of procedure of the African Court. 
Art. 28 III expresses the matter of course that every ruling has to be justified. The importance 
of the reasons given for the judgement has been repeatedly referred to. If the tenor is 
essentially decisive for the parties involved in the dispute, the value of a ruling (in terms of 
international law) lies in its rationale. It reflects the legal views of the Court in a generalised 
manner so that it can garner importance beyond the actual proceedings. 
In the event that a ruling does not reproduce the unanimous opinion of the judicature, Art. 28 
VII provides the possibility for every judge to render a dissenting opinion or separate reasons 
for the judgment. Such a possibility is provided in virtually all international arbitral and 
judicial proceedings.646 
In the Sunday Times lawsuit, the ECtHR explicitly opposed the objection that dissenting 
opinions weaken the authority of a judicial decision.647 But even if one would like to impute 
more persuasive power to a unanimous ruling than a controversial ruling through dissenting 
opinions648, it still must be noted that the possibility of a dissenting opinion entails 
considerable advantages. It is the continuation of the independence of the judiciary, and takes 
its authoritative claim into consideration. The individual judges must be given the opportunity 
                                                 
643
  Comp. Art. 23 III IACtHR Statute. 
644
  Comp. Art. 23 I RP ECtHR. 
645
  Art. 55 II ICJ Statute, Art. 29 II ITLOS Statute. 
646
  Comp. Art. 66 II ACHR, Art. 45 II ECtHR, Art. 57 ICJ Statute, Art. 33 ITLOS Statute. 
647
  „Thirdly, the Government referred to their promise to introduce legislation amending the law of contempt 
of court and to the small majorities by which both Commission and Court arrived at their conclusions. 
However, these features are not relevant for the examination of the present claims: the Contracting States 
concerned are in any event under an obligation to adjust their domestic law to the requirements of the 
Convention and no consequence in law attaches to the size of the majority by which, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions (Articles 34 and 51 par. 2 of the Convention and Rule 20 par. 1 of the Rules of Court), 
Commission and Court arrive at their decisions.“, Sunday Times vs. United Kingdom, judgement of 6 
November 1980, para 16. 
648
  For instance, Georg Ress, in: FS Mosler, p. 733, who states that the integrative ability of the ECJ is also 
attributed to the fact that no dissenting votes are permissible (see footnote 62 there); Jörg Polakiewicz, Die 
Verpflichtungen der Staaten aus den judgementen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, 
Berlin 1993, p. 353; J.G. Merrils, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human 
Rights, Manchester 1988, p. 36. Dissenting: Rolf Lamprecht, Richter contra Richter: Abweichende 
Meinungen und ihre Bedeutung für die Rechtskultur, Baden-Baden 1992, p. 39, who comes to the 
following conclusion: “The fictitious unanimity of the traditional characterisation, but also any other 
decision both have authority in the sense of powers of self-assertiveness, even if they should come into 
existence merely with an outwardly visible narrow majority. Both must endeavour to assert authority in the 
sense of persuasive power.” 
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to express their legal opinion in the same manner as the majority of the judicature has 
expressed through the reasons given for the judgement. In addition, dissenting opinions 
provide insight concerning the essential contents of the deliberations, and thus substantially 
contribute to the understanding of a ruling and its rationale.649 
Subsequent to the principle of public proceedings, Art. 28 V specifies that a reading is to be 
read out in public after the promulgation date has been duly announced to the parties to the 
dispute. 
b) Content of the ruling 
Art. 27 I formulates the possible contents of the ruling as follows: “If the Court finds that 
there has been a violation of a human or people’s right, it shall make appropriate orders to 
remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.” 
Thus said, the tenor of the ruling encompasses three elements: For one thing, the Court 
establishes whether a conventional violation is at hand. In this case, the ruling does not differ 
from the other courts of human rights or controlling authorities. This determinant portion of 
the decision is inseparably connected with the function of a control body650 – to monitor the 
compliance with the conventions651. The determination of conventional adversity is an 
inevitable prerequisite for a more far-reaching contextual tenor.  
The second essential content of the ruling can be a claim concerning reparation to be paid or 
appropriate compensation. The adversarial state can thus be adjudicated to fulfilment of a 
certain obligation vis-à-vis the complainant. Insofar as that is concerned, this portion of the 
                                                 
649
  J.G. Merrils: The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, Manchaster 
1988, p. 34. See also the comments of the ICJ in the advisory procedure: Application for Review of 
Judgment No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, ICJ Reports 1987, p. 18 et seqq, 45, para. 
49: “In order to interpret or elucidate a judgement it is both permissible and advisable to take into account 
any dissenting or other opinions appended to the judgment. Declarations or opinions drafted by members of 
a tribunal at the time of a decision, and appended thereto, may contribute to the clarification of the 
decision.” With regard to the development of the permissibility of dissenting opinions in ICJ proceedings, 
see Edvard Hambro, Dissenting and Individual Opinion in the Internaional Court, in: ZaöRV 17 (1956), pp. 
229-248. Christoph Grabenwarter states that the function of dissenting opinions before the ECtHR also had 
the task to elucidate that the legal system is the subject matter of the conventional procedure; compare 
same, Die Bedeutung der “Dissenting Opinion” in der Praxis des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für 
Menschenrechte, in: JRP 7 (1999), pp. 16-24, p. 18; same, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 
Munich 2003, p. 109; Luzius Wildhaber, concurs, same, Opinions Dissidentes et concordantes de juges 
individual à la Court Européenne des droit de l’Homme, in: FS Valticos, pp. 529-535, 529. However, this 
function of dissenting votes in the African system is not taken into account in light of the fact that the 
matter proceeds according to the doctrine of nemo iudex in causa sua (Art. 22). 
650
  Comp. Art. 63 I ACHR, Art. 41 ECHR. 
651
  Comp. Art. 58 II AfrCHPR, Art. 50 ACHR, Art. 5 IV FP 1 IPbpR, Art. 13 I CERD, comp. Katrin Weschke, 
Internationale Intrumente zur Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte, Berlin 2001, pp. 22 et seq.  
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ruling is to be qualified as a “performance judgement”.652 In contrast to the competences of 
the Commission, this is a remarkable advance.653 However, the performance judgement is 
widespread in the practice of the regional human rights regimes: the ECtHR as well as the 
IACtHR can specify payments through ruling.654 Within the scope of their performance 
judgements, both judicial bodies take into consideration not just the complainant’s material 
damage, but also immaterial damages.655 But in contrast to the ACHR, the ECHR only 
provides for special cases (commensurate with Art. 41) in which “the interstate right of those 
involved only [provides] imperfect reparation of a high contractually conclusive portion”. 
Such a restriction is also not foreseen for the AfrCtHPR. This exonerates it from a 
corresponding justification obligation with regard to the approval of compensation, which 
would represent another public denunciation of the participating states in addition to the mere 
conventional violation. 
The orientation of the protocol towards Art. 63 I ACHR also becomes clear in the third 
possible ruling category. Like the IACtHR, the AfrCtHPR can also issue “appropriate orders” 
regarding how the determined conventional violation is to be redressed.656 The ECtHR is not 
entitled to such a competence within the scope of its rulings; it is restricted to the mere 
determination of a conventional violation. The ECtHR’s ruling may not include instructions 
or references as to how the involved state has to proceed with regard to the determined 
                                                 
652
  Comp. Walter Schmidt, Die Wirkungen der Entscheidungen der europäischen Menschenrechtsorgane, 
Zürich 1974 p. 119; Hans Stöcker, Die Wirkungen der Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für 
Menschenrechte in der Bundesrepublik, in: NJW 1982, pp. 1905-1909, 1908; Michael Traßl, Die 
Wiedergutmachung von Menschrechtsverletzungen und die deutsche Rechtssprechung, Berlin 1993, p. 212; 
Dieter Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für 
Menschenrechte, Mannheim 1993, pp. 99 et seq.  
653
  In particular, the Commission also recently endeavoured to take into account the need for compensation in 
their decisions. However, in light of its jurisdictional limitations, it is restricted to the mere reference within 
the scope of its concluding recommendations. Once the Commission had determined violations of 
conventional rights, it regularly flanked these determinations with comments such as “The Commission 
invites the Government to take all necessary steps to comply with its obligations under the Charter”, or 
“The Commission urges the Government to bring its laws in conformity with the provisions of the 
Charter”. In the Communication 218/98, the Commission called for the first time (and to date the only 
time) to compensate the victim, but left the amount open (“The Commission requests the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria to compensate the victims, as appropriate”). There are no findings available 
concerning the implementation of this recommendation, however. 
654
  Art. 41 ECHR, Art. 63 I 2 ACHR. 
655
  Comp. Ulrich Zwach, Die Leistungsurteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, Stuttgart 
1996, pp. 122 et seqq., with references to findings of both organs on pp. 149 et seqq. 
656
  In the first drafts of the protocol this imitation was even more ovious. Art. 24 Nouackchott Draft was 
formulae identical with Art. 63 I ACHR: „The Court may also order, that the consequences of the measure 
or situation that constituted the breach of such rights be remedied and that fair compensation or reparation 
be paid or made to the injured party“. The Governments of Sudan and Ethiopia successfully pleaded for the 
deletion of this paragraph and argued that it had to be up to the respondend State party to implement the 
judgement. 
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conventional violation.657 On the other hand, after determination of a conventional violation, 
the AfrCtHPR is allowed to impose on the involved states through a ruling with detailed 
specifications, such as how the conventionality is to be restored. As a result, there is no direct 
influence on the governmental legal system or the act of state, and the rulings have no 
cassation effect. But the order to undertake concrete actions is pronounced. This goes far 
beyond the mere determination of a conventional violation or beyond the mere granting of a 
payment. As far as that is concerned, it appears legitimate to quality the ruling of the African 
Court as a “forming judgment”. It arranges a contested legal relationship within the scope of 
what is possible under international law by establishing a direct and concrete obligation 
(under international law) for the addressees to internally implement the measures determined 
in the ruling. Such a far-reaching juridical competence is astounding if one takes into account 
the high degree of relative importance which state sovereignty assumes in the Court’s sphere 
of activity.  
c) Effect of rulings 
The decisions of an international judicial authority have an effect in two directions. For one 
thing, they are inherent in the effects on which the contracting parties have come to an 
understanding in the constitutional document – i.e. the legal effects for the parties involved in 
the dispute. But in addition to that such a decision also has a purely factual influence that can 
surpass the actual decision. The factual efficiency depends on various factors: First of all, this 
includes the authority of the court of decision, comprehensibility of the rulings, the unanimity 
of the adjudication, and naturally the will of the contracting parties to implement.658 
aa) Legal effect 
The legal effects of the Court’s rulings can be divided into formal and substantive aspects. 
Commensurate with Art. 28 II, the ruling is “final and not subject to appeal”. As a result, Art. 
28 II assigns the ruling an effect which is described in domestic law as formal res judicata 
(legal force).659 Therefore the ruling is no longer commutable with legal remedies (appeals) 
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  Georg Ress, Die europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die Vertragsstaaten: Die Wirkungen der 
judgemente des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im innerstaatlichen Recht und vor 
innerstatlichen Gerichten, in: Irene Maier (Ed.), Europäischer Menschenrechtsschtz: Schranken und 
Wirkungen, Frankfurt 1982, pp. 227-287, 234. 
658
  Comp. hereunto Herbert Miehser, On the Authority of Findings of International Institutions, in: Christoph 
Schreuer (Ed.), Autorität und internationale Ordnung, Berlin 1979, pp. 35-61, 44 et seqq. 
659
  Georg Ress, Die europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die Vertragsstaaten: Die Wirkungen der 
judgemente des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im innerstaatlichen Recht und vor 
innerstatlichen Gerichten, in: Irene Maier (Ed.), Europäischer Menschenrechtsschtz: Schranken und 
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and is protected in its existence. But the formal res judicata does not make the ruling 
irrevocable. That ensues from Art. 28 Section III, according to which a procedure can be 
resumed if new facts necessitate this.660 
A successful resumption of proceedings breaks through the formal legal force, since it 
replaces the original decision through another decision, which is promulgated on the basis of 
complete or corrected findings of fact.661 
Art. 30 establishes the substantive res judicata of the ruling, in which case the provision 
obligates the contracting states involved in the dispute to comply with the ruling and to 
guarantee its timely implementation. The rulings of an international judicial body bind the 
involved states as subjects of international law. Their effects are thus also restricted to the 
international law level.662 At the same time, the states are basically free in the selection of 
means for implementation of the ruling,663 but are responsible under international law for this 
implementation.664 Accordingly, multilateral agreements are frequently restricted – just like 
the ECHR – to specifying that international rulings are to be observed by the affected 
states.665 An exception to this is constituted by Art. 68 II ACHR, whereby the portion of the 
ruling specifies the compensatory payments to the affected state by declaring them to be 
immediately enforceable in accordance with nation-state enforcement law. It may well be 
doubted that this exception is more advantageous vis-à-vis the rule. The effectiveness of this 
provision namely depends on how and, if necessary, whether rulings can be enforced against 
the state machinery in the individual nations.666 
                                                 
Wirkungen, Frankfurt 1982, pp. 227-287, 231. 
660
  This possibility of resumption was adopted quite late in the protocol so that the legal force does not conflict 
with the actual legal situation; compare: Report of the Third Governmental Legal Experts Meeting on the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and People’s Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT (III) 
Rev. 1, para 31. 
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  Frank Schellenberg, Das Verfahren vor der Europäischen Kommission und dem europäischen Gerichtshof 
für Menschenrechte, Frankfurt 1983, pp. 239 et seq.; also comp. Karel Vasak, La Convention européenne 
des Droits de l’Homme, Paris 1964, p. 185. 
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  Hermann Mosler, Judgements of International Courts and Tribunals, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Bd. III, Amsterdam et al. 1995, pp. 31-38, 32; same Supra-
National Judicial Decisions and National Courts, in: HICLRev 4 (1980), pp. 425-451, 448; Andrea 
Giardina, La mise en oevre au niveau national des arrêts et décisions internationaux, RdC 165 (1979), pp. 
233-344, 247 et seq.  
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  Andrea. Giardina, La mise en oevre au niveau national des arrêts et décisions internationaux, RdC 165 
(1979), pp. 233-344, 248. 
664
  The ILC Draft on State Resposibilty provided a special statutary provision for this kind of breach of 
international law in Art. 21: „There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to 
achieve, by means of ist own choice, a specified result if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not 
achieve the result required of it by that obligation.“ The obligations resulting from judgements are such 
obligation of result, comp. YBILC 1980 Vol II (Part 2), p. 32. 
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  Comp. i.e. Art. 94 I ChUN; Art. 46 I ECHR. 
666
  Compare Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in: EuGRZ 
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In objective terms, the substantive res judicata of a ruling undeniably applies to its tenor. The 
substantive res judicata of the mere determination of a conventional violation leads to 
introducing legally necessary steps for the affected state in order to redress the conventional 
violation. But it is by no means clear which immediate obligation a declaratory judgement 
entails.667 
Therefore this obligation can be flanked through the “appropriate orders” which the Court can 
issue. The substantive res judicata also applies to them. Since the ruling itself is not capable 
of having an effect on the act of state in question, an international legal obligation ensues for 
performance of the legally required measures. And so the “appropriate orders” may restrict 
the fundamental freedom of choice of the states with regard to the implementation of the 
ruling.668 At the same time, this lead to an effectiveness of legal protection, since the 
implementation of the ruling can be monitored far better through the affected state than by 
means of mere determination of the conventional violation.669 In the same way, the granting 
of compensation increases as a portion of the tenor in substantive res judicata, which 
obligates the concerned states to performance. 
It is firmly entrenched in international practice that immediate legal obligations arising from 
legal disputes cannot be imposed on states that have been involved in the dispute.670 The 
substantive res judicata commensurate with Art. 30 merely obliges the involved parties — i.e. 
it has a subjective inter partes effect. Commensurate with Art. 5 II, those involved in a 
dispute are – in addition to the complainant and appellee state – intervening parties, so that 
                                                 
11 (1984), pp. 169-189, 179. For instance, the Headquarters Agreement with Costa Rica contains a 
remarkable provision concerning the domestic effect of the IACtHR’s decisions: Commensurate with Art. 
27 of the agreement, decisions of the Court and, if necessary, its presiding judges, have the same effect as 
those of the courts of Costa Rica as soon as they have been communicated to the responsible executive and 
judiciary bodies; compare ibid, printed in: AJIL 76 (1982), p. 240. Regarding this problem in general, 
compare Mary Ellen O’Connell, Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgements of the International Court 
of Justice in: VirgJIL 30 (1990); pp. 891-921, 895 et seqq. 
667
  Georg Ress, Die europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die Vertragsstaaten: Die Wirkungen der 
judgemente des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im innerstaatlichen Recht und vor 
innerstatlichen Gerichten, in: Irene Maier (Ed.), Europäischer Menschenrechtsschtz: Schranken und 
Wirkungen, Frankfurt 1982, pp. 227-287, 234; D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, London 1995 p. 700. The ECtHR stated in Marcks vs. Belgium „[the 
judgement] leaves to the state the choice of the means to be utilised in its domestic system for performance 
of its obligation under Article 53.“ para. 58. 
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  I.e. the IACtHR has declared a national criminal proceeding as invalid in a case against Peru and ordered a 
reform of the Peruvian military criminal law (Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, judgement of 30 May 1999), comp. 
on the reaction of Peru footnote 361 above on p. 91. 
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  Also Nico Krisch, The Establishment of an Anfrican Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, in: ZaÖRV 58 
(1998), pp. 713-726, 721. 
670
  Comp. already Louis Delbez, Les Principes Généraux du Contentieux International, Paris 1962, p. 135, who 
qualifies the inter-partes effect of res iudicata  as the „grande règle de l’autorité relative de la chose jugée“ 
qualifiziert. Cop. also Hermann Mosler, Supra-National Judicial Decisions and National Courts, in: 
HICLRev 4 (1981), pp. 425-472, 454, 464. 
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they are also covered by the effect of the ruling. 
bb) Factual effect — the significance under international law 
Beyond the isolated case, the decisions of an international judiciary body can display effects 
which are not to be qualified as legal, but rather as factual.671 
Rulings have an orientation effect because the legal opinions expressed by a monitoring body 
assume a special significance for the interpretation by addresses of the applied provisions and 
standards.672 Wildhaber even assumes that to a certain extent the “prejudicial structure 
participates in the obligation of the basic agreement under international law”,673 since the 
authority intended for conventional bodies in proceedings related to arriving at and 
concretising human rights includes the judgement that exceeds the elucidation of conventional 
obligations in the isolated case.674 
The comments regarding the institutional and procedural portion provide various indicators 
which point out that the rulings of the AfrCtHPR can also have an effect in this direction. At 
least its rulings will be able to offer much more orientation than the concluding 
recommendations of the Commission. 
First of all, its form plays a substantial role for the factual effect of an “institutional act”.675 
Whereas the decisions of the AfrCHPR were provided as mere recommendations with no 
compliance claim, the protocol specifies (in Articles 28 I and 30) the factual authority of the 
judgment together with the legal aspects in which the rulings will be declared final and 
absolute. As a result, the legal opinions of the Court have the greatest possible claim to 
authority under international law.676 
In other respects, the authority of the decision of an international institution essentially 
                                                 
671
  Christoph Schreuer, The Authority of international judicial practice in Domestic Courts, in: ICLQ 23 
(1974), pp. 681-708, p. 695, who states that the effects of a finding „cannot be adequately perceived in 
terms of a dichomaty of binding and non-binding although such a concept of legal obligation is tempting in 
its apparent logical simplicity; it’s often misleading and does not reflect social realities.“ 
672
  Georg Ress, Wirkung und Beachtung der judgemente und Entscheidungen der Straßburger 
Konventionsorgane, in: EuGRZ 23 (1996), pp. 350-353, 350. 
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  Luzius Wildhaber, Erfahrungen mit der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, in: Schweizerischer 
Juristenverein 112 (1979), pp. 316-387, 355. 
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  Comp. auch Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Munich 2003, p. 118. 
675
  Comp. Herbert Miehsler, On the Authority of Findings of International Institutions, in: Christoph Schreuer, 
Autorität und internationale Ordung, Berlin 1976, pp. 35-62, 46. 
676
  Compare also Kéba Mbaye, Les droits de l’homme en Afrique, Paris 1993, p.75, who states “L’efficacité 
du résultat dépend de la forme juridique que ce résultat emprunte. La forme la plus parfaite est certainement 
le jugement.” This applies irrespective of the question as to whether – in addition to the tenor – the 
explanations of the ruling will be encompassed by the legal force, since the explanations form the basis for 
the res judicata ruling. The factual effect of the rationale is therefore not directly linked to the legal. 
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depends on its level of familiarity and the public opinion.677 In contrast to the Commission 
procedure, the principle of public trial is applicable before the AfrCtHPR. The transparency 
makes the procedure not only more credible, but it also ensures that it will be transported in 
terms of content, and as a result the Court can definitely gain in terms of profile. If the Court 
manages to win over the general public, this would make a state action that diverges from its 
legal opinions appear unattractive for governments, since they would thereby oppose this 
public opinion. 
However, the intensity of factual efficiency is not foreseeable. In addition to the contextual 
quality of the rulings, the fulfilment of the compliance claim of a ruling through its addressees 
is an essential element of the factual effect.678 In turn, this is also connected with the judicial 
enforcement competences of a Court. The more restricted these are configured, the more the 
decisions will be disregarded.679 The practice of the Commission has made this more than 
clear. Therefore an attempt was made in the protocol to secure the effectiveness of the judicial 
ruling. 
d) Implementation control mechanisms  
Three mechanisms are provided for this purpose: the public dissemination of its rulings, the 
implementation control through the Council of Ministers as well as a judicial reporting 
system. 
aa) Public dissemination 
Art. 29 I obligates the Court not only to promulgate the ruling to the parties involved in the 
dispute, but also to pass it on to the Commission as well as the member states of the AU. 
Once again, the fact that the greatest possible form of dissemination was selected is 
astounding. And so not only the ratifying parties, but all AU member states will be notified of 
the outcome of a procedure. The rulings will be read aloud in public and published so that 
they are perusable at any time. However, with the active routing of rulings the AU member 
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  Ulrich Fastenrath, Lücken im Völkerrecht, Berlin 1991, p. 196; Herbert Miehser, On the Authority of 
Findings of International Institutions, in: Christoph Schreuer (Eds.), Autorität und internationale Ordnung, 
Berlin 1979, pp. 35-61, 54 et seq.  
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  A classic example in this context is the fate of the Central American Court. In the second case adjudicated 
by the Court, Nicaragua rejected the implementation of the ruling. It terminated the agreement and thus 
brought about a quick end of the Central American Court. Compare Erich Kraske, Der Mittelamerikanische 
Gerichtshof, in: AVR 2 (1950), pp. 169-207, 187 et seqq; Manley Hudson, The Central American Court of 
Justice, in AJIL 26 (1932), pp. 759-786, 785; Christian Tomuschat, in Berhnahrd Mosler (Eds.), Judicial 
Settlement of International Disputes, p. 315 et seqq. 
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  Comp. Patricia Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit als Instrument friedlicher Streitbeilegung, Baden-
Baden 2003, pp. 153 et seq.  
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states will also be included in the work of the Court without their express will. This 
international publicity brought about by the AfrCtHPR increases the implementation pressure 
on the concerned governmental party.680 The fact that this point has been placed in the 
protocol, and – unlike in the ACHR and the ECHR – was not left up to the Court681 once 
again bears witness to the importance attached to the public disclosure principle in the work 
of the AfrCtHPR. 
bb) Ministerial implementation control 
In other respects, it is the responsibility of the Conference of Heads of State and Government 
to monitor the implementation of the ruling, which is realised in accordance with Art. 39 II 
from the Conference of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers was abolished within the 
framework of the transformation process from the OAU to the AU. The Executive Council of 
Ministers of the Union (ECM) has taken over its responsibilities. 
Due to concern that the Court’s rulings could remain unheeded, the authors of the protocol 
(exceptionally) did not orient themselves towards the Inter-American regime – such a 
monitoring mechanism is not provided for there – in this connection, but rather towards the 
ECHR system. Art. 46 II ECHR provides that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe monitors the implementation of the ECtHR’s rulings.  
Commensurate with Art. 10 of the Constitutive Act, the ECM is comprised of the foreign 
ministers or of other ministers or government officials of the member states. It regularly 
confers at least twice a year,682 and also meets for extraordinary sessions at the request of a 
member and with the approval of a two-thirds majority.  
Commensurate with Art. 13 II AC in conjunction with Art. 9 II lit. c RP ECM, the ECM is 
responsible for tasks which are delegated to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. This includes the monitoring of the implementation of judicial rulings in 
accordance with Art. 29 II of the protocol (which anticipates this delegation). However, it is 
unlikely that the ECM itself executes (and does not delegate) this task. The implementation 
control possibly necessitates clear words – which are rarely selected in the circle of high-
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  Concernig publicity as an enforcement mechanism comp. Nanette Dumas, Enforcement of Human Rights 
Standards: An International Human Rights Court and Other Proposals, in: HICLRev (1990), pp. 585-608, 
607; Joseph Warioba, Monitoring Compliance with and Enforcement of Binding Decisions of International 
Courts, in: Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), pp. 41-52, 50 et seq.; very vividly also David Weissbrodt, Maria 
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  The ECtHR does not send the executed rulings directly to the concerned third-party states. However, based 
on its RP the IACtHR also sends the rulings to the contracting states, Art. 57 VI RP IACtHR. 
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  Art. 8 I RP ECM. 
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ranking diplomats – to the concerned state. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe also delegated its monitoring task arising from Art. 54 ECHR (current version) to its 
advisory body, the Directorate of Human Rights.683 And so if there was a reason for scrutiny, 
this would not be undertaken in the upper circles of diplomacy, but on a lower level. 
Lamprecht aptly summarised this: “Indeed, if there is a reason to doubt whether the measures 
taken by a state as a consequence of a Court judgement are pertinent or sufficient, there is 
little chance of such doubt being expressed by the representative of other states. This 
uncomfortable task is left to the Directorate of Human Rights.”684 
A referral of this diplomatically precarious task is also practical from another point of view: It 
is by no means assured that a political body consisting of diplomatic representatives is even 
professionally qualified to review the legislative or administrative implementation of a ruling 
for its completeness.685 
In accordance with Art. 21 CA, the ECM is supported by the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (PRC), an auxiliary body consisting of permanent representatives of the member 
countries. The ECM can delegate the task of implementation control to this committee 
commensurate with Art. 5 IV RP ECM in conjunction with Art. 4 I lit. c. RP PRC.686 In 
accordance with Art. 26 RP PRC, PRC decisions are not binding until acceptance through the 
ECM. And so the PRC itself could not conclusively determine whether a ruling has been 
implemented or not. Only the ECM is entitled to this competence. 
In accordance with Art. 34 I RP ECM, such decisions can be promulgated in three different 
forms:  
Regulations, which are binding for member states and immediately applicable. Directives, 
which are only binding with regard to the objectives to be achieved (the choice of the form 
and means are left up to the domestic agencies, however), and other decisions 
(recommendations, resolutions, opinions and so forth) which have no binding effect.687 
The question regarding in which form the decisions are promulgated is essential for their 
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  D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, London 1995, p. 
700. 
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  Peter Leuprecht, The Protection of Human Rights by Political Bodies – The Example of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, in: FS Ermacora, pp. 95-108, 106. 
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  D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, London 1995, p. 
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u RP ECM). 
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  As far as that is concerned, the ECM’s forms of decisions are conspicuously reminiscent of the Community 
institutions of the EU. Compare: Art. 249 EGV; also: Thomas Oppermann, Europarecht, 2005, p. 204 et 
seqq.; Stefan Hobe, Europarecht, p. 37 et seqq. 
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effectiveness. In fact, the non-compliance with regulations and directives can entail severe 
sanctions after confirmation through the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Art. 
32 II RP ECM in conjunction with Art. 23 CT).688 However, the non-compliance with other 
decisions is at least not legally capable of being sanctioned. Therefore, it is to be anticipated 
that implementation control acts will not be undertaken through the ECM in binding forms of 
handling. Otherwise the judicial ruling would experience such a political revaluation that 
seems virtually out of the question. 
It is doubted in the literature whether the monitoring of the implementation of rulings through 
the AU essentially contributes towards their compliance through the addressees. Naldi and 
Magliveras assume that the monitoring could be exhausted in the mere starting of a file.689 On 
the other hand, the experiences within the scope of the ECHR show that the political 
monitoring of implementation can be quite effective.690 The activities of the Committee with 
regard to the monitoring of implementation provide an impressive image of the interlocking 
of judicial controls with political enforcement. The Committee of Ministers perceives it task 
via the Directorate of Human Rights as a quasi “buffer institution” with extreme emphasis, 
and also does not shrink back from unequivocal opinions. Its interim resolution in the 
Loizidou case may serve as an expressive example, in which Turkey had initially rejected the 
implementation of a ruling. First of all, the Committee emphasised “that the failure on the part 
of High Contracting Parties to comply with a judgement of the Court is unprecedented”.691 
Further more, it declared “that the refusal of Turkey to execute the judgment of the Court 
demonstrates a manifest disregard for its international obligations, both as a High Contracting 
Party to the Convention and as a Member State of the Council of Europe”.692 The Committee 
“in view of the gravity of the matter, strongly insists that Turkey comply fully and without 
any further delay with the European Court of Human Rights’ judgement of 28 July 1998.”693 
It remains to be seen whether the AfrCtHPR will also experience such a political 
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Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples‘ Rights, in: NQHR 4 (1998), pp. 431-456, 452. 
690
  Peter Leuprecht, The Protection of Human Rights by Political Bodies – The Example of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, in: FS Ermacora, pp. 95-108, 104; D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, London 1995, p. 702, who conclude that „[The] record 
of the Committee of Ministers [...] can be seen as more than satisfactury“. 
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  Interim Resolution DH (2000) 105 concerning the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of 28 
July 1998 in the case of Loizidou against Turkey vom 24. Juli 2000, Abs. VI. 
692
  Ibd. Abs. VII. 
693
  Ibd. Abs. VIII. 
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strengthening through the ECM. At any rate, a look at the experiences of the IACtHR bears 
witness to the exact opposite: In its annual report, the IACtHR explicitly referred the General 
Assembly to the fact that Honduras rejected the implementation of the ruling in the Velasquez 
Rodriguez case, and retained the compensation awarded through the ruling.694 But this was 
not even mentioned with a word in the report which was adopted in the resolution of the 
General Assembly.695 The IACtHR also had to experience the lack of support on the part of 
the OAS in the Trinidad and Tobago case. Trinidad and Tobago disregarded provisional 
arrangements issued by the Court, which ordered the postponement of the enforcement of 
several death penalties until final decision on the compatibility of respective criminal 
proceedings with the ACHR.696 The General Assembly rejected any cooperation and – 
despite the protests of the IACtHR697 – did not even include the matter in its own agenda.698 
cc) Judicial reporting system 
As the final control mechanism, the protocol in Art. 31 specifies that the Court submits a 
report on its work of the preceding period to every ordinary session of the General Assembly. 
While doing so, it shall particularly refer to cases in which states have not implemented 
rulings of the Court.699 The IACtHR proceeds similarly in accordance with Art. 65 ACHR. 
By contrast, the ECHR only provides for the monitoring control through the Council of 
Ministers, but does not include any judicial reporting procedure.  
                                                 
694
  Annual Report of the Inter-American Court 1990, pp. 85 et seqq. 
695
  This, however, was not umentioned in the Court’s following annual report, comp.. Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Court 1991, p. 11. 
696
  James et al. Case vs. Trinidad and Tobago, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights 1998, S 70. 
697
  Comp. the press announcement of the Court of 1 June 1999, CDH-CP 5/99: „Hemos notado con profunda 
preocupación que en la parte resolutiva de las recomendaciones emitidas por la Comisión de Asuntos 
Jurídicos y Políticos y por el Consejo Permanente de la Organización a la Asamblea General en relación 
con el Informe Anual de la Corte correspondiente al año 1998, no se hace mención a la recomendación de 
la Corte antes mencionada.“ 
698
  Also astounding in this connection is the decision of the Privy Council, Trinidad and Tobago’s highest 
appellate court with seat in London, in which it is specified that the Court exceeded its competence, and 
that Trinidad and Tobago had acted in a lawful manner: “The Court’s order of 25th May 1999 was made 
without jurisdiction and, insofar as it was an interim order pending further decision, was empty of consent”. 
Compare: Privy Counsel Appeal No. 31 of 1999, available at www.privy-council.org.uk. With regard to the 
Privy Council institution, compare: Aidan O’Neill, Judicial Politics and the Judicial Committee – the 
Devolution of the Privy Counsel, in: MLRev 64 (2001), p. 604 et seqq.; 
699
  During the Third Conference of Experts, the Government of Sudan had pressed for a provision, according 
to which a state that hade not undertaken the implementation of a ruling must be informed before the report 
is passed on to the General Assembly. However, the proposal was not answered. Compare: Report of the 
Third Governmental Legal Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT. (III) Rev. 1, para. 43. 
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X. Other provisions 
The protocol contains only two final provisions. The ratification and the amendment 
procedure. However, two essential questions are not taken into consideration: the question 
pertaining to the presentation of possible reservations, and the question pertaining to 
possibility of termination. In the absence of any other contractual provisions, these questions 
are to be evaluated according to the VCLT.700 
1. Termination 
Termination clauses are provided for in the ECHR701 as well as in the ACHR702. If a 
corresponding provision is missing, such as in the protocol, a reciprocal termination 
commensurate with Art. 56 VCLT is only possible if all contracting parties want the 
termination despite the lack of a provision, or if a right of termination can be derived due to 
the nature of the agreement. 
However, the travaux préparatoires is not an indication that a possibility of termination shall 
exist. Termination was not even a subject of discussion. In other respects, neither the Banjul 
Charter nor the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child or the Draft Protocol 
to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa provide a termination clause. The 
question remains as to whether a right of termination can be derived due to the nature of the 
agreement. Listed by way of example in this connection are trade agreements and agreements 
which contain military assistance obligations.703 Agreements which go beyond the mere 
exchange of relations between the contracting parties and aim at bringing about the protection 
of a particular common interest are not to be attributed to this category, however.704 And so 
agreements with human rights content hardly offer any room for the assumption of an implicit 
unilateral right of termination.705 This is why termination is only permissible if all other 
                                                 
700
  Antiono Cassese, International Law, Oxford 2005, p 170. 
701
  Art. 65 ECHR, which for one thing provides for a minimum term of five years and a notice period of six 
months, and for another thing explicitly specifies that a termination has no effect on the ongoing 
proceedings. 
702
  Compare Art. 78 ACHR, in which a five year minimum term (but no notice period) is specified. Ongoing 
proceedings are also left unaffected by a termination here. 
703
  Comp. Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchaster 1984, p. 186. 
704
  Feist, Kündigung, Rücktritt und Suspendierung von multilateralen Verträgen, p. 198; the argumentum e 
contrario rightly sees the exceptional character of free right of determination reinforced through the fact 
that many agreements expressly call for termination clauses; the states thus governed this possibility if they 
chose to do so, and in other respects it is assumed that there is no fundamental right of termination; 
compare also Dahm, Delbrück, Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, p. 718; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and 
Practice, p. 233 et seqq. 
705
  Comp. concerning the CCPR Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary, Kehl 1989, Introduction, No. 25 with 
further refrences. 
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contracting states approve it. 
With the above-mentioned argumentation, the revocation of a declaration of acceptance under 
Art. 34 VI may also prove to be impermissible for individual and popular complaints under 
the competence of the Court. The IACHR had to answer precisely this question in a 
heretofore unique case. Peru wanted to withdraw its declaration of submission as a response 
to a procedure.706 But in its ruling the Court did not allow the mere revocation as an actus 
contrarius. In accordance with Art. 78, the ACHR provides for only the termination of the 
entire convention, but not the separate revocation of the declaration of aceptance. The ECtHR 
also publicly joined this perception.707 Since the protocol provides for neither the possibility 
of termination nor the revocation of the declaration of acceptance, such an action is not 
considered to be permissible. 
2. Reservations 
The presentation of reservations with regard to a set of agreements under international law is 
fundamentally permissible within the scope of Art. 19 VCLT, in which case narrower limits 
have developed for human rights agreements in the literature708 as well as in the judicature.709 
This is connected with the ordre publique character of such agreements, which are essentially 
not particularly based on a reciprocal obligation of states, but an obligation vis-à-vis the 
convention community.710 At any rate, the previous ratifying parties did not present any 
reservations, and thus serve as good examples for the future contracting states. 
                                                 
706
  Castillo Pertuzzi v. Peru, judgement of 30 May 1999, Series C No. 52. 
707
  Compare the substantiation above. However, an incident in 1938 is to be referred to in this connection: 
Paraguay withdrew its declaration of submission under the jurisdiction of the statutes of the Permanent 
Court, but without terminating the statute. The Secretary General of the League of Nations informed all 
contracting parties to the statute which had submitted a declaration of submission. Only six states protested 
against Paraguay’s action and did not recognise the withdrawal. Compare Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral 
Denunciation of Treaties containing no Declaration Clause, in: BYIL 53 (1982), pp. 83-114, 97. 
708
  Comp. Thomas Giegerich, Vorbehalte zu Menschenrechtsabkommen: Zulässigkeit, Gültigkeit und 
Prüfungskompetenz von Vertragsgremien, in: ZaöRV 55 (1995), pp. 713-777, 717; Bernhard Graefrath, 
Vorbehalte zu Menschenrechtsverträgen – neue Projekte und alte Streitfragen, in: HuV 9 (1996), pp. 68-75, 
70 et seq.; Monika Bauer, Vorbehalte zu Menschenrechtsverträgen, Munich 1994, pp. 74 et seqq. 
Especially on the reservation of reciprocy Francesco Pausi/Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and 
the Economics of Article 21 (1) d of the Vienna Convention, in: BerkJIL 21 (2003), pp. 1-25, 20 et seqq. 
709
  Comp. Catherine Redgewell, Universality of Integrity? Some reflections on Reservations to General 
Multlateral Treaties, in: Scott Davidson (Ed.), The Law of Treaties, Aldershot 2004, pp. 231-282, 250; 
Thomas Giegerich, Treaties, Reservations, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Bd. IV, Amsterdam et al. 1995, pp. 965-980, 976 et seqq. 
710
  The Human Rights Committee stated in a Generl Document the situation: „Such treaties [...] are not a web 
of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations, They concern the endowment with individuals with rights“ 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (General Comment), para. 17; vgl. Antionio Cassese, International Law, Oxford 
2004, p 175; Bernhard Graefrath, Vorbehalte zu Menschenrechtsverträgen – neue Projekte und alte 
Streitfragen, in: HuV 9 (1996), pp. 68-75, 70 et seq.  
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3. Ratification provisions 
Commensurate with Art. 34 I, the protocol is only available to contracting states of the Banjul 
Charter for signature and ratification. This provision is inevitable, since the protocol 
supplements the Banjul Charter and thus cannot be ratified on an isolated basis. But since all 
AU member states have ratified the Banjul Charter, the circle of potential contracting states 
corresponds to all member states of the AU. 
However, the provision is vague under consideration of the fact that (in accordance with Art. 
5 I lit. e) African IGOs can also present cases to the Court. They are not taken into account in 
the ratification provisions – in other respects, no more than in the drafting of text in all other 
provisions, which address only states or contracting states; for instance instead of addressing 
“High Contracting Parties”. At any rate, since the Banjul Charter is also not technically 
prepared for the accession of IGOs, a special accession protocol would have to be adopted in 
this connection.711 But this could have been avoided – at least for the protocol – with the right 
choice of wording and the consideration of IGOs as possible ratifying parties. 
Multilateral agreements usually provide that the contractual documents are to be submitted to 
a depositary agency, which keeps them in safe custody.712 The protocol (Art. 34 II) has 
entrusted the General Secretariat of the OAU – or its successor respectively, the AU 
Commission – with this responsibility.  
Art. 34 III specifies the minimum number of ratifications (15) which the protocol allows to be 
enacted. The number of necessary ratifications was a controversial topic during the 
preliminary works to the protocol. The original draft only provided for 11 ratifications (Art. 
31 III Cape Town Draft). During the Nouakchott Conference, Tunisia and Algeria vehemently 
advocated adopting a two-thirds majority of the OAU members. According to this proposal, 
the required number of ratifications would have amounted to 36. Nigeria called for at least 
half of the OAU members, i.e. 27 ratifications.713 Such a provision would have indefinitely 
prolonged the anyhow sluggish ratification process. The protocol would have been 
predestined as a “stillbirth” with the acceptance of these amendments. The arguments from 
                                                 
711
  With regard to the necessary content of such an accession protocol in relation to the European system, 
compare Heribert Golsong, in: EuGRZ 6 (1979), p. 73 et seqq.; compare also Christoph Grabenwarter, 
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Munich 2003, p. 41 et seqq.; Sebastian Winkler, Der Beitritt der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, Baden-Baden 2000, p. 46 et 
seqq. 
712
  Shabtai Rosenne, Treaties, Conclusion and Entry into Force, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Bd. IV, Amsterdam et al. 1995, pp. 932-935, 934. 
713
  Comp. Report of the Secretary General on the Draft Protocol on the Establushment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT (2), para. 48. 
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Nigeria and Tunisia for their proposals can also be described with good reason as flimsy: the 
agreement is “too important to require a lesser number”.714 Nigeria voted for a greater 
number of ratifying parties “to make the Court more credible”.715 
Since no consensus was able to be reached, the General Secretariat informed the Assembly 
about the other contractual practices within the framework of the OAU, which was not able to 
predetermine a clear line, however. The required number of ratifications of the 17 agreements 
concluded within the framework of the OAU ranged from nine to two-thirds of the member 
states.716 All other delegations also let it be known that they would not accept a greater 
number than 15. Since no consensus was able to be reached, the now valid version was 
adopted in the consensus procedure. Nigeria and Tunisia presented their reservations to the 
protocol. 
The ratification of the protocol has proceeded much slower than hoped for after the signing of 
the protocol. The protocol has been available for signature since the end of the 34th Session of 
the OAU’s Heads of State and Government on 10 June 1998. Up until today, 35 states have 
signed; but the required quorum was only reached in December 2003.717 The protocol entered 
into force on 25 January 2004.  
Commensurate with Art. 34 III, the entry into force is planned for 30 days after deposition of 
the 15th ratification or accession document. With the introduction of a delay period after 
deposition of the required number of ratification documents, the depositary agency will be 
given the possibility to govern in advance the administrative matters of entry into force with 
regard to multilateral agreements.718 Since a subsequent accession of a state does not 
constitute any high administrative expenditure, the protocol also enters into force for the 
acceding state on the direct date of the deposition of the ratification document (Art. 34 IV). 
The Commission president informs all AU member states about the protocol’s entry into force 
(Art. 34 V).  
The provision on the declaration of acceptance pertaining to the Court’s jurisdiction for 
individual and popular actions was also incorporated in the ratification provisions. Together 
                                                 
714
  Loc.cit. 
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  Third Government Legal expert Meeting on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples‘ 
Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT.(III) Rev.1, para 34. 
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  Comp. Report of the Secretary General on the Draft Protocol on the Establushment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT (2), para. 50. 
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  Status of Signature/Ratification/Accession – OAU Treaties, DOC/OS (XXIX)/INF.33. 
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  Shabtai Rosenne, Treaties, Conclusion and Entry into Force, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Bd. IV, Amsterdam et al. 1995, pp. 932-935, 935; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty 
Law and Practice, Cambridge 2000, p. 135. 
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with the ratification, or at a later point in time, the contracting parties can submit an 
appropriate declaration of acceptance to the Commission presidents (Art. 34 VI). In 
accordance with Art. 34 VII, only the contracting parties will be notified of this submission. 
Out of the previous ratifying parties, only Burkina Faso has submitted a declaration of 
acceptance up to now. 
4. Amendments 
Amendment applications can be submitted to the AU Commission from the contracting 
parties (Art. 35 I) as well as from the Court (Art. 35 II). The General Assembly can adopt 
these amendment proposals with a simple majority decision, after all contracting states have 
been informed and the Court has had an opportunity to comment in the event of an 
amendment application from a contracting state. 
According to international contract law, adopted amendments only take effect for the parties 
which have accepted the amendments.719 This ensues from Art. 35 III, which insofar as that is 
concerned, merely reproduces international law. But in addition to that, Art. 35 III declares 
that the amendment enters into force for any contracting state that notifies the AU 
Commission of its declaration of acceptance. This provision has to be described as a failure. 
In fact, it can lead to a situation in which only very few contracting states – should the 
occasion arises, also only one – are bound to the amendment.720 Depending on the extent of 
the contractual amendment, this can lead to a disproportionately high expenditure for the 
Court, since it would have to observe the corresponding amendments in relation to the 
pertinent contracting state; whereas in other respects the old contractual structure would have 
to be applied. If several amendments were to be resolved, there would be a risk that the 
contractual structure breaks down completely. But in this case it rather concerns a technical 
inaccuracy, which will probably not have any influence on the Court’s working method. This 
formulation was the practice with multilateral agreements within the framework of the AU, 
and up until today has not led to discernible difficulties due to lack of purview. 
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  Art. 40 IV i.c.w. 30 IV lit. b VCLT, comp. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge 
als Hauptrechtsquelle des Völkerrechts, in: Knut Ipsen (Ed.), Völkerrecht, Munich 1999, pp. 92-179, 138. 
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  For instance, this is why Art. 76 ACHR specifies a two-thirds majority of the contracting states in order to 
lend validity to an amendment. 
   
5. Chapter: Results and outlook 
The preceding analysis of the protocol has served the purpose of exploring its normative 
content in order to show the potential efficacy of the AfrCtHPR. This took place on the basis 
of the protocol’s respective provisions. This analysis also enables the new African system to 
be examined in the context of regional human rights protection, as it is characterised through 
the already existing protection mechanisms. For this purpose, the system-determining 
procedural and institutional components of the regional pacts will now be outlined coherently 
in order to elucidate the significant differences of the new African system in comparison with 
other regional mechanisms. 
I. Classification of the protective procedure 
Three phases can be distinguished in all judicial procedures: the initiation phase, the actual 
course of procedure and adjudication. These stages are given varying importance for the 
appraisal of the efficacy of a protective entity, whereby the greatest importance is to be 
attributed to the realms of procedural initiation and procedural termination, since they decide 
on the issues regarding who can even have recourse to the entity, and which possibilities have 
been granted to the entity within the scope of law enforcement.  
1. Procedural initiation 
States appear as complainants before the IACtHR if they file a complaint against another 
contracting state. First of all, they have to file a complaint before the IACHR, but they can 
independently – i.e. without the involvement of the IACHR – make a complaint pending. In 
addition, only the IACHR can initiate a judicial protective procedure by transferring a 
procedure (that it has been concluded) to the Court. For one thing, contracting states are in 
turn authorised to file a complaint before the IACHR; but on the other hand, individuals are 
also entitled to do so. Therefore individual complaints can be brought before the IACtHR 
exclusively via the IACHR.  
Nevertheless, the ACHR itself does not provide for any compulsory jurisdiction of the 
IACtHR. On the contrary, it requires an additional declaration of acceptance on the part of the 
contracting states through which the jurisdiction is to be recognised (Art. 62 ACHR). In 
relation to state complaints, this also applies to the jurisdiction of the IACHR, whose quasi 
jurisdiction also has to be recognised separately (Art. 45 I ACHR). Therefore a governmental 
complainant can only bring a matter before the Court if the appellant state has submitted 
declarations of acceptance to both entities. Lacking submission under the IACHR leads to the 
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fact that an obligatory preliminary procedure cannot take place, and therefore the complaint 
cannot even reach the Court. Lacking submission under the jurisdiction of the IACtHR results 
in the fact that the protective procedure ends before the IACHR, and can no longer be 
authoritatively adjudicated. 
However, individual complaints before the IACHR are not possible without additional 
recognition of competence. This is noteworthy, since individual complaints also constitute the 
vast majority of pending procedures in the Inter-American system721, and therefore the 
purpose pursued with a declaration of acceptance – curbing the quasi-judiciary control 
through the IACHR – comes up empty-handed if it is restricted merely to the extremely rare 
state complaints (such as through Art. 45 I ACHR).  
The European system took a very similar approach as the basis for its original version, which 
(as the oldest regional human rights protection system) was to a certain extent the inspiration 
for the American system. The ECtHR (under the current version of the ECHR) could also 
only be applied to by states and the European Commission of Human Rights (Articles 44, 48 
ECHR, current version). 
Complaints were able to be brought before the ECHR from state parties as well as from 
individual citizens. Just like in the Inter-American system, individuals received access to 
judicial protective procedures only through the intervention of the Commission. But unlike 
the Inter-American system, the European counterpart raised a double jurisdictional barrier — 
not for state complaints, but for individual complaints. The jurisdiction of the ECHR722 as 
well as the jurisdiction of the ECtHR723 were only established through submission of an 
appropriate declaration of acceptance. That meant the states could accede to the ECHR, but 
the validity of the control system – at least for the virtually solely relevant realm of individual 
complaints – was for the most part precluded.724 
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  As a matter of fact, there has not even been a single State complaint until this very day.  
722
  Art. 25 I ECHR (curret version). 
723
  Art. 46 ECHR (current version). 
724
  In the end, all member states recognised the decisional competences of the ECHR and the ECtHR, and 
since 1993 it has been a ‘political compulsory exercise’ – for states which want to join the Council of 
Europe – to join the ECHR, and to comprehensively recognise the control system: “Such accession 
presupposes that the applicant country has brought its institutions and legal system into line with the basic 
principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The people's representatives must 
have been chosen by means of free and fair elections based on universal suffrage. Guaranteed freedom of 
expression and notably of the media, protection of national minorities and observance of the principles of 
international law must remain, in our view, decisive criteria for assessing any application for membership. 
An undertaking to sign the European Convention on Human Rights and accept the Convention's 
supervisory machinery in its entirety within a short period is also fundamental. We are resolved to ensure 
full compliance with the commitments accepted by all member States within the Council of Europe”, comp. 
Vienna Declaration of 9 October 1993, available on www.coe.int. 
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The access of the individual to the judicial control mechanism was only granted with entry 
into force of the 9th Supplementary Protocol to the ECHR for states which had ratified the 
additional protocol. The individual only garnered unrestricted capacity to be a party to legal 
proceedings before the ECtHR with entry into force of the 11th Supplementary Protocol. 
Based on this background, if one considers the legal fundamentals of the AfrCtHPR, 
considerable differences to the two other regional systems are conspicuous in the procedural 
initiation stage. The most important difference lies in the provision of Art. 5, which 
enumerates those entitled to lodge complaints. As in any regional system, this includes the 
contracting states as well as the AfrCHPR. But a decisive aspect at this point is that the 
jurisdiction of the AfrCtHPR is also open to individual and popular complaints.725 Of course, 
this presupposes a separate jurisdictional commencement through presentation of a 
declaration of acceptance commensurate with Art. 34 VI, but this circumstance – unlike in the 
two corresponding regional packs – shall not prove to be a long-term obstacle, due to the 
following considerations:  
First, the quasi-jurisdiction of the AfrCHPR for individual complaints (in the terminology of 
the Banjul Charter: “other communications”) is already established with the ratification of the 
Banjul Charter, and requires no further declaration of acceptance through the contracting 
states. And so individuals can initiate a complaint procedure before the AfrCHPR at any time; 
this entity can then transfer the procedure to the AfrCtHPR. This corresponds to the legal 
situation under the ACHR. But there is a fundamental difference to the ACHR as well as the 
ECHR (current version): No further declaration of acceptance on the part of member states is 
required for the transfer of the complaint through the AfrCHPR to the regional Court, since 
the restriction rule of Art. 34 VI only pertains to direct complaints through individuals and 
NGOs. For complaints from states and the AfrCHPR, the mere ratification of the protocol 
establishes the ratione personae competence of the AfrCtHPR. Ratifying parties to the 
protocol can thus no longer be protected against transferred individual communications. As a 
result, the AfrCHPR obtains a catalyst effect which allows the Court to adjudicate over 
individual complaints, without the appellee state having to render a declaration of acceptance 
concerning individual complaint procedures. This difference may have far-reaching 
repercussions, since it was a long way for the IACtHR and the ECtHR until the first 
individual complaint had cleared the various jurisdictional hurdles. Insofar as that is 
concerned, the African system, which lagged behind in the international comparison until the 
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establishment of the AfrCtHPR, was further developed with remarkable progress, and as a 
result has left the ACHR and the ECHR (in its original version) behind with regard to the 
procedural initiation.  
2. Procedual Process 
While the material handling of the complaint goes on in front of all courts of human rights 
relatively uniformly, a noteworthy procedural distinction can be found in the scope of the 
admissibility requirements which on the one hand serve as a filter for the respective regional 
court, on the other hand however depending on the legal set-up also complicate the claim to 
legal help and thus protect the treaty states from legal examination of their acts of state. 
Refered of here is the admissibility requirement of the obligatory completion of a commission 
procedure prior to a court procedure.  
Before the IACtHR, which anyway can only be accessed by the IACHR and the treaty states, 
the completion of a preliminary proceeding through the IACHR is an inalienable admission 
criteria, even if the states involved waive this procedure. Therefore, the complaint without 
prior commisional procedure will be dismissed as inadmissible. The same is true for the 
former regulations of the ECHR: Art. 47 ECHR (current version) constituted the completion 
of the commission process as an indispensable requirement for calling up the ECtHR. 
The case is different under the new Banjul system. State claimants have, in contrast to the 
ACHR and the ECHR (current versions), a direct right to file a complaint to the Court without 
previous invocation of the AfrCHPR. The protocol however does not leave it with this – in 
view of the state complaints which are hardly to be expected almost emerging negligence – 
simplified process. Also individual claimants profit from this functional independence of the 
two protective procedures. In order to initiate a complaint before the AfrCtHPR as an 
individual, the appeal to the AfrCHPR is necessary as long as the involved state party has not 
sumitted it declaration of acceptance according to Art. 34 VI and thus opened the competence 
ratione personae of the AfrCtHPR for individuals. The completion of this commission 
process, however, is not listed in the protocol as compulsory and therefore dispensable. That 
has the advantage that the AfrCHRP can forward a procedure at its own discretion at any time 
to the AfrCtHRP and thus if necessary can function quasi as an acceptance office for the 
AfrCtHRP, which merely catalyses the court procedure. Laying a claim before the AfrCHRP 
is a moot issue for individuals as soon as they have the locus standi before the Court through 
corresponding declarations of acceptance, since in the protocol also no commissionary 
preliminary process is fixed as a requirement for admission for an individual complaint as 
well as for state complaints.  
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Also this modification of the international standard, the renouncement of a prior commission 
proceeding thus of an access restriction which is time and cost intensive clarifies the 
progressiveness of the system change in the African human rights protection.  
3. Procedural termination 
In the procedural termination phase, the cardinal question arises when terminating by verdict. 
It concerns both, the content and he method of implementation, in order to ensure that the 
judgement is being given effect. 
The competence to assess a violation of the convention is common to all human rights 
Courts.726 It is then the spirit of a judiciary control function and a condition precedent for 
more comprehensive content of the rulings. Besides this declaratory part, all verdcted states 
can also have obligations to perform imposed upon them that are aimed at the compensation 
of the complainant for the injustice suffered.727 For judgments passed in action for 
performance, however, the ECtHR is limited to cases in which the “internal  law  of  the  High 
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made”.728 This limitation 
affects neither the IACtHR nor the AfrCtHPR. The legal options of ECtHR end with this 
declaratory ruling and judgement passed in action for performance. The IACtHR, on the other 
hand, is still entitled to arrange by ruling “that the consequences of the measure or situation 
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied”.729 Thus the IACtHR can, 
beyond the recognition of simple monetary compensation, also arrange the concrete remedy 
of consequences by the state opposing the claim. The arrangement competence of the 
AfrCtHPR, on the other hand, exceeds not only that of the ECtHR, but also of the IACtHR. It 
is under obligation “[to] make appropriate orders to remedy the violation [...]”.730 Thus, the 
AfrCtHPR is not limited to the aspect of remedy of the consequence as is the IACtHR,731 but 
rather can issue orders that are aimed at correction of the violation of rights as such. Thus the 
AfrCtHPR is entitled to largely dictate the domestic implementation of the adjudicated 
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  Art. 63 I ACHR; Art. 41 ECHR; Art. 50 ECHR (current version); Art. 27 I. 
727
  Art. 63 I ACHR; Art. 41 ECHR; Art. 50 ECHR (current version); Art. 27 I. 
728
  Art. 41 ECHR; Art. 50 ECHR (current version). 
729
  Art. 63 I ACHR. 
730
  Art. 27 I. 
731
  In legal practice, however, the IACtHR exceeds this limitation and, among other things, organizes 
implementation measures that go beyond pure remedy of consequences. In the case of Alochoetoe vs. 
Suriname (Series C No. 15), for example, IACtHR has, in addition to the promise of pecuniary 
compensation, ruled that a school and a hospital be established in order to ensure that families of victims 
killed by Governmental troops will continue to be provided for in future. It also ordered Suriname to 
establish a foundation for the compensation amount to ensure the money is used usefully for the families of 
the victims and distributed as needed. 
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obligations. Also, in this respect, the AfrCtHPR is superior in competence to its two regional 
sister institutions. 
The competence to pronounce a judgement, however, only describes a partial aspect of the 
power of a judiciary organ. Equally essential are the mechanisms that ensure that the rulings 
are actually carried out. The legal force of the rulings732 and the obligations of the concerned 
member states to carry them out733, as conventionally anchored in all systems, are not 
sufficient in light of the international enforcement deficit. All conventions therefore have 
provisions made for implementation controls, but these appear to be arranged differently: the 
IACtHR signs with sole responsibility for the supervision of the ruling enforcement. It is 
bound and at the same time limited to inform the OAS of the cases in which a judged member 
state has not met its obligation of enforcement in its annual reports from the general 
assembly.734 The supervision of the ruling of the ECtHR, in contrast, takes place on the 
political level by the Minister Committee.735 In contrast to the regulations of the ACHR, there 
is no provision for an individual follow-up system for the ECtHR. 
For the rulings of the AfrCtHPR, both approaches are combined: the Minister Council of the 
AU (EMC) is given the task according to Art. 29 II to ensure the ruling is enforced by the 
convicted contractual state. At the same time, the AfrCtHPR is obliged to present a report to 
the annual general assembly of the AU, which must give information as to whether a 
convicted state has not met its obligations of iplemenation. This is where the special nature of 
the African system lies. The enforcement of the ruling is not only supervised by a political 
instance; the Court itself is substantially involved in the enforcement control. This supervision 
mechanism by the ECM on the one hand and the Court on the other should make it 
significantly difficult for the ECM to allow breeches of contract to go unmentioned in favour 
of diplomatic considerations or not be pursued to the full extent. In its supervision, the ECM 
must constantly expect the Court to submit a different assessment of the state of 
implementation to the general assembly. The supervision control by the Court should 
therefore also have an objectifying effect on the work of the ECM and make its supervision 
more effective if it does not want to see it subject to the reproach of the AfrCtHPR that it is 
not fulfilling its supervisory duty. Inasmuch, the AfrCtHPR does not only supervise the actual 
implementation by the verdicted member states, but also the supervisory function of the 
                                                 
732
  Art. 44 ECHR; Art. 52 ECHR (current version); Art. 67 ECHR; Art. 28 II. 
733
  Art. 68 I ACHR; Art. 46 I ECHR; Art. 53 ECHR (current version).; Art. 29. 
734
  Art. 65 ACHR. 
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  Art. 54 ECHR (current version); Art. 46 II ECHR. 
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ECM. This interlacing of the protection systems sounds convincing at least “on paper”, and is 
certainly advantageous in comparison to the more restrictive methods of ruling supervision of 
the IACtHR and the ECtHR. One may hope that even convicted contractual states can be 
convinced of this, yet it appears in no way assured in light of the so far widespread resistance 
to implementation relating to recommendations from the commission. 
II. Institutional classification 
While the institutional scope of the AfrCtHPR largely follows the example of the IACtHR, 
the contractual protection institutions AfrCHPR and AfrCtHPR have a unique relationship to 
each other. 
1. On the institutional scope of the AfrCtHPR 
With the modification of the ECtHR by the 11th Supplementary Protocol, the European 
human rights protection system has left the traditional path of the dual approach of the 
protection system and introduced a full-time court for the protection of human rights that is 
undoubtedly the most advanced of its kind. Therefore, only the ECtHR in its original form is 
comparable with the institutional scope of the AfrCtHPR. Nevertheless, specific 
organizational elements of the ECtHR are not found in the protocol. Instead, the 
organizational regulations for the AfrCtHPR show a distinct orientation to the ACHR. While 
the number of judges in the ECtHR is the same as that of the contractual states of the Council 
of Europe, only eleven judge positions are provided for in the AfrCtHPR, which in proportion 
to the number of the states in the parent organization is equivalent to the IACtHR, which has 
seven judges. From this follows the next similarity of the two Courts of Justice, which 
distinguishes them from the original ECtHR: the large number of judges with the ECtHR led 
to it being divided in different chambers,736 while both the IACtHR and the AfrCtHPR are 
intended as one-chamber courts.737 Also, the tenure of office for African judges follows the 
example of IACtHR with only six years,738 where nine years have been prescribed for judges 
on the ECtHR.739 Likewise, the ACHR is equivalent to the form of the protocol on the 
selection of judges. While the ECHR almost entirely does away with this field of regulation, 
                                                 
736
  Art. 43 ECHR (current version). 
737
  Art. 56 ACHR; Art. 23. 
738
  Art. 54 I ACHR; Art. 15. 
739
  Art. 40 I ECHR (current version). 
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the ACHR and the protocol specify the modalities of selection in detail.740 What is 
remarkably advanced in this context, however, is the stress of the protocol on the ensuring of 
gender equality both in the nomination and the selection process.741 
2. The relationship of the commission to the Court 
The relationship of the human rights commissions to the respective courts of human rights 
significantly characterizes the protection system and the possibilities of its development. 
While a clear, yet rigid relationship between the two protective institutions underlies both the 
ACHR and the ECHR (current version), the protocol appears more nebulous, yet also more 
flexible in this regard. 
This becomes clear when one looks at the procedural law function of the IACHR and the 
former ECHR. This is, or was, limited to performing the preliminary proceedings before the 
court procedure and, where necessary, to the forwarding of claims to the Court. The 
commissions should primarily be trial courts and conduct an initial legal appraisal of the 
claim. At the same time, the commission procedure has a conciliatory element to it, since it is 
aimed at bringing about an amicable settlement. These functions of the commissions find their 
procedural nature in the strict necessity of their pre-trial use as an admissibility criterion for 
legal proceedings before the court. Only a successfully concluded commission procedure 
opens the way to the Court, the consequence being an immanent interweaving of both bodies, 
which is intractably anchored in the convention. While the multi-phased nature of the 
protection system resulting from this leads to a clear distribution of responsibility and duties, 
it also leads to considerable procedural redundancy,742 thus hindering a dynamic development 
of the system. This becomes particularly clear if one bears in mind that the institutional 
complexity of the former ECHR has been seen as a significant inhibiting factor in the 
effectiveness of the European protection system,743 which could only be eliminated by 
completely reforming the ECHR. 
If one looks at the specifications of the protocol for the AfrCtHPR, one sees a completely 
different picture, which leaves all possibilities of development open. In the new protection 
system, both bodies – the AfrCHPR and the AfrCtHPR – work alongside and entangled with 
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  Art. 53 ACHR; Art. 12, 13, 14. 
741
  Art. 12 I, 14 II. 
742
  Comp. Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 195 with regard to 
the Inter-American system, who states that “it may be arguable that the tardiness of proceedings under the 
[American] Convention may, in itself, be a denial of Justice to individual petitioners”.  
743
  Volker Schlette, Das neue Rechtsschutzsystem der europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, in: ZaöRV 56 
(1996), pp. 905-976; 917. 
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each other. The protocol does not lead to a clear distribution of duties, however. Quite the 
opposite: the responsibilities of both bodies, both regarding the individual adjudicates and the 
interpretation work by assessment, are practically identical, even if the Court has been 
equipped with a somewhat broader scope of competence. This does involve the risk of 
redundancy and overlapping of responsibilities, yet the two institutions could independently 
counter this by coordinating the performance of their competences with each other. 
The essential element of the new protection system, however, is the institutional 
independence of both bodies. This is achieved by doing without adopting the concluded 
Commission procedure as an admissibility prerequisite for a complaint procedure before the 
Court. This is also where the most remarkable difference lies from the two other regional 
pacts, in which, as illustrated, the legal procedure is – or was in the case of the ECtHR – only 
possible after performing Commission preliminary proceedings. The overlapping of 
responsibilities of both African protection bodies is therefore remarkably high. Structurally, 
however, their institutional interweaving remains very low. 
III. On the further development of the system 
These statutory specifications put both protection bodies in the position to dynamize the 
African protection system on their own and thus catch up with the already established 
systems. In their collaboration, they can mostly do without a procedural interweaving and 
avert conflicts of competence. 
Until such time as direct access to the court is opened to individual complainants by 
ratification of the facultative clause, the commission first has an essential activation role, 
since only this way can individual claims be checked by the court. In light of the fact that 
state claims are not expected in the foreseeable future, it is the commission upon which the 
effectiveness of the Court’s work, the scope of its jurisdiction and thus its international weight 
depend, especially in the first years after its inauguration. Already in this development phase, 
the protection system under the Banjul Charter appears extremely promising, the more so 
given that the AfrCHPR can transfer an individual coplaint procedure to the AfrCtHPR and 
thus bring about a final ruling without having to complete its own proceedings. 
The dynamization of the system sets in as soon as the AfrCHPR withdraws from its protective 
function, once it has “pushed” the new system. Then, there remains no room for it any longer 
in the scope of the claims procedure, as long as the Court has established original competence 
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ratione personae for individual claims by ratification of the facultative clause. The AfrCHPR 
is then only of very indirect relevance to the procedure,744 its active participation, on the other 
hand, is procedurally no longer necessary. As a consequence, there will be a low-resource, 
protection-boosting single phase of the protection system before the AfrCtHPR, in contrats to 
the two other regional pacts where the procedural association of the institutions and the rigid 
multi-phase nature of the system hinder such a development. 
When the initialization phase is over and the AfrCHPR has done its duty, by transferred 
procedure, to put the AfrCtHPR in the position to bind contracting states by a ruling, it should 
be clear to these states that the ratification of the facultative clause is no longer a great 
concession, but brings with it a gain of image. States have so far been reluctant to accept 
unrestricted individual direct access to the court, while they perceived the option for making 
claims with the AfrCHPR as less intervening.  
It is up to the Commission to make it clear that this is a false impression. Especially in the 
beginning phase, the cooperation of commission and Court is therefore essential. If the wrong 
path is taken here, and the commission insists upon its responsibilities and does not include 
the Court accordingly, this will have fatal effects on the development of the protection 
system. The Court could then require as much time as the commission until it can work more 
or less successfully. 
The potential for problems in such institutional cooperation can be seen in the Inter-American 
protection system. There, too, the IACHR functions primarily as an independent protection 
body, and a Court was adjuncted upon the entry into force of the ACHR. Since the IACtHR 
can exclusively process transferred procedures, it is even more dependent on cooperation with 
the commission than the AfrCtHPR. The IACHR, however, is still extremely reticent on 
forwarding processes.745 From the part of the Court, it has already been voiced that this must 
be connected with a certain protectiveness of the commission, which must be defending its 
competences.746 Even in the earlier ECHR regime, it was rumoured that the commission 
                                                 
744
  This is especially true for complaints by NGO’s since these must have observer status before the 
Commission in order to file a suit, Art. 5 III. 
745
  The inter-American commission achieved an average of 500 petitions per year; cf. Cecilai Medina, The 
Inter-American Comission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: elections of a 
Joint Veture, in: IIRQ 12 (1990), pp. 439-464, 448. In the first ten years of its existence, only four claims 
made it through to the Court, one of which Costa Rica lodged against itself. Only from 1998 this practice of 
the commission seems to have slightly changed. Until today, however, the Court has only been able to 
decide upon 61 proceedings; comp. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index_serie_c_ing.html. 
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  Comp. the statements of former judges Buergenthal, Nikken, Tovar and Nieto in the interview with Lynda 
Frost, The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Refections of Present and Former 
Judges, in: IIRQ 14 (1992), pp. 171-205, 177 et seq; comp. also Scott Davidson, The Inter-American 
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wanted to “starve out”747 the Court in that it presented no more cases to it. Such a 
development should be avoided in Africa if one wishes to achieve effective positioning of the 
new protection system. 
Especially the relatively small quantity of cases compared to the other regional protective 
courts requires the cooperative treatment of these claims so that the new Court can position 
itself.748 Moreover, it would be unreasonable for the AfrCHPR to exploit the legal content of 
a complaint it has received and hazard the consequence that its finding – as usual – remain 
unheard by the addressee while at the same time a legal procedure before the AfrCtHPR is 
available that considerably increases the chances for the implementation of the legal decision.  
However, the conduct of the Commission during the entire development process towards the 
protocol does not give the impression that it does not shut itself off from the redistribution of 
duties illustrated here: it championed vehemently – if unsuccessfully – for a direct access to 
be possible for individual complainants without obligatory declaration. In all of its regular 
meetings, in the scope of the state reporting procedure, the state delegations were explicitly 
called upon to ratify the protocol as soon as possible, if they have not yet done so. Quite 
inquisitively, it is demanded what reasons exist for non-ratification. In nearly every final 
resolution, participants are reminded to ratify soon, and the existing contractual states are 
positively mentioned for their participation.749 This raises hope for the full cooperation of the 
Commission, even though it accepts its own loss of importance in the long term. 
Conflicts of competence and work redundancy can incidentally be most easily avoided if the 
commission counters them with retraction. If such a clear distribution of work can be 
achieved, this has the great advantage for the AfrCHPR that it can fulfil its promotional 
function significantly more intensively. Resources – especially time – would be freed up, 
                                                 
Human Rights System, Dartmouth 1997, p 192, underscoring the “strong frustrations” of the judges in this 
concern. 
747
  Norbert Engel, Status, Ausstattung und Personalhoheit des Inter-Amerikanischen und Europäischen 
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, in: EuGRZ 30 (2003) 4-6, pp. 122-133, p. 131. 
748
  In this sense, also the self-appraisal of the ICJ: “in reality, the future of the Court depends on the extent of 
recourse to it by states." International Court (Ed), The International Court. Questions and Answers about 
the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations, p. 68. 
749
  Comp. only the resolution on the ratification of the protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ rights of 16 May 2002. Comp. in 
this context also the press release of the AfrCHPR on the occasion of the coming into effect of the Protocol 
of 23/01/04, in which it is stated, inter alia “The African Commission is pleased with this memorable 
advent and hails the significant contribution it has received from the States Parties and the community of 
the defenders of human rights, who spared no efforts to move forward the process of formulation, adoption 
and ratification of this invaluable instrument.” The contractual states of the Banjul-Charta were called upon 
to ratify: “The African Committee on Human and Peoples’ Rights makes an urgent appeal to the States 
Parties that have not yet ratified the said Protocol to do so as expeditiously as possible in order to give this 
important human rights protection instrument a truly pan-African scope”. 
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which it could use for intensifying state reporting, conducting state investigations or 
promoting civil society projects. 
What the new protection system will surely not be able to do to a great extent is to create 
individual justice. The system is still not powerful enough for that. Moreover, it can only 
concern working towards a protection system that unfolds its effectiveness even apart from 
the direct utilization of the protective bodies. The primary duty of the protective system is 
therefore to create a coherence of human rights and congruence of standards in its sphere of 
influence that has an orientating effect. The high regard of the Court and its findings of justice 
shall contribute towards a human rights concept and standardization being implemented in the 
African system. 
Flanked by the constitutive changes to the African regional organization, the institutional 
expansion by addition of the Court is a significant improvement on the African human rights 






This thesis focuses on the establishment and operation of the latest regional Human Rights Court: 
The African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights.  
For the development of human rights protection mechanisms within regional organizations the 
governments of the member states are of special relevance. They pull the strings to either foster 
and develop a system or to disrupt it. Therefore, following a brief historical introduction, the first 
chapter gives an overview of the regional African organization, the former Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and today’s African Union (AU) which was instrumental in the 
establishment of the African Human Rights System and has now enhanced it by adding a judicial 
authority.  
However, it will become clear that is has taken a long time for the OAU to put human rights 
violations within the borders of its own member states on its agenda: Not until there was 
increasing international pressure due to never-ending excrescences of violence in the dictatorial 
regimes in Africa did the OAU carefully attend to this matter in the late 1970s. Its efforts 
culminated in the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
eponymous Banjul Charter) which entered into force in 1981. The body for the protection created 
by the Charter was the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights which took up its 
function in 1987. 
Since the newly established African Court is not supposed to replace the Commission but rather 
to strengthen it, the Court operates in concert with the Commission. Therefore the old protection 
system will still be applicable which deems a portrayal of the system in the following chapter 
necessary. Here, it will be outlined, that the competences of the Commission remain very limited 
and that its judicial impact on the State parties involved in its protection procedures has been 
nearly nil up to this very day. 
Against this background the next chapter focuses on the Protocol to the Banjul-Charter 
establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. First, the historical-political 
background and the protocol’s juridical formulation process are examined. Here it will be shown 
that the end of global bipolarity has had a remarkable impact on the political protagonists in 
Africa with the effect that the increasing demands for a human rights Court within the OAU no 
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longer remained completely unheard. It will also be outlined that the path towards the adoption 
of the protocol has been long and difficult.  
After a short survey of the organisational structure of the Court it will become clear that the 
protocol follows to a large extend its Inter-American counterpart concerning the institutional 
embodiment. However, a remarkable and, in international comparison, a unique achievement has 
also been achieved by the institutional regulations by making gender equality has one of the key 
issues to encompass when it comes to the nomination and election of judges.  
The following chapters outline the jurisdiction of the Court and the judicial process before the 
Court. In this connection the admissibility criteria will be highlighted in which two remarkable 
regulations stand out: First, it will become clear that in contrast to other regional human rights 
courts individuals and NGOs alike are entitled to file a complaint with the African Court (even 
though initially with the help of the Commission, since the protocol makes the complaint 
authority of individuals and NGOs dependent of a special declaration of acceptance of the State 
Parties concerned). Moreover, also unique compared to international two-tier human rights 
procedures, the protocol does not include a provision according to which a complainant would be 
obliged to go through a prior Commission procedure before filing a complaint with the Court. 
Individual complainants rather have direct access to the Court once a declaration of acceptance 
has been submitted by a State Party to the protocol.   
Following short remarks on the competence of the Court to issue provisional measures which, 
among other things, reveal that these measures have, in contrast to those of the ECtHR, binding 
effect the procedural termination of a complaint comes into focus. Here, the possible contents of 
the rulings and the control mechanisms for their implementation are being contemplated in a 
detailed fashion. This last aspect most probably will have great influence on the fate of the Court 
since the Commission for its part had to a large extent no success due to the fact that it had no 
conventional implementation procedures to rely on. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases the 
findings of the Commission trailed off without any State Party concerned paying any attention to 
it.  
The drafters of the protocol establishing the Court obviously have learned this lesson since the 
protocol provides for a quite remarkable implementation mechanism that may be able to impose 
political and legal pressure alike on State Parties if the Court deems that they have not properly 
complied with a Court’s ruling. Even sanctions within the African Union against a recusant State 
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come into question from a legal point of view – a quantum leap regarding the legal situation 
under the Banjul Charter.  
The last chapter rehearses the main findings of the thesis and concludes with a positive outlook 
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AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS  
PREAMBLE 
The African States members of the Organisation of African Unity, parties to the present Convention entitled 
“African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary 
Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of “a preliminary draft on an 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote 
and protect human and peoples’ rights”;  
Considering the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, which stipulates that “freedom, equality, justice 
and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples”;  
Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all forms of 
colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the 
peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which 
should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples’ rights;  
Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attitudes of human beings, which 
justifies their international protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of peoples’ rights should 
necessarily guarantee human rights;  
Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of 
everyone;  
Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to development and that civil 
and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well 
as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment 
of civil and political rights;  
Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are still struggling for 
their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, 
zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and all forms of discrimination, language, religion 
or political opinions;  
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles of human and peoples’ rights and freedoms contained in the 
declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, the Movement 
of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations;  
Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and freedoms and taking into 
account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa;  








PART 1  
RIGHTS AND DUTIES  
CHAPTER 1  
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS  
  
ARTICLE 1  
The Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, parties to the present Charter shall recognise the 
rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures 
to give effect to them.  
ARTICLE 2  
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the 
present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any status.  
ARTICLE 3  
1. Every individual shall be equal before the law  
2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law  
ARTICLE 4  
Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his 
person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.  
ARTICLE 5  
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the 
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave 
trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.  
ARTICLE 6  
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his 
freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily 
arrested or detained.  
ARTICLE 7  
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises:  
a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as 
recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force;  
b) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal;  
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c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;  
d) The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.  
2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the 
time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time 
it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.  
ARTICLE 8  
Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to 
law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms.  
ARTICLE 9 
1 Every individual shall have the right to receive information.  
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.  
ARTICLE 10  
1. Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law.  
2. Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in Article 29, no one may be compelled to join an 
association.  
ARTICLE 11  
Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject 
only to necessary restrictions provided for by law, in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, 
the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.  
ARTICLE 12 
1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State 
provided he abides by the law.  
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country.  
This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law 
and order, public health or morality.  
3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in 
accordance with the law of those countries and international conventions.  
4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled 
from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.  
5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at 
national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.  
ARTICLE 13  
1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or 
through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.  
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2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of the country.  
3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all persons 
before the law.  
ARTICLE 14  
The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in 
the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.  
ARTICLE 15  
Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive 
equal pay for equal work.  
ARTICLE 16  
1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.  
2. State Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and 
to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick  
ARTICLE 17  
1. Every individual shall have the right to education  
2. Every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his community.  
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the community shall be the 
duty of the State.  
ARTICLE 18  
1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take 
care of its physical health and moral. 
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values 
recognized by the community. 
3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection 
of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.  
4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their 
physical or moral needs.  
ARTICLE 19  
All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall 
justify the domination of a people by another.  
ARTICLE 20  
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-
determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social 
development according to the policy they have freely chosen.  
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2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by 
resorting to any means recognized by the international community.  
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties to the present Charter in their liberation 
struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural.  
ARTICLE 21  
1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the 
exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.  
2 In case of spoilation, the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well 
as to an adequate compensation.  
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of 
promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles 
of international  law.  
4. State Parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of 
their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African Unity and solidarity.  
5. State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign exploitation particularly 
that practised by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages 
derived from their national resources.  
Article 22  
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their 
freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.  
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.  
ARTICLE 23  
1. All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. The principles of solidarity 
and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the 
Organisation of African Unity shall govern relations between States.  
2. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, State Parties to the present Charter 
shall ensure that:  
a) any individual enjoying the right of asylum under Article 12 of the present Charter shall not engage in 
subversive activities against his country of origin or any other State Party to the present Charter;  
b) their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any other 
State Party to the present Charter.  
ARTICLE 24  
All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.  
ARTICLE 25  
State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education and 
publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these 
freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood.  
241 
 
ARTICLE 26  
State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall 
allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and 
protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.  
CHAPTER 2 
DUTIES  
ARTICLE 27   
1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognised 
communities and the international community.  
2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, 
collective security, morality and common interest.  
ARTICLE 28  
Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to 
maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.  
ARTICLE 29  
The individual shall also have the duty:  
1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the 
family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need.  
2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service;  
3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is;  
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is strengthened;  
5 To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of his country and to 
contribute to his defence in accordance with the law;  
6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the 
society;  
7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the 
society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of 
the moral well being of society;  
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of 
African unity.  
PART 11  
MEASURES OF SAFEGUARD  
CHAPTER 1  
242 
 
ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANISATION OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON  HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS  
ARTICLE 30  
An African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, hereinafter called “the Commission”, shall be 
established within the Organisation of African Unity to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their 
protection in Africa.  
ARTICLE 31  
1. The Commission shall consist of eleven members chosen from amongst African personalities of the highest 
reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and 
peoples’ rights; particular consideration being given to personshaving legal experience.  
2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity.  
ARTICLE 32  
The Commission shall not include more than one national of the same State.  
ARTICLE 33  
The members of the Commission shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, from a list of persons nominated by the State Parties to the present Charter.  
ARTICLE 34  
Each State Party to the present Charter may not nominate more than two candidates. The candidates must have 
the nationality of one of the State Parties to the present Charter. When two candidates are nominated by a State, 
one of them may not be a national of that State.  
ARTICLE 35  
1. The Secretary General of he Organisation of African Unity shall invite State Parties to the present Charter at 
least four months before the elections to nominate candidates;  
2. The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall make an alphabetical list of the persons 
thus nominated and communicate it to the Heads of State and Government at least one month before the 
elections;  
ARTICLE 36  
The members of the Commission shall be elected for a six year period and shall be eligible for re-election. 
However, the term of office of four of the members elected at the first election shall terminate after two years 
and the term of office of three others, at the end of four years.  
ARTICLE 37 
Immediately after the first election, the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
Organisation of African Unity shall draw lots to decide the names of those members referred to in Article 36.  
ARTICLE 38  
After their election, the members of the Commission shall make a solemn declaration to discharge their duties 
impartially and faithfully.  
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ARTICLE 39  
1. In case of death or resignation of a member of the Commission, the Chairman of the Commission shall 
immediately inform the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, who shall declare the seat 
vacant from the date of death or from the date on which the resignation takes effect.  
2. If, in the unanimous opinion of other members of the Commission, a member has stopped discharging his 
dutiesfor any reason other than a temporary absence, the Chairman of the Commission shall inform the 
Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, who shall then declare the seat vacant. 
3. In each of the cases anticipated above, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall replace the 
member whose seat became vacant for the remaining period of his term, unless the period is less than six 
months.  
ARTICLE 40  
Every member of the Commission shall be in office until the date his successor assumes office.  
ARTICLE 41  
The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall appoint the Secretary of the Commission. He 
shall provide the staff and services necessary for the effective discharge of the duties of the Commission. The 
Organisation of African Unity shall bear cost of the staff and services.  
ARTICLE 42  
1. The Commission shall elect its Chairman and Vice Chairman for a two-year period. They shall be eligible 
for re-election.  
2. The Commission shall lay down its rules of procedure.  
3. Seven members shall form the quorum.  
4. In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.  
5. The Secretary General may attend the meetings of the Commission. He shall neither participate in 
deliberations nor shall he be entitled to vote. The Chairman of the Commission may, however, invite him to 
speak.  
ARTICLE 43  
In discharging their duties, members of the Commission shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities 
provided for in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation of African Unity.  
ARTICLE 44  
Provision shall be made for the emoluments and allowances of the members of the Commission in the Regular 
Budget of the Organisation of African Unity.  
CHAPTER II  
MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION  
ARTICLE 45  
The functions of the Commission shall be:  
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1. To promote human and peoples’ rights and in particular:  
a) to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and 
peoples’ rights, organise seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and 
local institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights and, should the case arise, give its views or make 
recommendations to Governments.  
b) to formulae and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and 
peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African Governments may base their legislation.  
c) cooperate with other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of 
human and peoples’ rights.  
2. Ensure the protection of human and peoples’ rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter.  
3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State Party, an institution of the OAU or 
an African Organisation recognised by the OAU.  
4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.  
CHAPTER 111  
PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION  
ARTICLE 46  
The Commission may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; it may hear from the Secretary General 
of the Organisation of African Unity or any other person capable of enlightening it.  
COMMUNICATION FROM STATES  
ARTICLE 47  
If a State Party to the present Charter has good reasons to believe that another State Party to this Charter has 
violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written communication, the attention of that State to the 
matter. This Communication shall also be addressed to the Secretary General of the OAU and to the Chairman 
of the Commission. Within three months of the receipt of the Communication, the State to which the 
Communication is addressed shall give the enquiring State, written explanation or statement elucidating the 
matter. This should include as much as possible, relevant information relating to the laws and rules of 
procedure applied and applicable and the redress already given or course of action available.  
ARTICLE 48  
If within three months from the date on which the original communication is received by the State to which it is 
addressed, the issue is not settled to the satisfaction of the two States involved through bilateral negotiation or 
by any other peaceful procedure, either State shall have the right to submit the matter to the Commission 
through the Chairman and shall notify the other States involved.  
ARTICLE 49  
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 47, if a State Party to the present Charter considers that another State 
Party has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to the Commission by 
addressing a communication to the Chairman, to the Secretary General of the Organisation of African unity and 
the State concerned.  
ARTICLE 50  
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The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure that all local remedies, if they 
exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious to the Commission that the procedure of achieving these 
remedies would be unduly prolonged.  
ARTICLE 51  
1 The Commission may ask the State concerned to provide it with all relevant information.  
2. When the Commission is considering the matter, States concerned may be represented before it and submit 
written or oral representation.  
ARTICLE 52  
After having obtained from the States concerned and from other sources all the information it deems necessary 
and after having tried all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution based on the respect of human and 
peoples’ rights, the Commission shall prepare, within a reasonable period of time from the notification referred 
to in Article 48, a report to the States concerned and communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government.  
ARTICLE 53  
While transmitting its report, the Commission may make to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
such recommendations as it deems useful.  
ARTICLE 54  
The Commission shall submit to each Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government a 
report on its activities.  
ARTICLE 55  
1. Before each Session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the Communications other than 
those of State Parties to the present Charter and transmit them to Members of the Commission, who shall 
indicate which Communications should be considered by the Commission. 
2. A Communication shall be considered by the Commission if a simple majority of its members so decide. 
ARTICLE 56 
Communications relating to Human and Peoples’ rights referred to in Article 55 received by the Commission, 
shall be considered if they: 
1. Indicate their authors even if the latter requests anonymity, 
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organisation of Afri- can Unity or with the present Charter, 
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and its institutions 
or to the Organisation of African Unity, 
4. Are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media, 
5. Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged, 
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the 
Commission is seized with the matter, and 
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7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by those States involved in accordance with the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Or- ganisation of African Unity or the provisions of the 
present Charter. 
ARTICLE 57 
Prior to any substantive consideration, all communications shall be brought to the knowledge of the State 
concerned by the Chairman of the Commission. 
ARTICLE 58 
1. When it appears after deliberations of the Commission that one or more Communications apparently relate to 
special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples’ 
rights, the Commission shall draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to these 
special cases. 
2. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request the Commission to undertake an in-depth 
study of these cases and make a factual report, accompanied by its finding and recommendations. 
3. A case of emergency duly noticed by the Commission shall be submitted by the latter to the Chairman of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government who may request an in-depth study. 
ARTICLE 59 
1. All measures taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall remain confidential until the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide. 
2. However the report shall be published by the Chairman of the Commission upon the decision of he 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
3. The report on the activities of the Commission shall be published by its Chairman after it has been 
considered by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
CHAPTER IV 
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES 
ARTICLE 60  
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from 
the provisions of various African instruments on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other 
instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United 
Nations of which the Parties to the present Charter are members. 
ARTICLE 61  
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, 
other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognised by Member States of 
the Organisation of African Unity, African practices consistent with international norms on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognised by African States as 
well as legal precedents and doctrine. 
ARTICLE 62  
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Each State Party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the present Charter comes into force, 
a report on the legislative or other measures taken, with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms 
recognised and guaranteed by the present Charter. 
ARTICLE 63  
1. The present Charter shall be open to signature, ratification or adherence of the Member States of the 
Organisation of African Unity. 
2. The instruments of ratification or adherence to the present Charter shall be deposited with the Secretary 
General of the Organisation of African Unity. 
3. The present Charter shall come into force three months after the reception by the Secretary General of the 
instruments of ratification or adherence of a simple majority of the Member States of the Organisation of 
African Unity. 
PART 111  
GENERAL PROVISIONS  
ARTICLE 64  
1. After the coming into force of the present Charter, members of the Commission shall be elected in 
accordance with the relevant Articles of the present Charter. 
2. The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall convene the first meeting of the 
Commission at the Headquarters of the Organisation within three months of the constitution of the 
Commission. Thereafter, the Commission shall be convened by its Chairman whenever necessary but at least 
once a year. 
ARTICLE 65  
For each of the States that will ratify or adhere to the present Charter after its coming into force, the Charter 
shall take effect three months after the date of the deposit by that State of the instrument of ratification or 
adherence. 
ARTICLE 66 
Special protocols or agreements may, if necessary, supplement the provisions of the present Charter. 
ARTICLE 67 
The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall inform members of the Organisation of the 
deposit of each instrument of ratification or adherence. 
ARTICLE 68 
The present Charter may be amended if a State Party makes a written request to that effect to the Secretary 
General of the Organisation of African Unity. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may only 
consider the draft amendment after all the State Parties have been duly informed of it and the Commission has 
given its opinion on it at the request of the sponsoring State. The amendment shall be approved by a simple 
majority of the State Parties. It shall come into force for each State which has accepted it in accordance with its 




PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES` RIGHTS ON THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES` RIGHTS 
The Member States of the Organization of African Unity hereinafter referred to as the OAU, States Parties to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights. 
Considering that the Charter of the Organization of African Unity recognizes that freedom, equality, justice, 
peace and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African 
Peoples; 
Noting that the African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights reaffirms adherence to the principles of Human 
and Peoples` Rights, freedoms and duties contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments 
adopted by the Organization of African Unity, and other international organizations; 
Recognizing that the twofold objective of the African Commission on Human and Peoples` Rights is to ensure 
on the one hand promotion and on the other protection of Human and Peoples` Rights, freedom and duties; 
Recognizing further, the efforts of the African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights in the promotion and 
protection of Human and Peoples` Rights since its inception in 1987;  
Recalling resolution AHGéRes.230 (XXX) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 
June 1994 in Tunis, Tunisia, requesting the Secretary-General to convene a Government experts` meeting to 
ponder, in conjunction with the African Commission, over the means to enhance the efficiency of the African 
commission and to consider in particular the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples` Rights; 
Noting the first and second Government legal experts` meeting held respectively in Cape Town, South Africa 
(September, 1995) and Nouakchott, Mauritania (April 1997), and the third Government Legal Experts meeting 
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (December, 1997), which was enlarged to include Diplomats; 
Firmly convinced that the attainment of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights 
requires the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples` Rights to complement and reinforce the 
functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples` Rights. 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
Article 1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT 
There shall be established within the Organization of African Unity an African Court Human and Peoples` 
Rights hereinafter referred to as “the Court”, the organization, jurisdiction and functioning of which shall be 
governed by the present Protocol. 
Article 2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURT AND THE COMMISSION 
The Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the protective mandate of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples` Rights hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”, conferred 
upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights, hereinafter referred to as “the Charter”. 
Article 3 JURISDICTION  
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument 
ratified by the States concerned. 
 
2. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide. 
Article 4 ADVISORY OPINIONS  
1. At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, or any African organization 
recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any 
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other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a 
matter being examined by the Commission. 
 
2. The Court shall give reasons for its advisory opinions provided that every judge shall be entitled to deliver a 
separate of dissenting decision. 
Article 5 ACCESS TO THE COURT  
1. The following are entitled to submit cases to the Court: 
a) The Commission 
 
b) The State Party which had lodged a complaint to the Commission 
 
c) The State Party against which the complaint has been lodged at the Commission 
 
d) The State Party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation 
 
e) African Intergovernmental Organizations 
 
2. When a State Party has an interest in a case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to join. 
 
3. The Court may entitle relevant Non Governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the 
Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34 (6) of this 
Protocol. 
Article 6 ADMISSIBILITY OF CASES 
1. The Court, when deciding on the admissibility of a case instituted under article 5 (3) of this Protocol, may 
request the opinion of the Commission which shall give it as soon as possible. 
 
2. The Court shall rule on the admissibility of cases taking into account the provisions of article 56 of the 
Charter. 
 
3. The Court may consider cases or transfer them to the Commission. 
 
Article 7 SOURCES OF LAW 
The Court shall apply the provision of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by 
the States concerned. 
 
Article 8 CONSIDERATION OF CASES 
The Rules of Procedure of the Court shall lay down the detailed conditions under which the Court shall 
consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind the complementarity between the Commission and the Court. 
 
Article 9 AMICABLE SETTLEMENT 
The Court may try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter. 
Article 10 HEARINGS AND REPRESENTATION 
1. The Court shall conduct its proceedings in public. The Court may, however, conduct proceedings in camera 
as may be provided for in the Rules of Procedure. 
 
2. Any party to a case shall be entitled to be represented by a legal representative of the party’s choice. Free 
legal representation may be provided where the interests of justice so require. 
 
3. Any person, witness or representative of the parties, who appears before the Court, shall enjoy protection and 
all facilities, in accordance with international law, necessary for the discharging of their functions, tasks and 
duties in relation to the Court. 
 
Article 11 COMPOSITION  
1. The Court shall consist of eleven judges, nationals of Member States of the OAU, elected in an individual 
capacity from among jurists of high moral character and of recognized practical, judicial or academic 




2. No two judges shall be nationals of the same State. 
Article 12 NOMINATIONS  
1. States Parties to the Protocol may each propose up to three candidates, at least two of whom shall be 
nationals of that State. 
 
2. Due consideration shall be given to adequate gender representation in nomination process. 
Article 13 LIST OF CANDIDATES 
1. Upon entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary-general of the OAU shall request each State Party to the 
Protocol to present, within ninety (90) days of such a request, its nominees for the office of judge of the Court. 
 
2. The Secretary-General of the OAU shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the candidates nominated and 
transmit it to the Member States of the OAU at least thirty days prior to the next session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU hereinafter referred to as “the Assembly”. 
Article 14 ELECTIONS  
1. The judges of the Court shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly from the list referred to in Article 
13 (2) of the present Protocol. 
 
2. The Assembly shall ensure that in the Court as a whole there is representation of the main regions of Africa 
and of their principal legal traditions. 
 
3. In the election of the judges, the Assembly shall ensure that there is adequate gender representation. 
Article 15 TERM OF OFFICE 
1. The judges of the Court shall be elected for a period of six years and may be re-elected only once. The terms 
of four judges elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years, and the terms of four more judges 
shall expire at the end of four years. 
 
2. The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the initial periods of two and four years shall be chosen 
by lot to be drawn by the Secretary-General of the OAU immediately after the first election has been 
completed. 
 
3. A judge elected to replace a judge whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of 
the predecessor’s term. 
 
4. All judges except the President shall perform their functions on a part-time basis. However, the Assembly 
may change this arrangement as it deems appropriate. 
Article 16 OATH OF OFFICE 
After their election, the judges of the Court shall make a solemn declaration to discharge their duties 
impartially and faithfully. 
Article 17 INDEPENDENCE 
1. The independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in accordance with international law. 
 
2. No judge may hear any case in which the same judge has previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate 
for one of the parties or as a member of a national or international court or a commission of enquiry or in any 
other capacity. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by decision of the Court. 
 
3. The judges of the Court shall enjoy, from the moment of their election and throughout their term of office, 
the immunities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance with international law. 
 




Article 18 INCOMPATIBILITY 
The position of judge of the court is incompatible with any activity that might interfere with the independence 
or impartiality of such a judge or the demands of the office as determined in the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court. 
Article 19 CESSATION OF OFFICE 
1. A judge shall not be suspended or removed from office unless, by the unanimous decision of the other judges 
of the Court, the judge concerned has been found to be no longer fulfilling the required conditions to be a judge 
of the Court. 
 
2. Such a decision of the Court shall become final unless it is set aside by the Assembly at its next session. 
Article 20 VACANCIES 
1. In case of death or resignation of a judge of the Court, the President of the Court shall immediately inform 
the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of 
death or from the date on which the resignation takes effect. 
 
2. The Assembly shall replace the judge whose office became vacant unless the remaining period of the term is 
less than one hundred and eighty (180) days. 
 
3. The same procedure and considerations as set out in Articles 12, 13 and 14 shall be followed for the filling of 
vacancies. 
Article 21 PRESIDENCY OF THE COURT 
1. The Court shall elect its President and one Vice-President for a period of two years. They may be re-elected 
only once. 
 
2. The President shall perform judicial functions on a full-time basis and shall reside at the seat of the Court. 
 
3. The functions of the President and the Vice-President shall be set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
Article 22 EXCLUSION 
If the judge is a national of any State which is a party to a case submitted to the Court, that judge shall not hear 
the case. 
Article 23 QUORUM 
The Court shall examine cases brought before it, if it has a quorum of at least seven judges. 
Article 24 REGISTRY OF THE COURT 
1. The Court shall appoint its own Registrar and other staff of the registry from among nationals of Member 
States of the OAU according to the Rules of Procedure. 
 
2. The office and residence of the Registrar shall be at the place where the Court has its seat. 
Article 25 SEAT OF THE COURT 
1. The Court shall have its seat at the place determined by the Assembly from among States parties to this 
Protocol. However, it may convene in the territory of any Member State of the OAU when the majority of the 
Court considers it desirable, and with the prior consent of the State concerned. 
 
2. The seat of the Court may be changed by the Assembly after due consultation with the Court. 
Article 26 EVIDENCE 
1. The Court shall hear submissions by all parties and if deemed necessary, hold an enquiry. The States 
concerned shall assist by providing relevant facilities for the efficient handling of the case.  
 
2. The Court may receive written and oral evidence including expert testimony and shall make its decision on 
the basis of such evidence. 
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Article 27 FINDINGS 
1. If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ rights, it shall make appropriate orders 
to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.  
 
2. In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Court 
shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary. 
Article 28 JUDGMENT 
1. The Court shall render its judgment within ninety (90) days of having completed its deliberations. 
 
2. The judgment of the Court decided by majority shall be final and not subject to appeal. 
 
3. Without prejudice to sub-article 2 above, the Court may review its decision in the light of new evidence 
under conditions to be set out in the Rules of Procedure. 
 
4. The Court may interpret its own decision. 
 
5. The judgment of the Court shall be read in open court, due notice having been given to the parties. 
 
6. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the Court. 
 
7. If the judgment of the court does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous decision of the judges, any 
judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate or dissenting opinion. 
Article 29 NOTIFICATION OF JUDGMENT 
1. The parties to the case shall be notified of the judgment of the Court and it shall be transmitted to the 
Member States of the OAU and the Commission. 
 
2. The Council of Ministers shall also be notified of the judgment and shall monitor its execution on behalf of 
the Assembly. 
 
Article 30 EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT 
The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are 
parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution. 
Article 31 REPORT 
The Court shall submit to each regular session of the Assembly, a report on its work during the previous year. 
The report shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a State has not complied with the Court’s judgment. 
Article 32 BUDGET 
Expenses of the Court, emoluments and allowances for judges and the budget of its registry, shall be 
determined and borne by the OAU, in accordance with criteria laid down by the OAU in consultation with the 
Court. 
Article 33 RULES OF PROCEDURE 
The Court shall draw up its Rules and determine its own procedures. The Court shall consult the Commission 
as appropriate. 
Article 34 RATIFICATION 
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and ratification or accession by any State Party to the Charter. 
 
2. The instrument of ratification or accession to the present Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the OAU. 
 
3. The Protocol shall come into force thirty days after fifteen instruments of ratification or accession have been 
deposited. 
 
4. For any State Party ratifying or acceding subsequently, the present Protocol shall come into force in respect 
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of that State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession. 
 
5. The Secretary-General of the OAU shall inform all Member States of the entry into force of the present 
Protocol. 
 
6. At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State shall make a declaration 
accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under article 5 (3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not 
receive any petition under article 5 (3) involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration. 
 
7. Declarations made under sub-article (6) above shall be deposited with the Secretary-General, who shall 
transmit copies thereof to the State parties. 
 
Article 35 AMENDMENTS 
1. The present Protocol may be amended if a State Party to the Protocol makes a written request to that effect to 
the Secretary-General of the OAU. The Assembly may adopt, by simple majority, the draft amendment after all 
the State Parties to the present Protocol have been duly informed of it and the Court has given its opinion on 
the amendment. 
 
2. The Court shall also be entitled to propose such amendments to the present Protocol as it may deem 
necessary, through the Secretary-General of the OAU. 
 
3. The amendment shall come into force for each State Party which has accepted it thirty days after the 
Secretary-General of the OAU has received notice of the acceptance. 
 
 
